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## **Outward Ripples: How Japan-Korea History Tensions Affect ASEAN**

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Mr. Buckalew wrote this paper as a research intern at the East-West Center in Washington. This report is about how Japan-Korea conflict over historical memory impacts their relations with ASEAN member states.

## Abstract

Over the past decade, Japan-Korea tensions over their shared history have become a major cause for concern for analysts and practitioners of international relations. This working paper examines whether and how much Japan and Korea have “exported” their bilateral tensions to relations with member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and the impact on Japan-ASEAN and Korea-ASEAN ties. This is done by analyzing the economic, political, and security ties between these nations, as well as public opinion and media coverage of Japan-Korea ‘history issues’ within ASEAN. This data is interpreted through a ‘holistic constructivist’ theoretical framework, which seeks to look at culture and social constructions as a causal factor in international relations. The primary findings of this study are that: 1) Japanese regional efforts are primarily directed at countering China, not Korea; 2) While using some similar methods to Japan, Korea is also trying to change perceptions in ASEAN through local events; and 3) ASEAN member states are either not interested in the dispute or have strong incentives not to take a public or official stance on ‘Japan-Korea history’ issues.

Keywords: ASEAN, comfort women, holistic constructivism, Japan-Korean history tensions, Liancourt

## I. Introduction

The legacies of colonialism and World War II (WWII)<sup>1</sup> cast long shadows across history. Although there are few living people left who directly experienced the war, the importance of ‘history’ in many parts of Asia has grown with the passage of time. For Japan and Korea<sup>2</sup>, ‘history’ has exercised an increasing influence on their bilateral relations in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Prior to 2005 tensions would periodically arise related to the Korean ‘comfort women’ or the Liancourt Rocks among other issues<sup>3</sup>, but with the exceptions of protests related to the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty on Basic Relations and efforts to push Japan to apologize and compensate the comfort women in the early 1990s, these flare ups were usually limited in scale and scope.

There are several reasons why history issues were not a sustained topic public discourse in Japan and Korea. First, until 1987 Korean discussion of these topics was limited due to authoritarian rule under Presidents Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. Second, the end of the Cold War and rapid economic growth in Japan in 1991 and Korea in 1997 undermined the justifications upon which political elites based their continued governance.<sup>4</sup> In Japan, declining economic fortunes led the public to increasingly prioritize domestic and economic issues over foreign affairs. In Korea’s case the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis kept the public and political leaders preoccupied for years. Finally, the ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) by Japan and Korea in 1996 incentivized the two governments to be more open and assertive about their claims to Liancourt.

Though not immediately apparently these changes were harbingers of a shift in public sentiment in Japan and Korea. The 1997 crisis which led to a near macroeconomic collapse in Korea and the 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup, which incentivized cooperative behavior between

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter referred to as WWII, except in quotes and table titles.

<sup>2</sup> For the sake of consistency this report will refer to the ‘Republic of Korea’ or ‘South Korea’ simply as ‘Korea’, except when quoting source materials. The ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ will be referred to as ‘North Korea.’

<sup>3</sup> Known as ‘Dokdo’ in Korea and ‘Takeshima’ in Japan, this paper shall henceforth refer to the territory in question as ‘Liancourt’. Neither the author nor the East-West Center (EWC) make any assertions about the veracity of claims to the territory, which is a topic beyond the scope of this report.

<sup>4</sup> See Kan Kimura. *Ni-Kan Rekishi Ninshiki Mondai to wa nanika: Rekishi Kyokasho, Ianfu, Popyurizumu* [Something About the Japan-Korea History Recognition Problem: History Textbooks, the Comfort Women and Populism]. Tokyo: Minerva, 2014.

the governments and peoples of each nation. This cooperation led to a boom in the popularity of Korean pop culture known as *Hallyu* in Japan. However with Korea on much firmer economic footing by 2005 and an anti-*Hallyu* backlash was beginning to emerge in Japan a shift was about to take place.

The declaration of ‘Takeshima Day’ by Shimane Prefecture was laden with symbolism. The holiday first took place on the 100th anniversary of the original annexation of the territory in 1905, followed shortly thereafter by the establishment of a ‘protectorate’ over the whole of Korea. In addition, the declaration was issued in order to ‘highlight Japanese claims to the territory’.<sup>5</sup> This moment stands out to focus on because of the shifts in Japan and Korea’s foreign policy after 2005 and how that shift impacts ASEAN.

In Korea ‘Takeshima Day’ outraged the public and focused the nation’s civil society. From 2005 onward the Liancourt issue became ‘historicized’<sup>6</sup> and associated with the other legacies of Japanese-Korean interactions from the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries: 1) the intervention of Japan in Joseon<sup>7</sup> Korea’s affairs; 2) the annexation of Liancourt by Shimane Prefecture in 1905; 3) the colonization of Korea in 1910; 4) the forced conscription of Korean laborers during WWII; 5) the ‘Comfort Women’ system of military brothels operated by the Japanese military; and 6) Japanese efforts at revising Article IX of 1946 ‘Peace Constitution’ which legally limits their military forces. These issues taken together are referred to as ‘historical issues’ amongst Korean scholars. The recent ‘Comfort Women’ agreement between Japan and Korea in late 2015 has further brought their historical issues back into the limelight.

For the past decade these disputes have become more frequent and spilled out into both countries’ international relations with each other and their neighbors. Japan and Korea’s bilateral relations have been extensively written on in English, Japanese, and Korean by various scholars. Kagotani et al. (2013) and Kimura’s studies (2011, 2012, 2014) looked at the various impacts of ‘history issues’ on Japan and Korea’s domestic politics and bilateral relations. In a similar vein,

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<sup>5</sup> Choe, Sang-Hun. “Desolate Dots in the Sea Stir Deep Emotions as South Korea Resists a Japanese Claim,” *New York Times*, August 30, 2008. Accessed May 8, 2016.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/world/asia/31islands.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>6</sup> See Andrew Linkhart. *Historicizing Dokdo: The Role of NGOs in Changing South Korea's Policy Towards the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute with Japan, 1996-2008*. Masters' Thesis, Korea University: Seoul, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Joseon (or Choson) refers to the final pre-modern kingdom on the Korean Peninsula and the predecessor state of Korea.

Kim (2008) looked at Japan and Korea's interactions in an 'inter-mestic' context. Midford (2008) looked at Japan-Korea relations from the Liberal school of international relations (IR). His primary finding was that their relationship was so atypical as to call into questions of assumptions of the 'democratic peace theory.'<sup>8</sup> Linkhart (2012) looked at the influence of Korean civil society on the conflict utilizing Robert Putnam's 'Two Level Game' Theory.

Additionally, U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral interactions have also been extensively studied by scholars across different IR schools. Victor Cha has written a numerous studies from the neo-realist school (2000a, 2000b), looking at how Japan and Korea's bilateral relations have affected trilateral cooperation during and since the Cold War. Chinworth et al. also covered this topic but with an eye towards future challenges for the U.S. and its two allies in the region. In a slight contrast Gries et al. (2009) conducted a small-n quantitate study looking at how China, Japan, and Korea's relations in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries impacts perceptions of each other in the modern era among university students. This study had interesting implications for the future outlook of relations among the next generation of leaders.

There are several limitations to these studies. First the Liberal and Realist schools have had difficulty comprehensively analyzing Japan-Korea ties in isolation, let alone how their relations impact third party actors. This is because they rely on *a priori* rules based on theoretical assumptions which form the basis of their testing methodologies.<sup>9</sup> Specifically their epistemological assumptions may lead these schools limit or exclude critical data sources from consideration about how Japan-Korea relations influence ASEAN member states.

Second, while other studies have provided a number of insights into how Japan and Korea's bilateral relations impact each other's domestic politics and relationships with both China and the U.S., there seems to have been no comprehensive empirical studies conducted in English about if and how Japan-Korea historical issues influence ASEAN). This study seeks to fill in this gap in international relations research. Additionally, following President Obama's 'Rebalance to Asia' American interest by both scholars and practitioners of international relations in the region has greatly increased. While U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea ties are strong,

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<sup>8</sup> Paul Midford. "Challenging the Democratic Peace? Historical Memory and the Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea," *Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 23 Issue 2, 2008.

<sup>9</sup> John Gerard Ruggie. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," in *International Organization* 52, 4, 855-885, Autumn 1998, 857.

Japan-Korea relations have been a point of difficulty, which has potential consequences for American policy towards both China and ASEAN. The next section will look at the methodology of the study and its theoretical structure.

#### A. Methodology and Theoretical Structure

To attempt to get a more complete picture of how Japan and Korea's bilateral tensions impact ASEAN this report will utilize a number of qualitative and quantitative data sources: 1) statements by the respective governments or their subsidiary ministries; 2) analysis of ASEAN's economic ties with Japan and Korea including: bilateral trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and Official Development Assistance (ODA), trade agreements and membership in joint economic forums; 3) an analysis of ASEAN's political and security ties with Japan and Korea including regional political/security frameworks, major security agreements, cooperative efforts, treaties, joint military exercise and state visits; 4) public opinion data; 5) issue advocacy by the Japanese and Korean governments and their respective civil societies; and 6) newspaper articles published or republished in ASEAN member states. The number of articles included in this report represent a small-n sample of (n = 73).

Furthermore, newspaper article searches were conducted online via Google and on respective ASEAN, Japanese, and Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)-associated websites use the following keywords in various combinations: Japan, (South) Korea, history, comfort women, tension, Dokdo, Takeshima, Liancourt, constitutional revision, colonization, world war II/2 and the names of the countries being profiled for this report.

To assess this data, this study will utilize 'holistic constructivism' as an analytical framework which looks at socialization and culture as casual normative factors exercising influence on how Japan and Korea's domestic and bilateral perspectives over their shared history impact their approach to and conduct of relations with ASEAN member states. "[Holistic constructivism] adopts a more encompassing perspective that seeks to incorporate domestic and international phenomena..." seeing them two faces of a single global order.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, while

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<sup>10</sup> Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit. "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," in *European Journal of International Relations* Vol 4(3); 259-294, 1998, 268.

constructivism's use of 'interpretivist thick description'<sup>11</sup> places extraordinary demands on researchers in terms of acquiring data, the subsequent results that can be yielded are quite useful. In this case due to the relative lack of prior studies about this topic, this study requires the acquisition and synthesis of disparate data sources, such as economic, political, and security ties, as well as public opinion and media data. Specifically, the questions to be looked at here are: 1) How do ASEAN members and citizens of those states perceive their nations economic and political connections to Japan and Korea? 2) How do those interactions influence their stance on Japan-Korea history issues? 3) If so, what influence do they have?

