ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY SURVEY 2008

REPORT

Richard W. Baker
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EAST-WEST CENTER

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by
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FOREWORD

This report presents the results of an online survey completed by 128 security analysts from 16 countries across the Asia Pacific region plus Taiwan and Europe. This is the third year that the East-West Center has conducted this survey, and it reflects an expansion in the number of participants from the previous year as well as some changes in the content of the survey. The report includes comparisons with the two previous surveys.

We believe that the information compiled from the survey provides a generally accurate representation of the state of thinking about the security outlook in the region among security specialists. By bringing together and comparing responses from a variety of country perspectives to the same set of questions, we hope that the survey and report will be a valuable additional resource for both analysts and policymakers.

The Asia Pacific Security Survey is coordinated by Richard Baker, my Special Assistant. In preparation for this year's survey, a group of advisors representing many of the countries covered by the survey reviewed and provided input on the questionnaire. We are grateful to all the members of this group: Dipankar Banerjee (India), Chu Shulong (China), Brad Glosserman (United States), Eiichi Katahara (Japan), Satu Limaye (United States), John Ravenhill (Australia), Jim Rolfe (New Zealand), Sergey Sevastyanov (Russia), and Pushpa Thambipillai (Malaysia).

The report was drafted by Richard Baker and Galen Fox, a former researcher at the Center. John Friend, a degree fellow at the East-West Center, processed the responses, and Sidney Westley of the Center's Research Program, with John Friend, produced the graphics in the report. The Center's Publications Office oversaw the final processing and the posting of the report on the Center's website (www.EastWestCenter.org).

We welcome any comments and suggestions on the report or the survey. We also welcome assistance in expanding the numbers of participants in the survey, whether through suggestions of names or recommendations that colleagues contact us directly. Communications should be sent to Richard Baker at BakerR@EastWestCenter.org.

Finally, I want to express our deep appreciation to all the respondents for the time and effort they have contributed to the survey, without which the project would not be possible. Thank you.

Charles E. Morrison
President
East-West Center

SUMMARY

This report is based on a detailed questionnaire completed in November–December 2007 by 128 analysts from 16 Asia Pacific countries as well as Taiwan and Europe who follow regional security issues. This is the third year of this project. Participation in the survey is by invitation, but responses are anonymous except for country or other geographic affiliation. Background information on the questionnaire and a breakdown of the respondents are contained in the full report and the appendices.

Generally, the survey responses provide a snapshot of contemporary mainstream thinking among security analysts on the outlook of major current issues. This section of the report summarizes the principal results and conclusions.

Terrorism and internal instability. Continuing the pattern from the previous surveys, terrorism remains the leading general security concern in the region. However, when asked to weigh the seriousness of some three dozen specific issues, the analysts rated internal instability in Pakistan and Burma/Myanmar as the most significant specific concerns; recent events in both countries are probably responsible for the prominence of these issues in current thinking. Similarly, domestic instability was rated as the issue that had changed most negatively over the preceding year.

Global warming. The survey responses also underscored the status of global warming as a leading current concern. The more general topic of environmental degradation has been a major concern in previous surveys, but with the Bali conference in November 2007 having crowned a year of intense public attention to global warming, this issue was also uppermost among the "nontraditional" security concerns in the minds of the analysts.

Regional stability and U.S.-China relations. The analysts ranked the broad outlook for regional security as having improved over the past year. But they expressed concern over the future evolution of the security equation, with U.S.-China relations in the center of this conundrum. On the one hand, participants concur that the two key factors determining regional security in the coming decade are (a) the rise of China and the evolution of Chinese policy and (b) the reaction of the United States to China's rise. However, there is a marked contrast in their expectations in each case. While they generally reject the proposition that China's rise will destabilize the region, they nevertheless express a significant level of concern that the United States *will* regard China's rise as a threat. This indicates broad worry over the future directions and management of U.S. policy in the region, and corresponding uncertainty over the prospects for stability.

North Korean nuclear issue—sober optimism. Responses to a number of questions reveal a reduction in the level of concern over the North Korean nuclear program, which has been ranked among the top issues in previous surveys. The participants rate this issue as the most improved of a number of perennial concerns, a conclusion readily explicable by the continuing negotiations within the Six-Party Talks. A strong majority also expresses confidence that the outlook is for further, albeit slow and uneven, progress toward denuclearization of the Peninsula.

Iraq—No end to conflict or U.S. engagement in sight. The group's assessment of the future of the Iraq conflict is both less positive and more uncertain than its view of the North Korean

nuclear issue. While strong majorities do not believe that the American-led stabilization effort will be successful, most do not see U.S. involvement in the conflict as ending any time soon. On the downside, they also believe that the terrorists will continue to draw energy and new recruits from the conflict, and that there is a serious possibility of a widening of the conflict across the Middle East. Thus the group does not anticipate any early resolution of this situation and is concerned that it might get worse.

Interventions by the international community. The attitude of the survey group, as in previous years, was generally cautious to reluctant on the advisability of intervention by the international community in conflicts with serious humanitarian impacts. Darfur was the only case in which the overall group would endorse the use of United Nations (UN) Peacekeepers, and in none of the five cases posed was there group support for UN-authorized intervention (much less non-UN-authorized coalition action). The 2008 survey did not include the historic cases of East Timor or the post–September 11, 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which had drawn approval in past surveys. However, recognizing that except for Darfur the cases posed are all hypothetical rather than immediate, the survey clearly indicates a lack of basic enthusiasm over such proactive steps by the international community.

Regional institution building. Another regular survey question asks participants to assess the effectiveness of regional institutions on two dimensions—in building a sense of community and as mechanisms for practical cooperation. The responses to the 2008 survey continue the previous pattern. The set of regional institutions that have developed around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is credited with contributing most effectively to building a sense of regional community. Both the range of other regional institutions—e.g., the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the China-based Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—and the major extraregional institutions operating in Asia—e.g., the U.S. alliance system and the UN—are accorded lower rankings on the scale. The ASEAN-centered institutions are also considered to be contributing (more positively than in previous years) to organizing practical cooperation, but both the U.S. alliance system and the UN are ranked much higher in terms of their practical effectiveness than as instruments for building a sense of regional community.

BACKGROUND: THE SURVEY, RESPONSES, AND TABULATION

The purpose of this project is to tap the views of security analysts across the Asia Pacific region —and some from other areas—regarding the outlook for regional security and the priority among longstanding as well as emerging issues in the region. The survey is intended to identify differences in perspectives among country and subregional groups as well as broad areas of consensus. As far as we know, no similarly broad or detailed survey is conducted at present. Thus we hope that the report will be of use both to security analysts and to policymakers interested in this vast and increasingly important region.

The 2008 report is based on responses to a questionnaire sent in November 2007 to over 400 analysts and other professionals from the Asia Pacific region, as well as Europe, who follow Asia Pacific security issues. In developing the questions for this year's survey we consulted with an advisory group of analysts from most of the principal countries involved. Our purpose in doing this was to minimize possible national bias in the selection and wording of questions—especially in view of the fact that the survey originates from an American institution and is run basically by Americans. The survey does pay substantial attention to the U.S. role, but we believe this reflects broad agreement that this is an important element in the regional security landscape and outlook.

In response to comments received on last year's survey, we endeavored to shorten the survey for 2008, both reducing the number of questions and changing the structure in some cases. Also, taking into account the changing landscape of the region and perceptions of security issues, some previous questions have been reworded and new options added. This complicates making linear comparisons with the responses in previous years but is necessary to keep the survey current, and in the analysis we have continued to comment on comparisons with previous years where this seems useful.

Responses were received from 128 analysts. While this represented encouraging growth in participation from the two previous surveys (which had 104 and 73 respondents respectively), it still falls short of our target of 10 respondents from each geographic unit surveyed—a number that we believe would provide a reasonably authoritative representation both of the majority view and of the diversity of opinion. In the analysis we have noted those cases where a low number of responses may have reduced the reliability of the findings.

Questionnaire responses are processed in the following way. Responses to most questions (those asking for weighting of different issues or factors on a scale) are given numerical scores. These scores are then averaged according to the country or other geographic unit of the respondents, in order to identify the major variations between them. The country/unit averages are then averaged to generate subregional averages, and the subregional figures are averaged to produce the overall scores. This process avoids giving undue weight to those countries or other groups with large numbers of participants. (An Excel file containing the raw scores may be obtained from the East-West Center by request.)

