

*Policy Studies 14*

# Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation

*Richard Chauvel*



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by Richard Chauvel

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# List of Acronyms

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DOM	<i>Daerah Operasi Militer</i> [Military Operations Area]
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the national parliament
DPRD-GR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah-Gotong Royong [Provincial Parliament–Mutual Assistance], the provincial parliament that was established in 1963 and disbanded in 1968.
FORERI	Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya [Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya]
GRIB	Gerakan Rakyat Irian Barat [Peoples’ Movement of West Irian]
HPB	Hoofd van het Plaatselijk Bestuur, the head of the local administration under the Dutch
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
KING	Kesatuan Islam Nieuw Guinea [Muslim Association of New Guinea]
MRP	Majelis Rakyat Papua [Papuan People’s Assembly]
MUBES	Musyawaharah Besar Papua 2000 [Papuan Mass Consultation 2000]
NAA	National Archives of Australia

NEFIS	The Dutch intelligence organization during World War II.
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NGR	Nieuw Guinea Raad [New Guinea Council]
NNG	Nederlands Nieuw Guinea [Netherlands New Guinea]
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka [Free Papua Organization]
PARNA	Partai Nasional [National Party]
PKII	Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian [Indonesian Independence Party in Irian]
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RDPU	Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum [Meeting to Hear Public Opinion]
SARA	<i>suku, agama, ras dan antar golongan</i> [ethnic, religious and inter-group conflicts]
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

# Executive Summary

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Papuan nationalism is stronger today than it was in 1961, when the Morning Star flag was first raised. Its evolution as a political force is a crucial factor in any analysis of relations between the Indonesian government and Papuan society. This study shows that Papuan nationalism today has been shaped by four primary factors. First, many Papuans share a historical grievance about the manner in which their homeland was integrated into Indonesia. Second, the Papuan elite feels a rivalry with the Indonesian officials who have dominated their country's administration both in the early Dutch period and since the Indonesian takeover of 1963. It is the Papuan participants in this political and bureaucratic competition who have also been the principal formulators and articulators of Papuan nationalism. Third, the territory's economic and administrative development, together with Papuans' continued sense of difference from Indonesians, has fostered a sense of pan-Papuan identity whose popular roots are much broader today than they were during the first efflorescence of nationalism in the early 1960s. Fourth, the demographic transformation of society in Papua, with its great influx of Indonesian settlers, has engendered a widespread feeling that Papuans have been dispossessed and marginalized. The most extreme, though by no means uncommon, expression of this conviction is the assertion that Papuans face extinction in their own land.

Papuan nationalists of the post-Suharto *reformasi* era have structured much of their demand for independence as an argument about the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia. In particular, it is an argument about the decolonization of the Netherlands Indies, the struggle between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the sovereignty of Papua, and Papua's subsequent integration into Indonesia. The failure of decolonization to produce a Papuan nation state has fostered and shaped the development of Papuan nationalism, due to resentment about the process that led to this result. Papuan nationalists resented that in the decolonization dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands they were the objects of the struggle rather than participants in it, and this resentment was a catalyst for the Papuans' own demand for a nation state. Paradoxically, though decolonization failed to produce a Papuan state, it has provided a language and a set of principles, particularly the principles of self-determination and human rights, with which Papuans argue their case today.

Pan-Papuan identity is much more widespread and the commitment to a Papuan nation much stronger in 2004 than it was in 1963, when Indonesia thought it was liberating the Papuans from the yoke of Dutch colonialism. Rather than feeling liberated from colonial rule, Papuans have felt subjugated, marginalized from the processes of economic development, and threatened by the mass influx of Indonesian settlers. They have also developed a sense of common Papuan ethnicity in opposition to Indonesian dominance of the local economy and administration, an identity that, ironically, has spread in part as a result of the increasing reach of Indonesian administration. These pan-Papuan views have become the cultural and ethnic currency of a common Papuan struggle against Indonesian rule. Yet the sharp ethnic distinctions Papuans make between themselves and Indonesians reflect the various and complex relationships Papuans have had with the latter.