In a general context, socialization means the process by which children and adults learn from others. However in international relations Johnston defines it as, "...provid[ing] guidelines to states and their leaders about how they are supposed to behave in the international system."<sup>12</sup> Moreover, socialization cannot be understood in the absence of context and intersubjectivity. Context here is simply defined as: the circumstances in which an event, statement, or idea is perceived and in what terms it can be fully understood and assessed. Context is formed by "...precedents and shared symbolic materials – in order to impose interpretations upon events."<sup>13</sup> Understanding is provided by norms and intersubjective meanings. Intersubjectivity is focused on the psychological relations between people and how they understand the meaning of themselves, others and the world around them.<sup>14</sup> Finally, as this study is looking at the both the state and sub-state levels it is necessary to define 'structure'. It is defined as being given shape and meaning constructed through unit and state level social practices.

## B. Predictions

In addressing the first and second questions, it is predicted that Japan and Korea will attempt to influence the perception and dialog on some of their historical and territorial disputes. At the very least both countries foreign ministries will advocate for their positions on issues

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<sup>11</sup> Ted Hopf. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." in *International Security, Volume 23, No. 1*, 171-200, Summer 1998, 198.

<sup>12</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston. "But Is It Socialization? International Institutional Effects on Chinese Arms Control Policy," Harvard University Seminar, 1998. [http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed\\_archives98spring/johnston.htm](http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives98spring/johnston.htm) Accessed March 16, 2015.

<sup>13</sup> Hopf, 179.

<sup>14</sup> See Hopf, 1998.



publically or privately. Also it is expected that Japan will attempt to apply pressure privately, while Korea may attempt a combination of public and private inducements and pressure to advance their stances on ‘historical issues.’ The reasons for this are: 1) given Japan’s larger economic and military spending, any potential inducements that Korea could offer ASEAN members could be exceeded by Japan and; 2) given that asymmetry of resources the Korean government and civil society would have to rely on different tactics to advance their agenda.

One precedent for this are the different approaches taken to assess and influence U.S. public opinion on Japan-Korea ‘history’ issues. The Japanese government took a top down approach and hired two lobbying firms firms, Hogan Lovells and Hecht Spencer & Associates,<sup>15</sup> to compile information on meetings between U.S. House of Representatives members and Korean-American groups lobbying on the comfort women issue as well as a gathering a list of comfort women memorials, advertisements, and relevant state legislation.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, Korean and Korean-American groups have taken a bottom-up civil society based approach to change U.S. public opinion through the construction of memorials to the comfort women<sup>17</sup> and amending state level textbook curricula to include the Korean perspective on disputes such as the ‘Sea of Japan/East Sea’ naming controversy.<sup>18</sup>

As for the final question, this report predicts that most ASEAN member states will have little or nothing to say about Japan-Korea historical and territorial disputes. There are three primary reasons for this. First most of ASEAN, excluding Brunei and Singapore, are still economically developing and are still dependent on external trade, investment, and ODA to grow their economies. Second similar to economics, ASEAN member states and their publics are

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<sup>15</sup> Hecht, Latham, Spencer and Associates, Inc. are still employed by the government of Japan as of May 2016. See <http://www.hecht.com/> and “Hogan Lovells US LLP Foreign Agents Restoration Act Filing,” *Archive.org*, March 29, 2013. Accessed May 9, 2016. [https://archive.org/stream/676326-hogan-lovell-us-llp-foreign-agents-registration/676326-hogan-lovell-us-llp-foreign-agents-registration\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/676326-hogan-lovell-us-llp-foreign-agents-registration/676326-hogan-lovell-us-llp-foreign-agents-registration_djvu.txt)

<sup>16</sup> Kevin Bogardus. “Japan Turns to K Street Amid Calls for Apology on WWII Era ‘Comfort Women’”, *The Hill*. February 2, 2014. Accessed May 9, 2016. <http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/197599-japan-turns-to-k-street-amid-calls-for-apology-on>

<sup>17</sup> Eric Johnson, “San Francisco Unanimously Adopts Measure to Build ‘Comfort Women’ Memorial,” *The Japan Times*, September 15, 2015, accessed April 20, 2016. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/23/national/politics-diplomacy/san-francisco-unanimously-adopts-measure-to-build-comfort-women-memorial/#.VxfhUPkrKUK>

<sup>18</sup> Scott Neuman, “Virginia Textbooks to Recognize S. Korea’s ‘East Sea’ Claim,” *NPR*, February 4, 2014, accessed April 20, 2016. <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/07/273125480/virginia-textbooks-to-recognize-s-koreas-east-sea-claim>

probably wary about depending too much on one state for political and security cooperation. Since 2000 the influence of China in ASEAN has grown significantly and is increasingly seen as a matter of concern by their members. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have maritime disputes with China. Thus, the perceptions about Chinese intentions and interests in the region constitute an important intervening variable in this study. The other major factor influencing the perspectives of ASEAN member states is the relative levels of English proficiency among their publics. Excluding the Philippines and Singapore, most ASEAN nations are less proficient in English which could suggest less demand to consume and produce English language media in newspapers.

To summarize these two points: 1) ASEAN member states will likely have little to say about Japan-Korea history disputes because of the perceived importance of economic, political, and security ties with both nations. 2) Even if their publics have opinions, it is likely that the relatively lower levels of English proficiency will limit the output of articles on the topic in the region, excluding the Philippines and Singapore.

## **II. Official Statements by ASEAN Member State MOFAs on Japan-Korea History Issues**

This section will address statements issued by ASEAN member states' MOFAs. These statements covered two general subject areas: 1) Japanese colonial legacies in Korea including the 'comfort women' and WWII and; 2) those issued about the maritime and territorial disputes over the 'Liancourt Rocks'. Please refer to table 1 below for a list of official statements.

**Table 1: Statements regarding disputes over direct colonial legacies, World War II, the 'Comfort Women', or Historical/Maritime and Territorial Disputes related to Liancourt**

Methodology: This section conducted searches on the ASEAN member states MOFA websites using the following keywords: 'apology' 'comfort women', 'Dokdo'/'Liancourt'/'Takeshima', 'Japan', 'Korea', 'Second World War/World War II', 'Sea of Japan'/'East Sea' and in various combinations are selected and summarized by relevance in the chart below.

### Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand

- No statements issued on any of these issues.

### Indonesia

- From the MOFA of Japan: "The Government of Japan and the Asian Women's Fund explored the most appropriate project to be implemented in Indonesia in order to express atonement from the Japanese people. As a result, the Asian Women's Fund (AWF) decided to support a project proposed by the Government of Indonesia called the "Promotion of Social Welfare Services for Elderly People in Indonesia" through a fund disbursed by the

Government of Japan. This decision was made partly because the Government of Indonesia found it difficult to identify former comfort women.”<sup>19</sup>

#### Philippines

• “This 70-year history [since 1945] demonstrates to the world that through their relentless efforts, peoples of two countries [Japan and the Philippines] can attain a remarkable achievement in overcoming issues of the past and establishing strong friendship.”<sup>20</sup>

#### Singapore

##### *Comfort Women*

• On the December 28, 2015 ‘Japan-ROK Comfort Women Agreement’: “The resolution of these issues will help people in both countries move forward to build trust and reconciliation... This will not only benefit Japan and the ROK, but will also enhance regional peace, stability and cooperation.”<sup>21</sup>

##### *World War II Legacies*

• “Singapore has not forgotten the horrors and suffering of World War II. Singapore’s position is that Japan should accept clear responsibility for the war. At the same time, it is equally important for all countries to build upon the statements of His Majesty Emperor Akihito, Prime Minister Abe and previous Japanese cabinets to seek further reconciliation and move forward. This will benefit our region and the world.”<sup>22</sup>

• “...I think the Japanese government made an apology, donated some money and we built a memorial. So between Singapore and Japan, the chapter is closed... With Korea, you have not reached that point. So if you reopen the old subjects - whether it is comfort women, whether it is aggression, whether there is an apology or no apology – well, it is your prerogative to do so, but you have to consider whether this will be helpful in the context of your relations with other Asian countries and whether it is the most important thing you want to do. But that is for Japan to decide.”<sup>23</sup>

#### Vietnam

##### *Territorial Disputes (Liancourt)*

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<sup>19</sup> Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Measures Taken by the Government of Japan on the Issue Known as ‘Comfort Women,’” October 14, 2014. Accessed March 18, 2016.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/policy.html>

<sup>20</sup> Republic of the Philippines. “On the Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Abe on the 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of World War II,” *Department of Foreign Affairs*, August 14, 2015. Accessed March 18, 2016.

<https://dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/7127-on-the-statement-of-japanese-prime-minister-abe-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-world-war-ii>

<sup>21</sup> Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “MFA Spokesman’s Comments in Response to Media Queries on the Outcome of the Meeting Between the Japanese and Republic of Korea (ROK) Foreign Ministers on 28 December 2015,” December 29, 2015. Accessed March 16, 2016.

[http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media\\_centre/press\\_room/pr/2015/201512/press\\_20151229.printable.html?status=1](http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2015/201512/press_20151229.printable.html?status=1)

<sup>22</sup> Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “MFA Press Statement: Abe Statement of 14 August 2015,” August 16, 2015. Accessed March 16, 2016.

[http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media\\_centre/press\\_room/pr/2015/201508/Press\\_20150816.html](http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2015/201508/Press_20150816.html)

<sup>23</sup> Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “MFA Spokesman’s Comments in Response to Media Queries on the Global Times Website Article ‘Less Hsien Loong: China Could Gain Daiyou Islands but Lose Its International Standing,’” August 23, 2013. Accessed March 18, 2016.

[http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media\\_centre/press\\_room/pr/2013/201308/press\\_20130923.html](http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2013/201308/press_20130923.html)

• “We must work together so as not to allow disputes and differences to escalate into conflicts, but to ensure their peaceful settlement and to uphold respect for international law and the 1982 U.N. convention, including its provisions related to exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of coastal states...”<sup>24</sup>

Among ASEAN member states, only three issued statements on any of the relevant issues that were attributable to MOFA sources online in English: the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. The first two issued statements related to the comfort women and WWII legacies, while Vietnam addressed territorial disputes in the region. As for the recent December 28<sup>th</sup> Japan-Korea comfort women agreement, only Singapore’s government issued direct statements in English online, highly approving of the agreement.