Six geographic subregions are represented in the survey:* Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, Europe, and North America. The composition of the subregions follows the generally accepted geographic definitions: Southeast Asia encompasses the ASEAN respondents,

South Asia includes SAARC members, Oceania covers Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, while the Northeast Asian group includes China, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia as well as analysts from the Russian Far East and Taiwan.

A full breakdown of the participants is given in Appendix I. The subregional breakdown was North America 33 (of whom 28 were from the United States), Southeast Asia 28, Northeast Asia 22, Oceania 20, South Asia 15, Europe 10. Unfortunately, there was no participation this year from Mongolia, Thailand, Vietnam, or the Pacific Islands. (Burma, Laos, and Cambodia have not been included in the survey due to difficulties in recruiting participants from these countries.) A further possible deficiency is that only three responses were received from Chinese analysts this year, which could bring into question the representativeness of the scores for China.

As is frequently the case in such surveys, responses tend to bunch around the middle options, reflecting the "conventional wisdom" on these questions and possibly underrepresenting the range of views—or significant original insights—within the groups. This also frequently results in relatively narrow differences in the scoring of the different options. For this reason, we pay more attention to the relative rankings than the absolute magnitudes of the scores, while recognizing the inevitable potential for misinterpretation involved. Nevertheless, we believe that the survey provides a reasonably good measure of the state of mainstream opinion among the experts in the field as well as the major differences in outlook between country and subregional groups, which is the primary purpose of the project.

* In order to avoid confusion in this text between the overall "Asia Pacific" region and the six subgroups into which the survey is organized, in this report we refer to the latter as "subregions" even though we recognize that in most contexts these groupings are considered geographic regions in their own right.

FINDINGS: SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESULTS

The survey contained 11 questions with multiple options, most of which called for ratings on a scale of 1 to 5. An additional five open-ended questions gave respondents opportunities to expand on their answers or give individual views on the questions or the survey as a whole. The full text of the questionnaire is given in Appendix II.

The remainder of this report presents a description and analysis of the survey responses, in the order in which the subjects were covered in the survey (the question numbers refer to the questionnaire text in Appendix II).

Issues for Regional Security (Question #2). Participants were asked to grade the relative seriousness of seven broad categories of issues for Asia Pacific regional security over the next five years, on a scale from 1 (not serious) to 5 (very serious). Within each category, participants were also asked to rank the relative seriousness of a series of specific examples, 37 in all (see Appendix II for the full list).

The rank order and overall average scores given to the seven broad categories were

Rank	Issue Category	Average Score
1	Terrorism	3.20
2	Nationalism	2.74
3	Economic and resource issues	2.64
4	Territorial issues	2.52
5	Internal instability	2.45
6	Arms issues	2.42
7	Tensions in bilateral relations	2.24

Terrorism was unquestionably the broad threat category of most concern to the participants. Notably, terrorism was the only category for which the overall rating exceeded the neutral (threshold) level of 3, thus clearly reaching the "serious" side of the 5-point scale. Terrorism was also the top-ranked concern for four of the six subregional groups. The exceptions were the Northeast Asians, whose greatest concern was nationalism, and the Europeans who were more concerned about territorial disputes; however, terrorism ranked as the number two concern for both of these groups.

Answers on specific issues within the broad areas provide a more detailed look at the range of regional security issues. Figure 1a shows the rank order and scores of all 37 specific issues, along with the absolute average score of each. Figure 1b shows the top five specific issues regionwide as well as for each of the subregions.

The two top issues were both new entries in the 2008 survey—instability in Pakistan and Burma. The fact that they were ranked as the most serious specific concerns in this survey validates their addition to the list.

The level of concern over internal instability in Pakistan was the only issue that received an overall "serious" rating (level 4): it received scores of 4 or above from four of the six subregional

Figure 1a. Issues for Regional Security

Color coding
(in order of seriousness)

- Terrorism
- Nationalism
- Economic/Resource Issues
- Territorial Issues
- Internal Instability
- Arms Issues
- Bilateral Tensions

Regionwide Rankings of 37 Specific Issues – 2008

Issues are listed in order of seriousness. Scale: From 1 = "not serious" to 5 = "very serious"
Colors indicate general category (see box at left)

Rank		Score
1	Pakistan Internal Instability	4.00
2	Myanmar/Burma Internal Instability	3.58
3	Competion for Energy Sources	3.44
4	Islamist Terrorists	3.40
5	Tensions in/across the Taiwan Strait	3.35
6	India-Pakistan Tensions	3.29
7	South Asia Nuclear Proliferation	3.20
8	U.S. Nationalism (and/or Unilateralism)	3.16
9	North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program	3.14
10	Competition for Other Resources	3.12
11	Sri Lanka Internal Instability	3.12
12	Kashmir	3.09
13	Chinese Nationalism	3.03
14	North Korea Internal Instability	2.96
15	Tensions on the Korean Peninsula	2.92
16	Financial Crises	2.88
17	China-U.S. Tensions	2.86
18	Nepal Internal Instability	2.85
19	Conventional Arms Races	2.85
20	North-South Korea Tensions	2.85
21	Migration/Working Rights	2.84
22	Central Asian Republics Internal Instability	2.84
23	Domestic Terrorists (non-Islamic)	2.80
24	East Asia Nuclear Proliferation	2.71
25	China-Japan Tensions	2.71
26	International Terrorists (non-Islamic)	2.66
27	Thailand Internal Instability	2.61
28	Trade Disputes	2.60
29	China Internal Instability	2.50
30	Japanese Nationalism	2.43
31	South China Sea Claims	2.40
32	Russia Internal Instability	2.29
33	Korea-Japan Tensions	2.23
34	Pacific Islands Internal Instability	2.23
35	Intra-ASEAN Tensions	1.92
36	Japan-Russia "Northern Territories" Dispute	1.84
37	Japan-Russia Tensions	1.68

Figure 1b. Issues for Regional Security

Regionwide and Subregion Rankings of Top Five Issues – 2008

Scale: From 1 = " not serious" to 5 = " very serious"

Color coding: Bars for the same issue bear a standard color, with white for all other issues.





groups. The fact that virtually all surveys were submitted before Benazir Bhutto's December 27 assassination further underlines the level of concern over Pakistan's political prospects. In light of the serious unrest and harsh government crackdown in Burma in September 2007, it is also not surprising that this was a very prominent issue on the minds of the respondents as they completed the survey.

Some aspects of the rankings by subregions in figure 1b are worth noting.

- First, the absolute levels of concern vary significantly among the subregions. (This can be seen in the differences between the median scores of the top five issues for each of the subregions—these numbers are highlighted in gray in figure 1b.) The *South Asian* respondents expressed the highest levels of concern, followed by the *Northeast Asians*. The analysts from *Oceania* and *Southeast Asia* registered much lower levels of concern virtually across the board. These differences account for some apparently anomalous variation between the regional rankings and the overall rankings on some issues. Most strikingly, Islamist terrorism was one of the top five issues overall but among the subregions it only made the top-five list for the Oceania and North American groups; however, since the other four subregional groups all scored this issue above the 3 level, and the Europeans and South Asians gave it a score of 3.5 or above, the overall average made the top group.

- The *Northeast Asian* participants expressed the highest level of concern over Chinese nationalism of any of the subregional groups—the only group for which this issue made the top five. Further, this is the case even if the score of the single respondent from Taiwan is not counted. Thus concern about China is highest among its immediate neighbors, the ones most directly and continuously affected by China's behavior. The Southeast Asians are the only other group to rate Chinese nationalism above the survey's threshold of concern (and they were the only other group to rank this issue among their top ten, in eighth place).

