



U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY AFTER ONE YEAR

*Perspectives from Allies, Partners,
and across the Indo-Pacific*





EAST-WEST CENTER

The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the U.S. Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The East-West Center in Washington advances U.S.-Indo-Pacific relations by creating innovative content, publications, exchanges, and outreach activities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| INTRODUCTION | 2 |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 3 |
| U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: EXCERPTS FROM U.S. OFFICIALS | 4 |
| PERSPECTIVES FROM ALLIES, PARTNERS, & ACROSS THE INDO-PACIFIC | 11 |
| EWC INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY SURVEY | 31 |
| ANNEX | 34 |
| ▶ Keynote Remarks from U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy at One Year Conferences | |
| 1. U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink Keynote Remarks in Washington, D.C. | |
| 2. U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink Remarks in Honolulu | |
| 3. U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Camille P. Dawson Keynote Remarks in Jakarta | |
| 4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Director General of Asia-Pacific and Africa Abdul Kadir Jailani Keynote Remarks in Jakarta | |
| SPECIAL ASIA PACIFIC BULLETIN SERIES ON INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY | 47 |
| ASIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA INITIATIVE | 48 |



INTRODUCTION

During 2023, the East-West Center, with support from the U.S. Department of State, held a series of three closed-door conferences in Washington, D.C.; Honolulu; and Jakarta, at which U.S. allies, partners, friends, and American experts and government officials provided their insights and perspectives on U.S. policy and implementation with respect to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). These convenings were held to provide updates from U.S. officials on how IPS has progressed, and for American audiences to listen to and gain insights from Indo-Pacific stakeholders regarding how they perceive and assess U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The first section of this report includes excerpts from remarks given by U.S. government officials at the three conferences, sharing U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy priorities and updates on how the strategy has been implemented since its release in February 2022. Transcripts of keynote remarks delivered by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink, Deputy Assistant Secretary Camille Dawson, and Director General of Asia-Pacific and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Abdul Kadir Jailani can be found in the annex of this publication.

“Perspectives from Allies, Partners, and across the Indo-Pacific” is a summary of discussion points raised at each of the three conferences, held under the Chatham House Rule, by experts and officials from Northeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. The views shared in this report are those of the conference participants, and do not reflect the views of the East-West Center or of the U.S. Department of State.

Also in this report is a survey conducted by the East-West Center of expert opinion on U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy to supplement the views shared by experts at the three conferences. The survey covers a range of topics, including an overview of the United States and the Indo-Pacific, national and regional security, regional organizations, and economic growth, as well as a section on the 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States.

In addition to remarks delivered by high-level officials, the annex to this publication provides further resources to learn more about Indo-Pacific and European views on Indo-Pacific Strategy, including a special series of the East-West Center’s *Asia Pacific Bulletin* articles, and links to the East-West Center’s *Asia Matters for America* initiative website and publications, which map the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and the Indo-Pacific at the national, state, and local levels.

This report is also intended as a resource for the students selected to take part in the East-West Center’s “U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Educational Toolkit,” which imparts knowledge of the principles and aims of U.S. Indo-Pacific policy through a series of online curriculum and discussion modules. Students taking part in the online training program were invited to be observers at the conferences and to engage with U.S. officials and Indo-Pacific experts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The East-West Center gives sincere thanks to the U.S. Department of State for sponsoring and partnering in this yearlong, multifaceted effort focused on U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. I especially wish to acknowledge our excellent cooperation with Della Hareland in every aspect of this effort in coordination with the many officials who contributed from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

I wish to thank the ambassadors, officials, and many experts from the United States and from across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond who participated in our series of conferences to share their valuable insights. We are truly grateful to Dr. Dino Djalal and his team at the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia for convening an outstanding conference in Jakarta with representation from across Southeast Asia. EWC Director of the Pacific Islands Development Program Dr. Mary Hattori and her team also organized a brilliant conference in Honolulu convening stakeholders from across the Pacific Islands region. Coordination of the conference in Washington, D.C., was led by EWC Program Manager Ross Tokola and EWC Programs Coordinator Latoya “Toya” Jackson with significant support from my Executive Assistant Aing-On Sliwa and from the entirety of the East-West Center in Washington office.

Ross Tokola wrote “Perspectives from Allies, Partners, and across the Indo-Pacific” based on insights shared at all three conferences and led preparation of this report through to publication. EWC Program Manager Amy Namur wrote “EWC Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey” and led coordination of the survey. EWC Program Manager Abigail Hull and EWC Programs Coordinator Aryan D’Rozario led coordination and development of the “U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Educational Toolkit” curriculum program with kind support from academics who acted as supervisors for the 60 students from 34 universities who took part in the curriculum program. EWC Programs Coordinator Lance Jackson led coordination of a special series of *Asia Pacific Bulletins* on Indo-Pacific Strategy. EWC Infographic and Design Specialist Jeanette Simmons designed all conference materials and this beautiful publication.

We hope that this report and its supplementary materials will be a valuable resource for those who wish to gain deeper insights into U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and how it is perceived and assessed by stakeholders from and beyond the Indo-Pacific region.



Dr. Satu Limaye

Vice President, East-West Center
Director, Research & East-West Center in Washington



U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: EXCERPTS FROM U.S. OFFICIALS


“The United States is an Indo-Pacific power. The region, stretching from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean, is home to more than half of the world’s people, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries. More members of the U.S. military are based in the region than in any other outside the United States. It supports more than 3 million American jobs and is the source of nearly \$900 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States. In the years ahead, as the region drives as much as two-thirds of global economic growth, its influence will only grow—as will its importance to the United States.”

[U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy](#)
February 2022

“The United States is demonstrating its leadership and commitment to the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing the region’s ability to address 21st-century challenges like climate change, and showing that we can build a better future together.”

“ASEAN is at the heart of this Indo-Pacific Strategy and ... we fundamentally, deeply, and with great commitment believe that a strong, resilient, empowered, independent, prosperous ASEAN that has high capacity is a public good.”

DO YOU CONSIDER THE UNITED STATES TO BE AN INDO-PACIFIC NATION?



Source: East-West Center, 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey

“ASEAN centrality is absolutely a fundamental principle of our approach to the region. And we keep ASEAN centrality in mind in all of our discussions about the Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

PILLAR 1 Advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

“Our Indo-Pacific Strategy is grounded in our foundational values that are universal and the belief that a successful and stable Indo-Pacific region is rooted in the rule of law, good governance, and the protection of human rights. These values are at the center of strategy and cut across all our efforts in the Indo-Pacific. We are working together with our allies and partners to ensure the region remains free and open by promoting human rights, rule of law, freedom of navigation, free and open media, and a vibrant civil society across the region.”

“Our vital interests and those of our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open Indo-Pacific requires that governments can make their own choices and that shared domains are governed lawfully. Our strategy begins with strengthening resilience, both within individual countries, as we have done in the United States, and among them. We will advance a free and open region, including by:

- Investing in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society
- Improving fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform
- Ensuring the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law
- Advancing common approaches to critical and emerging technologies, the internet, and cyber space”

[Fact Sheet: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022](#)

PILLAR 2 Build Connections within and beyond the Region

“No matter what challenges we face, our relationships are central. Our ability to tap into our wellspring of diplomatic bonds, our collaboration with partners abroad, and our investment in bilateral ties and the multilateral architecture—these are the underpinnings of strengthening our shared capacity and protecting our vision of the international order.”

The Quadrilateral Dialogue (the Quad)

The Quadrilateral Dialogue brings together Australia, Japan, India, and the United States in a grouping that is committed to supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific through practical cooperation on shared challenges. The Quad “is one of our foremost avenues for building connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. Quad cooperation is at an all-time high, with major progress on vaccines, climate, maritime security, and infrastructure.”

“Since 2015, the United States and our Quad partners have provided more than \$48 billion in financing for high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region. And we aim to do more through the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group. In addition to the Quad and other regional groupings, the U.S. is a leader in developing regional infrastructure.”

AUKUS

The Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) partnership “is not just about submarines—the partnership fosters deeper integration of our efforts in the Indo-Pacific, modernizes long-standing alliances to meet the security challenges of the future, and bridges the Atlantic with the Indo-Pacific to boost Indo-Pacific stability, security, and prosperity.”

U.S.-EU Indo-Pacific Consultations


“We have significantly expanded cooperation to work with European allies and partners on shared Indo-Pacific priorities, including on maritime security, infrastructure, and countering disinformation ... The very first trip that Deputy Secretary Sherman took in her tenure was to Brussels to launch our U.S.-EU Dialogue on China; when that dialogue next met in Washington, she launched the separate Consultations on the Indo-Pacific.”



Partners in the Blue Pacific

Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) was established in June 2022 “to harness collective strength to support Pacific priorities more effectively and efficiently. Bringing together Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, and the Republic of Korea, the PBP represents increased focus and commitment to genuine partnership with the Pacific, and presents an opportunity to drive additional resources, de-duplicate efforts, and expand cooperation between the Pacific and partners across the world.

The partners have committed to regular and ongoing engagement with Pacific Island governments and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and have discussed prospective initiatives under lines of effort that range from climate-change resilience to technology and connectivity and political leadership and regionalism.”




EMBASSIES AND HIGH COMMISSIONS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Locations of embassies and high commissions from the countries of the Partners of the Blue Pacific

Source: Embassy websites of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States

U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY AFTER ONE YEAR





PILLAR 3 Drive Regional Prosperity

“The centerpiece of the President’s regional economic agenda is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The 13 countries that have joined the United States in launching the framework negotiations represent over 40 percent of global GDP. We seek a high-ambition initial framework with concrete goals for each of these areas that will provide more and lasting opportunities for more of our workers and businesses in the Indo-Pacific region. We recognize the imperative for the United States to deepen our economic engagement in the region. IPEF’s goal is to strengthen our economic ties, improve connectivity and resilience, and boost our shared economic prosperity.”

“IPEF is a new type of economic arrangement that goes beyond traditional free-trade agreements in both its ambition of its commitments and the scope of topics covered. And these include new issues that are going to be vital for 21st-century competitiveness. IPEF’s innovative approach is enabling us to expand and update existing rules while at the same time addressing important issues, like the supply chains, climate, and anti-corruption, that have not fully directly been addressed by previous regional trade agreements. IPEF’s approach also creates flexibility to convene a broad range of partners, including some countries


that would struggle to be able to join a traditional United States FTA, and thereby it more fully reinforces the rules and standards throughout the region.”

“The theme of the U.S. APEC 2023 host year is ‘a sustainable and resilient future for all,’ prioritizing areas of interconnectedness, innovation, and inclusivity. “The United States is taking full advantage of hosting APEC in 2023 to collaborate with like-minded partners in strengthening the international economic system, demonstrating U.S. leadership in the region, delivering concrete economic-policy outcomes in the region, and showcasing the importance of engagement in the Asia Pacific for the American people and the importance of it to American prosperity.”

“IPEF Partners shared their enthusiasm for creating high-standard agreements that can create sustainable and inclusive economic growth throughout the region.”

“Our approach to economic policy under the Indo-Pacific Strategy is creating the latticework of mutually reinforcing initiatives that promote our shared positive vision of the U.S. and our partners for a region that is not only free and open, but also connected, prosperous, and sustainable.”