With the end of the Cold War the political and social imperatives which had limited discussion of ‘historical issues’ in Asia began to weaken and eventually collapse, although this would not be immediately apparent. Beginning in the early 1990s the comfort women became a focus of public discourse in Korea.<sup>25</sup> The Korean public was not alone in their interest about this topic. In Indonesia there was a push by surviving comfort women and some members of the government to criticize Japan on this issue and push for compensation. However, in order to quash efforts at investigating this issue, the Japanese government put pressure on Indonesia to remain quiet on the issue. As part of that effort, President Suharto, “...ordered the toning down of a statement that criticized Japan over the wartime “comfort women” issue. But even that was not enough to quell the outrage from Japanese officials.”<sup>26</sup> Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, who wrote the Indonesian MOFA’s statement said, “Although I wanted to write a much harsher statement, I had to obey the president, which was difficult.”<sup>27</sup> Following this event the Indonesian government has shied away from discussing the issue with Japan publically.

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<sup>24</sup> “Vietnam Voices Concern Over Japan’s Senkaku, Takeshima Disputes with China and S. Korea at ASEAN Maritime Forum,” *NamViet News*, October 7, 2012.

<https://namvietnews.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/vietnam-voices-concern-over-japans-senkaku-takeshima-disputes-with-china-and-s-korea-at-asean-maritime-forum/>

<sup>25</sup> Jun Sato, Hiroyoshi Itabashi and Tamiyuki Kihara. “‘Comfort Women’ Issue Sidelined as Suharto Pushed Relations with Japan,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 15, 2013.

[http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around\\_asia/AJ201310150061](http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around_asia/AJ201310150061)

<sup>26</sup> Sato, et. al, 2013.

<sup>27</sup> Sato, et. al, 2013.

### III. Economic Analysis

This section will look at ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-Korea economic linkages by analyzing the following areas: 1) Bilateral trade data; 2) FDI to ASEAN; 3) Japanese and Korean ODA to ASEAN; and 4) shared Regional Economic Frameworks and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Furthermore, the possible influences of economics on how ASEAN perceives and acts on Japan-Korea history tensions will also be analyzed.

#### A. Bilateral Trade

Japan and Korea are large and globally influential economies. In 2014, Japan and Korea are the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> largest economies in the world by GDP respectively.<sup>28</sup> Please refer to Appendices B and C for specific data about Japanese and Korean trade data with ASEAN. While the data shows that both nations have significant trade relations in the region, what quickly becomes apparent is the fact that in most cases Japan has a larger share of trade with ASEAN members than does Korea. Japan exceeds Korea in trade with Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand. Korea slightly exceeds Japan in trade with Vietnam and Singapore since 2013 and is about even in trade with Cambodia. Even in the cases where Korea's trade exceeds Japan's the gap is small and relatively recent.

#### B. FDI Flows

In terms of FDI flows into ASEAN in 2013, Japan was the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest source of FDI Inflows at 18.7% while Korea only accounted for 2.9% (see appendix E). In both 2008-09 and 2011, Japan's FDI to ASEAN dropped because of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.<sup>29</sup> However despite that, the overall flow of Japanese FDI into the region increased by more than 4-fold from 1995-2013. Turning more specifically to FDI inflows from Japan and Korea, please see appendix F.

The data clearly shows that Japan has invested significantly more FDI into Southeast Asia than Korea with the exception of Cambodia. Additionally, several nations had supplementary data included. Both Thailand and Singapore's data for FDI outflow was added

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<sup>28</sup> The World Bank, 2014.

<sup>29</sup> In Japan, the Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear crisis are commonly referred to in this way.

due to its relevance and Vietnam did not have year-on-year FDI inflow data until 2012, so FDI in-stock was substituted in lieu of that. While Japan generally had more FDI in and outflow in Thailand and Singapore, Korea actually has been ahead of Japan in terms of Vietnamese FDI.

### C. ODA

The next section of this report covers Japan and Korea's ODA into ASEAN. As the data makes abundantly clear, Japan has provided more ODA to ASEAN members than has Korea. Moreover, this is not just a recent trend but has been consistent going back decades, which is product of Japan's more rapid economic development, while Korea has only recently become an ODA donor country. Additionally, when looking at the top recipients of Japanese ODA (see appendix H), we can see ASEAN members account for four of the top ten and seven of the top 30 countries in terms of gross disbursement. This clearly demonstrates that even with shrinking ODA budgets that Japan places a priority on money going to ASEAN.

The most interesting case of ODA to ASEAN may be that of Vietnam. While are relatively flat or declining in real dollar terms, the aid they are receiving from Japan and Korea has increased notably. Japanese ODA aid to Vietnam has risen significantly, more than doubling between 2010 and 2012 from \$1 billion to over \$2.5 billion dollars. The most likely explanation for this is probably that Japan seeks to strengthen their ties with Vietnam to check perceived Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. However, if Japanese ODA has in anyway influenced Vietnamese public opinion on history issues with Korea it is not apparent.

### D. Bilateral and Regional Economic Frameworks

Following the Cold War as the world moved to remove barriers to economic exchange, both Japan and Korea joined or became active in a large number of economic forums. This next section will assess the economic ties between ASEAN, Japan, and Korea via regional economic frameworks and free trade agreements.

Table 2: Regional Economic Forums and Institutions

Economic Forum/Institution	Selected Member States
APEC	Brunei, Indonesia, <b>Japan, Korea</b> , Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam
ASEAN + 3	ASEAN 10, China, Japan, Korea
ASEAN + 6/ Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)	ASEAN 10, Australia, China, India, <b>Japan, Korea</b> , New Zealand
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	ASEAN 10, China, <b>Japan, Korea</b>
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)	ASEAN 10, China, <b>Korea</b>

Sources: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Shim (2015)

First looking at the regional economic forums in Table 2, we see that Japan and Korea both hold memberships in APEC, ASEAN + 3, RCEP, and the ADB. The one major exception to this is the recently founded AIIB. Japan joined the U.S. in its efforts to oppose the new institution, while Korea was one of its first signatories. Given the fact that it was founded quite recently it remains to be seen what if any influence Korea could leverage from within the institution.

Table 3: Japanese and Korean Trade Agreements with ASEAN Members states

Japanese Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)	Korean Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam*	Korea-Indonesia FTA*
Japan-Vietnam EPA (2009)	Korea-Vietnam FTA (2015)
Japan-ASEAN EPA (2008)	ASEAN-Korea Investment Treaty (2009)
Japan-Indonesia EPA (2007)	Korea-Singapore FTA (2005)
Japan-Brunei EPA (2007)	Korea-ASEAN FTA (2005)
Japan-Thailand EPA (2007)	
Japan-Philippines EPA (2006)	
Japan-Malaysia EPA (2005)	
Japan-Singapore EPA (2000)	

Sources: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), AKFTA.ASEAN.org

\* Agreements are either under negotiation or signed, but not ratified at the time when this paper was written.

Looking more specifically at FTAs we see a significant difference in the number of agreements that Japan has concluded with ASEAN when compared to Korea. Although Japan and Korea have region wide agreements with ASEAN, Japan has seven agreements with individual ASEAN members while Korea only has two. Additionally, Japan is a founding member of the TPP with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Korea is not at TPP

member, but likely would be one of the first candidates seeking to join if and when the TPP is ratified by its signatory members.

However, the difference in the number of agreements may not be directly attributable to a competition for influence in ASEAN, but rather a difference in outlook and priorities in negotiating free trade agreements. Japan has been seen by some developed nations as being relatively more resistant to opening up their economy to international competition. Consequently, Japanese policymakers who are concerned about angering domestic constituencies in sectors such as agriculture and automobiles have in the past shied away from large trade deals with developed nations. As a result, Japan has prioritized EPAs with developing nations, especially with ASEAN members. In contrast, Korea has been one of the most active FTA negotiators, having prioritized agreements with the U.S. and EU in 2011 and with China in 2015. That being said the lack of efforts at individual Korean FTAs with ASEAN member states is not because of disinterest on Korea's part, but rather a lack of available financial and negotiators in the government to conclude new agreements.

#### E. Economic Analysis Summary

With a more complete picture of the economic relations between Japan, Korea, and ASEAN several points have been made clear. First, although both Japan and Korea are important economic partners to ASEAN, Japan represents a larger source of trade, FDI, and ODA than Korea does. Much of this is a simple matter of size: Japan has a higher population (125 million) and per capita GDP than Korea (50 million). To equal Japan in terms of economic prominence in the region, Korea would have to deploy a disproportionate amount of its resources. Second, as mentioned previously ASEAN countries perceive no material benefits from taking a stance on Japan-Korea history issues. So, unless there is a pressing domestic constituency (such as in the case of the Filipino comfort women), then there is no perceived benefit for taking a side on Japan-Korea history issues. Especially given the relatively lower level of economic development in ASEAN, the downsides to antagonizing relations with Japan and Korea are potentially many while keeping neutral comes with no costs.



#### IV. Political/Security Analysis

##### A. Bilateral Ties with ASEAN

The following section will briefly address historic relations between Japan, Korea and each ASEAN member state. To begin, first refer to the table below for the date when formal diplomatic relations were established between each nation in the modern era.

Table 4: Formal Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Japan and Korea

	Japan	Korea	Notes
Brunei	1984	1984	
Cambodia	1953	1970-1975, 1997	Relations were severed in 1975 following overthrow of the government by the Khmer Rouge
Indonesia	1958	1973	
Laos	1955	1974-75, 1995	
Malaysia	1957	1966	
Philippines	1956	1949	The Philippines was the 5 <sup>th</sup> nation to diplomatically recognize Korea
Singapore	1966	1975	
Thailand	1887	1958	Thailand was allied with Japan for part of WWII and technically relations were never severed during and after the war.
Vietnam	1975	1992	

Sources: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs

With the exception of Brunei and the Philippines formal diplomatic relations by ASEAN member states were established earlier with Japan than Korea. The primary reason for this was the fact that Korea was divided in two in 1945 and the stalemate of the Korean War left two competing states on the peninsula. Thus during the Cold War, political recognition of one of the two Korean states over the other created complications non-aligned states or Chinese/Soviet allied states. That is not to say that Japan did not have difficulties to overcome in establishing diplomatic ties in the region though. With the exception of Thailand, Japan invaded every ASEAN member state in WWII. However, when Japan did formally establish ties in the region, each treaty on basic relations addressed broad issues of compensation related to wartime damage.

Japan and Korea have and continue to play an important political role in ASEAN. One example of this is in Cambodia, where the Japanese government helped to broker a peace deal to allow opposition party members to participate in elections in 1998 and also promoting domestic

stability as recently as 2013.<sup>30</sup> That same year Cambodia-Japan relations were upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership’ under President Hun Sen and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.<sup>31</sup> As for Korea, following the reestablishment of ties with Cambodia in 1997 their relations have been seen as quite constructive. One example of this is Lee Myong-Bak’s role as a special economic advisor to President Hun from 2000-08 prior to his election as Korea’s president.<sup>32</sup> In fact President Hun has gone so far as to refer to Cambodia and Korea as ‘countries-in-law’ to emphasize their strong relations.<sup>33</sup>

Japan influenced post-WWII independence movements in both Indonesia<sup>34</sup> under Sukarno and Hatta and in Myanmar under Ne Win<sup>35</sup> during the war. As for Korea, they upgraded their relationship with Indonesia to a ‘strategic partnership’<sup>36</sup> and worked to create MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia), which is a middle-power nation grouping. Looking more closely at Myanmar, recent events have led to significant changes in their relations with Japan and Korea. While initially quite strong, Japanese relations with Myanmar declined after the 1988 military coup until efforts by the Obama administration to open up the country. Since then Japan and Korea have both been active in engaging Myanmar economically and politically with an eye towards new opportunities in the country as it opens up. This suggests that if the current path of political reforms continues in Myanmar their relations with both nations will keep expanding.