- *The Southeast Asian* respondents placed U.S. nationalism and/or unilateralism at the top of their worry list: their average score for U.S. nationalism was nearly half a point higher than that for China, and when rounded to single digits the concern registers at the "serious" (4) level. The ratings from three of the five countries in this group for U.S. nationalism/unilateralism are a full point higher (more serious) than Chinese nationalism. Two of the three (Brunei and Indonesia) are majority Muslim countries, where concerns about U.S. unilateralism have probably been exacerbated by the invasion of Iraq. However, the third country in this group, Singapore, does not have a Muslim majority, and the analysts from both Muslim-majority Malaysia and Christian-majority Philippines reversed the order of China and the United States, ranking China over half a point higher. So the Muslim factor alone does not appear to be determinative of the degree of concern over U.S. unilateralism. Similarly, the latter three countries all have substantial Chinese populations and yet do not have consistent views of the relative danger posed by American and Chinese nationalism, so the size of ethnic Chinese populations also does not appear to be a major determinant of these threat perceptions either.

- The *South Asians*' score on instability in Pakistan was the second-highest of any subregion for this question (exceeded only by the North Americans). This ranking from Pakistan's neighbors further reinforces the seriousness of the concern over the situation in Pakistan.

  Like their Southeast Asian counterparts, the South Asian analysts rated U.S. nationalism/unilateralism as a top issue, in this case second overall after instability in Pakistan. The Pakistan analysts ranked U.S. nationalism as their most serious specific concern, and for the small number of participants from Bangladesh it tied with several other issues at the highest level. Presumably, like analysts from other Muslim countries, these participants are uncomfortable about the U.S.-led effort to counter Islamic extremism. In a clear contrast, the respondents from secular India do not appear to share the Muslim countries' concern over the nature of U.S. international behavior. Indian respondents rated U.S. nationalism/unilateralism as a less-than-serious problem, far below the other issues discussed here.

- The analysts from *Oceania*—Australia and New Zealand—expressed less concern about China than those from other subregions. The Taiwan Strait issue ranked thirteenth among 37 choices for this group, and received the lowest numerical score given by any subregional group on this survey question. On the other top issues, the rankings from this group paralleled the overall results.

- The participants from *Europe* ranked competition for energy as their second highest specific concern, the highest score on this both in relative and absolute terms of any of the subregional groups.

Figure 2 presents the results of a subset of issues on which the project has comparative data from 2007 and 2006. This list is headed by competition for energy resources, Islamist terrorism, and tensions in the Taiwan Strait. (Instability in Pakistan and Burma outranked these issues in 2008 but were not included in the surveys in 2007 or 2006.)

Because of changes in the way the questions have been posed over the three years, we have included in Figure 2 both the specific issue of Islamist terrorism and the general category of terrorism. The two earlier surveys found a higher level of concern over terrorism in general than Islamist terrorism, and concern over general terrorism has declined steadily over the three-year period. Concern over Islamist terrorism also declined between 2006 and 2007, but the current survey appears to indicate that this trend was reversed between 2007 and 2008 and that there is now greater concern over Islamist terrorism than terrorism as a general category. However, some caution is in order in interpreting this result. Instructions to participants would have led many participants who are less concerned about Islamist terrorism not to rate this specific issue.* If the entire group had scored Islamist terrorism the average would likely have been lower than that shown, and the overall level of concern for Islamist terrorism may well have also showed a decline between 2007 and 2008.

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* The instructions for the 2008 survey asked participants only to grade the specific issues within a category if they scored that whole category (e.g., terrorism) at or above the concern threshold level of 3. Compliance with this instruction was uneven, but many respondents who scored the general category of terrorism below 3 did not give a score on Islamist terrorism, scores that might have lowered the overall average.

Figure 2. Issues for Regional Security



*In 2007, this question referred to "scarce resources," in 2006, to "resources."
**In 2006 and 2007, this question referred to "violent Islamic extremism." (See also comment in text.)
***In 2008, this question was posed as one of seven generic categories. (See also comment in text.)
****In 2006, this question referred to "conflict on the Korean Peninsula."
*****The score for 2008 combines three separate questions on trade, labor, and finance.

In 2006 and 2007, the level of concern over terrorism was equaled or even exceeded by worry about North Korea's nuclear program and tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In 2008, the North Korean nuclear issue remains a subject of concern (above the 3 threshold), as does instability in North Korea (just below the threshold). However, among the nuclear proliferation issues the 2008 respondents rated the North Korean program as a lesser threat than proliferation in South Asia, and they rated Korea below the threshold level both as a territorial issue and in terms of bilateral tensions (see figure 1a).

The most obvious cause of the reduction in concern levels over issues on the Korean Peninsula is the durability and relative success of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. This judgment is reinforced by responses on subsequent questions, which rated the outlook on the North Korean nuclear question as both the most improved and the most positive of a series of continuing regional security issues. The Taiwan Strait situation has alternated with the Korean Peninsula in relative ranking over the course of this survey series; in 2008 it has again surpassed Korea on the list of concerns.

Propositions on Regional Security (Question #3). Participants were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with 15 statements about regional security (see the full list in Appendix II). The scale ran from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly), with 3 being the neutral threshold. Eleven of the 15 questions had also been asked in 2007, and two others had been asked in a slightly different form. Two of the questions were new for 2008—a question on whether regional countries will look to the United States for leadership on security issues over the next decade, and another on whether the United States will exercise active security leadership in the region.

Figure 3 presents the responses to the propositions on regional security, ranked in terms of the degree of agreement. (Responses to the same or similar questions in 2007 are also shown, along with responses to eight of the statements that were also asked in the 2006 survey.)

Respondents' answers generally ranged from "agree" to "neutral." The only statement for which the overall average for the region fell on the negative side of neutral was "China's rise will have a destabilizing impact on the region." The low level of concern over the impact of China's rise carried across all regions. Responses from the South Asian, European, and North American groups all expressed disagreement, while those from Southeast Asia and Oceania were neutral. The Northeast Asians were the only group whose ratings rounded to agreement with this statement, with the Koreans and Russians expressing agreement and the Japanese rating being nearly neutral but still positive. (The views of the Chinese and Taiwan respondents on this question unsurprisingly were at opposite poles, effectively canceling each other out.)

The analysts' projections were less sanguine on the U.S. response to China's rise. There was general agreement that the U.S. response will be critical to the future political environment in the region, but this was coupled with a similar (though lower) level of agreement that the United States will see China's rise as a threat. The Chinese participants expressed skepticism that the United States would see China's rise this way, perhaps related to their overall view that China's rise will not be destabilizing. At the other end of the spectrum, the Indonesian and Malaysian analysts agreed strongly that the United States would see China's rise as a threat. In these cases, given their own very low level of concern that China's rise will be destabilizing,

Figure 3. Statements on Regional Security



presumably both of these country groups would see such a U.S. assessment as incorrect and therefore all the more worrisome.

The desirability of enhanced security cooperation in the region drew a more positive response nearly across the board. There was strongest agreement with the statement that "Regional countries and institutions should develop effective mechanisms for taking joint action in response to security problems." Three other top-ranked statements expressed similar sentiments—support for more coordination on political and security issues among the various regional forums, support for an official security forum for Northeast Asia, and support for a China-Japan-U.S. defense dialogue. These responses continued the patterns in past surveys, in which the rankings on similar lists of statements also prioritized the need for greater regional cooperation.

Other responses suggest that support for strengthened regional security arrangements is reinforced by declining confidence in the U.S. security role in the region. Three of the four least supported statements were (1) "Over the coming decade the United States will exercise active security leadership in the region," (2) "The U.S. forward military presence will be very important to regional stability," and (3) "Regional countries will look to the United States for leadership in case of serious security problems."

Nevertheless, despite their assessment of limited prospects for future U.S. support of regional security and their strong belief that the countries and institutions in the region should cooperate more closely with each other (thus moving to fill the gap), survey participants were not optimistic that the region will actually meet this challenge. The statement "Regional countries will increasingly cooperate over the next decade in taking action to respond to regional security problems" received virtually the same low score as the assertion that the region would/could look to the United States for leadership. So what emerges is a sober—though not panicked—assessment of prospects for regional security cooperation and leadership.

Noteworthy aspects of the subregional responses are

- The *Northeast Asians* registered the highest level of agreement with the statement "The impact of China's rise and Chinese future actions as a great power are the biggest uncertainties in the region." This statement ranked third in this group's list, and it would have ranked even higher except that respondents from China downplayed the concern (consistent with their responses on related questions). The Northeast Asians, unsurprisingly, also recorded the strongest level of support for the establishment of a security forum for the subregion, as well as for the proposition that "The discussion of political and security issues in APEC should be more structured and regular."