ASEAN PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORKS



















Sources: Asian Development Bank Database; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2023; UNCTAD, Office of the United States Trade Representative, The White House, Center for Strategic & International Studies

PILLAR 4 Bolster Indo-Pacific Security

“Broad-based prosperity can only be achieved in a stable and secure region. We are bolstering regional security by strengthening and modernizing our security alliances and partnerships, increasing joint military exercises, building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their waters and cyberspace, and advancing the Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) partnership.”

“Not only is it important for the United States to be a steadfast ally in the region, but we also need to enhance the capabilities of our partners to maintain a secure region; to protect our shared interests; to defend open, global community standards; and to deter aggression. Partnerships and rules help protect our communities. A key example of this is the new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.”

US NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS WITH INDO-PACIFIC COUNTRIES

| HAWAI'I AND PHILIPPINES | GUAM AND PHILIPPINES | WASHINGTON AND THAILAND | ALASKA AND MONGOLIA | HAWAI'I AND INDONESIA | OREGON AND BANGLADESH |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2006 | 2008 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| IDAHO AND CAMBODIA | OREGON AND VIETNAM | NEVADA AND TONGA | WASHINGTON AND MALAYSIA | NEVADA AND FIJI | UTAH AND NEPAL |
| 2008 | 2012 | 2014 | 2017 | 2019 | 2019 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WISCONSIN AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA | MONTANA AND SRI LANKA | RHODE ISLAND AND TIMOR-LESTE | MONTANA AND MALDIVES | NEVADA AND SAMOA | |
| 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2022 | 2023 | |
|  |  |  |  |  | |

Source: East-West Center, *The Pacific Islands Matter for America/America Matters for The Pacific Islands*, 2022



PILLAR 5

Build Regional Resilience to Transnational Threats

“A stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is one which is resistant to shocks and crises, including the impacts of the climate crisis, and of health-security threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic. We are committed to working with our allies and partners to build regional resilience to these and other 21st-century transnational threats.”

“We will partner with the region to help end the COVID-19 pandemic and build resilience against common threats. We will work closely with partners to strengthen their health systems to withstand


future shocks, drive investments in global health security, and expand regional platforms to prevent, detect, and respond to emergencies, including biological threats. We will also work through the World Health Organization (WHO), the G7, the G20, and other multilateral fora to strengthen preparedness and response. We will advance our resilience efforts in close coordination with ASEAN, APEC, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and other organizations.”

[U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy](#)
[February 2022](#)


SHOULD THE UNITED STATES INCREASE OR DECREASE ITS COOPERATION WITH ASIAN COUNTRIES TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE?

General Public - Percent of Adults

Asian Countries Excluding China




China




Elected and Appointed Officials, Bureaucrats, and Business Leaders -

Asian Countries Excluding China



China



Source: East-West Center, *Asia Matters for America: Public & Elite Opinion*, 2022

PERSPECTIVES FROM ALLIES, PARTNERS, & ACROSS THE INDO-PACIFIC

The “Indo-Pacific” as a Regional and Policy Concept

The term *Indo-Pacific* as a nationally adopted, policy-directing framework originated in Japan under the administration of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as outlined in his 2016 speech on Japan’s vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa had earlier promoted use of the term in a 2013 speech in which he proposed the creation of an Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The United States released its vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific in 2017, and the White House released the Biden-Harris administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022.

Emphasizing the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade, the Abe administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept had as its focus the pursuit of regional economic prosperity, linking Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa through economic partnership. Underpinning that prosperity was also a focus on securing peace and stability, building maritime-law-enforcement capacity, humanitarian assistance, and disaster-relief capacity.

The inclusion of India was, arguably, the most important part of Japan’s Indo-Pacific concept, as Prime Minister Abe saw the Indo-Pacific as a free and open union where the Indian and Pacific Oceans stretched from Asia to Africa, providing global stability and prosperity. India and Japan share a historical respect for each other and continue to have common strategic goals. Bringing Japan and India together would grow a vast network extending across the Pacific to also include the United States, Australia, and others, across which could flow people, goods, and capital. Linking India through the Indo-Pacific concept has also contributed to India’s participation in the Quad and to the elevation of U.S.-India relations to that of a comprehensive global and strategic partnership. The U.S.-India relationship is seen not as a newly emerging partnership, but an already mature and stable partnership with strong foundations to continue building upon, exemplified by already high levels of engagement across multiple sectors. Engagement with South Asia is a core element of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.





Divergences in Indo-Pacific Strategies and Alignments

Japan has a distinctive role in the Global South, an area in which the United States is more inclined to emphasize values, such as those of democracy and human rights. Japan has committed to bringing Global South states more inclusively into global governance. Similarly, Japan feels that it must have a more nuanced view on human rights and the rule of law with respect to Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries. Much of Southeast Asia, for its part, has demonstrated discomfort with the term *Indo-Pacific*, believing that it is too confrontational toward China. South Korea's own Indo-Pacific economic and strategic frameworks have a more inclusive approach toward China.

Europeans were initially opposed to the term *Indo-Pacific*, as they considered it part of an American agenda—one that also denoted a focus on the transatlantic and U.S.-Europe partnership. That conversation changed in the lead-up to the European Union releasing its own 2021 “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” and with European nations adopting their own Indo-Pacific strategies. Europeans view with alarm the frequency with which discussions in Washington, D.C., point toward a possible U.S.-China conflict. No less because many in Europe see China as a potentially larger trading partner.

Such a shift in perspectives on the term *Indo-Pacific* is taking place within Southeast Asia as well. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations adopted its “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) in June 2019. ASEAN's use of the term was in part motivated by a concern that ASEAN would be sidelined as a primary driver of wider ASEAN regional

architecture, as well as out of a concern that the Indo-Pacific concept was being seen by China as part of a China-containment policy. Instead of letting external powers define the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN promotes a framing of an Indo-Pacific that is a neutral geographic strategic space inclusive of China. Although China has not recognized the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN hopes that AOIP can be a means of engaging with rather than excluding China. Furthermore, ASEAN leaders, such as Indonesian President Joko Widodo, focusing on promoting use of the Indo-Pacific concept on their own terms emphasizes attention on ASEAN centrality and on the ways in which the Indo-Pacific is an ASEAN-driven region.

India largely converges with U.S. policy toward China, but India's strategic autonomy will remain a reality. With the formation of BRICS in response to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, there was anxiety and curiosity in India to see whether India could cooperate closely with both China and Russia. The following years demonstrated to India that an India-Russia-China triangle was not sustainable. However, the position taken by India on the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine was a disappointment, including among Europeans considering a Quad+ arrangement. Although India's strategic autonomy is not necessarily at odds with the Quad, and although relations between the United States and India are being elevated, India is not a treaty ally of the United States, as is Japan, Australia, South Korea, and NATO members. India's strategic autonomy also reflects its differing positions from those of the United States in their relations with Pakistan, Iran, and the Global South.

Are the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic “One Theatre”?

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the partnership between Russia and China affect the framing and implementation of Indo-Pacific strategies, and call into question whether the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic have now become “one theatre.” From a European perspective, the answer is yes, and that is affecting Europe’s cultural approach to the Indo-Pacific. That view, however, is not shared by much of South Asia and Southeast Asia.

NATO is seen as the bridge between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, particularly with respect to cybersecurity and the increasing role that Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea are

adopting with respect to coordination with NATO after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. There are also growing discussions among Indo-Pacific countries and NATO member states on technology and economic security.

The Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic being one theatre raises other questions of international alignments, such as whether the G7 is fit to purpose given that Japan is currently its only member from within the Indo-Pacific region. There are discussions taking place on whether Australia, India, Korea, and Indonesia might be added to the grouping’s membership.

JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

Japan and South Korea are surrounded by three potential adversaries, namely China, North Korea, and Russia. As such, the security environment in the region is deteriorating, which has led to determination in Japan to increase defense budgets to support regional stability; to South Korea announcing its own Indo-Pacific strategy; and to deeper cooperation and coordination among these two countries and their mutual ally, the United States. Prime Minister Abe once commented that a Taiwan contingency would be an equivalent contingency for Japan.



Ships from the United States, Japan, and South Korea conducted a trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise in the East Sea/Sea of Japan in October 2022. The ships included the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) (foreground), the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) (background), and Republic of Korea Navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) (middle). (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson)

Japan as a major power is determined to maintain the international order based on global and universal values, including human rights, democracy, and freedom of speech. Some in Tokyo are considering the possibility of enhancing cooperation with the enhanced trilateral security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS).

Japan and Korea have also been deeply engaged in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific Islands, focusing on development assistance, deepening commercial ties, and contributing to capacity-building efforts.



SOUTH ASIA

India's Act East policy drives its relationships with India's friends and partners to its east, including the ASEAN member states in Southeast Asia. India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative partners with member countries in the region to manage, conserve, and sustain the maritime domain. India also launched the International Solar Alliance of more than 120 countries to promote sustainable clean energy, as well as the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure to promote regional resiliency. India also has a Neighborhood First policy to utilize India's size, strength, and leadership to grow the economies and countries in its immediate neighborhood of South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Among those neighbors, Bangladesh also envisions a free, open, prosperous, secure, and inclusive Indo-Pacific to improve the lives of the region's people. Bangladesh also prioritizes adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and the strengthening of existing mechanisms for maritime safety and security. Bangladesh is an active contributor to regional emergency-response efforts; to maintenance of the nonproliferation regime; and to addressing transactional concerns, such as the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people. Bangladesh also collaborates with subregional partners such as ASEAN and APEC to share regional knowledge.

AUSTRALIA

From the Australian perspective, China's military modernization and expansion, gray-zone brinkmanship, and encroachments into the territory of other Indo-Pacific nations have created a strategic imbalance in the region that must be addressed. Within Australia, China's economic coercion, political interference, and diaspora intimidation over the last several years have also contributed to this Australian consensus on the deterioration of the Indo-Pacific security dynamic, and to Australia pursuing greater security cooperation through AUKUS.

Australia's focus on multilateral arrangements traces its roots to Australia's founding as a nation-state in 1901. Australian multilateralism with respect to the Indo-Pacific can be understood with respect to three priorities. The first has historically been keeping the United States focused on the region, as the U.S. policy community has historically been Atlanticist. Second has been delivering on arrangements that build interdependencies for economic prosperity. And third has been engaging with India "at a pace that is comfortable."

Australians believe that there is a strength to concentric circles of agreements and arrangements, and critically in trade arrangements that include China, even if such inclusion is fragile. Australia is willing to reduce dependence on China, but not isolate it from such arrangements.

AUSTRALIA IN THE ASIA PACIFIC



Source: East-West Center, *Australia Matters for America/America Matters for Australia*, 2015



EUROPE

The European Union (EU) and a rising number of EU member states were “driven to form an Indo-Pacific strategy as [they] saw tensions rising between the United States and China.” Over the decade leading up to the release of European Indo-Pacific strategies, EU member states began to assess that the global geopolitical reality had shifted, and that the Indo-Pacific region had grown in significance. The Indo-Pacific, as the engine of the global economy, is now a major driver for European prosperity.