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<sup>30</sup> Phoak Kung. “Cambodia-Japan Relations: Beyond the East China Sea,” *The Diplomat*, February 24, 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/cambodia-japan-relations-beyond-the-east-china-sea/>

<sup>31</sup> Bopha Phorn. “Official Says ‘Strategic Partnership’ with Japan Won’t Irk China,” *The Cambodia Daily*, December 18, 2013. <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/official-says-strategic-partnership-with-japan-wont-irk-china-49410/>

<sup>32</sup> Pichnorak. 2015.

<sup>33</sup> Khuon Narim. “PM Dubs S Korea and Cambodia ‘Countries-in-Law’”, *The Cambodia Daily*, May 14, 2015. <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/hun-sen-dubs-south-korea-and-cambodia-countries-in-law-83715/>

<sup>34</sup> “Indonesia, a Nation in Transition,” *Jakarta Post*, Last updated May 26, 2001. Accessed February 10, 2016. [http://www.thejakartapost.com/resources/indonesian\\_history](http://www.thejakartapost.com/resources/indonesian_history)

<sup>35</sup> Kudo, 2007, 1.

<sup>36</sup> “40 Years of Friendship: S. Korea, Indonesia Embark on Stronger Strategic Partnership,” *The Jakarta Post*, March 8, 2013. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/08/40-years-friendship-s-korea-indonesia-embark-stronger-strategic-partnership.html>

Japan's post-1945 relations with the Philippines were initially defined by dealing with wartime compensation issue which was settled in 1956.<sup>37</sup> This also included the issue of the 1000 Filipino women who were forced to become 'comfort women' by the Japanese army garrisons occupying the country from 1941-45.<sup>38</sup> More recently, the Philippines and Japan have been attempting to strengthen political and military ties based on the intensifying China-Philippines maritime dispute in the South China Sea. One example of this was the announcement of joint maritime drills in 2015.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, that same year Japan won a contract to construct 10 new coast guard vessels for the Philippines.<sup>40</sup> As for Korea, they have long standing cultural and political ties going back to March 1949 when they established ties.<sup>41</sup> One contemporary example of this was the election of Jasmine Lee to the Korean parliament as a proportional representative from the ruling *Saenuri* Party list.<sup>42</sup> She became the first naturalized Korean citizen to be hold national political office in Korea.

Following the end of WWII, Thai relations with both Japan and Korea were strong for decades. However, the May 2014 military coup in Thailand has cast a pall on their relations with both nations. Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio has stated that "Japan strongly urges those concerned that democracy in Thailand must be quickly restored."<sup>43</sup> In contrast to Japan, Korea has responded to the May 2014 events quite differently. In fact, the Korean government

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<sup>37</sup> Presidential Communications Office, "Country Profile: Japan," *Backgrounder*, 2011.

<http://www.pcoo.gov.ph/japanvisit2011/backgrounder.htm>

<sup>38</sup> Manuel Mogato. "Philippine 'Comfort Women' Fear China Sea Dispute Blocks Justice From Japan," *Jakarta Globe*, January 6, 2016. <http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/international/philippine-comfort-women-fear-china-sea-dispute-blocks-justice-japan/>

<sup>39</sup> Kyodo News. "Japan, Philippines Defense Chiefs Agree to Cooperate on Maritime Security," *The Japan Times*, January 30, 2015. [http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/30/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-philippine-defense-chiefs-agree-cooperate-maritime-security/#.VsdmZ\\_krKUK](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/30/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-philippine-defense-chiefs-agree-cooperate-maritime-security/#.VsdmZ_krKUK)

<sup>40</sup> Parameswaran, Prashanth. "Japan Wins New Philippine Defense Deal," *The Diplomat*, April 24, 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/japan-wins-new-philippine-defense-deal/>

<sup>41</sup> Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in the Republic of Korea. "Philippine-Korean Relations," Accessed February 17, 2016. [http://www.philembassy-seoul.com/rp\\_rk\\_relations.asp](http://www.philembassy-seoul.com/rp_rk_relations.asp)

<sup>42</sup> Jonathan M. Hicap, "Jasmine Lee: A Filipino in South Korea's Assembly," *Manila Bulletin*, May 10, 2014. <http://www.mb.com.ph/jasmine-lee-a-filipino-in-south-koreas-assembly/>

<sup>43</sup> Bangkok Pundit. "Views From Japan on the Thai Coup," *Asian Correspondent*, June 27, 2014. Accessed February 29, 2016. <https://asiancorrespondent.com/2014/06/views-from-japan-on-the-thai-coup/>

has been criticized by some domestic civil society organizations for their failure to address the setback to civil and political rights in Thailand.<sup>44</sup>

Finally looking at Vietnam, Japanese ties with the country were not reestablished until Vietnamese reunification in 1975, which settled WWII compensation issues. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan and Vietnam's regional outlook shifted even further. In 2009 and 2014 Japan-Vietnam relations were elevated to a 'strategic partnership' and 'extensive strategic partnership' respectively.<sup>45</sup> Additionally Vietnam and Japan have greatly expanded cooperation over issues related to territorial disputes between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea.<sup>46</sup> First, Japan has offered continued assistance to help Vietnam enhance its maritime law enforcement capacity.<sup>47</sup> In addition, Japan has pushed for a settlement of the dispute in accordance with international law.<sup>48</sup> Given Japan's territorial and maritime disputes with China in the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands, it can be assumed that their efforts are in part to keep China pre-occupied in the South China Sea and/or to build support for their own claims vis-à-vis China, rather than targeting issues with Korea.

In contrast the Korea-Vietnam relationship didn't emerge until later. This was because of their alignments in the Cold War. In fact, Korea under President Park Chung-Hee, father of the current Korean president sent a total of 300,000 combat soldiers to help the U.S. war effort in Vietnam.<sup>49</sup> Vietnamese civilians allege that Korean soldiers committed alleged war crimes against the population, a charge that the Korean government does not acknowledge.<sup>50</sup> Korea and Vietnam did not establish ties until 1992. Since that time their ties have warmed significantly. In

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<sup>44</sup> Ichihara, Maiko, Jeong-Woo Koo, Niranjana Shahoo, Thitinan Pongsudhirak. "Asian Democracies and Thailand's Military Takeover," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October 13, 2015. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/13/asian-democracies-and-thailand-s-military-takeover/iiu3>

<sup>45</sup> Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Relations," 2015, 1. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000099707.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> "The Benefits of Deep Advancements in Vietnam-Japan Relations," *Tuoi Tre News*, last updated September 18, 2015. Accessed February 29, 2016. <http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/30488/the-benefits-of-deep-advancements-in-japanvietnam-relations>

<sup>47</sup> "Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Relations," 2015, 4.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>49</sup> Steven Borowiec. "Allegations of S. Korean Atrocities Arising 40 Years after Vietnam War," *Los Angeles Times*, May 18, 2015. <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-korea-vietnam-20150516-story.html>

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

2013, President Park Geun-Hye came to Vietnam on a state visit, although she did not mention the Korean role in the Vietnam War.<sup>51</sup>

#### B. Major Security Agreement, Cooperative Efforts and Treaties

Turning to regional cooperation, please refer to Appendix I. As the data shows there is a large overlap on a number of policy areas. These include: anti-terrorism efforts, combating transnational crime, defense cooperation, numerous high level discussion forums, and mutual treaties of friendship and cooperation. The primary differences for Japan is that they have held two high-level dialogues to combat cybercrime, held an additional defense cooperation forum, and have had more recent anti-terror/anti-international crime efforts with ASEAN. The overall picture indicates that cooperation is motivated more out of shared practical concerns rather than as an attempt by one party to gain some kind of political advantage vis-à-vis the other.

#### C. Joint Exercises and Military Equipment Purchases

The next major area of cooperation to address is that of joint military exercises and equipment purchases between ASEAN, Japan, and Korea. Although the reasons for such exercises can vary widely, their existence allows for both high level and large-scale contact between military forces in the region. This can involve joint dialogs and planning between top brass and contacts through the officer corps down to the soldiers in the field. To see the frequency and participants in joint exercises over the last few years please refer to Appendix J.

While many of the operations are related to disaster relief, there are several clear differences are apparent based on the available data of operations: 1) Japan has the capacity to hold its exercises based on its own military capacity; and 2) Japan has on at least one occasion held a bilateral exercise with the Philippines. The reasons for this are clear. First, Japan is a maritime nation and its first line of defense is the sea. Second, a large portion of Korea's military capacity is directed at defending against possible attacks from North Korea, thus limiting their operational capacity off of the Korean Peninsula.

The other major area of increasing cooperation between ASEAN, Japan, and Korea are the sales of maritime military equipment to ASEAN members. One example of this was the

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<sup>51</sup> Borowiec, 2015.

purchase of two Korean submarines by Indonesia.<sup>52</sup> In fact, between 2007-2011 22% of all Indonesian major conventional weapons purchases were from Korea.<sup>53</sup> Additionally, the Indonesian government and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) have cooperated on the joint development of a new fighter jet.<sup>54</sup> Even more than Indonesia, the Philippines has become a focal point of maritime military equipment sales and donations. In 2013, Japan donated ten patrol vessels to the Philippines.<sup>55</sup> In addition to this the Philippines purchased 12 FA-50 fighter jets from Korea to be delivered by 2017 and received a donation of a Pohang-class warship from the Korean navy in appreciation for the Philippines' assistance in the Korean War.<sup>56</sup>

Taking all of these measures together seems to indicate several points. First, Japanese efforts are geared towards blunting Chinese efforts in the region and not directed at Korea. Next, Korean donations and military equipment sales are generally for the purposes of promoting economic access and cooperation with ASEAN member states and do not seem to be to be done to seek leverage over Japan.

#### D. State Visits by Japanese and Korean Leaders and Summits

This section concerns state visits by Prime Minister Abe and President Park since 2013. Given the fact that they were both elected around the same time and should both will serve in office through at least 2017, state visits to ASEAN member states can be assessed as one measure of the level of priority each of them gives to the region. For a comprehensive list of state visits to ASEAN by Abe and Park, please refer to Table 5 below.