- At the other end of the scale, the *Southeast Asians* were least supportive of strengthening APEC's political-security discussions, presumably reflecting the priority given by Southeast Asians to the ASEAN Regional Forum as the premier regional mechanism for political-security consultations.

- Similarly, the *South Asian* respondents, somewhat removed from Northeast Asia and its issues, showed less interest than other subregional groups in a security forum for

Northeast Asia or a defense dialogue among Japan, China, and the United States. The South Asians were more supportive of a more structured role for APEC (perhaps reflecting the hope of most South Asian countries to join APEC). Also interestingly, the South Asians were the only subregional group that clearly agreed that the United States will exercise active security leadership in the region over the next decade—possibly reflecting a pragmatic judgment that the United States' deep entanglement in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan will not end any time soon.

Nontraditional Security Issues (Question #4). Participants were asked to grade the degree to which 17 nontraditional security issues (see Appendix II) pose threats to their country's security in the near-term future, on a scale of 1 (no threat) to 5 (very serious threat).

Figure 4a displays the top 10 issues in 2008 both regionwide and for each of the subregional groups. Figure 4b shows the changes in overall rankings of those issues carried in the 2008, 2007, and 2006 surveys.

Rounding the scores on this question to single digits,* two environmental issues—global warming and environmental degradation—registered as posing a "serious threat" (level 4). Another seven issues were rated as posing mid-level threats (level 3), and a final five were ranked as lower-level threats (level 2). The "possibility of serious international economic downturn or crisis" ranked third overall, at the top of the second group. However, the more generalized threat from economic globalization, which ranked fourth in 2007, dropped to the next-to-last position in 2008. One possible explanation for this otherwise anomalous contrast is that the more specific issue of energy insecurity, new to the 2008 list, may have displaced the broader topic of globalization in the 2008 rankings.

Global warming, also new to the 2008 list, is another very topical issue. With reports of the Bali summit fresh in analysts' minds, the top ranking of this issue is understandable. This ranking is also supported by the level of concern over environmental degradation, which nearly tied with global warming for first place in 2008 and ranked first or second in all three years. In 2006, with memories of SARS fresh in people's minds, the spread of infectious diseases ranked first, followed by environmental degradation; diseases dropped to second place in 2007 and this threat ranks fourth in 2008. The threat of an economic downturn also ranked third in 2007, up from fourth in 2006. A recurrence of either an infectious disease outbreak or economic crisis in subsequent years would very likely raise these two issues in the ratings again.

Other topics included for the first time in the 2008 survey were cross-border pollution flows, nuclear proliferation, water shortages, trafficking in women, and instability in one's own country. All of

* Computation of average responses to this question was complicated by an error in labeling the choices. The middle option was labeled "Neutral/Uncertain" instead of "Threat" and the preceding choice was labeled "Threat" instead of "Some Threat." While some respondents may well have chosen the middle option thinking it meant the third level on the scale, on the chance that some selected it because they were neutral or uncertain we chose not to include any of the "3" responses in the calculation. (We also believe that, as "3" was the middle option on the scale, leaving out these responses would not unduly skew the resulting scores.)

Figure 4a. Nontraditional Security Issues

Regionwide and Subregion Rankings (Top 10) – 2008

(Each issue has same color throughout.)

(Median score of top five highlighted gray.)

REGIONWIDE

Rank		Score
1	Global warming	3.88
2	Environmental degradation	3.75
3	International economic crisis	3.28
4	Spread of pandemic diseases	3.14
5	Insecurity of energy supply	2.91
6	Pollution from another country	2.79
7	Nuclear proliferation	2.72
8	Drug trafficking	2.65
9	Vulnerability to natural disasters	2.65
10	Instability in a neighboring country	2.42

NORTHEAST ASIA

	Score
Environmental degradation	3.97
Global warming	3.77
Pollution from another country	3.74
Instability in a neighboring country	3.73
Insecurity of energy supply	3.70
Vulnerability to natural disasters	3.00
Spread of pandemic diseases	2.78
International economic crisis	2.75
Nuclear proliferation	2.60
Drug trafficking	2.55

SOUTHEAST ASIA

	Score
Environmental degradation	4.28
International economic crisis	4.05
Vulnerability to natural disasters	3.97
Spread of pandemic diseases	3.78
Global warming	3.61
Drug trafficking	3.24
Trafficking in women/sex trade	3.22
Insecurity of energy supply	3.12
Pollution from another country	2.79
Income inequalities/social instability	2.77

OCEANIA

	Score
Global warming	3.55
International economic crisis	2.80
Spread of pandemic diseases	2.75
Environmental degradation	2.50
Vulnerability to natural disasters	2.50
Nuclear proliferation	2.21
Drug trafficking	2.10
Shortage of water	2.05
Instability in a neighboring country	1.70
Insecurity of energy supply	1.50

SOUT ASIA

	Score
Environmental degradation	4.60
Global warming	4.54
Vulnerability to natural disasters	4.19
Drug trafficking	4.08
Shortage of water	4.04
Trafficking in women/sex trade	3.89
Pollution from another country	3.83
Insecurity of energy supply	3.73
Spread of pandemic diseases	3.68
International economic crisis	3.61

EUROPE

	Score
Global warming	4.00
Environmental degradation	3.67
Nuclear proliferation	3.17
Pollution from another country	2.71
International economic crisis	2.71
Insecurity of energy supply	2.67
Spread of pandemic diseases	2.67
Income inequalities/social instability	2.13
Economic globalization	2.00
Drug trafficking	1.75

NORT AMERICA

	Score
Global warming	3.82
International economic crisis	3.72
Environmental degradation	3.49
Nuclear proliferation	3.18
Spread of pandemic diseases	3.18
Insecurity of energy supply	2.73
Pollution from another country	2.45
Vulnerability to natural disasters	2.25
Drug trafficking	2.15
Ethnic nationalism or separatism	2.00

these were ranked in the middle ranges except instability in one's own country, which came in last. This is largely because only the Southeast Asian and South Asian groups expressed serious concern about this issue. However, even these subregional groups ranked this problem relatively low (tenth) on their list of concerns.

Again, some variations in the subregional rankings are worth noting:

- The *South Asian* participants had the longest list of "serious" threats. To the top three they added vulnerability to natural disasters (third place), drug trafficking, shortage of water, pollution from another country, insecurity of energy supply, and trafficking in women/sex trade. Although they also rated a possible economic downturn as a serious threat, it placed ninth and last on their "serious" list. At the low end of their list, nuclear

Figure 4b. Nontraditional Security Issues



proliferation ranked fourteenth for the South Asians: only three of nine Indian participants and one of six Pakistanis ranked this as a serious threat. (As both India and Pakistan already possess nuclear weapons, further proliferation in South Asia may not be an immediate concern for these analysts. However, this rating also suggests less concern over the possibility or significance of Iran developing a nuclear capability than there is in the international community generally.)

- *Northeast Asian* participants also had a large number of concerns over nontraditional issues, ranking six of these as "serious" threats. They put pollution flowing from another country in third place, perhaps stimulated by recent incidents involving China. Instability in a neighboring country (e.g., North Korea), insecurity of energy supply, and vulnerability to natural disasters filled out the Northeast Asians' "serious" list.

- *Southeast Asian* respondents identified four "serious" level concerns. They differed from the overall results through ranking environmental degradation in the top place and also ranking the spread of infectious diseases and the possibility of an economic downturn ahead of global warming. Southeast Asia's position at the center of the continuing avian flu outbreak is a logical explanation for the second-place ranking of this issue.

- The other three subregional groups registered lower levels of concern about most of the nontraditional issues than the South, Northeast, and Southeast Asians, although their rank ordering is generally consistent with the overall results. The *Europeans* only rated global warming and the environment at the "serious" level, the *North Americans* rated global warming and a possible economic downturn at this level, and the *Oceania* respondents only gave this rating to global warming—and that was only because the New Zealand analysts rated this threat as very serious.