Conversely, over the course of the same decade, Indo-Pacific nations were beginning to consider how NATO might contribute to the Indo-Pacific region. Deepening Europe-Indo-Pacific ties have moved quickly in more recent years, largely because of a more assertive China, but also because of the COVID-19 pandemic requiring global coordination. Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, for their part, became NATO Summit participants after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia and respectively contribute to efforts to support Ukraine.

To Europeans, Russia’s war on Ukraine is seen as not simply a European war, but an assault on the United Nations Charter and on rules-based international order. Similarly, stability across the Taiwan Strait, freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, and missile launches by North Korea are of direct concern to Europe.

Essential to European efforts in the Indo-Pacific region is working with partners. Japan, Korea, and Australia are considered most open for opportunities to deepen European ties in the Indo-Pacific region because of their shared values and interests. Though there are differences, these commonalities present opportunities to magnify implementation of European policies in the region, such as those of France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The primary partner for Europe in the Indo-Pacific region remains the United States.

The European Union is a resident Indo-Pacific actor through France’s overseas territories, including New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Reunion in the Indian Ocean. Approximately 1.65 million EU citizens live within EU territory in the Indo-Pacific region, and the EU has 3.5 million square miles of exclusive economic zone. The EU is a top investor and the biggest provider of development assistance to the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific is the second-biggest destination for EU exports.

The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has seven priority areas for EU action, namely sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, security and defense, and human security. This strategy is about showing that the European Union believes in a free and open Indo-Pacific, just as freedom and openness are part of the identity and prosperity of the European Union. European multilateralism also reflects in EU respect for ASEAN centrality.

There are three sets of interrelated issue areas that are most frequently raised in discussions with the European Union about the Indo-Pacific. The first is China, China-Russia relations, and North Korea relations. Second are issues related to technology and cyberspace. And third is economic security and supply chains. Climate change is also discussed, and discussions with the European Union on Indo-Pacific security dynamics focus primarily on maritime security.

The European Union will continue to seek to cooperate with China where it is possible and when it is in EU interest to do so. The European Union will continue to protect its essential interests to promote its values by pushing back where fundamental disagreements exist with China.

FRANCE

France was the first European country to present an Indo-Pacific strategy, and it took a lead in the creation of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. France is the one European country that has territories in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans and is a resident power in the Indo-Pacific. Traditional defense for the protection of EU citizens in the region is one of the main priorities of its strategy. With extensive economic ties to the region, France is less dependent economically on China than is Germany and other EU member states. France's Indo-Pacific Strategy also focuses on reinforcing relations with regional partners such as Japan, Korea, India, Australia, ASEAN, and the United States.

France was affronted by the 2021 announcement of the AUKUS partnership, which canceled the contracted delivery of French conventional submarines, replacing them with a promise of nuclear-powered submarines agreed to among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Relations between France and Australia have since improved, and the war in Ukraine has necessitated unity among these countries.

GERMANY

Germany has never been an Indo-Pacific power—though historically it has had colonial territories in the Pacific Islands region—yet with 20 percent of its trade conducted in the Indo-Pacific region and expanding cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Germany aims to maintain and support relations with partners that share an unwavering commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international order. In 2023, Germany appointed its first special envoy to the Pacific Islands states and announced a new embassy in Fiji. Germany engages the Pacific on climate change and will support efforts to combat the region's vulnerability to climate change, rising sea levels, and extreme weather events.

Germany also released its first ever National Security Strategy in June 2023. Shortly afterward, Germany released a new, separate, and comprehensive policy on China, stating that China is a “partner, competitor and systemic rival,” which follows the common policy on China of the European Union.



THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom has committed to “being both the greatest single European contributor to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area” and “deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence.” The U.K. Indo-Pacific policy, referred to as the Indo-Pacific “tilt,” recognizes the region as critically important geopolitically and geoeconomically. Since Brexit, Britain has pursued a whole new range of bilateral partnerships, including the U.K.-India 2030 roadmap, new cooperation with Germany, recent meetings with France, a 2+2 process with Japan, and unilaterally through AUKUS as well as upgrading facilities in Singapore. Britain has also been a dialogue partner with ASEAN since 2019 and appointed a new U.K. ambassador to ASEAN, recognizing ASEAN centrality. The U.K. also applied for and was accepted as a member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on a Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

The United Kingdom has become more assertive on China as a threat to world order, more so than other partners in the region, such as South Korea, which is still inclined to hedge and balance despite recent rhetoric. Misalignment in terms of coordination with partners and whether the United Kingdom has the capacity to deliver on its stated commitments are potential liabilities for cooperation.

CANADA

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has five priorities—promoting peace, resilience, and security; expanding trade, investment, and supply-chain resilience; investing in and connecting people; building a sustainable and green future; and to be an active and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific. Canada costed its strategy at \$2.3 billion, which is equivalent in scale to an investment of \$20 billion in the U.S. context. It is a founding member of CPTPP, it has an FTA with Korea, and negotiations are ongoing with ASEAN, India, Indonesia, and others. Six of Canada’s 10 biggest trading partners are in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada joined the Partners in the Blue Pacific, it has opened an embassy in Fiji, and it is seeking to increase its presence elsewhere among the Pacific Islands.

In terms of regional security, Canada plays a key role in enforcing sanctions on North Korea. It also participates in military exercises in the South China Sea and in the North Pacific. On China, embedded in Canada’s Indo-Pacific policy is a clear-eyed engagement with the PRC that challenges it in areas where there is disagreement while pursuing cooperation on critical global issues.

Southeast Asia and ASEAN

Southeast Asians have been wary of any one country being dominant in the region. There were anti-Japanese riots in the 1970s when it seemed that Japan would be the dominant player in the region. There have also been frequent anti-American and anti-Chinese riots over the years across the region. When any one country gains too much visibility in Southeast Asia, this is seen as dangerous. It is important to the region that Europeans, Americans, and others are active in the region to ensure that no one country is perceived as too dominant, thereby becoming a target of public protest.

Though adopting the term *Indo-Pacific* relatively recently, ASEAN-driven regional architecture has historically had an Indo-Pacific scope. The ASEAN Regional Forum, founded in 1994, includes South Asian countries and stretches to Mongolia and to Papua New Guinea. ASEAN is the primary regional convenor, including through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus). The ASEAN Plus Three brings together ASEAN member countries with China, Japan, and South Korea to pursue opportunities for multilateral cooperation amid increasing tension between China and the United States.

The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific emphasizes transparency, openness, inclusiveness, the rule of law, and ASEAN centrality. ASEAN stresses using existing ASEAN mechanisms rather than any new Indo-Pacific architecture. The ASEAN

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific presents connectivity, maritime security, the economy, and sustainable development goals as the four primary areas for regional and international cooperation.


There is interest in seeing an outcome of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific being greater connectivity among ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the Pacific Islands to connect these subregional architectures. There have also been private discussions of the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook being linked with China's Belt and Road Initiative, particularly with respect to connectivity, which will be a main theme for Laos as the chair of ASEAN in 2024.

When released, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, a relatively short five-page document, was dismissed by some as lacking in substance. Yet it has been praised as a statement of principles to build upon. However, there are criticisms that the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific relies on existing ASEAN mechanisms as well as already accepted principles and uses AOIP as a label to package existing efforts rather than expand on them. Also, there is concern about sustained focus on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific when the chairmanship of ASEAN transitions from Indonesia, which promoted the creation of the outlook and of the ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Forum in September 2023.



HEADS OF STATE VISITS 2003-2023*

Number of official visits by ASEAN Leaders to the United States and official visits by US Presidents to ASEAN Member States



Source: East-West Center, ASEAN Matters for America/America Matters for ASEAN, 2023

ASEAN, Minilateralism, and Regional Security

ASEAN does not necessarily comment on or form an official position on the regional minilateral arrangements and agreements made by other stakeholders in the region. ASEAN itself is composed of and operated by numerous formal and informal minilateral dialogues among its member countries. However, ASEAN member countries each have their own interests with respect to such arrangements and their impact on the region.

The Quad was initially received with skepticism among Southeast Asian countries, as it appeared to be a mechanism to contain China. However, the Quad gained greater acceptance among those in Southeast Asia, as it seemed to de-emphasize its identity as a potentially more security-focused minilateral grouping. As the Quad broadened its areas of cooperation to deliver public goods, such as vaccines at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it received even greater buy-in among those in Southeast Asia.



Navigating Strategic Competition and the Question of Choosing Sides

Southeast Asia as a region is not in a U.S. or Chinese camp but is “sailing between two corals,” as it did during the Cold War, leaning one way or another based on each country’s national and regional interests. Although China is not perceived to be as powerful as the United States globally, China is perceived as the most powerful country in the region. There is also the perception that other countries are adopting Indo-Pacific strategies not only because of the region’s growing geopolitical and geoeconomic importance, but also because the region may be where a global conflict may erupt, particularly over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

China is not dismissed as a threat by Southeast Asians, who have seen China acting in a manner that suggests it is an implacable power that does not care who it is willing to offend to get what it feels belongs to it. That has been seen more and more in the South China Sea, where there are frictions but not yet full-scale conflict.

Southeast Asian countries still believe that they have leverage in terms of diplomatic negotiations with China “to prevent the unthinkable.” An example of such engagement is ongoing negotiations with China on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Indonesia alone is the fourth-largest country in the world; it controls strategic sea lanes and supplies crucial raw materials for China’s economy.

Other solutions to resolve tensions in the South China Sea are proposals to engage with the region in terms of a common good, an area in which to promote scientific collaboration; prevention of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; and preservation of the sea’s fisheries and natural resources. Southeast Asians have noted that although China is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, it does not respect its rules, whereas the United States is a signatory to UNCLOS that has not yet ratified it but supports efforts to ensure that UNCLOS is respected.

Although ASEAN wishes to avoid being perceived as a collective security organization, countries in

Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are paying greater attention to security needs in the region. The second Super Garuda Shield multinational military exercise was held in Indonesia in 2023, with troops from Indonesia, the United States, Singapore, Japan, Australia, France, and the United Kingdom and several observers from across the Indo-Pacific region and from Europe.

Singapore takes a pragmatic approach to engaging with Indo-Pacific actors. Whether it be with minilateral arrangements such as the Quad or AUKUS or bilaterally with stakeholders in the region, Singapore will pursue cooperation when it is in Singapore’s national interest and when others have something concrete to offer, and preferably in a quieter manner so as not to antagonize China. Singaporeans will “talk Mandarin but think American.”

Philippine nationalism in the not-too-distant past used to be defined in anti-American terms. But the Philippines now provides locations for American bases despite PRC protests, and the United States has given assurances that it will support the Philippines when the Philippines stands for its national interests vis-à-vis China.

Vietnam deliberately avoids alignments and has a policy of supporting all initiatives that contribute to peace and cooperation, and that contribute to the rules-based regional order. By expanding relations through ASEAN, with Japan, and with countries in Europe, etc., Vietnam is continuing to pursue diplomatic diversification and multilateralization.

Cambodia has faced a series of criticisms from the international community. It was blamed for not resolving tensions in the South China Sea in 2012 when it had the chair of ASEAN, despite Cambodia not being a claimant state. It was criticized for accepting Chinese money to build its first deep-sea port and denied that it was supporting a Chinese military base in Cambodia; instead, it said it was creating a port for its own national interests that any nation could take advantage of. And Cambodia

was disappointed with ASEAN when it brought its 2008 border dispute with Thailand to ASEAN for arbitration, to which ASEAN responded that the matter should be addressed bilaterally. There is a concern in Cambodia that the United States considers Cambodia as being in China's camp, and so will not engage with Cambodia as it does with others in the region.