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<sup>52</sup> O'Callaghan, 2015.

<sup>53</sup> Tang Siew Mun. "ASEAN-Japan Defense Cooperation: Overcoming History and Charting New Possibilities," *ASEAN-Japan Defense Cooperation*, 200-213. 2008, 208. [http://www.jcie.org/japan/j/pdf/pub/publst/1451/11\\_tang.pdf](http://www.jcie.org/japan/j/pdf/pub/publst/1451/11_tang.pdf)

<sup>54</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran. "Indonesia, South Korea Move Closer to New Fighter Jet with Key Pacts," *The Diplomat*, January 8, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/indonesia-south-korea-move-closer-to-new-fighter-jet-with-key-pacts/>

<sup>55</sup> Zachary Abusa. "The Philippines' Slowly Modernizes its Defense Capabilities," Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), June 10, 2014. <http://cogitasia.com/the-philippines-slowly-modernizes-its-defense-capabilities/>

<sup>56</sup> Abusa, 2014; Camille Diola. "Meet South Korea's Guided Missile Warship for Philippines," *The Philippine Star*, updated June 24, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2016. <http://www.philstar.com/news-feature/2014/06/24/1338490/meet-south-koreas-guided-missile-warship-philippines>

Table 5: Number of visits by Prime Minister Abe (2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> cabinets) and President Park to ASEAN Members

Visiting Leader(s)	ASEAN Member State (number of visits)	Reason for Visit (year)
Abe	Brunei (1)	ASEAN Summit (2013)
Park	Brunei (2)	ASEAN Summit (2013), ASEAN-ROK Summit (2015)
Abe	Cambodia (1)	State Visit (2013)
Park	Cambodia (0)	--
Abe	Indonesia (3)	Asian-African Conference 60 <sup>th</sup> Anniversary (2015), State Visit (2013), APEC Summit (2013)
Park	Indonesia (1)	APEC Summit (2013)
Abe	Laos (1)	State Visit (2013)
Park	Laos (0)	--
Abe	Malaysia (3)	18 <sup>th</sup> ASEAN Plus Three Summit (2015), APEC Summit (2015), State Visit
Park	Malaysia (2)	18 <sup>th</sup> ASEAN Plus Three Summit (2015), APEC Summit (2015)
Abe	Myanmar (2)	ASEAN Summit (2014), State Visit (2013)
Park	Myanmar (2)	ASEAN Summit (2014), State Visit (2013)
Abe	Philippines (1)	State Visit (2013)
Park	Philippines (0)	--
Abe	Singapore (3)	Former President Lee Kwan Yew's Funeral (2015), State Visits (2013, 2014)
Park	Singapore (2)	Former President Lee Kwan Yew's Funeral (2015), Korea-Singapore Summit (2013)
Abe	Thailand (1)	State Visit (2013)
Park	Thailand (0)	--
Abe	Vietnam (1)	State Visit (2013)
Park	Vietnam (1)	State Visit (2013)
Total Visits to ASEAN by Prime Minister Abe: 17		
Total Visits to ASEAN by Prime Minister Park: 10		

Sources: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Shim (2015)

As the data indicates, Abe has made a more trips to the region than Park has. Abe visited all ten ASEAN members during his first year in office, while Park has not made any official visits to Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, that is not to say that Park has not been active in meeting with ASEAN's political leaders. In December 2014, Korea hosted the ROK-ASEAN Summit in Busan and from December 9-13<sup>th</sup> during the summit President Park hosted individual summits with all ten of the ASEAN member states' leaders.<sup>57</sup> Overall, this data also indicates that both Abe and Park do place a good deal of priority in the region.

<sup>57</sup> Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "2015 Diplomatic White Paper," Seoul, 2015.

However, there does not seem to be evidence to suggest that state visits are being used by Japan and Korea to build up political capital within ASEAN vis-à-vis each other. Instead what is more likely is that both nations see strengthening economic and political ties in ASEAN in order to link up with the region as an engine of growth in the coming decades. If political or security considerations do enter into the equation it is more likely Japan directing its efforts against China, rather than Korea.

#### E. Issue Advocacy Outreach in ASEAN by Japan and Korea

The following section will look at advocacy by the Japanese and Korean governments and civil society organizations on the historical and territorial disputes. Official embassy websites, embassy-associated web pages, and other relevant pages are referenced as source materials. Over the past few years, an international public relations war has started over ‘Liancourt’ with both governments allocating a significant amount of money to promote their respective nation’s views.<sup>58</sup> First, Japanese advocacy efforts will be detailed, followed by Korea.

Both the Japanese and Korean governments and their respective civil societies are quite active in promoting their perspectives on the comfort women and Liancourt issues for their domestic audiences. However, what the available data makes clear is that while both countries MOFAs provide similar information on their official websites, they differ significantly in direct outreach efforts to ASEAN.

#### *Japan*

The Japanese MOFA’s promotion of their perspectives on both history and Liancourt can in general be described as passive. That is to say their MOFA has prepared a large array of materials, but either does not publicize their active efforts online or merely leaves the materials on relevant websites to be found and assessed by others. At the bottom of all of the English and

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<sup>58</sup> “Tae-Guk Juyo Shinmun Bodo Yoyak (9-Wol 12-il Ja) [Summary of Important Newspaper Articles in Thailand (for September 12<sup>th</sup>)],” *Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Kingdom of Thailand*, September 9, 2012. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://tha.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=15&boardid=12543&seqno=946058> In 2012 Japan approved \$7.15 million USD, while Korea approved \$4.4 million USD in promotional efforts related to Liancourt.



Japanese language embassy websites, links are provided to issue pages regarding claims to Liancourt, other maritime claims, and the Sea of Japan naming controversy.

Next, all of the Japanese embassy English websites in ASEAN provide a link in their ‘Foreign Policy News’ sections.<sup>59</sup> The videos include information on the official Japanese perspectives on the settlement of colonization and compensation issues, previous official apologies, the December 2015 agreement with Korea regarding the comfort women, claims to ‘Takeshima’, and ‘history issues’ among others.<sup>60</sup> In addition, Japan has published videos in English on post-WWII reconciliation in Asia, including with ASEAN members. However, beyond that the Japanese MOFA either does not seem to conduct issue advocacy through their embassies in ASEAN or does not post it online.

### *Korea*

Like their Japanese counterparts, the Korean embassy websites all provide links to videos in English and Korean regarding Korea’s positions on the comfort women, ‘Sea of Japan’/‘East Sea’ naming controversy, and ‘Dokdo’.<sup>61</sup> Of the ASEAN member states, only Laos seems to have no material available online regarding Korean issue advocacy in the country. However, this is the point where each Korea’s efforts diverge sharply. The table below details events related to ‘history issues’ that supported or promoted by the Korean embassies within ASEAN.

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<sup>59</sup> Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Videos on Japan’s Foreign Policy,” accessed March 16, 2016. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/p\\_pd/pds/page23e\\_000381.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/p_pd/pds/page23e_000381.html)

<sup>60</sup> Also see <https://www.youtube.com/user/mofachannel/> The Japanese MOFA YouTube page also creates playlists on various issues. For example, claims to Liancourt, the Senkakus and the ‘Sea of Japan’ name issue have videos translated into a variety of Eurasian languages, but there are no materials published in any native languages within ASEAN.

<sup>61</sup> *Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Republic of Singapore*. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://sgp.mofa.go.kr/english/as/sgp/main/index.jsp>

Table 6: Events supported by the Korean Embassy or promoting Korean views on ‘history issues’ with Japan in ASEAN members on embassy websites

Dates	Location	Type of Event	Speaker/Writer	Topics Covered
October 27, 2015	Ambarawa (former comfort women station), Indonesia	Visit	Ambassador Jo Tae-Yeong	‘Comfort Women’
August 10, 2015	Surabaya Petra Christian University, Indonesia	Lecture	Ambassador Jo Tae-Yeong	‘Dokdo’
May 5, 2015	Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia	Lecture	Ambassador Jo Tae-Yeong	‘Dokdo’
February 20, 2015	Hasannudin University, Indonesia	Lecture	Ambassador Jo Tae-Yeong	‘Dokdo’
December 2014	The Korean Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia	Speech Contest and Dokdo Quiz	N/A	‘Dokdo’
September 12, 2014	Singapore	Newspaper Publication	Ambassador Jang Yeunju	‘Comfort Women’ and ‘Dokdo’
February 21, 2014	University of Asia and the Pacific in Pasig, Philippines	Lecture, Korean culture festival	Professor Kim Jun-Gil	‘Dokdo’
February 10, 2014	The Korean Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia	Korean History Class	N/A	‘Dokdo’
November 27, 2013	Maktab Duli College, Brunei	Lecture and Embassy Visit	Ambassador Choe Byeong-Gu	‘Dokdo’
August 28, 2013	St. Andrew's School, Brunei	Lecture and Embassy Visit	Ambassador Choe Byeong-Gu	‘Dokdo’

Source: Republic of Korea Embassy websites in ASEAN member states

One of the most prominent differences between embassies are the public lecture events held or supported by the Korean foreign service. Ambassadors Choe Byeong-Gu (Brunei) and Jo Tae-Yeong (Indonesia) spoke to students from five different schools between 2013 and 2015. Additionally, on two occasions in Malaysia in 2014, the Korean embassy in Kuala Lumpur hosted two cultural events which concurrently promoted the Korean position on Liancourt.<sup>62</sup> Though further English information posted online seems to be limited, the event name indicates that the speech contest and quiz is an annual event has been held every year since 2006 in Kuala Lumpur. In a similar vein the Korean embassy to the Philippines also promoted a culture festival and lecture by Professor Kim which was supportive of the Korea’s claims to Liancourt as well.