"Watch-List" Issues (Question #5). The survey asked respondents to grade the changes over the past year in the outlook for nine regional security issues (listed in Appendix II), on a scale from 1 (much better) through 3 (unchanged) to 5 (much worse). Most of these issues are continuing concerns in the region and have been tracked by the Security Outlook project over a full decade. The only change in the content of this question in the 2008 survey was the addition of the overall security situation in the region (there also had been one change in 2007, generalizing a previous question on instability in Indonesia to apply to the whole region). Figure 5 shows the rankings on these issues, ordered from the most positive to the most negative, with comparable findings from the previous surveys where available.

As in previous years, responses on this question were very cautious, essentially bunching within a half-point range around "unchanged." However, comparison with the two previous years shows a slightly more optimistic outlook. The outlooks for six of the eight specific issues were rated as having changed in an overall positive direction in the 2008 survey, compared with five of eight in the two preceding years. Further, the new overall assessment is the second highest among the positives. The most positive outlook, and the only one rated closer to "better" than "neutral," was for "Peace on the Korean Peninsula." As previously noted, this ranking is consistent with the progress in the Six-Party Talks during 2007.

Figure 5. "Watch-List" Issues

At the other end of the spectrum, the outlook for "Dangers of domestic instability affecting regional stability" received the most negative rating for change between 2007 and 2008. This is consistent with responses to previous questions on internal instability in Pakistan and Burma, likely reinforced by awareness of internal issues in many other countries in the region. However, the numerical assessment on this issue was only tenths of a point below neutral, almost identical to that in the 2007 survey. The other issue that received a negative ranking is the outlook for regional arms races, which has drawn negative ratings in all the surveys.

One other change from the 2007 survey of some interest is that the outlook on terrorism has shifted from negative to positive. In absolute terms, the overall rating on this issue improved by nearly half a point. The improvement could reflect a feeling that the threat of terrorism regionwide is no longer on the rise. However, the overall score on this issue in 2008 was skewed by the one Bangladeshi and one of the Chinese analysts, both of whom gave it the top score of "much improved." Without these two responses the overall average for 2008 would still have been negative (-.03).

At the level of the subregional groupings, two variations from the overall pattern stand out:

- *Northeast Asian* respondents felt most positive about the regional economic outlook, scoring it closer to "better" than "unchanged." Peace in Korea received the second most positive score, but unlike the overall average, the Northeast Asian score was closer to "unchanged" than "better." The Northeast Asian analysts thus are more cautious about future progress on the North Korean nuclear issue than their colleagues from other subregions who are less directly exposed to the North Koreans. This more skeptical outlook may also underlie the Northeast Asian rating of the outlook for regional arms races as closest to "worse." A final variation is that the respondents from Northeast Asia, unlike most others, ranked "domestic instability affecting regional instability" on the "better" side of "unchanged." This may reflect a feeling that the North Korean situation will not deteriorate too far, but could also indicate confidence that the degree of consultation among the neighboring governments (via the Six-Party Talks) reduces the chance that instability in North Korea would lead to wider regional conflict.

- *Southeast Asian* participants also identified the prospects for dampening regional arms races as closest to "worse" but, in contrast with their Northeast Asian counterparts, the Southeast Asians ranked domestic instability second on their "worse" list. With Burma and other insurgencies in their immediate neighborhood, the Southeast Asians have reason to feel more uncertain on this topic than the Northeast Asian participants.

Significant Developments in 2007 (Question #6). This question asked for assessments of the impact on the security outlook of 15 specific developments over the past year (listed in Appendix II), on a scale from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative), with 3 meaning no change/neutral.

Figure 6 presents the eight developments rated as most positive or most negative, by overall averages. (The scores on the other seven developments clustered in a very narrow range of 0.22 points on the negative side and are not specifically discussed here.)

Figure 6. Significant Developments in 2007



Most of the developments selected for this question have apparent negative implications, and several positive developments from the previous survey were dropped from the list. Consequently, almost all of the assessments fell on the negative side of neutral. Seven of the scores were clearly negative, and only one was positive.

The positive rating went to "Further agreements in Six-Party Talks with North Korea on the nuclear issue." The seven developments given negative ratings were a disparate group—led by oil price rises, followed by global warming and the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, the level of concern over the U.S. "surge" in Iraq, which had been ranked the third most negative development in the 2007 survey and the most negative development in 2006, dropped by almost a half a point in the 2008 survey to become only the seventh most negative development. By contrast, the continuing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, which was ranked the most negative development in 2007, is still in this range in 2008, in a virtual tie for second place. This suggests some decline in concern among security analysts over the direction of developments in Iraq, but no similar decline in the case of Afghanistan.

The Six-Party Talks involving North Korea's nuclear program were the unanimous choice of the subregions—and of all but two single-respondent groups at the country level—as the year's most positive development. The subregions also agreed that the rise in oil prices and global warming were among the most negative recent developments.

The more noteworthy subregional variations on this question included

- Participants from *South Asia, Europe,* and *Northeast Asia* all listed the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan as significantly more negative (by nearly half a point) than the events in Burma. The *Southeast Asian* analysts reversed this placement and gave priority to developments in their own region, ranking the Burma events as the second most negative development, well above Afghanistan. The Southeast Asian priority order was very similar in the 2007 survey, when the insurgencies in southern Thailand and the Philippines were ranked first and second most negative and the U.S. surge in Iraq virtually tied with Afghanistan in third and fourth place. The *North American* and *Oceania* analysts also ranked developments in Burma as more serious than those in Afghanistan, but by only one place (the North Americans ranked Burma as the most negative development).

- The *Oceania, South Asian, and Southeast Asian* analysts stood out in giving clearly negative assessments (rounding to the "4" level) to the idea of U.S.-Japan-Australia-India cooperation to counter China. They ranked this proposal among their four most negative developments over the year. By contrast, this development was given a much less negative rating by the participants from *Europe*, *North America*, and *Northeast Asia*; their scores rounded to the "3" or neutral level—with the exception of the Chinese analysts, who (not surprisingly) rated this as by far the worst development of 2007.

Likely Impact of Events Scheduled for 2008 (Question #7). Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that five events in 2008 may *cause tensions or instability* in the Asia Pacific region in 2008, on a scale of 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely).

The respondents identified only two of the five events—the presidential election in Taiwan and the parliamentary elections in Pakistan—as somewhat (though not strongly) likely to cause tensions in the region. The other events listed—inauguration of a new Korean president, the U.S. elections, and the Beijing Olympics—were rated as not likely to cause tensions, with the Beijing Olympics considered the least likely of all.

The few noteworthy exceptions to the broad consensus among the subregions and country groups were

- The analysts from China (and the one respondent from Bangladesh) identified the Beijing Olympics as the potentially most-disruptive event. Given the importance of the Olympics to China, the Chinese analysts may well be especially conscious of the possibility that something could go wrong and mar this event (as in fact happened when demonstrations on Tibet disrupted the Olympic torch relay).
- The Russian, South Korean, and Chinese respondents all ranked the U.S. elections as the second-most likely disruptive event.
- The Bangladesh analyst also differed from the norm by rating the Pakistan elections as least likely to cause regional tensions.

International Action in Internal Conflicts (Question #8). Participants were asked to indicate the strongest level of international community action they believed would be appropriate in six instances of civil conflicts with potentially wider impacts. They were offered five options, on an ascending scale of activism: diplomacy, graded sanctions, peacekeepers, UN-authorized military intervention, or "coalition" intervention (i.e., if necessary without UN approval).

The conflict situations presented were

1. Sudan (Darfur)
2. South Pacific Islands (failed state)
3. Burma/Myanmar (human rights)
4. Sri Lanka (escalating civil war)
5. Middle East (Palestine/Lebanon/Jordan)
6. Iraq (civil war after U.S. disengagement)

Figure 7 displays these results. None of the situations prompted respondents to endorse the use of force beyond sending peacekeepers, and only Darfur was judged sufficiently serious to justify this step.

In dealing with Darfur, respondents from several of the subregional groups did express willingness to go beyond peacekeeping to "UN military intervention." Participants from Oceania endorsed this option most strongly, followed by those from Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. The South Asians were least supportive of peacekeepers, primarily because the Pakistani participants favored only the lesser step of "graded sanctions."