Despite the sharp distinctions they draw between themselves and Indonesians, the Papuans are themselves diverse. Papuan society is a mosaic of over three hundred small, local, and often isolated ethno-linguistic groups, whose contacts with each other and with non-Papuans has varied significantly. The evolution of Papuan nationalism has therefore gone hand in hand with the creation of a pan-Papuan identity. The first generation to begin thinking of themselves as Papuans were the graduates of the mission schools and colleges established by the Dutch to train officials, police, and teachers after the Pacific War. The study exam-

ines two regions to illustrate something of Papua's ethnic and religious diversity as well as the different ways in which regions have interacted with the world outside Papua. These two regions, Fakfak and Serui, had displayed some of the strongest pro-Indonesian sentiment prior to 1961. Today, the choice between Papuan and Indonesian identity is a hotly contested issue in Fakfak, while Serui has become anti-Indonesian. The analysis in these case studies sheds additional light on the ways Papuans have negotiated their ways through choices of identity and political orientation.

The study goes on to examine the Indonesian government's 2003 decision to divide Papua into three provinces. The jockeying for position that this policy unleashed suggests that regional and tribal interests remain politically salient. Yet some of the localities that have been most intensely involved in this struggle—Biak, for instance—have also been some of the strongest advocates of Papuan independence. It appears that the intra-Papuan rivalries are being expressed in a context in which pan-Papuan identity is far more salient, and reaching many more Papuans, than it ever did before.

The study also explores the apparent paradox between the rigidity of the Papuan nationalists' straightforward demand for independence, a demand accentuated by the sharp ethnic distinctions made with Indonesians, and the ability of Papuan nationalists to adapt to changing political circumstances. Given that adaptability, the study closes by posing the question as to whether Indonesian government policy could be altered to accommodate Papuan interests and values, and to encourage Papuans to accept a political future within the Indonesian state. The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 seemed to offer this possibility. Papuans participated in the formulation of the law, and it incorporated some Papuan nationalist values and ideals. The law's potential has not been put to the test, however, as Jakarta has been reluctant to implement it. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election as President has created another moment for Jakarta to grasp the historic opportunity created by the Special Autonomy Law. Some of the new President's statements suggest that he has a preference for political rather than military solutions, and for accommodation rather than repression.



# Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation

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Papuan nationalism is stronger today than it was in 1961, when the Morning Star flag was first raised.<sup>1</sup> A creation of the second half of the twentieth century, Papuan nationalism and its evolution as a political force are crucial factors in any analysis of political and cultural change in Papua, and the future development of relations between the Indonesian government and Papuan society. This paper will explore, in the spirit of Anthony Smith (2002: 6), the “pedigrees” of Papuan nationalism, that is, its varied sources and origins, through an investigation of the movement’s historical formation and how it has transformed earlier cultural identities. Specifically, it will show that Papuan nationalism today has been shaped by reactions to four primary factors. Firstly, many Papuans share a historical grievance about the integration of their homeland into Indonesia, which they consider to have occurred against their expressed wishes and without their participation. Secondly, historical developments in Papua’s administration have led to a sense of difference and rivalry. The curious “dual colonialism” of Netherlands New Guinea, in which before 1942 officials from the future Indonesia staffed most of the administrative positions, was followed, from 1944 to 1962, by promotion of Papuans’ educational and political advancement. These developments laid the groundwork for an intense sense of rivalry between the Papuan elite and Indonesian officials since the Indonesian takeover in 1963. The Papuan participants in this political and bureaucratic competition became the

principal formulators and articulators of Papuan nationalism. Thirdly, the territory's economic and administrative development, together with the continued sense of difference from Indonesians, has fostered a sense of

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pan-Papuan identity that was just developing in the efflorescence of nationalism that preceded the onset of Indonesian rule. Fourthly, the demographic transformation of society in Papua, with the great influx of Indonesian settlers, has engendered a widespread feeling that Papuans have been dispossessed and marginalized in their

own land. The most extreme, though by no means uncommon, expression of this conviction is the assertion that Papuans face extinction in their own land.

Papua's nationalist ideology is founded on the history and nationalist historiography of decolonization, specifically Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. John Kelly and Martha Kaplan have asserted that decolonization has constituted the nation state as we know it (Kelly and Kaplan 2001: vii). The decolonization of the Netherlands Indies bequeathed the nation state of Indonesia, but, the belated endeavors of the Netherlands government notwithstanding, it has as yet failed to produce a nation state in West Papua. Despite its failure to provide a state for the Papuans, the decolonization process has fostered and shaped the development of Papuan nationalism, while the UN system of nation states has provided a language in terms of which they have articulated a call for self-determination and human rights in their efforts to secure "autonomy, unity and identity" against Indonesian domination (Smith 2001: 442).