<sup>62</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Malaysia. “9<sup>th</sup> Korean Speech Contest and Dokdo Quiz,” *Facebook*, November 7, 2014. Accessed March 16, 2016. <https://www.facebook.com/koremy.eng/posts/825036320874983>

Figure 9: Ambassador Choe Presenting a Map Denoting 'Dokdo' and the East Sea to the 'Maktab Duli College Korean Club' Advising Professor in Brunei



Source: Republic of Korea Embassy in Negara Brunei, November 27, 2013

Finally, Ambassador Jo visited a former comfort women station in Indonesia and Ambassador Jang (Singapore) published an article in the *Straits Times* seeking to build a forward looking relationship grounded in an 'accurate understanding of the past.'<sup>63</sup> She went on to criticize Japanese claims to Liancourt and the government's denial of the comfort women system during the war. In addition to this the Korean Embassy in Singapore indexed an article by Andy Ho, an author writing for the *Straits Times* who was critical of Japan over its stance on the comfort women issue.<sup>64</sup> Finally, a Chinese language 'Dokdo' video was also included on Korea's Singapore embassy webpage.<sup>65</sup>

Another major difference between Japan and Korea's efforts is that Korean civil society is active in advocating for their positions within ASEAN. One group the 'Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan'<sup>66</sup> said that it plans "...to start a movement to erect both inside and outside the country [Korea] statutes similar to the one located in front of

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<sup>63</sup> Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Article about Dokdo on the Straits Times," *Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Republic of Singapore*, September 21, 2012. Accessed March 16, 2016. <http://sgp.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/legengreadboard.jsp?typeID=16&boardid=5775&seqno=683313>

<sup>64</sup> Andy Ho. "Korean Comfort Women Deserve Justice," *Straits Times*, August 19, 2010. <http://sgp.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/legengreadboard.jsp?typeID=16&boardid=12414&seqno=680239>

<sup>65</sup> *Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Republic of Singapore*. Additionally, this statement also appears on the Cambodian, Malaysian, Philippines, and Singapore embassy pages when 'Dokdo' is searched.

<sup>66</sup> Hereafter referred to as the 'Korean Council'

the Japanese Embassy in Seoul that Tokyo wants removed.”<sup>67</sup> Singapore was the first country where the Korean Council tried to construct a comfort woman statue for outside of Korea. However, the effort was rejected by Singapore government and the Korean Culture Minister in Singapore denied that there had been talks to put up such a statue in 2013.<sup>68</sup> Despite this setback the group aims to have similar statues erected in Indonesia and Malaysia.<sup>69</sup>

Although not as active as the embassies in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, the Korean government took steps to promote their stances on the comfort women and Liancourt, at least passively, in the rest of ASEAN. First, the Korean Embassy in Cambodia and Myanmar posted videos called ‘the Truth about Dokdo’ in Korean in September 2012.<sup>70</sup> Additionally, the Korean Embassy in Bangkok provides a Thai translation detailing Korea’s claims to ‘Dokdo’ for distribution.<sup>71</sup> Finally, while Vietnam not receive any direct advocacy from the Korean government through their MOFA the Korean embassy there had a detailed tracking of local newspapers. When searching for ‘Dokdo’ and ‘comfort women’ in Korean on the embassy in Vietnam’s website, 64 and 12 indexed entries come up respectively from 2007-2015,<sup>72</sup> which provided summaries of how these issues were covered in Vietnamese newspapers.

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<sup>67</sup> Kyodo News. “South Korean Group Pledges to Erect More ‘Comfort Women’ Statues Despite Japanese Apology,” *South China Morning Post*, December 30, 2015. <http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1896638/south-korean-group-pledges-erect-more-comfort-women-statues>

<sup>68</sup> “S’pore Rejects ‘Comfort Women’ Statue,” *The Brunei Times*, January 31, 2013. <http://www.bt.com.bn/2013/01/31/spore-rejects-comfort-woman-statue>

<sup>69</sup> Agence France-Presse. “Singapore Rejects ‘Comfort Women’ Statue,” *Capital News*, January 30, 2013. <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/01/singapore-rejects-comfort-woman-statue/>

<sup>70</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Kingdom of Cambodia. *Facebook*, accessed March 17, 2016. <https://www.facebook.com/koreanembassy cambodia/> and Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Myanmar. “Dokdo ui Jin-Sil [Dokdo Facts], *Facebook*, September 18, 2012. Accessed March 16, 2016. <https://www.facebook.com/notes/471580596206356/>

<sup>71</sup> “Dokdo-e Daehan Hanguk Jeong-Bo ui Gibon Ip-Jang, (Taeguk-Eo Beon-Yeok Bon) [Basic Position of the Korean Government Regarding Dokdo (Thai Language Translation),” *Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Kingdom of Thailand*,” accessed March 17, 2016. <http://tha.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=15&boardid=3529&seqno=675700>

<sup>72</sup> Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Embassy of the Republic of Korean in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam*. <http://vnm-hanoi.mofa.go.kr/korean/as/vnm-hanoi/main/index.jsp>

## F. Public Opinion

This section addresses public opinion in ASEAN member states regarding Japan and Korea. Please refer to tables 7 and 8 regarding opinion polling conducted in four ASEAN member states among others.

7: Selected Asian Countries' Views of Each Other (% of respondents who view \_\_\_\_\_ favorably)

Selected ASEAN members	Japan	Korea
Indonesia	71%	42%
Malaysia	84%	61%
Philippines	81%	68%
Vietnam	82%	82%

Source: Pew Research Center, "How Asia Pacific Publics See Each Other and their National Leaders," 2015.

Table 8: 'Confidence in Abe to do the right thing regarding foreign affairs' Among Selected Asian Countries

Selected ASEAN members	Japan
Indonesia	43%
Malaysia	73%
Philippines	68%
Vietnam	68%

Source: Pew Research Center, "How Asia Pacific Publics See Each Other and their National Leaders," 2015.

The data in this poll seems to indicate that Japan is generally viewed somewhat more positively than Korea by the publics of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines while being viewed equally favorably in Vietnam. However, the reasons for these disparities are not clear. It could be attributable to being more familiarity with Japan, an interest in their pop culture or a relative lack of information about Korea.

Looking at the specific case of the Philippines however we see some seemingly contradictory outcomes. Japan is viewed quite favorably by the Filipino people and yet there is a notable minority of the population that seeks justice and compensation for Filipina comfort women from WWII. In fact the issue is so resonant with a part of the population that that several members of the Filipino Congress' Minority Bloc have actively pushes for their cause in their

domestic politics.<sup>73</sup> However there are one of three scenarios that could be posited to explain the high approval ratings in the Pew poll and yet have a strong civil society movement on the comfort women issue: either 1) the Filipino people separate the issue of the comfort women from current relations with Japan; 2) they hold their government more responsible than Japan for the lack of direct compensation to the comfort women; or 3) Filipino concerns over the Chinese claims to the Spratly Islands<sup>74</sup> supersede perceived importance of the comfort women issue. As will be explained in the media section, issues 2 and 3 may be stronger explanations for the seeming disparity.

Additionally, the Japanese MOFA commissioned the *Ipsos* polling firm to conduct research on public opinion about Japan on their behalf. Please refer to the table below for a summary of how selected ASEAN states regard their nation’s relationship with Japan.

Table 9: ‘Relationship between Your Country and Japan (%)’

Country	Very Friendly	Somewhat Friendly	Not very Friendly	Not Friendly at All
Indonesia	65%	30%	3%	0%
Malaysia	42%	48%	2%	0%
Myanmar	22%	66%	6%	2%
Philippines	68%	30%	1%	1%
Singapore	44%	52%	1%	1%
Thailand	54%	43%	1%	0%
Vietnam	67%	28%	1%	1%
Total	52%	43%	2%	1%

Source: “ASEAN Study,” *Ipsos* (2014)

The data gathered by *Ipsos* seems to coincide with the poll conducted by Pew: Japan is generally seen as friendly by most ASEAN states with all nations polled being over 80 or even 90% when combining the ‘very friendly’ and ‘somewhat friendly’ responses. Moreover this seems to indicate that the Korean public and government’s dislike towards Japan (or the Japanese government more specifically), does not seem to carry over into ASEAN. Finally, in a study

<sup>73</sup> Jovee Marie De La Cruz. “Comfort Women Should Get P1-B Compensation from Japan,” *Business Mirror*, January 1, 2016. Accessed February 17, 2016. <http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/comfort-women-should-get-p1-b-compensation-from-japan/>

<sup>74</sup> As in other cases, assessment of the validity of claims over disputed territories is a topic beyond the scope of this paper and the use of this particular name does not indicate agreement with one disputant over another.

conducted by the Japanese MOFA in 2008, they evaluated how the public in ASEAN member states view Japan’s actions during WWII. Please refer to Table 10 below.

Table 10: ‘Perception in selected ASEAN countries of Japan’s actions during World War II’

	Cannot Forget the Bad things Japan Did	Japan Did Some Bad Things, but They are Not an Issue Now	I have never Considered it an Issue	Don’t Know
Indonesia	18.14%	69.56%	5.36%	6.93%
Malaysia	26.74%	64.94%	5.06%	3.25%
Singapore	23.15%	69.28%	4.54%	3.03%
Philippines	27.26%	59.07%	13.52%	0.15%
Thailand	13.84%	68.27%	13.36%	4.53%
Vietnam	11.94%	77.54%	9.01%	1.51%
Total	20.2%	68.1%	8.54%	3.2%

Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008)

The data in this poll indicates seems to be corroborated by the other polling data: Japan is increasingly viewed in a friendly manner by ASEAN. So while many in ASEAN remember the negative experiences of WWII, the majority of their publics do not seem to see it as a relevant contemporary issue. Moreover, the poll listed in this table has been conducted several times before and the percentage of ‘Cannot Forgive the Bad things Japan Did’ has consistently declined over time.<sup>75</sup>

#### G. Summary of Security and Political Ties

Looking at Japan and Korea’s security ties to ASEAN provides a number of important points to consider. First, both countries have a similar number of agreements and forums where they have high level contacts with ASEAN. This is not out of a matter of preference for one state or the other, but relative to individual ASEAN states Japan and Korea are sufficiently large powers to merit cooperation and discussions with on a variety of issues. Second, Japan has been more active in terms of joint military exercise with ASEAN. Korean military drills with ASEAN members have been limited to multilateral exercises, which also include Japan and the U.S. The reason for this is that the lion’s share of Korean defense spending goes to counter the land threat posed by North Korea, limiting their ability to participate in many joint drills or to lead them.

<sup>75</sup> Mun 2008, 203. [http://www.jcie.org/japan/j/pdf/pub/publst/1451/11\\_tang.pdf](http://www.jcie.org/japan/j/pdf/pub/publst/1451/11_tang.pdf)

Next, Abe has been somewhat more active than Park on state visits to ASEAN. Some have referred to Abe's foreign policy in ASEAN as a 'Pivot to Southeast Asia' after returning to office at the end of 2012. However, even though Park has not conducted as many state visits, she has also met with the leaders of each ASEAN member state as recently as the end of 2014. This suggests that both leaders place a priority on good relations with ASEAN and even if they were seeking any gains vis-à-vis each other the results are inconclusive based on this metric alone.

Perhaps the most distinct difference between Japan and Korea in their outreach to ASEAN is the efforts of their MOFAs to advocate for their positions on controversial issues. Based on the information available on their respective embassy websites, Japan either does not conduct or publicize direct issue advocacy on territorial or historical issues. In contrast, many of the Korean embassies in ASEAN made some kind of efforts to promote the Korean government's stance on 'historical issues.' This was true, whether an embassy kept track of local newspapers, provided translations of Korean territorial claims, or even when the ambassadors to those countries wrote op-eds or gave lectures to university students in a number of ASEAN countries. What is not clear however is how much of a macro impact that has on historical issues. The results are either not immediately perceivable or masked by other larger countervailing forces such as perceived economic and political imperatives.