Figure 7. International Intervention

In 2007, the strongest overall response was also on Darfur, with participants expressing willingness to employ "strong sanctions." Individual analysts in North America and Oceania had indicated a willingness to go beyond this step in the direction of "military intervention," although neither group reached this level of intervention. Only in the 2006 survey did the participants as a group endorse military intervention, and this was for the then-established case of the postñSeptember 11 intervention in Afghanistan.

Some of the subregional groups did indicate willingness to intervene in other situations—though only with peacekeepers:

- *Southeast Asian* respondents were comfortable with peacekeeping in the Middle East, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and the South Pacific (in that order). In the case of Burma, however, they were only willing to recommend "sanctions." This response may reflect the fact that Burma is an ASEAN member and therefore a particular problem for the Southeast Asians, and to date ASEAN has been reluctant to put serious pressure on the Burmese regime to reform.

- The *Oceania* and *North American* analysts supported using peacekeepers in the South Pacific, but only because the Australian and Canadian participants were enthusiastic about this option; the U.S. analysts were ambivalent, and the New Zealanders were distinctly unsupportive. The Australians' position may reflect their country's special sense of responsibility for leadership in the island region, and the Canadians have a strong record of participation in peacekeeping operations around the world.

- Among the *Northeast Asians*, only the South Koreans and the one respondent from Taiwan favored stronger action than peacekeepers in any situation, and the Chinese and Japanese respondents only supported using peacekeepers in Darfur.

- In *South Asia*, the Indian and Bangladeshi respondents endorsed peacekeepers in Iraq after U.S. disengagement, and the Indians also supported peacekeepers in the South Pacific.

Outcomes of the Iraq Conflict (Question #9). This question asked participants to grade the likelihood of six possible outcomes of the Iraq conflict over the next decade, on a scale from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely). The options offered were

a. Full U.S. withdrawal will take place or be well underway by the end of 2008 and will be quickly completed under the next U.S. administration.
b. U.S. military involvement in Iraq will continue at a substantial level for many years.
c. The Iraq war will be followed by wider conflicts in the region that could involve Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and/or Israel.
d. Terrorist groups in the Asia Pacific region will gain new recruits and energy due to the Iraq conflict and the U.S. "War on Terrorism."
e. The governments in Iraq and Afghanistan will consolidate their positions over the next five years, leading to a more peaceful and stable region.
f. Sustained anti-terrorism campaigns in the region will erode the morale and capability of terrorist organizations and reduce terrorist attacks.

Figure 8 presents the responses to this question. As with most questions in this survey, responses fell overwhelmingly in the middle ranges—in this case between "likely" and "unlikely." The only outcome rated as "likely" was that terrorist groups in the region will gain new recruits and energy. The outcome ranked second most likely was that U.S. military involvement will continue for many years. The outcome considered most "unlikely" is that the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan will consolidate their positions over the next five years, and the one ranked second most unlikely is full U.S. withdrawal under the current or next administration. Thus the basic appraisal of this broad group of analysts is that U.S. involvement in Iraq will continue but that the region will not become more stable and the energy of the terrorists will not be diminished.

The responses on the outcomes of the Iraq conflict were quite uniform across the subregions. All six subregional groups selected "terrorists will gain recruits" and "U.S. military involvement will continue" as the two most likely outcomes. Respondents from Southeast Asia, Oceania, Europe, and North America all rated "terrorists will gain recruits" as the single most likely outcome.

Past surveys have approached the Iraq problem in slightly different ways, based on the situation at the time of each survey. In 2006, participants were asked to identify their preferred course of action regarding Iraq, and the responses overwhelmingly favored transferring responsibility from U.S. to UN control (except for the Europeans who preferred outright withdrawal). In 2007, respondents weighed a set of possible longer-term impacts of the conflict on Asia Pacific security, and the majority chose "U.S. standing in the region will be eroded in the short term, but the U.S. security role and relationships will continue to be valued and confidence on both sides will largely recover over the next decade."

Both the 2006 and 2007 choices suggested a presumption of a relatively early (and ignominious) U.S. exit from Iraq. In the 2008 survey, following the U.S. surge in 2007, the respondents still do not appear to believe that this American strategy will be successful, but they nevertheless believe that it will continue at least through the end of Bush's term and into that of the next administration.

Outlook for the North Korean Nuclear Issue (Question #10). In a similar format to the question on Iraq, participants were asked to choose among six possible outcomes of the North Korean nuclear issue following the February 2007 agreement in the Six-Party Talks:

a. Further (if slow/uneven) progress toward the declared goal of denuclearization
b. North Korean delays stalemate the process leading to return to standoff/sanctions
c. Additional North Korean nuclear and missile tests
d. Acceptance by international community of North Korea as a nuclear power
e. Military conflict (either incidents by North Korea or U.S. preemption)
f. Other (with an invitation to elaborate in a subsequent space)

Counting only those participants who responded to this question (15 percent did not), an overall average across the subregions of 71 percent selected option (a) "Further/uneven progress." Another 21 percent chose option (b) "Delays – stalemate – return to – sanctions." Figure 9 displays these results.



Figure 8. Likely Outcomes of Iraq Conflict

Figure 9. Outlook for North Korean Nuclear Issue



In the 2006 survey, at a time when Six-Party Talks had yet to show results, participants opted for continuing negotiations as the most likely course (with the South Asians urging the United States to be more accommodating toward North Korea). In the 2007 survey, conducted following the February agreement, respondents were offered the same options as in the current survey. One half chose the "further progress" outcome, while somewhat over one third chose the "return to standoff/sanctions" outcome. Thus after continuing stop-and-go negotiations throughout 2007, more participants seem to have become convinced that this pattern will prevail into the future, and a smaller percentage now anticipates a breakdown in the Six-Party process.

At the subgroup level, variations from the overall pattern of some interest are

- Japanese respondents (and the one participant from Taiwan) were significantly less sanguine than the overall consensus: Five out of six Japanese who responded on this question (and the one from Taiwan) chose the stalemate/standoff outcome, while the sixth Japanese predicted resumed North Korean nuclear testing. Japanese skepticism on this question is in keeping with more pessimistic responses from the Japanese analysts to other questions dealing with Northeast Asian security issues. The only other groups in which a majority did not select the "further progress" option were Canada, where the "stalemate" option was the choice of the majority (60 percent), and Europe where just 50 percent chose "further progress."

- Only very small numbers of participants predicted either further North Korean nuclear tests or international acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. One each from Japan, Singapore, and Europe foresaw resumed testing, and one analyst from Europe, one from Brunei, and two from the United States anticipated that the international community will ultimately accept North Korea as a nuclear power. No participant expected conflict to be initiated by either side.

Effectiveness of Regional Institutions. The final two questions dealt with different aspects of the effectiveness of 13 regional institutions and other mechanisms (full list in Appendix II). The first (Question #11) asked participants to rate the effectiveness of regional institutions as *instruments for building a sense of regional community*, while the second (Question #12) asked them to appraise the institutions as *mechanisms for practical cooperation and problem solving.* In both cases the scale was from highly effective to highly ineffective.

Figure 10 presents the overall results on both dimensions, with the 13 institutions ranked in order of their perceived effectiveness on the first (community-building) dimension.

(A) Sense of community (top bars): As in the 2007 survey, ASEAN and related institutions emerged as the clear winner as builders of a sense of community. ASEAN itself obtained the highest rating, followed by the ASEAN-Plus-Three grouping (the "three" being China, Japan, South Korea). All six subregional groups rated ASEAN "effective" or better. APEC was the only other institution to be

Figure 10. Effectiveness of Regional Institutions



rated "effective," but by only two of the subregional groups: Oceania (which founded APEC) and South Asia (where many governments would like to join). Seven other institutions, including the SCO, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Six-Party Talks (on North Korea) were rated between "effective" and "neutral." (APEC's overall rating was also in this group ranking sixth out of the seven.)

The final four institutions on the list ranked at some level of "ineffective." As in 2007, the lowest ranking on this measure went to SAARC (South Asia's counterpart to ASEAN), an organization that has struggled to find a mission and stature. The second-lowest ranking institution was the Tumen River Area Development Program, a relatively obscure and, to date, ill-starred regional development effort along the Russia-China-Korea borders.