Timor Leste strongly aligns with the United States and others in its commitment to democratic values, overcoming its political uncertainty since 2017 through dialogue and through elections. Timor Leste has also committed to ASEAN, attending its first ASEAN meeting as an observer in May 2023. Being part of a dynamic region has helped Timor Leste in terms of economic development when the country has struggled with political turmoil, with Indonesia as its largest trading partner. The people of Timor Leste are waiting to see whether democracy and institutional reforms will deliver social and economic benefits.

In terms of democracy, there are differences between the approach taken by the United States and that taken by Southeast Asia. Several countries in Southeast Asia are committed to democracy, and there is recognition that there is a democratic deficit among ASEAN member countries, and not only with respect to Myanmar. Southeast Asian regional efforts, such as the Bali Democracy Forum, seek to facilitate dialogue even among countries that are not democracies, whereas the U.S. Summit on Democracy invited only a select grouping of democratic nations, from which Singapore was "not happy" about being excluded. Southeast Asians also noted that the Summit of Democracy was seen

as a mechanism to contain China.

Where China is viewed as one source of instability in Southeast Asia, there is a perception that the United States and India contribute to instability as well. U.S. policy on Russia has "driven the Russians into the arms of the Chinese," and the Russians are not without influence in Southeast Asia. Also, as the United States and India have been enhancing their relations, Prime Minister Modi's domestic policies toward Muslim communities affect Southeast Asia, which is multiracial, multiethnic, and multireligious, including the majority Muslim population in Indonesia and the significant Muslim population in Malaysia.

One issue area in which the United States and Southeast Asia are in very close alignment is in their joint efforts to counter terrorism. For example, the United States led the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercises in the early 2000s, which have since grown to include participation and observers from South Asia, Europe, and East Asia to jointly address regional concerns about terrorism.

By arguing that they should not choose sides in strategic competition, Southeast Asian nations are also avoiding the political fear of "being owned" by one side or the other. And by not taking sides, there is the practical advantage of making outside powers compete with one another to offer political, strategic, and economic opportunities for Southeast Asians that sustain and support national priorities and ongoing nation and state building.



Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity

Southeast Asia had been waiting for the United States to return in an economic sense to the region since the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017. As such, expectations in the region were high, and concerns remain for the long-term credibility and sustainability of initiatives from one U.S. administration to the next.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) has been both welcomed in Southeast Asia and variously criticized for being too little, too late, and not contributing the billions of dollars that China is channeling through its Belt and Road Initiative. As such, IPEF has less to offer in terms of infrastructure investment. Even more, IPEF is criticized as not offering increased market access to the United States' huge economy.


Only three Southeast Asian countries have not become negotiating members of IPEF—Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. As only seven of the 10 ASEAN member countries became members of IPEF, there is concern that IPEF may be undermining ASEAN centrality as well as a means of addressing China's

influence in the region. It is recommended that this concern be alleviated by IPEF being managed in a complementary manner with ASEAN-led mechanisms.

With the increase of protectionist U.S. industrial policies, such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act as well as the CHIPS Act, there is concern that the way IPEF is overseen may become more for the benefit of U.S. companies, i.e., that IPEF may present a framework to its members that is “all stick and no carrot.”

In terms of regional supply chains, they are, by their nature, not easy to unravel or reverse. That is also a reality in the Southeast Asian region, with countries' national economies and supply chains being China-centered. Attempting to “decouple” supply chains from China would cause “reckless” disruptions to these economies. Since the rise of U.S. protectionist measures, it has been reported that trade between the United States and China has increased, and where those measures have affected trade between the United States and China, some

HOW EFFECTIVE DO YOU BELIEVE THE US-LED INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR PROSPERITY (IPEF) IS?



Source: East-West Center, 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey

of that preexisting trade is still being routed to the United States via Southeast Asian countries. After years of international trade liberalization, Southeast Asians do not see how to “remove a critical player from this whole web of intricately linked networks.”

The United States is seen as an important economic partner for the region, and Southeast Asian countries are finding various elements of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to be beneficial to their interests. IPEF is an answer to the Southeast Asian region’s focus on open regionalism as was the TPP, which was since renegotiated into the CPTPP and to which China has sought membership.

A significant point of debate is that the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is not a trade agreement; it does not offer trade liberalization, and so is unlikely to provide regional countries access to U.S. markets. Although the exchange of tariff concessions, which are not part of IPEF, is one way of looking at market access, it is not the only one. IPEF’s focus on rules with respect to the environment, labor standards, and digital trade, among others, affects the competitiveness of a space that is implementing such reforms, thereby making that market more competitive to investors. Such behind-the-border issues have a great deal to do with market accessibility, and the standards being addressed in IPEF are those that are expected by foreign investors and would contribute to greater trade and investment and hence development efforts and economic prosperity.

IPEF is also noted to have the potential to contribute to mitigating climate change in Southeast Asia through investment in clean-energy-infrastructure development that will result in reduced emissions to enable countries in the region to move closer to meeting their climate targets. However, this will require investment of resources and sustained commitment through concrete projects. IPEF in tandem with regional mechanisms, including U.S. and other international support for Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), can support a collective approach to addressing climate change.



The Pacific Islands

Engagement and Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands Region

United States engagement with Pacific Islands nations, while not new, has been reinvigorated and strengthened. The Pacific Islands have welcomed these conversations with the Biden administration and are closely observing how U.S. commitments are being honored.

Pacific Islanders are concerned about the U.S. commitments made to the Pacific Islands being operationalized and sustained over time. United States neglect of the Pacific Islands leads to, and has contributed to, major vulnerabilities that have opened the region to malicious actors and regional instability.

Strategic competition has elevated interest in the Pacific Islands region and prompted U.S. reevaluation of strategies in the region. The Pacific Islands believe this, accept it, and hold that U.S. reengagement with the Pacific Islands is overdue.

The Pacific Islands are concerned about coercion by any side in growing strategic competition to reshape the wider Indo-Pacific region, particularly the nature and degree of such competition undermining Pacific interests and agendas. Efforts to reshape the regional order have already led to an increasingly visible security footprint in the Pacific Islands region.

The United States has a legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific, which is but one example of legacy issues that present tensions in U.S.–Pacific Islands relations. The Pacific Islands have a collective memory of great-power competition in the region, which has led to concerns about military-adjacent technologies and development in the South Pacific. There is also concern that over-militarization of the region, such as the U.S. military buildup of Guam, puts at risk the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and may be contrary to the pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

There is a desire among the Pacific Islands for the United States to be a powerful advocate: a genuine partner who advocates on behalf of the Pacific with other actors in the region, including to address the climate crisis and other shared interests in a peaceful and prosperous Pacific. Rather than engaging in terms of competition, the Pacific Islands wish for engagement in terms of long-standing relationships that respect one another's sovereignty.

Pacific Islands Identity and Sovereignty

Pacific Islands identity is not that of a “small island people” but a “large sea of islands.” Understanding this and the scale of the region is foundational to engaging with the Pacific Islands.

Of the five exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Pacific Islands region, that of the Federated States of Micronesia alone is equivalent to the size of the continental United States. The five Pacific Islands EEZ jurisdictions combined cover almost 13 million square miles, which is larger than any single country in the world's jurisdictional domain of

sovereign rights. While most countries in the world may see land as more important than sea, that is fundamentally not so for the Pacific Islands.

Understanding this is particularly important with respect to freedom of navigation and the rights, security, and livelihoods of Pacific Islands nation-states and territories. Malign actors have entered Pacific Islands exclusive economic zones under the guise of freedom of navigation and have violated the sovereign rights of Pacific Islands states, including via illegal fishing.


Climate Change and Pacific Islands Survival

The Pacific Ocean is the single largest natural resource upon which the Pacific Islands depend for their survival. The fisheries sector is a key aspect of the livelihood of Pacific Islanders, and for some, the mainstay of their national economies.

Climate change is the number one problem for the Pacific Islands region. The Pacific Islands region is the largest victim of climate change, and it has contributed the least to the rise of this transnational global crisis. This stirs in Pacific Islanders and others a sense of urgency, fury, and injustice.

Recent climate-modeling studies, for example, indicate that climate change is driving pelagic fish stocks eastward and away from Pacific Islands EEZs, which threatens to disrupt a multibillion-dollar fisheries industry in the western and central Pacific Ocean. Studies have also documented that a healthy ocean is critically important, because the ocean is both the world’s largest carbon sink and the largest producer of the oxygen we breathe. The United States can continue to support and join efforts for a healthier ocean, such as that of the International Maritime Organization to decarbonize the shipping industry by 2050.

MAP OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION



Source: East-West Center, *The Pacific Islands Matter for America/America Matters for The Pacific Islands*, 2022



Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Pacific Islands sovereign territory threatens to destroy the livelihoods of the people of the Pacific Islands. International partners are needed to secure the seas through investments in critical technology, such as monitoring systems, and efforts must be made to reduce Pacific Islands dependence on outside assistance. The U.S.-Pacific Partnership Strategy builds on existing U.S. support for critical areas, such as policing Pacific Islands exclusive economic zones, as well as support for disaster response. At the international organizational level, Pacific Islands states expect that the United States will support and implement the WTO agreement prohibiting harmful subsidies in fisheries.

Meanwhile, rising sea levels have visibly, physically harmed Pacific Islands people, and have affected developing states most acutely as they see the loss

of valuable resources, which thereby threatens their existence. Of legal concern is whether receding coastlines affect maritime boundaries. Some have argued that as land boundaries shift, maritime boundaries shift landward as well, thereby also decreasing states' EEZ boundaries. This means the loss of access to valuable resources, particularly tuna, on which the Pacific Islands depend. The Federated States of Micronesia have shown leadership by declaring a freezing of boundary lines along precise coordinates to maintain maritime boundaries.

The Pacific Islands seek further necessary support in terms of climate funding, technical assistance, resilient infrastructure, and a recognition of the gravity of the climate crisis for the Pacific Islands that leads to urgent action.

Development and Finance

Though agreements have provided beneficial ways to ensure that there is a closeness in development efforts that is not seen with other island nations, it is not a perfect situation. What worked in Micronesia may not work in Polynesia.

There are implementation regulations in existing arrangements that Pacific Islands nations find counterintuitive, as well as bottlenecks that make for slow processes that are at times so bureaucratically protracted that development goals change by the time one has navigated the system.

There is Compacts of Free Association (COFA) infrastructure that has not been used, and there are instances where Pacific Islands states do not have the capacity in place to use the funds that are committed. Negotiations of compact relations also address movements of people and resources between the United States and the Freely Associated States, and there are policy barriers to supporting further integration.

Although there are financial institutions designed for island states to adequately respond to changes in their environments, a system that is a better fit to address frontline concerns is sought by Pacific Islands states to support their domestic and regional efforts.

As a major contributor to international financial institutions, the United States could advocate for more fit-for-purpose policies that could enable the Pacific to better rely on financial institutions to address development, the climate crisis, and disaster response in a way that reduces Pacific Islands concerns over debt sustainability.

