The Six-party talks are stagnated since the US intensive efforts of denuclearizing North Korea failed in October 2008.  It was the United States, not North Korea, who constantly made a series of concessions, which eventually failed to prevent North Korea from its nuclear debut.  Why and how could a state with the largest nuclear forces lose to North Korea, a failed and impoverished state with obsolete military forces and immature nuclear weapons?  Dr. Ikegami explains the failure of the US-North Korea bilateral bargaining during the latter G.  Bush administration by applying an asymmetrical enforcement game model.  At this seminar, she will share her research paper which further clarifies that it is North Korea, a weaker and impoverished state with nothing to loose, who is best positioned to utilize the very essence of nuclear weapons, “diplomacy of violence” (T. Schelling), to induce a contest of nerve and brinkmanship.  This essential nature appeals to many failed states or clandestine regimes as “the last resort of absolute deterrence”.  This is the driving force of global nuclear proliferation.

Masako Ikegami is professor of political science, and former director (2001-08) of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS) at Stockholm University. Her research has focused on a variety of issues, ranging from empirical analysis of defense R&D and production, defense policy- making process, arms control & disarmament to East Asian regional security, and confidence- building measures. Dr. Ikegami is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, and a board member of the Swedish Pugwash of the Pugwash Conferences on arms control & disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Currently, she is a visiting Abe Fellow, visiting scholar in Honolulu and Washington, D.C., and was a POSCO Fellow at EWC in Honolulu in 2005. She holds a Doctor of Sociology from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. in peace and conflict research from Uppsala University.