Finally, in assessing public opinion there was a much wider array of polling available regarding ASEAN member states' publics about Japan. The overall picture seems to be that: 1) Japan is somewhat more popular in selected ASEAN states than Korea; 2) relations between Japan and ASEAN member states seems to be somewhat or very good based on public perceptions; and 3) with the passage of time the historical legacies of Japanese aggression during WWII have faded. This is in direct contrast to the Korean public's perceptions of their colonial past. Korea was a colony of Japan for 40 years and after independence, the Korean War and decades of authoritarian governments limited the space for discussing these issues. It wasn't in the late 1980s onwards that issues such as the comfort women and Liancourt grew in Korean public discourse. Thus the overall picture presented shows a distinct disconnect between public opinions held about Japan/the Japanese government in Korea and ASEAN.



## V. ASEAN Media Analysis

The next part of this report will focus on how Japan-Korea history issues are depicted in the press of ASEAN member states. Before addressing that directly it is important to look at the status of the press in ASEAN to have context in which to view the published articles.

Table 11: 2015 Map of Press Freedom

Country	Press Freedom Score (0 = most free, 100 = the least free)	Country	Press Freedom Score (0 = most free, 100 = the least free)
Brunei	75/100	Myanmar	73/100
Cambodia	69/100	Philippines	44/100
Indonesia	49/100	Singapore	67/100
Laos	84/100	Thailand	75/100
Malaysia	65/100	Vietnam	86/100

Source: *Freedom House*

According to Freedom House's data only two ASEAN member states: Indonesia and the Philippines have a partially free press. The other eight member states are rated as 'not free' according to their definitions. This could be because of government censorship, the legal environment, the political environment or owing to economic factors. With this in mind, this report will turn to specific countries. The data found on digital newspapers and other publications was searched with the same keywords as statements issued by ASEAN MOFAs. Articles in this section fall into two categories: 1) domestically produced articles; and 2) Articles written by a third party outside of ASEAN and republished in a domestic outlet in their countries. All efforts have been made to be exhaustive regarding sources published online in English since 2005. However, some newspapers had limitations do to issues with search engines, paywalls, or lack of available resources. For a comprehensive list of articles covered in this study and how they are categorized, please see Appendices A and B.

Of the ASEAN member states covered in this study, six of them had no domestically produced content in English and published online since 2005: Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. There are several possible reasons for this: 1) government censorship, 2) lack of English proficient writers/audience in those countries, 3) a lack of interest in Japan-Korea history issues, and so forth. Four ASEAN member states published articles on a

number of issues. Without exception, all articles on the issue of Liancourt took a neutral stance and focused on detailing the history of the dispute and/or arguments advanced by the two parties.

As for the comfort women issue, articles tended to be mixed to somewhat critical of Japan in the region. Perhaps the nation's press who was most critical of Japan was the Philippines. This could be due to higher English proficiency or the relatively freer state of their press. However, it should be noted that the press was generally more critical of Filipino President Aquino than it was of Japan. Five articles in Singapore covered how WWII is remembered and held a wide range of opinions. This may be attributable to *Xinhua*, a Chinese/English language press distributor. Future works may want to expand on Chinese language media sources where there is a large ethnic Chinese population in ASEAN such as Indonesia and Singapore to see what influences they have on public opinion.

Republished articles were generally sourced from a number of places including but not limited to: Agence France-Press (AFP), the Associated Press (AP), BBC, Bloomberg News, the BBC, Reuters, Kyodo News, Xinhua and other English language sources. As for issue specific articles, the majority of articles covering Liancourt were neutral. One example of this is the comfort women agreement where most articles provided neutral, matter-of-fact restatements about the deal. There were several exceptions though. One article each in Indonesia and Singapore provided a mix of positive and critical coverage of the December 2015 agreement. The Philippines had positive one article about the agreement. Finally, one article by Singapore by a Chinese author was critical of the agreement and one article republished in Thailand was critical of Japan's general stance on the comfort women issue prior to December 2015. As for other issues such as history textbooks, the Sea of Japan/East Sea naming dispute, forced labor in Korea, and other WWII legacies, all articles took a neutral stance regarding them. Perhaps the one exception to this rule was the comfort women issue, but even articles in that category tend to be neutral more often than not.

### *Summary of Media Analysis*

Given the available data for media coverage of Japan-Korea 'history issues' in the region it might be possible to extrapolate the following possible explanations: First, excluding the Indonesia and the Philippines, English publications covering these issues are quite limited. While

this seems to suggest English proficiency in the region may limit available data, there are some inferences we can make from the Singaporean and Filipino press. Even in those two countries, their outlook tends to be mixed. Moreover, the Filipino press is more critical of their government than Japan's on the comfort women issue. Another possibility may be a lack of interest in Japan-Korea history issues in the region. This seems more plausible at least based on available English source materials. While the number of articles published on these issues is not insubstantial it absolutely pales in comparison to the number of articles published on a wider range of historical issues with in Japan and Korea.<sup>76</sup>

## VI. Conclusions and Implications of this Study

### A. The Importance of this study and Analyses of Predictions

This study has broken new ground by looking directly at the efforts of Japan and Korea to promote their perspectives on historical disputes in ASEAN. While much more attention has been paid in the U.S. regarding Japanese and Korean issue advocacy, efforts in ASEAN have been relatively ignored by comparison. To analyze whether or not Japan and Korea's 'inter-mestic'<sup>77</sup> issues have spilled into ASEAN a number of factors were assessed: 1) Official statements by ASEAN MOFAs or other governmental bodies; 2) economic relations, 3) political/security relations, 4) issue advocacy by Japan and Korea's embassies in ASEAN, 5) public opinion polling, and 6) newspaper publications/republications in ASEAN member states about Japan-Korea history issues.

In line with this study's first hypothesis, Japan and Korea both are seeking to influence ASEAN, although in different ways. The lack of data about Japan's activities suggests that their MOFA is likely to be conducting lobbying efforts out of the public eye. Additionally, the Japanese government's goals may not even be to win over other states or their public to Japan's side, but to maintain neutrality and/or the status quo. Excluding the Liancourt dispute, Japan generally is seen as an upholder of the international system as it is currently constructed. For

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<sup>76</sup> See Kimura, Kan "Why are the Issues of 'Historical Perceptions' between Japan and South Korea Persisting?" in *Journal of International Cooperation Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, July 2011. This article contains large-n samples of newspaper articles published in the Japanese Asahi Shimbun and the Korean Choson/Chosun Ilbo from 1945-2009 on all contentious historical issues between both countries.

<sup>77</sup> Referring to international relations issues that spill over into a nation's domestic politics.

Korea, on a number of issues such as the comfort women, the East Sea, etc., they are seeking to establish a new international consensus. Moreover, the Korean MOFA has attempted to change perceptions on the ground in ASEAN through, lectures, public events, and publishing/promoting pro-Korea articles in regional newspapers. Furthermore, it should also be noted that Korean economic and political ties to the region are probably not conducted with the intent to sway the region to their cause. Doing so would arguably be at most a secondary priority for the Korean government.

Perhaps the most consequential takeaway from this study is that on a macro-level, Japan-Korea tensions over history do not seem to be affecting their bilateral and multilateral relations in ASEAN. What is perhaps less clear is whether this is due to perceived economic and/or political imperatives in ASEAN member states or a lack of interest on the parts of their leaders and the public. The truth may lie somewhere in between. ASEAN nations only had a relatively brief experience of military occupation by Japan in comparison to Korea and China. Following WWII, Japan made efforts particularly through financial reparations to ‘apologize’ for the actions of their nation and in large part that effort has succeeded.

Thus as mentioned before there seems to be a huge disconnect between the perceptions and feelings of the Korean public and those of ASEAN member states. While this could arguably be because of the perceived economic and political importance of Japan in the region, just as strong a case could be made that for ASEAN member states these issues are not a priority. Perhaps with the exception of the comfort women in the Philippines, history issues do not seem to constitute a domestic-level political issue within ASEAN. Simply put the governments and publics in ASEAN have more pressing domestic and international issues that demand their attention and resources.

## B. Limitations of this Study and Future Works

This work would be remiss to not discuss the limitations in terms of available data. While this writing utilized data sources in English, Japanese, and Korean, the lack of access to primary and secondary sources in ASEAN languages certainly has limited the potential resources from which to make inferences. In particular, several of the least developed ASEAN members such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar had very limited data to work with due to language barriers

issues related to newspaper article indexing. In particular given recent developments in Myanmar, future scholars should take care to look at how Japan and Korea jockey for influence there as Myanmar's economy and political system liberalize over the coming years.

Perhaps more consequentially as an aside in this study, there seems to be data to indicate that tensions between Japan and China are having more practical impacts in ASEAN's political relations than the Japan-Korea bilateral relationship. In particular, Japanese ODA and security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam seem directed to check perceived or real Chinese expansion into the disputed territories and maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. Thus, a direct study would be of perhaps greater interest and prominence at the moment.

Finally, future researchers should build upon this work and continue to look at how Japan and Korea's relationships with ASEAN evolve in the post-Abe and post-Park eras. President Park will serve through February 2018 and barring some major change Prime Minister Abe will continue to serve in office until that point or as late as 2019. The question to be looked at that point is whether future Japanese and Korean leader's policies towards ASEAN will have continuity or diverge from Abe and Park.