Crucial to progress in these issue areas is close political consultation and recognition that the nature of development implementation efforts must vary depending on which part of the region is being focused upon.

Strengthening People-to-People Ties and Human Capacity


Pacific Islands states see many areas for further cooperation with the United States, particularly with respect to educational exchanges and increasing the number of scholarships for Pacific Islands students to study at institutions in the United States.

These programs provide important opportunities for leadership development in governance and in civic engagement, in training in financial support for existing institutions, and in human capacity for combating climate change and natural disasters. Such programs can also provide further human-capacity development in terms of infrastructure, healthcare, emerging technologies, food security, gender disparities, and education. These programs

are seen by the Pacific Islands as invaluable to enhancing domestic capacity to address these challenges.

The Pacific diasporas within the United States also deserve special attention and represent close sociocultural, economic, and political ties between Pacific Islands countries and the United States. There are established migrant communities in the United States as well as seasonal workers who travel between the United States and the Pacific Islands for employment opportunities. There should be a greater focus on transitional programs post-graduation and post-immigration to help Pacific Islanders who participate in programs to pursue opportunities in the United States.

NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES



Source: East-West Center, *The Pacific Islands Matter for America/America Matters for The Pacific Islands*, 2022
 US Census Bureau, 5-year American Community Survey, 2021



Engagement with Pacific Islands Regional Organizations

The U.S. commitment—and that of partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, and others—to the Pacific Islands Forum and to other regional agencies, such as the Pacific Islands Development Program, is both welcome and fundamental to the success of the U.S.-Pacific Partnership Strategy. The appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum is seen as an important step forward in this regard.

There is concern in the Pacific Islands that the Partnership for the Blue Pacific is outdated in its understanding of the power dynamics at play in the region, but it is still a conduit for action.

The Pacific Islands region's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent is the region's own articulation of its place in the world. This

regional strategy reflects that other Indo-Pacific stakeholders' framings of the Indo-Pacific are not necessarily representative of Pacific Islands framings of the region.

Alignment of the U.S.-Pacific Partnership Strategy with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent is crucial to its success, and a demonstration of U.S. commitment to work through and with regional Pacific Islands institutions.

Pacific Islands unity through such regional organizations and in partnerships with international stakeholders is central to protecting the region's shared interests in a peaceful, prosperous, and resilient Pacific.

Engaging the Pacific Islands

As the United States and others engage with Pacific Islands countries and the Pacific Islands region, the Pacific Islands welcome engagement that is in alignment with the goals and desires of the people within the Pacific Islands region, and that respects existing Pacific Islands institutions and frameworks.

It is important that the frameworks of larger countries engaged in the Pacific Islands region not undermine or supplant existing Pacific Islands regional frameworks and indigenous understandings, particularly with respect to Pacific Islands security. Doing so would threaten to undermine the Pacific Islands' own regional coordination and democratic processes.

The Pacific Islands desire collaborative, cooperative, and true partnerships that appreciate the ways in which the Pacific functions as a region, as well as historical, cultural awareness of Pacific Islands values that foster lasting, meaningful relationships, such as the importance of time and humility.

To Pacific Islands countries and institutions, respectful, genuine, and deliberately inclusive consultations are just as significant as the substance of dialogues and should be the basis for sustained and meaningful partnerships and engagement.

EWC INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY SURVEY

As part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy at One Year events, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey was designed to showcase current perceptions of the United States’ 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy by experts in the field of U.S.-Indo-Pacific relations. The survey covered a range of topics, including an overview of the United States and the Indo-Pacific, national and regional security, regional organizations, economic growth, and a section on the 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States. The respondents came from a wide range of backgrounds, with 97 percent coming from the United States (65 percent) or the Indo-Pacific (32 percent), and an additional 3 percent from European participants in the conference series.

The survey was offered in English and was composed of 20 questions. An additional seven questions were offered to respondents who answered “yes” or “unsure” to question 20, “Are


you aware of the 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States?” These questions focused on the 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States and the United States’ relationship with Pacific Islands countries.

Participants were selected using a network-sampling method to target professionals with knowledge and/or experience in the Indo-Pacific region. The survey was conducted over a period of four and a half months, from May 23 to September 26, 2023, and received a total of 355 respondents, 266 having completed the survey in its entirety. Highlights of the questions and results have been reorganized for logical flow and optimal reporting. The figures in this report have been rounded up or down to the nearest whole number. The survey is not meant to present a definitive or comprehensive view of issues in the region.

The United States and the Indo-Pacific

Of respondents, 95 percent found the Indo-Pacific region to be very (78 percent) or somewhat (17 percent) important to the prosperity of the United States. Additionally, 70 percent considered the United States to be an Indo-Pacific nation, and 66 percent were aware of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. When asked how important it was for the United States to accomplish the following in the Indo-Pacific, 60 percent of respondents found it very important to build connections within and beyond the Indo-Pacific region, 53 percent found it very important for the United States to drive regional prosperity, and 52 percent found it very important for the United States to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Additionally, a little more than half of all respondents (51 percent) found it very important for the United States to support governments, civil society, and media organizations in the Indo-Pacific to expose and mitigate information manipulation, and an additional 24 percent found it somewhat important.


IN YOUR OPINION, HOW IMPORTANT IS THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION TO THE PROSPERITY OF THE UNITED STATES?



Source: East-West Center, 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey



HOW IMPORTANT IS IT FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC FOR THE SEAS, SKIES, AND OTHER SHARED DOMAINS TO BE LAWFULLY GOVERNED?



Source: East-West Center, 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey

Security in the Indo-Pacific

When asked about national security, 80 percent of respondents found the Indo-Pacific region to be very important to the national-security interests of the United States. Additionally, 77 percent indicated it is very important to the regional security in the Indo-Pacific for the seas, skies, and other shared domains to be lawfully governed. When asked to rank natural disasters, global health,

trafficking of weapons, cyber threats, terrorism and violent extremism, and climate change from most to least threatening to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region, 35 percent of respondents found climate change to be the most threatening, followed by 28 percent of respondents who ranked natural disasters as most threatening.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE QUAD, ASEAN, AND APEC

The Quad

When asked about regional organizations in the Indo-Pacific, 75 percent, or 200 respondents, were somewhat familiar (47 percent) or very familiar (28 percent) with the work of the Quad. Of those 200 respondents, 63 percent found the work of the Quad to be very relevant (36 percent) or somewhat relevant (27 percent).

APEC


A majority of respondents (81 percent) found the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to be somewhat important (41 percent) or very important (38 percent) for promoting free, fair, and open trade and investment in the Indo-Pacific. Only 7 percent of respondents found APEC to be somewhat unimportant (5 percent) or very

unimportant (2 percent) for promoting free, fair, and open trade and investment in the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN

When asked to rank which policy initiatives the United States should prioritize from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 48 percent of respondents indicated climate and the environment as their top priority, followed by 29 percent of respondents ranking health-policy initiatives as their top priority. Only 32 respondents (12 percent) found energy to be a top priority. Thirteen respondents (5 percent) chose transportation, and eight respondents (3 percent) chose gender equity and gender equality.

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTION THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE INDO-PACIFIC?



Source: East-West Center, 2023 Indo-Pacific Strategy Survey

Economic Growth

Opinions were split when asked to identify the most significant action the United States could take to promote economic growth in the Indo-Pacific. Nearly one in four participants (24 percent) found expanding economic opportunities for middle-class families to be the most significant action the U.S.

could take. Participants selected strengthening economic competitiveness in the region second (23 percent), and 20 percent of participants selected rebuilding supply chains as the most significant action.

IPEF

Of all respondents, 116 respondents (44 percent) were somewhat familiar (32 percent) or very familiar (13 percent) with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) economic initiative. Of those respondents, most found IPEF to be neither effective nor ineffective in a variety of areas, including developing new approaches to trade that meet high labor and environmental

standards; accelerating efforts to tackle the climate crisis through clean energy, decarbonization, and improved infrastructure; and enacting and enforcing effective tax, anti-money-laundering, and anti-bribery regimes to promote a fairer economy. However, 41 percent of these 116 respondents found that IPEF was somewhat effective at making supply chains more resilient against disruptions.

2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States

At the end of the survey, an additional seven questions were offered to respondents who answered “yes” or “unsure” to question 20, “Are you aware of the 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States?” These questions focused on the 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States and the United States’ relationship with Pacific Islands countries. When participants were asked if they were aware of the document, 44 percent were aware and 14 percent were unsure, qualifying 155 participants for this additional

survey portion. Of these respondents, 131 found it very important or somewhat important for the U.S. to promote economic growth in the Pacific. Bolstering regional institutions was also deemed very important or somewhat important by 130 respondents, or 86 percent. Additionally, 84 percent of respondents noted that enhancing regional security and strengthening people-to-people connections were both very important or somewhat important.



ANNEX

U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink

KEYNOTE REMARKS MARCH 14, 2023 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Good morning,

Great to be here with you all today. Let me start off by thanking the East-West Center for hosting this incredible event in your beautiful new offices downtown. From convening events like these, to supporting people-to-people exchanges, to helping demonstrate to the American people why the Indo-Pacific matters—the East-West Center is at the forefront of these discussions around the region. In other words, the East-West Center matters. In particular, I want to thank Suzy and Satu, East-West Center’s President and Vice President, respectively, for their invitation, introduction and for being great friends to the Department of State.

This event is timely, as we celebrate the one-year anniversary of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy—a key administration priority through which we have taken historic strides with allies and partners to advance our common vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.

It is also timely, as yesterday, President Biden, alongside U.K. Prime Minister Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Albanese, announced the optimal pathway for Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) partnership—just one manifestation of America’s multifaceted commitment to the region. The United States continues to demonstrate American leadership in and commitment to the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing the region’s capacity and resilience to address the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century and showing that we can build a better future together. In the minutes we have together, I will walk through with you how we hope to achieve a free and

open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient region with our partners and allies.

We face global challenges that will shape all our futures. Some of the challenges stem from a threat to the rules, institutions, norms, and relationships that have enabled freedom, peace, stability, and prosperity and continue to deliver broad benefits for the American people and around the world.

A little more than one year ago, this administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which articulates our shared, affirmative vision for the region and the steps we are taking with allies and partners to make it a reality. Judge us not by our words—but how we collectively take action.

Most countries in the region have demonstrated they share this vision and are devoted to protecting the international order that has brought unprecedented security and prosperity to many across the globe.

Free and Open Pillar

Our Indo-Pacific Strategy is grounded in our foundational values that are universal and the belief that a successful and stable Indo-Pacific region is rooted in the rule of law, good governance, and the protection of human rights. These values are at the center of strategy and cut across all our efforts in the Indo-Pacific. We are working together with our allies and partners to ensure the region remains free and open by promoting human rights, rule of law, freedom of navigation, free and open media, and a vibrant civil society across the region.

A key plank in this vision is our commitment to standing up for democracy and human rights in places like Burma, where the worsening crisis is undermining peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the broader region. It has been over two years since the 2021 military coup in Burma, and the political and humanitarian crisis on the ground continues to grow more dire. We continue to urge the military regime

to cease its horrific acts of violence, release all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and restore Burma's path to democracy.