The other two institutions in the "ineffective" group were the UN and the U.S. alliance/defense cooperation system. (The U.S. system was virtually on the neutral line but nevertheless on the ineffective side.) These evaluations are not surprising in the context of contributions to building a sense of Asia Pacific *regional* community, given the UN's global mandate and perceptions of the U.S. regional defense system as a "hub and spoke" arrangement centered on the United States rather than a truly multilateral or region-driven undertaking.

At the subregional level, there were several variations, but none were particularly surprising.

- *Southeast Asia*, home to ASEAN and host of ASEAN-Plus-Three, rated both institutions as "effective," with ASEAN ranked first. The other choices received a neutral rating, except for SAARC, which was rated "ineffective."

- The ratings by the *North Americans* of both the UN and the U.S. defense mechanisms were even lower than the overall average. This largely reflected the Canadian ratings of both institutions as "ineffective" and at the bottom of the list (with the U.S. alliance system in last place).

- As in some other cases, the rankings for *Northeast Asia* as a subregion featured sharp contrasts in the views of the Chinese and Taiwan participants. The Chinese analysts ranked the China-led SCO in a tie with three other institutions for the top rating, while the U.S. alliance system was at the bottom. The Taiwan analyst reversed the two rankings, and also gave the SCO the lowest possible score of "highly ineffective"—the only such score in any of the group averages on this question. Respondents from all the other Northeast Asian countries, including U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, scored the U.S. alliance mechanisms and the SCO within two positions of each other. If the Taiwan scores are excluded, the SCO rises by three places on the Northeast Asian table, to sixth out of 13, and the U.S. alliance mechanism drops by seven places to next to last. However, it is also worth noting that with this exception, the rank order of the institutions is the same whether the Taiwan scores are included or not, so the Northeast Asians are actually quite consistent in their views on most regional institutions.

- *South Asian* respondents recorded the most positive views on the effectiveness of regional institutions in building a sense of community. The South Asian averages rated none of the

13 institutions at the neutral level or below. This enthusiasm may reflect the interest shown by all the major South Asian governments in membership in a number of these institutions (e.g., APEC or ASEAN-Plus-Three) which as yet have no South Asian participants.

- At the other end of the spectrum, the *North Americans* and the *Europeans* each gave 6 (the same 6) of the 13 institutions ratings of neutral or below, suggesting greater skepticism as to the effectiveness of the various institutions in forming a sense of regional community. And these rankings do not simply reflect the inclusion or exclusion of those giving the ratings: the Europeans participate in only one of the low-ranked six (the UN), while the North Americans participate in five (all but SAARC).

(B) Practical cooperation (lower bars): On this dimension too the analysts gave "effective" ratings to ASEAN and ASEAN-Plus-Three. However, the Six-Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear issue also received an "effective" rating, and the U.S. alliance/defense cooperation mechanisms came very close to this level. All the other institutions were rated "unclear" or neutral as vehicles for practical cooperation.

Comparing the ratings on the two institutional dimensions, the U.S. defense arrangements and the UN both gained six places in the rank ordering for practical cooperation as compared with general community building. The only other institution that gained in rank is the Six-Party Talks. This is consistent with the results of the 2007 survey, and as was noted in that report it appears that all three of these institutions are generally regarded as practical, action-oriented mechanisms.

The 2007 survey used slightly different wording and four effectiveness categories to rate only 10 institutions (the UN, Northeast Asia Track II processes, and the Tumen River project were added in 2008), so the two sets of rankings are not strictly comparable. However, in 2007 no institution was rated "generally effective" as a problem solver. ASEAN received the highest rating, but its score fell in the "somewhat effective" category, as did the second-place institution—U.S. alliance and defense cooperation mechanisms. All the other institutions were ranked in the "somewhat effective" category behind the first two, except for SAARC, which received an overall "ineffective" rating for problem solving.

Thus it appears that ASEAN has moved up in the esteem of security analysts between the 2007 and 2008 surveys, into the "generally effective" category as a mechanism for practical cooperation. This suggests that after long years of being considered primarily a "talk shop," ASEAN has gained recognition among regional security analysts as an organization that can have a practical effect—coordinating policies and actions by its members. A number of developments may have contributed to this rise in stature, including counterterrorism cooperation and free trade negotiations, but most prominently and recently the signing at the November 2007 summit of an ASEAN Charter making the grouping a legal entity, and the issuance of a declaration of intent to establish an ASEAN Community with politico-security, economic, and socio-cultural elements. By contrast, APEC, which has long focused on an economic cooperation agenda, has remained at the same "somewhat effective" level in the eyes of these analysts.

- Among the subregions, only *Europe* and *North America* gave ASEAN less than an "effective" rating in problem solving. A somewhat paradoxical contrast is that the *Southeast Asian* analysts ranked ASEAN, their own subregional institution, behind the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia in terms of practical effectiveness, while the *Northeast Asians* returned the compliment by ranking ASEAN ahead of the Six-Party Talks. Although there is no further detail on these points in the survey responses, it is tempting to suggest that the members of both of these subregions know their own institutions well enough to be quite aware of the challenges they face.

- As with the preceding question, the *South Asian* participants emerged as most positive on the practical effectiveness of regional institutions, again rating none of the 13 as "ineffective" or "neutral." The *North Americans* proved the most skeptical on this question, rating 7 of the 13 below neutral in effectiveness. On this measure the Europeans were more generous, ranking only two institutions as ineffective to some degree.

Comments on the Survey. The final question in this survey each year asks respondents to comment on the survey itself. As in the past, a number of comments suggested additional subjects that the survey might cover (or cover in more detail). Other comments expressed the view that the questionnaire is (still) too long.

Suggested additional or expanded subjects included the possible impact of a new conflict in the Middle East, the impacts of democratic politics, ethnic and religious conflicts, civil society, additional aspects of China's rise, and longer-term future trends in regional security. We will consider all these suggestions in preparing the next survey, and we will continue trying to cover the most significant factors and features of the security situation while at the same time keeping the questionnaire to a manageable length!

Finally, several participants pointed out problems in the wording of the questionnaire and the options for responses. We greatly appreciate this feedback. As indicated earlier in the text of the report, we have attempted to take into account some of these issues in processing the responses, and we will revise the next survey accordingly.

APPENDIX I:

BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS

Subregion		Respondents	
Northeast Asia			**22**
	China	3	
	Japan	8	
	South Korea (ROK)	5	
	Russia	5	
	Taiwan	1	
Southeast Asia			**28**
	Brunei	2	
	Indonesia	6	
	Malaysia	3	
	Philippines	10	
	Singapore	7	
South Asia			**15**
	India	9	
	Pakistan	5	
	Bangladesh	1	
Oceania			**20**
	Australia	6	
	New Zealand	14	
Europe			**10**
	Europe	10	
North America			**33**
	Canada	5	
	United States	28	
Grand Total			**128**

APPENDIX II:

ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY SURVEY 2008

1. Please check your country or group:

   Australia
   Brunei
   Cambodia
   Canada
   China
   Europe
   India
   Indonesia
   Japan
   Korea (ROK)
   Laos
   Malaysia
   Mongolia
   New Zealand
   Pacific Islands
   Pakistan
   Philippines
   Russia
   Singapore
   Thailand
   United States
   Vietnam
   Other (please specify)

   If you do not claim any of the countries listed above or if your country of residence is not your country of origin, please specify.

2. Please rank, in your view, the seriousness of the following issue areas (underlined) and specific issues (listed by a, b, c, etc.) for Asia Pacific regional security over the next five years. For each issue area, please indicate your view of its seriousness from 1 (not serious) to 5 (very serious). If you rate an issue area as serious (between 3 and 5), please also mark the individual subtopics listed that you regard as highly serious or extremely serious.