## Appendices

### Appendix A: Bibliography of Newspaper Articles about Japan-History Issues in ASEAN

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Appendix B: Newspaper Articles Published/Republished in ASEAN Countries Regarding Japan-Korea History Issues

Country of Publication	Domestic or Republished Content	Issue (number of articles)	Outlook (positive, mixed, neutral, negative)
Brunei	republished	Comfort Women Deal (1)	Neutral (1)
		Comfort Women (2)	Neutral (2)
		World War II Legacies (3)	Mixed (1), neutral (2)
Cambodia	republished	Comfort Women (2)	Neutral (2)
Indonesia	republished	History (general) (2)	Mixed (1), neutral (1)
		Comfort Women (4)	Neutral (4)
	domestic	Liancourt (1)	Neutral
Malaysia	republished	History Textbooks (1)	Neutral
		Liancourt (1)	Neutral
		Liancourt, comfort women, Sea of Japan/East Sea, forced labor (1)	Neutral
	Comfort Women (4)	Critical of Japan (1), neutral (3)	
	domestic	Comfort Women (2)	Critical of Japan (2)
Philippines	republished	Comfort Women Agreement (2)	Positive (1), neutral (1)
		Comfort Women (3)	Neutral (3)
		Liancourt (5)	Neutral (5)
	domestic	Filipina Comfort Women (10)	Positive towards Japan (2), critical of Philippines government (4), critical of Japan and Philippines government (1), mixed (1), neutral (1)
		History (general), Military Cooperation with Japan (1)	Mixed (1)
		Japanese Constitutional Revision(1)	Critical of Japan and Philippines government
Singapore	republished	Comfort Women Agreement (4)	Mixed (1), neutral (2), critical of Japan (1)
		Liancourt/Textbooks (2)	Neutral (2)
		General WWII regarding Japan (5)	Neutral (3), mixed (1), positive (1)
		Comfort Women Agreement (2)	Critical of Japan (1), mixed (1)
		Liancourt (2)	Neutral (2)
Thailand	republished	Comfort Women (3)	Neutral (2), positive towards Japan (1)
		Comfort Women Agreement (2)	critical of Japan (1), neutral (2)
		Liancourt/Textbooks (1)	Neutral (1)
Vietnam	republished	Comfort Women (1)	Neutral (1)
		Comfort Women Agreement (1)	Neutral (1)
		Comfort women, history (general), Liancourt (2)	Neutral (2)
		Liancourt/Textbooks (2)	Critical of Japan (1), neutral (1)

Sources: See Appendix A for a comprehensive list of articles included in this table.

Appendix C: Share of Exports to Trade Partners, by Exporting Country, 2013 (in percent)

AMS	ANZ	Chn	India	Japan	ROK	EU-28	USA	ASEAN
Brunei Darussalam	11.5	1.4	7.6	39.8	16.3	0.1	0.1	23.1
Cambodia	0.7	3.0	0.1	3.6	1.1	26.9	22.6	14.2
Indonesia	2.7	12.4	7.1	14.8	6.3	9.2	8.6	22.3
Lao PDR	27.8	14.0	0.0	0.9	0.1	8.8	0.3	47.6
Malaysia	4.6	13.4	3.6	11.1	3.6	9.1	8.1	28.1
Myanmar	0.1	26.7	7.1	6.8	2.9	1.8	0.1	49.2
Philippines	1.6	12.2	0.5	21.2	5.5	11.4	14.5	16.0
Singapore	4.3	11.8	2.7	4.3	4.1	7.6	5.7	31.4
Thailand	5.0	11.9	2.3	9.7	2.0	9.8	10.1	25.9
Viet Nam	2.7	10.0	1.8	10.3	5.0	18.3	18.0	13.7

Notes:

- Very important (share above 15%)
- Important (share 10-14.9%)
- Fairly important (share 5-9.9%)
- Less important (share <5%)

Source: ASEAN Community in Figures: Special Edition 2014, 15.

Share of Imports from Trade Partners, by Importing Country, 2013 (in percent)


AMS	ANZ	Chn	India	Japan	ROK	EU-28	USA	ASEAN
Brunei Darussalam	1.7	11.3	0.9	5.8	3.4	9.4	11.9	51.0
Cambodia	0.2	32.6	1.0	1.9	4.0	2.7	12.0	30.7
Indonesia	3.1	16.0	2.1	10.3	6.2	7.3	4.9	29.0
Lao PDR	0.5	15.5	0.4	2.9	2.8	1.2	0.3	75.8
Malaysia	3.0	16.4	2.5	8.7	4.7	10.8	7.9	26.7
Myanmar	0.6	30.5	3.1	13.2	11.7	2.1	0.9	35.3
Philippines	2.4	13.1	1.2	8.6	7.7	10.0	10.9	21.8
Singapore	1.3	11.7	2.4	5.5	6.4	12.4	10.3	20.9
Thailand	2.4	15.1	1.4	16.5	3.6	9.2	5.9	17.8
Viet Nam	1.5	27.9	2.2	8.8	15.7	7.1	4.0	16.2

Notes:

- Very important (share above 15%)
- Important (share 10-14.9%)
- Fairly important (share 5-9.9%)
- Less important (share <5%)

Source: ASEAN Community in Figures: Special Edition 2014, 15.

Appendix D: ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN Bilateral Trade 2006-2015 (all figures are in millions of USD unless otherwise stated)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Appendix E: FDI Inflow to ASEAN (by country or regional grouping)

Sources of ASEAN FDI Inflows, 2013


Figure 6.6. Sources of ASEAN FDI Inflows, 2013



Notes: No details breakdown for Lao PDR  
 Source: ASEAN Investment Statistics Database based on Member States' submission, as of 30 July 2014


Source: ASEAN Community in Figures: Special Edition 2014, 85.

FDI Inflow to ASEAN: 1995-2013



Source: ASEAN Community in Figures: Special Edition 2014, 88.

Appendix F: FDI Inflows (and selected countries FDI outflows) to ASEAN from Japan and Korea from 2001-2012



Source: UNCTAD<sup>78</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Prior to 2012, Vietnam did not have available statistics on year-to-year FDI inflows. In lieu of that, FDI in-stock data from 2001-2012 has been substituted instead.



Appendix G: Japanese and Korean ODA to selected ASEAN countries, 2009-2013



Sources: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Korea ODA<sup>79</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Note: Original Japanese valuations were converted from Yen to USD using the U.S. Department of the Treasury's average exchange rates for a given year.

Appendix H: Top 30 Recipients of Japan's Bilateral ODA in 2013

Rank	(including debt relief)			
	Country or region	Gross disbursement	Country or region	Net disbursement
1	Myanmar	5,331.76	Myanmar	2,528.32
2	Viet Nam	1,680.41	Viet Nam	1,306.89
3	India	1,400.11	Afghanistan	831.03
4	Indonesia	968.16	Iraq	700.46
5	Afghanistan	831.03	India	662.34
6	Iraq	711.90	Bangladesh	327.27
7	Thailand	607.21	Kenya	270.34
8	Bangladesh	435.25	Tanzania	196.87
9	Tanzania	338.43	Pakistan	172.97
10	Kenya	337.77	Mongolia	165.16
11	China	325.12	Ethiopia	150.12
12	Sri Lanka	318.12	Cambodia	141.49
13	Philippines	256.72	Sri Lanka	105.00
14	Côte d'Ivoire	243.06	Democratic Republic of the Congo	103.79
15	Pakistan	212.16	Mozambique	98.37
16	Madagascar	190.73	South Sudan	80.36
17	Mongolia	182.16	Morocco	76.75
18	Turkey	159.11	Sudan	76.31
19	Ethiopia	150.12	Laos	75.96
20	Mozambique	150.07	Guinea	69.93
21	Malaysia	144.54	Zambia	66.60
22	Cambodia	143.39	Ghana	65.79
23	Morocco	138.04	Somalia	58.35
24	Guinea	122.02	Uganda	57.51
25	Sierra Leone	117.14	Madagascar	50.59
26	Democratic Republic of the Congo	103.79	Mali	50.08
27	Brazil	96.03	[Palestinian Territories]	50.06
28	Egypt	88.45	Rwanda	49.86
29	South Sudan	80.36	Georgia	45.07
30	Laos	79.84	Sierra Leone	42.91

Source: Japan's ODA White Paper 2014, 195. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000119340.pdf> \_ Values in hundreds of millions of Japanese Yen.

Note: ASEAN nations were highlighted by the author, rather than in the original report.

Appendix I: Major Security Agreements, Cooperative Efforts, and Treaties between ASEAN, Japan, and Korea

Japan	Korea
ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meetings Plus (ADMM-Plus) (since 2010)	ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meetings Plus (ADMM-Plus) (since 2010)
ASEAN-Japan Eminent Persons Group (EPG) (2008-2009)	ASEAN-ROK Eminent Persons Group (EPG) (2007-2009)
ASEAN-Japan Cybercrime Dialog (2014)	
ASEAN-Japan Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (since 2004)	ASEAN-ROK Senior Officials' Consultations on Transnational Crime (since 2004)
ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (November 2004)	ASEAN-ROK Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (July 2005)
ASEAN-Japan Dialog (meeting last held in 2006)	ASEAN-ROK Dialog (meeting last held in 2012)
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (July 2004)	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (November 2004)
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2004)	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2004)
East Asia Summit (EAS)	East Asia Summit (EAS)
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (since 1994)	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (since 1994)
ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security	ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security
Asian Cooperation Dialog (ACD) (since 2002)	Asian Cooperation Dialog (ACD) (since 2002)
G-20 (1999)*	G-20 (1999)*
Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime (Nov 2014)	ASEAN-ROK Knowledge Transfer Project on Narcotics Crime (2007-2013)
ASEAN-Plus Japan Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (since 2013)	Anti-Drug Liaison Officials Meeting for International Cooperation
Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (since 2009)	Upgrade of ASEAN-Korea Relations to Strategic Partnership (October 2010)
	Korea-ASEAN Cooperation Forum (since 2006)

Sources: ASEAN.org; ADMM.ASEAN.org; Shim, 2015.

\*The only ASEAN member in the G-20 is Indonesia.

## Appendix J: Joint Military Exercises Between Japan, Korea and, ASEAN Member States

Year	Type of Exercise	Exercise Name	Selected Participating Nations
2016	Multilateral	Military Force Eighteen Exercise	ASEAN, <b>Japan, Korea</b>
February 2016	Bilateral	No name, but exercise near Sabah	<b>Japan</b> , Malaysia
2015	Multilateral (annual)	Exercise Cobra Gold	<b>Japan, Korea</b> , Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand
2015	Multilateral (annual)	Exercise Khaan Quest	<b>Japan, Korea</b> , Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
June 2015	Bilateral	N/A (exercise conducted near Palawan Island)	<b>Japan</b> , Philippines
2014	Multilateral (annual)	Pacific Partnership	<b>Japan</b> , Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam
2014	Multilateral (biannual)	Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)	<b>Japan, Korea</b> , Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
2014	Multilateral (annual)	Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone 'Garuda Canti Dharma'	<b>Japan, Korea</b> , Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
April 2014	Multilateral	ASEAN Humanitarian Disaster Relief Exercise	<b>Japan</b> , Thailand, Malaysia
February 2014	Multilateral	Komodo Multinational Joint Exercise	<b>Japan, Korea</b> , Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
June 2013	Multilateral	ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DA) and Military Medicine (MM) Exercise	ASEAN, <b>Japan, Korea</b>
2009	Multilateral	ARF Disaster Relief Field Exercise	ASEAN, <b>Japan, Korea</b>

Sources: *ADMM.ASEAN.org*; *currentaffairs.gktoday.in*; Japan Ministry of Defense; *Komodoexercise.org*; *the Mole*; Shim, 2015; Republic of Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Diplomatic White Paper."

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