We are pursuing strategic dialogues with our allies and partners on how to best advance human rights and governance in the region. Just last month, we held the first U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue on Democratic Resilience to discuss joint efforts to promote human rights globally and build democratic resilience at home and abroad. Similarly, last October we held our second annual U.S.-ROK Democracy Governance Consultation, and in November, our 26th annual U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue. These efforts are emblematic of our work across the Indo-Pacific.

Connected Pillar

The United States is committed to this endeavor, but the challenges we face are beyond the means of any one nation to address. This is why we deeply value the shared investments of so many allies and partners and appreciate the increasing number of like-minded countries that have issued national-security and Indo-Pacific strategies that share similar core precepts.

ASEAN, through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Canada, France, the EU, the United Kingdom, and more, share the same objectives of advancing openness and respect for sovereignty; promoting cooperation in regional institutions; strengthening security to assure stability; promoting prosperity, the rule of law, and good governance; and building regional resilience.

This convergence is striking. It allows us to think boldly and be more innovative in tackling jointly the economic, climate, health, and human-rights challenges of the 21st century.

Together, we are investing in the strengthening of the foundations of freedom, openness, connectivity, prosperity, security, and resilience as we support the region's multilateral architecture, and we are building partnerships to tackle shared challenges in the face of powers that offer a competing vision of the world order.

At the core of our Indo-Pacific strategy is building connections with our allies, partners, and friends, within and beyond the region, to create and support a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions to build collective capacity and more innovatively tackle our shared problems together.

The United States is significantly expanding our diplomatic engagement and presence in the region. This includes finalizing plans to establish a new embassy in Maldives and initiating discussions about our interest in opening two new embassies in the Pacific Islands: one in Tonga, one in Kiribati. Earlier this month, the United States announced the opening of our embassy in Honiara, Solomon Islands – less than a year after the Secretary announced our intention to do so.

This past year, we have invested deeply in developing the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific. One consequential innovation of the last decade has been the elevation of flexible partnerships like the Quad. Working with our Indo-Pacific partners Japan, Australia, and India, we continue to put forth ambitious initiatives that deepen our ties and advance practical cooperation on 21st-century challenges. Those initiatives include delivering vaccines during the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing the impacts of climate change, leading on high-standard infrastructure, launching the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative, and augmenting our capacity to undertake coordinated humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts in times of crises.

To enhance existing efforts to support Pacific priorities, we established the Partners in the Blue Pacific, or PBP, with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in June 2022. Since the PBP was established, Canada, Germany, and the Republic of Korea have joined the initiative as partners. The PBP is an inclusive, informal mechanism that builds on partners' long-standing commitment to the Pacific region and reaffirms their support for prosperity, resilience, and security in the region.

At the heart of the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific is ASEAN. As President Biden said during the historic U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit that we hosted last May, "The next 50 years is going to be written"



in Southeast Asia, and our relationship with ASEAN will shape the future we all want to see. That is why we have elevated our relationship with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and launched five new high-level dialogue processes on health, transportation, women’s empowerment, environment and climate, and energy.

We are building bridges between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic by leading on shared agendas that drive collective action. Now more than ever, we are seeing how events in Europe and Russia’s war in Ukraine have implications for the Indo-Pacific—and how Beijing’s quest to reshape the regional and international order has implications for Europe. Under this administration, Deputy Secretary Sherman and her EU counterpart have held four iterations of our U.S.-EU Dialogue on China, and she has since launched our U.S.-EU Indo-Pacific Consultations to coordinate on advancing our shared values and goals in the region.

Prosperity Pillar

The prosperity of everyday Americans is linked to the Indo-Pacific. It is the fastest-growing region on the planet. It accounts for 60 percent of the world economy and two-thirds of all economic growth over the last five years. It is home to more than half the world’s people, and many of the world’s largest economies. No region on Earth will affect the lives and livelihoods of Americans more than the Indo-Pacific. Every defining issue of the 21st century—from climate change to global health to the future of technology—runs through the region.

That means we have a responsibility to ensure the health and prosperity of the region’s economy. We are driving regional prosperity by promoting private investment, encouraging innovation, strengthening economic competitiveness, rebuilding supply chains, and expanding economic opportunities.

In May 2022, President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) with 13 regional partners, providing an affirmative model for economic cooperation that addresses the major challenges of the 21st century, including supply-chain resilience, trade, setting the rules for the digital economy, a clean-energy transition, and

anti-corruption. Importantly, the membership of IPEF reflects the economic diversity of the region as well as the interconnectivity among the partner countries that drives economic growth, job creation, and innovation. Together, they represent around 40 percent of world GDP and many of the fastest-growing economies. Similarly, we began negotiations on the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, which will strengthen commercial ties with another key regional partner.

We are very excited to host Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) this year, as a premier platform to advance economic policies in the region to promote free, fair, and open trade and investment and advance inclusive and sustainable growth. Our theme, “Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All,” advances practical economic policies as the region emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic. And our three policy priorities—“Interconnected, Innovative, and Inclusive”—will guide us as we work with our partners to strengthen the international economic system and deliver outcomes which increase prosperity for American workers, families, and businesses. We appreciated the opportunity to partner with the East-West Center to kick off our APEC host year last December at the Informal Senior Officials’ Meeting in Honolulu.

Beyond APEC and IPEF, we continue to support regional economies by addressing the region’s infrastructure gap. We are deepening our economic engagement alongside our Quad partners, through the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group. Since 2015, Quad partners have provided more than \$48 billion in official finance for infrastructure in the region, and we continue to build on this momentum. In coordination with the G7, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment will further advance our support for low- and middle-income countries to secure high-standard investment for critical infrastructure.

Security Pillar

Broad-based prosperity can only be achieved in a stable and secure region. We are bolstering regional security by strengthening and modernizing our security alliances and partnerships, increasing joint military exercises, building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their waters and cyberspace, and advancing the Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) partnership.

AUKUS is a significant step that builds on the Biden-Harris administration's commitment to two key priorities: revitalizing and modernizing our alliances and partnerships around the world to face the security challenges of the future, and enhancing our engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Through AUKUS, we will deepen our already close cooperation with Australia and the U.K. on a range of security capabilities to ensure continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Yesterday's announcement outlined how we will actualize AUKUS, as partners work together to design and build the new "SSN-AUKUS" to serve as a new class of submarine for Australia and the U.K. We are coming together to assist Australia in modernizing its submarine fleet to use the same technology—nuclear-powered submarines—that other countries, such as India, the PRC, France, U.K., Russia, and the United States, already deploy in the region. As we do so, we are bolstering the economic opportunity of all three of our nations, and setting the highest nonproliferation standards as we do it. AUKUS will enable continued global economic growth and prosperity through its role in helping to maintain security, stability, and predictability.

We are also building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their waters. In May 2022, in a joint venture with the Quad Partners, we launched a new initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), which will provide technology and training to support enhanced, shared maritime-domain awareness to promote stability and prosperity in our seas and oceans.

Through initiatives such as the Maritime Security Initiative, the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative, and the Global Defense Reform Program, which provides advisory support to enhance security-sector and maritime governance, as well as U.S. Coast Guard engagement across the region, we are bolstering Indo-Pacific partners' maritime-domain awareness, resilience against coercion, disaster response, and law-enforcement capabilities.

We continue to support secure and trustworthy technologies through cybersecurity cooperation and capacity building. Through the Digital Connectivity

and Cybersecurity Partnership, we are working closely with governments across the region, including Timor-Leste, India, and the Philippines, to strengthen cybersecurity protections.

Importantly, as Secretary Blinken has stated before, our policy toward the PRC is another important element of our regional strategy. Our Indo-Pacific strategy includes our approach to the PRC but is not defined by it. In other words, we have an Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China is a part—not the other way around.

The PRC is nevertheless the one country that increasingly has the economic, technological, military, and diplomatic means to challenge the international rules-based order. And Beijing's actions suggest it has the intention to do so.

The key elements of our China strategy are to "invest, align, and compete." Mainly we are 1) investing in the foundations of our strength at home; 2) aligning with partners, allies, and friends on our approach to defend the rules-based order; and 3) competing with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.

Moreover, the United States continues to work closely with regional allies and partners to make clear to the PRC that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is essential to regional—and global—peace and prosperity. The United States remains committed to our long-standing "one China" policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. We will continue to uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

Resilience Pillar

We are building regional resilience to these 21st-century transnational threats alongside our allies and partners. A stable Indo-Pacific is resistant to shocks



and crises. For example, the impacts of the climate crisis are here and growing ever more severe, and the COVID-19 pandemic continues to inflict a painful human and economic toll across the region, reminding us how fragile the world economy can be.

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to threaten lives and livelihoods across the world. The Quad continues to lead global efforts for COVID-19 response and has to date pledged \$5.2 billion to the COVAX AMC and delivered over 267 million doses to the Indo-Pacific and are helping prepare for future health emergencies. The United States continues to support the ASEAN Center for Pandemic Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases in the areas of workforce development, infection prevention and control, antimicrobial resistance, respiratory-disease surveillance, and zoonotic diseases.

We are demonstrating U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific for a clean-energy future that leverages market forces, technological innovation, and investments to tackle the climate crisis.

For example, at the G20 summit in Bali last November, Indonesia, the United States, and other members of the International Partners Group launched a Just Energy Transition Partnership that pursues an ambitious and just power-sector transition that shifts Indonesia's greenhouse-gas-emissions trajectory towards keeping the 1.5 °C global-warming limit within reach. Within the Just Energy Transition Partnership, Indonesia committed to peak its power-sector emissions seven years earlier, by 2030, with a goal of net-zero power-sector emissions by 2050, while the partnership intends to mobilize public and private financing over a three-to-five-year period to help drive the needed energy transition.

To conclude, we are deeply engaged in building collective capacity to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.

In the face of so many challenges, we remain guided by the foundational principles that form the bedrock of our foreign policy: that territorial integrity and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, information must be allowed to flow freely, universal rights must be upheld, and the global economy must provide opportunity for all.

We are working in common cause with those who share in this vision, leveraging the multilateral architecture to forge a future defined by cooperation and collaboration, shared prosperity, and steady progress.

Our accomplishments under the Indo-Pacific Strategy over the past year reflect not only American leadership, but also an unprecedented level of cooperation across the region to tackle global challenges and protect our shared vision of the world in the face of heightened geopolitical challenges to that order.

The United States knows that by working together with our partners, we can together ensure a prosperous and secure future for all countries and communities in the Indo-Pacific.

The benefits of this collaboration are not just reaching those in the region and partners overseas—our investments across the Indo-Pacific region also pay dividends at home. As we partner to build prosperity abroad, we strengthen economic ties that buttress markets here at home. As we collaborate on public-health crises, we become better prepared to protect ourselves from future pandemics. We are an Indo-Pacific nation, and what happens in the region helps secure a safer world for generations to come.

Thank you for having me.

U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary of State Daniel J. Kritenbrink

KEYNOTE REMARKS

JULY 26, 2023

HONOLULU (DELIVERED VIRTUALLY)

Thank you for having me here today as we celebrate the continued engagement we have through the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). I apologize I can't be there with you all today in Honolulu, given my ongoing travel to the region with Secretary Blinken, but I want to thank our close friends at the East-West Center for hosting such a pivotal seminar. I especially want to recognize my good friend, your amazing president, Suzy Vares-Lum.