   <u>Terrorism</u>

   Islamist terrorists
   Other international terrorists
   Other domestic terrorists

Nationalism

- Chinese nationalism
- Japanese nationalism
- U.S. nationalism (and/or unilateralism)
- Other (please specify)

Territorial issues

- Japan-Russia "Northern Territories" dispute
- Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
- Tensions in/across the Taiwan Strait
- South China Sea claims
- Kashmir
- Other (please specify)

Tensions in bilateral relationships

- China-Japan
- China-U.S.
- India-Pakistan
- Intra-ASEAN
- Japan-Russia
- Korea-Japan
- North Korea–South Korea
- Other (please specify)

Internal instability

- Central Asian republics
- China
- Burma/Myanmar
- Nepal
- North Korea
- Pacific Islands
- Pakistan
- Russia
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
- Other (please specify)

Arms issues

- Conventional arms races
- North Korean nuclear weapons program
- Nuclear proliferation in East Asia
- Nuclear proliferation in South Asia

Economic and resource issues

States competing to control energy sources
Competition for other resources
Migration/working rights and conditions
Trade disputes (over markets, jobs, investment)
Financial crises (rapid currency flows, exchange rate pressures)

3. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please use a scale of 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly), with 3 meaning neutral or uncertain.

a. The impact of China's rise and Chinese future actions as a great power are the biggest uncertainties in the region.
b. China's rise will have a destabilizing impact on the region.
c. How the U.S. responds to China's rise will largely determine the future political environment in the region.
d. The U.S. will see China's rise as a threat.
e. The U.S. forward military presence in Asia will be very important to regional stability over the next decade.
f. Regional countries will look to the U.S. for response and leadership in case of serious security problems over the next decade.
g. The U.S. will exercise active leadership on security issues in the Asia Pacific region over the coming decade.
h. Regional countries will increasingly cooperate over the next decade in taking action to respond to regional security problems.
i. Regional countries and institutions should develop effective mechanisms for taking joint action in response to security problems.
j. There should be more coordination among the different regional forums on political and security issues (ASEAN/ARF, APEC, East Asia Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organization).
k. The discussion of political and security issues in APEC should be more structured and regular.
l. There should be an official security forum for Northeast Asia.
m. There should be a triangular China-Japan-U.S. dialogue among defense ministers or officials.
n. Japan should be a "normal" country, capable of making security commitments to other countries.
o. Issues of human rights and political democracy will be a significant source of international consultations and disputes in the region over the next decade.

4. Please indicate your view as to whether the following issues pose threats to your country's security in the near-term future. Please use a scale of 1 (no threat) to 5 (very serious threat).

   a. Drug trafficking
   b. Environmental degradation
   c. Pollution flowing from another country
   d. Instability in a neighboring country
   e. Ethnic nationalism or separatism in your country
   f. Political system instability and/or violent competition in your country
   g. Income inequalities and social instability
   h. Shortage of water
   i. Economic globalization
   j. Illegal immigration
   k. Trafficking in women/sex trade
   l. Global warming
   m. Insecurity of energy supply
   n. Nuclear proliferation
   o. Possibility of serious international economic downturn or crisis
   p. Spread of diseases such as AIDS, SARS, or avian flu
   q. Vulnerability to natural disasters

5. Please indicate how you believe the outlook in the following areas has changed over the past year. Please use a scale from 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse), with 3 meaning unchanged.

   a. The overall security situation in the Asia Pacific region compared with a year ago.
   b. Peace on the Korean Peninsula
   c. Harmonious relations among the large powers
   d. Peaceful settlement of territorial disputes
   e. Dampening of potential regional arms races
   f. Regional economic outlook
   g. Dangers of domestic instability affecting regional stability
   h. Terrorism
   i. Negotiations to resolve India-Pakistan tensions

6. How do you assess the impact of the following developments over the past year on the Asia Pacific Security Outlook? Please use a scale from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative)—with 3 meaning no change or an even mix of positive and negative impacts.

   a. U.S. military "surge" in Iraq
   b. Continuing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan
   c. Further agreements in Six-Party Talks with North Korea on the nuclear issue
   d. Uncertainties over ratification of U.S.-India nuclear deal
   e. International response to Iran's nuclear program

f. Suggestion of U.S.-Japan-Australia-India cooperation to counter China
g. Anti-government protests and government crackdown in Burma (September-October)
h. Trends in the insurgency in southern Thailand
i. Pressures on Musharraf government in Pakistan
j. Continuing political conflict and uncertainty in Bangladesh
k. Uncertain outlook for government-Maoist accord in Nepal
l. Changes/trends in international oil prices
m. Global warming and climate change
n. Increasing incidence and awareness of cross-border pollution flows
o. Efforts by various governments to control energy resources and availability

7. What do you think is the likelihood that the following scheduled events in 2008 will directly or indirectly cause tensions or instability in the Asia Pacific region? Please use a scale of 1 (not likely) to 5 (highly likely), with 3 meaning an equal chance either way.

a. The U.S. Presidential/Congressional election
b. The Taiwan Presidential election
c. Inauguration of a new Korean President
e. Pakistan Parliamentary election
d. The Beijing Olympics

8. What actions by the international community do you think are or would be appropriate in the following situations? Please select the strongest level of action you believe should be seriously considered: Diplomacy (lowest level), Graded Sanctions, Peacekeepers, UN Military Intervention, or "Coalition" Intervention—meaning without UN approval (strongest level).

a. Sudan (Darfur) (humanitarian crisis, ethnic cleansing)
b. South Pacific Islands (failed state: government overthrow/collapse, conflict, anarchy)
c. Burma/Myanmar (suppression of human rights, democracy movement)
d. Sri Lanka (escalated civil/regional conflict with mass casualties)
e. Middle East—e.g., Palestine/Lebanon/Jordan (civil/sectarian wars with outside links)
f. Iraq post-U.S. disengagement (civil/sectarian war with outside links)

9. Please indicate your opinion as to the likelihood of the following possible outcomes and impacts of the Iraq conflict over the next decade. Please use a scale from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely).

a. Full U.S. withdrawal will take place or be well underway by the end of 2008 and be quickly completed under the next U.S. administration.
b. U.S. military involvement in Iraq will continue at a substantial level for many years.
c. The Iraq war will be followed by wider conflicts in the region that could involve Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and/or Israel.

d. Terrorist groups in the Asia Pacific region will gain new recruits and energy due to the continuing conflict in Iraq and related elements of the U.S. "War on Terrorism."
e. The new governments in Iraq and Afghanistan will slowly but steadily consolidate their military and political positions over the next five years leading to a more peaceful and stable region.
f. Sustained anti-terrorism campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region will erode the morale and capability of terrorist organizations, leading to a steady reduction in terrorist attacks.

10. How do you assess the outlook for the North Korean nuclear issue following the February 2007 agreement?

a. Further (if slow/uneven) progress toward the declared goal of denuclearization
b. North Korean delays stalemate process leading to a return to standoff and sanctions
c. Additional North Korean nuclear and missile tests
d. Acceptance by international community of North Korea as a nuclear power
e. Military conflict (either incidents by North Korea or preemption by U.S.)
f. Other—including if more than one of the above (specify)

11. How do you rate the effectiveness of the following institutions as instruments for building a sense of regional community? Please use a scale from 1 (highly effective) to 5 (highly ineffective), with 3 indicating not (or not yet) clear.

a. United Nations
b. APEC
c. ASEAN
d. ASEAN Regional Forum
e. U.S. alliance/defense cooperation mechanisms
f. ASEAN-Plus-Three
g. East Asia Summit
h. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
i. SAARC
j. Six-Party Talks (for Northeast Asia)
k. Tumen River Area Development Program (for Northeast Asia)
l. Regional Track II processes (e.g., PECC, CSCAP)
m. Northeast Asia Track II forums (e.g., NEA Economic Forum and Conference)

12. How do you rate the effectiveness of the following institutions as mechanisms for practical cooperation and problem solving? Please use a scale from 1 (highly effective) to 5 (highly ineffective), with 3 indicating not (or not yet) clear.

a. United Nations

b. APEC
c. ASEAN
d. ASEAN Regional Forum
e. U.S. alliance/defense cooperation mechanisms
f. ASEAN-Plus-Three
g. East Asia Summit
h. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
i. SAARC
j. Six-Party Talks (for Northeast Asia)
k. Tumen River Area Development Program (for Northeast Asia)
l. Regional Track II processes (e.g., PECC, CSCAP)
m. Northeast Asia Track II forums (e.g., NEA Economic Forum and Conference)