As you all know well, the Indo-Pacific is a key focus of the Biden-Harris administration's National Security Strategy, and we have taken historic strides with our allies and partners to advance our common vision of a free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific region.

Currently, we are in the midst of a strategic competition that will shape all our futures: It is a competition that challenges the very rules, institutions, norms, and relationships that enable freedom, peace, stability, and prosperity to flourish, and we must ensure that this common peace and prosperity continues.

In February 2022, this administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, a comprehensive, bold strategy that articulates our shared, affirmative vision for the region and its people and the steps we are taking alongside allies and partners to make it a reality together.

We have seen that many countries in the region and beyond share this vision and are devoted to promoting the conditions that have brought about regional security and prosperity.

The challenges we face are beyond the means of any one nation to address. This is why we deeply value the shared investments of so many allies and partners and appreciate the increasing number of like-minded countries that have issued national-security and Indo-Pacific strategies which feature such similar core precepts.

A key part of the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific is ASEAN. As President Biden said during the May 2022 U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, "The next 50 years is going to be written" in Southeast Asia, and our relationship with ASEAN will shape the future we all want to see. That is why we have elevated our relationship with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and launched five new high-level dialogue processes on health, transportation, women's empowerment, environment and climate, and energy.

Less than two weeks ago, I had the honor of traveling to Jakarta to support Secretary Blinken's participation in the U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial, the East Asia Summit Ministerial, and the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial. As the Secretary reiterated in Jakarta, the United States strongly supports the goals of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, known as the AOIP, and is committed to upholding ASEAN centrality.

Together, we are investing in the strengthening of the foundations of freedom, openness, transparency, responsive governance, respect for human rights, connectivity, prosperity, security, and resilience, as we support the region's multilateral architecture and build partnerships to tackle shared challenges. The Pacific Islands, of course, represent another key focus of our strategy. Nested within the Indo-Pacific Strategy is the U.S.-Pacific Partnership Strategy, launched in September 2022 at the inaugural U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in Washington. This strategy seeks to enhance our enduring relationships with the Pacific Islands, while ensuring a united Pacific Islands region, with the Pacific Islands Forum at its core. The Biden-Harris administration will work in partnership with Pacific governments and peoples to ensure they can build a resilient region prepared for the climate crisis and other challenges.

At that summit last September, we jointly issued the Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership. Together, these documents provide a roadmap for how we are working together to develop a strong U.S.-Pacific Islands partnership. We are also looking forward to hosting leaders from the Pacific Islands once again for a summit this fall in Washington.



To enhance existing efforts to support Pacific priorities, we established the Partners in the Blue Pacific, or PBP, together with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in June 2022. Since the PBP was established, Canada, Germany, and the Republic of Korea have also joined the initiative as partners. The PBP is an inclusive, informal mechanism that builds on partners' long-standing commitment to the Pacific region and reaffirms their support for prosperity, resilience, and security in the region.

Secretary Blinken's visits to Pacific Island nations, most recently to Papua New Guinea in May, reflect our continued dedication to the Pacific. The United States is now modernizing the Compacts of Free Association via updated partnerships with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, and committing \$7.1 billion to the Freely Associated States over the next two decades.

At the core of our Indo-Pacific Strategy is building connections with our allies, partners, and friends, within and beyond the region, to create a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions to build collective capacity, encourage transparency and inclusivity, and more innovatively tackle our shared problems together.

The United States is significantly expanding our diplomatic engagement and presence in the region. We announced the opening of our new embassy in Honiara (Solomon Islands) in January, as well as in Nuku'alofa (Tonga) in May, alongside our soon-to-be-opened embassy in Malé (Maldives). We are also in discussions about our interest in opening new embassies in Vanuatu and Kiribati.

The United States supports Pacific Islands Forum unity and Pacific regionalism. I am pleased that our first ever U.S. Envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum, Ambassador Frankie Reed, started her tenure in January and is already working closely with the Pacific Islands Forum to strengthen and deepen our relationship.

This past year, we have made other investments in the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific. For example, one consequential innovation has been the elevation of the Quad. Working with our partners

Japan, Australia, and India, we have advanced practical cooperation on key issues, such as climate change, high-standard infrastructure, the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative, and humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts in times of crises.

We have also strengthened trilateral cooperation with our Japanese and Korean allies on security and economic matters. We have responded to DPRK provocations, remaining prepared to deter—and, if necessary, defeat—any aggression to the United States and our allies, and promote human rights. Our commitment to the defense of both the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad, and we have worked to enhance extended deterrence with both countries.

The prosperity of every American is inextricably linked to the Indo-Pacific. U.S. companies continue to be the top source of foreign direct investment in the region with nearly \$1 trillion in U.S. investments, with roughly the same invested in the United States by firms in the region. The U.S. also remains a major trade partner with more than \$2 trillion in two-way trade. These exports to and investments from the Indo-Pacific support almost 4 million U.S. jobs.

We are helping to drive regional prosperity by stimulating private investment, encouraging innovation, strengthening economic competitiveness, rebuilding supply chains, promoting international labor rights, and expanding economic opportunities, including for marginalized populations.

At the same time, we also collaborate on public-health crises, becoming better prepared to protect the global community from future pandemics. As we invest in clean energy, we secure a safer world for generations to come.

President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, known as IPEF, with 13 regional partners last year to provide an affirmative model for economic cooperation that addresses the major challenges of the 21st century, including supply-chain resilience, digital transformation, and clean-energy transition. Similarly, in June, under the auspices of AIT and TECRO, the U.S. signed the

first agreement with Taiwan under the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, which will strengthen commercial ties with another key regional partner.

As Suzy and the EWC community know well, we are very excited to host APEC this year, as the premier platform to advance economic policies in the region to promote free, fair, and open trade and investment and advance inclusive and sustainable growth.

APEC serves an important role as an incubator of ideas from you and other key stakeholders from across the region that can help shape the global economic architecture. With our host year, our goal is to make APEC relevant to individual Americans, whether they are members of the private sector, civil society, think tanks, academia, advocacy groups, or local governments. We are also very excited for the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, to be hosted by President Biden in San Francisco in November.

Beyond APEC and IPEF, we continue to support regional economies by addressing the region's infrastructure gap, including via the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group. Since 2015, Quad partners have provided more than \$48 billion in official financing for infrastructure in the region.

With Japan, we co-hosted the fifth Indo-Pacific Business Forum in January, with satellite events in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and we were pleased to announce recently that we will co-host with the Philippines in Manila in 2024. The Forum is our premier regional commercial-diplomacy event and a key platform to engage business executives, senior policymakers, and stakeholders. It allows us to showcase the strength of U.S. private-sector trade and investment and drive home the importance of high-standard economic development, transparency, and the rule of law.

Broad-based prosperity can only be achieved in a stable and secure region. We are bolstering regional security by strengthening and modernizing our security alliances and partnerships, increasing joint military exercises, building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their waters and cyberspace, and advancing the Australia, United Kingdom, United States, or AUKUS, partnership.

AUKUS builds on the Biden-Harris administration's commitment to two key priorities: revitalizing and modernizing our alliances and partnerships around the world to face the security challenges of the future, and enhancing our engagement in the Indo-Pacific. We are also building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their maritime domains, including via the Quad Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, or IPMDA, which will provide technology and training to support enhanced, shared maritime-domain awareness to promote stability and prosperity in our seas and oceans.

Another key security matter in the region is the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is essential to regional—and global—peace and prosperity. The United States remains committed to our long-standing “one China” policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

Of course, another key element of our strategy is managing our complex but consequential relationship with the People's Republic of China. Last month, Secretary Blinken traveled to Beijing, where he advanced our interests from a position of confidence. Secretary Blinken had candid, substantive, and constructive conversations. His overarching message was to emphasize the importance of maintaining open channels of communication to reduce the risk of miscalculation. He made clear that while we compete vigorously, the U.S. would responsibly manage competition so that the relationship does not veer into conflict. Implementing the core pillars of our PRC strategy—“invest, align, compete”—is working, and is positioning the United States to outcompete China and maintain an enduring competitive edge.

These efforts are emblematic of the broad work on which we engage across the Indo-Pacific. The United States knows that by working together with our partners, we can together ensure a prosperous and secure future for all countries and communities in the Indo-Pacific.

Thank you very much!



U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Camille P. Dawson

KEYNOTE REMARKS JAKARTA, INDONESIA AUGUST 10, 2023

Good morning. Thank you for having me here today. Before I begin, I'd like to thank Dr. Satu Limaye and his team at the East-West Center for all the hard work they've put into making this event possible today. It has been a pleasure working with the East-West Center in the implementation of this program in three separate locations: in Washington, D.C., in March of this year; in Honolulu two weeks ago; and now, our final event in Jakarta, Indonesia. It's wonderful to join you in this final milestone event for what will no doubt be a rich and thought-provoking discussion.

The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation, and focusing on the Indo-Pacific region is a key Biden-Harris administration priority. In February 2022, the administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, a comprehensive, bold strategy which articulates our shared, affirmative vision for the region.

We have taken historic strides with our allies and partners to advance our common vision of a free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific region. The United States continues to demonstrate our strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific by reinforcing the region's capacity and resilience to address the challenges and embrace the opportunities of the 21st century.

The convergence of our mutual efforts is powerful. It gives us the opportunity to think boldly and be innovative in our approach towards tackling these challenges and opportunities.

I'd like to talk briefly today about our efforts under the five interlocking pillars of our Indo-Pacific Strategy—free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient—and how we are working with allies and partners, including ASEAN, to realize our shared vision for the region.

Free and Open

I'll start by talking about the 'free and open' pillar of our strategy. By a "free and open Indo-Pacific," we mean a region in which individuals will be free in their daily lives and live in open societies, and in which countries will be able to make independent political choices free from undue outside pressure. At the regional level, problems will be dealt with openly; rules will be developed transparently and applied fairly; and goods, ideas, and people will flow freely.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy is grounded in our belief that a successful and stable Indo-Pacific region is rooted in the rule of law, good governance, strong democratic institutions, and the protection of human rights. This is a belief we share with many of our regional partners, and which aligns with the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. We are working together with our allies and partners to ensure the region remains free and open by promoting democracy, human rights, rule of law, freedom of navigation, free and open media, and a vibrant civil society across the region.

One key human-rights-focused priority for the United States is our work with ASEAN to mainstream gender and disability rights. Last year, we held the inaugural Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Ministerial, and we are coordinating to launch a U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

We are also committed to continuing to stand up for democracy and human rights in places like Burma, where the worsening crisis is undermining peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the broader region. It has been two and a half years since the February 2021 military coup in Burma, and the political and humanitarian crisis on the ground continues to grow more dire. We continue to push the military regime to cease its horrific acts of violence, to release all those unjustly detained, to allow unhindered humanitarian access, and support a path toward inclusive and genuine democracy.

We also continue to underscore the need for justice and accountability for the regime's atrocities. In June, we took one of our most consequential steps since the

coup—sanctioning two of Burma’s largest state-owned banks to step up pressure on the regime.

We urge ASEAN to hold Burma’s military regime accountable to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and to support Indonesia’s efforts, as ASEAN Chair, to pursue a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict. We encourage all ASEAN members and dialogue partners to step up humanitarian aid to reach those in need—and the regime to grant access—especially in the wake of Cyclone Mocha.

We also continue to provide essential support to civil-society groups, activists, defenders, and journalists throughout the region, with the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) providing \$51.7 million worth of programming in the Indo-Pacific region since the IPS’s launch in February 2022.

Connected

Turning to the connected pillar, the United States is committed to realizing our shared vision for the Indo-Pacific region, but the challenges the region faces are beyond the means of any one nation to address. This is why we so deeply value the shared investments of so many allies and partners and appreciate the increasing number of like-minded countries that have issued Indo-Pacific strategies, all of which align so closely with our vision.

The core of our approach is about building connections with our allies, partners, and friends, within and beyond the region, to create and support a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions to build collective capacity to address common challenges and advance our shared vision for the region.

The past year has seen an unprecedented expansion in U.S.-ASEAN relations, marked by the first U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit held in Washington, D.C., in May 2022. As President Biden said during this summit, “The next 50 years is going to be written” in Southeast Asia, and our relationship with ASEAN will shape the future. That is why we elevated our relationship with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 2022 and launched five new high-level dialogue processes on health, transportation,

women’s empowerment, environment and climate, and energy.

Secretary Blinken’s recent participation in a series of ASEAN meetings in Jakarta, including the ASEAN-U.S. Ministerial, the East Asia Summit Ministerial, the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial, and an engagement with alumni of the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, all highlight our commitment to ASEAN and the region.

As the Secretary recently reiterated, the United States strongly supports the goals of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (known as the AOIP). Through our support for the AOIP, the United States and many like-minded partners share the same objectives of advancing openness and respect for sovereignty; promoting cooperation in regional institutions; strengthening security to assure stability; promoting prosperity, the rule of law, and good governance; and building regional resilience.

Prosperous

On the prosperity pillar, President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) with 13 regional partners last year to provide an affirmative model for economic cooperation that addresses the major challenges of the 21st century, including supply-chain resilience, the digital transformation, and a clean-energy transition. We were pleased that such a diverse group of partners initially joined negotiations on the framework, particularly from Southeast Asia.

Since then, partners have made great progress. Already, we have substantially concluded negotiations of a new supply-chain agreement that will build our collective resilience, improve crisis coordination, and better prepare businesses to identify, manage, and resolve supply-chain bottlenecks.

Building on that positive momentum, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation recently approved \$300 million in financing for sustainable infrastructure projects, including in eligible IPEF countries. This investment will mobilize up to \$900 million of equity capital for investments in renewable energy, smart-grid capabilities, and power storage.



Under our APEC 2023 theme of “Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All,” and our policy priorities for advancing an “interconnected, innovative, and inclusive” Asia-Pacific region, the United States remains committed to furthering APEC’s work across a wide range of policy domains, including trade and investment facilitation, the digital economy, health, gender equity and equality, clean energy and climate, anti-corruption, and food security.

As we speak, the Third APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting and Related Meetings are underway in Seattle, Washington. In addition to more than 200 expert-level meetings and workshops, we are hosting six ministerial meetings across the three-and-a-half-week period, including the Senior Disaster Management Officials’ Forum, SME Ministerial, Women and the Economy Forum, a joint State-Commerce-hosted event on women’s economic empowerment, an Energy Ministers’ Meeting, Food Security Ministerial, and the High-Level Meeting on Health.

We are also very excited to be working closely with the White House on planning for the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, to be hosted by President Biden in San Francisco in November.

Beyond APEC and IPEF, we continue to support regional economies by addressing the region’s infrastructure gap. We are deepening our economic engagement alongside our Quad partners, through the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group. Since 2015, Quad partners have provided more than \$48 billion in official financing for infrastructure in the region, and we continue to build on this momentum. The Quad welcomes opportunities to work with ASEAN to deliver impactful initiatives in the region.

With Japan, we co-hosted the fifth Indo-Pacific Business Forum in January, with satellite events in Dhaka, and we were pleased to announce recently that we will co-host with the Philippines in Manila in 2024. The Forum is our premier regional commercial-diplomacy event and a key platform to engage business executives, senior policymakers, and stakeholders from across the region. It allows us to showcase the strength of U.S. private-sector trade and investment with the Indo-Pacific and drive home the importance of high-standard economic development, transparency, and the rule of law.

And our economic engagement also includes key initiatives such as the launch of the U.S.-Indonesia Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact in November, dedicating \$698 million to support the country’s infrastructure and development goals.

Secure

For the security pillar, we know that broad-based prosperity can only be achieved in a stable and secure region. We are bolstering regional security by strengthening and modernizing our security alliances and partnerships and building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their waters and cyberspace.

In May 2022, in a joint venture with the Quad Partners, we launched a new initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), which will provide technology and training to support enhanced, shared maritime-domain awareness to promote stability and prosperity in our seas and oceans.

IPMDA is supporting three pilot programs across the region in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Indian Ocean Region—and discussions are underway to provide this enhanced capability to additional partners in the coming months. Through greater transparency, IPMDA is supporting our regional partners in their efforts to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific by improving their ability to counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; respond to climate change and natural disasters; and enforce the law near their shores.

Freedom of the seas is an enduring interest of all nations and is vital to global peace and prosperity. All nations, including the PRC, have long benefited from the rules-based maritime order, where international law, as reflected in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), sets out the legal framework for all activities in the oceans and seas.

Nowhere is the rules-based maritime order under greater threat than in the South China Sea. We support ASEAN Leaders’ June 2020 statement that a meaningful Code of Conduct (CoC) should accord with international law, including UNCLOS. The CoC

must not infringe on the rights and interests of non-claimant parties who rely on the South China Sea remaining a free and open waterway.

In addition to securing waterways, we are continuing to work with our ASEAN partners to bolster our mutual cybersecurity. Through regular coordination with ASEAN member nations and with the Secretariat, we have offered resources and conducted trainings in technical capacity, policy coordination, and industrial control systems cybersecurity.

Our work together focuses on improving the ability of government, and public and private stakeholders at all levels, to address threats to networks and ICT infrastructure. In addition, we work each year with our Singapore partners to conduct the cybersecurity Third-Country Training Partnership workshop on cybersecurity for all ASEAN members.

Resilient

Finally, let me turn to the ‘resilient’ pillar of the IPS. A stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is one which is resistant to shocks and crises, including the impacts of the climate crisis, and of health-security threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic. We are committed to working with our allies and partners to build regional resilience to these and other 21st-century transnational threats.

The United States continues to support the ASEAN Center for Pandemic Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases in the areas of workforce development, infection prevention and control, antimicrobial resistance, respiratory-disease surveillance, and zoonotic diseases.

We’re also working with Quad partners in this area via the Quad Health Security Partnership, launched at the 2023 Quad Leaders’ Summit in Hiroshima. This initiative builds on the success of the Quad Vaccine Partnership to support field epidemiology and outbreak responder training, boost disease surveillance, improve data systems, and build the capabilities of national health-emergency operations centers, allowing experts to offer faster and better-informed solutions to outbreaks and other health challenges affecting the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific nations are at the epicenter of the climate crisis and are most at risk from the damaging impacts of climate change. We are committed to working with our regional partners to address this, including through the Just Energy Transition Partnerships we have launched with Indonesia and Vietnam. These will pursue ambitious and just power-sector transitions that shift greenhouse-gas-emissions trajectories towards keeping the 1.5 °C global-warming limit within reach.

We also view building resilience in the media sector and information space as a critical component of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. We know that communities with high rates of media literacy and with a strong community of independent media professionals are better equipped to recognize and counter information manipulation. One way we’re working to promote media-sector resilience is by supporting journalists and outlets in particularly austere environments that are vulnerable to foreign manipulation and interference by providing free access to independent wire-service content, as well as seeking to expand capacity-building programming to support networks of journalists and free media sectors across the Indo-Pacific.

To conclude, we are deeply engaged in building collective capacity to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.

The United States and ASEAN share similar visions for the future of the Indo-Pacific region. We continue to look to the connections between the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific and our vision for the Indo-Pacific to guide our efforts to create a more prosperous and secure future, including in maritime and economic cooperation, sustainable development, connectivity, and human-capital development. Through our strengthening partnerships with ASEAN, we are united to address the Indo-Pacific’s historic challenges and are poised to seize the opportunities the 21st century presents.



Director General of Asia-Pacific and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Abdul Kadir Jailani

KEYNOTE REMARKS JAKARTA, INDONESIA AUGUST 10, 2023

I was very pleased to come here when I got the invitation. I was really excited, because I find this conference is important, because we have a good opportunity to get a better understanding about the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and possible synergy with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Just last month, Secretary Blinken joined other ministers from ASEAN and dialogue partners to reiterate U.S. support towards the implementation of AOIP, as you clearly described earlier. As one of the priorities of Indonesia's chairmanship this year, we know that amidst the current geopolitical dynamic, many countries and even regional organizations are also developing various strategic visions of the Indo-Pacific, particularly the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.

And at the same time, as a response to this new tendency, the ASEAN Outlook was also developed as initiated by Indonesia. The Outlook is essentially a unified vision which provides guidance to engage countries and major powers in the region through an ASEAN-led mechanism.

We are fully aware of the existing differences between the ASEAN Outlook and other strategic visions, but we believe that these differences can be narrowed and translated into concrete cooperation.

To this end, let me share some thoughts. First, we share the need to keep the Indo-Pacific open and free. As a global public good, the Indo-Pacific shall be open and inclusive to all states. When I say "inclusive," it is not only in the sense of no country should be left out, but also in the sense of ideas, so we are open to all ideas and how to implement this outlook or strategy. Freedom from coercion, freedom of choice, and respect for national sovereignty are imperative.

We need to integrate the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region under rule-based order, in which freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as peaceful settlement, are respected. Only then can we achieve stability and prosperity for every country in a truly open and free region.

The second point I would like to make is the need to advance concrete cooperation. The continuing rivalry among the great powers has resulted in strategic distrust among them. For that reason, through the Outlook, ASEAN tries to offer a framework for managing such strategic competition, with ASEAN taking a central role.


My Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister Marsudi, during the last AMM clearly mentioned that we all have our differences, but it is up to us whether we use the differences as a dividing force—or turn them into strength that enriches our collective efforts.

Currently, we share an interdependent economic relation and have a common interest in ensuring inclusive economic growth and sustainable development. We can support this by promoting inclusive cooperation in the region. ASEAN member states have been welcoming collaboration with any country. Any form of cooperation, including unilateral groupings, must serve as a building block for peace and stability instead of intensifying the division.

With the Outlook, we want to translate the competing strategic vision on the Indo-Pacific once again into concrete cooperation that could respond to the challenge faced by the region. This brings me to my last point on the implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The EAS Minister and all ASEAN dialogue partners have expressed their support for the implementation of the Outlook. But what does that mean? How is it going to be manifested in this region?

Indonesia tries to answer this question through the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Forum, which will be held back-to-back with the 43rd ASEAN Summit. As ASEAN is an important partner for the U.S., the participation and support of the U.S. is very important and more impactful, and concrete engagement with ASEAN countries will be much more desirable. In this regard, we look forward to welcoming President Biden to Jakarta for the next summit and active U.S. participation in the AIPF. I hope my intervention has contributed a lot to our discussion today.

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
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
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
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