Papua's evolving nationalist historiography has been strongly influenced by the pragmatic, and often contending, agendas of its creators, reflecting their experience. As Edward Said has remarked: "Anyone with the slightest understanding of how cultures work knows that defining a culture, saying what it is for members of that culture, is always a major and, even in undemocratic societies, a democratic contest" (Said 2004: 5). The historiography reflected the choices Papuans were making between the contending Indonesian, Dutch, and Papuan visions of a future. Consequently, where possible, this paper draws on Papuan sources for expressions of Papuan identity and the articulation of Papuan national ideals. Far from seeking national authenticity in antiquity, as many other nationalist movements have done (Smith 2001), Papuan nationalists have

dwelt on the recent past, focusing on the history of Papua's decolonization and integration into Indonesia, a history that many of them had observed and participated in. Thus, they have been political historians rather than the "political archaeologists" described by Smith (2002: 15). The movement is "modern" in the sense that it uses the language of decolonization and focuses on the recent past, yet it has evolved in a society in which economic development and advanced technologies are limited to urban centers and resource development projects. The two elements, the modern and the non-modern, are both prominent in the Papuan nationalist story. For example, one Papuan nationalist depicted Papuans as having been thrown from the Stone Age to the atomic age by the Pacific War, saying that "the revolution of Papuan independence could not be separated from the world revolution" (Bonay c1980s: 80).

In the course of the development of Papuan nationalist consciousness, the Netherlands-Indonesia struggle over decolonization has been replaced by Papua's own struggle against Indonesian rule. In Papua, as Anthony Smith has suggested for some nationalist struggles elsewhere (2002: 25), the experience of conquest by outsiders—first the Dutch and then the Indonesians—has forged bonds of shared discrimination and subjection and helped transform Papuans into a more compact, self-conscious, and organized community. In the process, the Papuans were transformed from being the object of a struggle among others (the Dutch and Indonesians) to being direct participants in their own struggle against the Indonesians. This transformation is the main story of the evolution of Papuan nationalism. To the Indonesian way of thinking, the annexation of West Papua in 1963 was a liberation from Dutch colonial rule. However, far from feeling liberated, the Papuans have felt subjugated, marginalized from the processes of economic development, and threatened by the mass influx of Indonesian settlers. Thus, in the four decades since the Indonesian takeover, a Papuan national movement featuring a pan-Papuan identity and a commitment to an independent Papua has spread from the small, educated urban elite that gave it birth to become a Papua-wide movement with roots in the villages. In addition, the educated elite that leads the movement is much more numerous, skilled, and politically experienced than it was when Indonesia assumed control in 1963.

As Papuan nationalism has grown, it has come to have a distinct ethnic expression. Today, many Papuan nationalists make strong distinctions between Papuans and other peoples, especially Indonesians, doing so in

cultural and ethnic terms that reflect the complex and varied relationships they have had. During the period of Dutch rule, the dual colonialism structure of Netherlands New Guinea shaped Papuan-Indonesian relationships by creating a rivalry between an emerging Papuan elite and Indonesian officials. This rivalry has continued during the period of

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expression***

Indonesian rule and been heightened by the “demographic invasion” of Indonesian settlers since 1963. Yet for all the clarity in Papuan-Indonesian differences, among the Papuans themselves there is tremendous ethno-linguistic diversity. Leaving aside the 35% of Papua’s population who are Indonesian settlers, Papuan society

is a mosaic of over three hundred small, local, and often isolated ethno-linguistic groups. Within this mosaic, the seven largest ethno-linguistic groups constitute about 80% of the total Papuan population, while the rest have populations of only a few thousand at most.<sup>2</sup> From this diverse base, there has been a process of “becoming Papuan.” The first people to think of themselves as Papuans were graduates of the mission schools and colleges established to train officials, police, and teachers after the Pacific War. At first, this new identity was restricted to a relatively small elite. However, in recent years the pan-Papuan identity has been embraced across a broad range of ethno-linguistic groups.

Like many nationalist movements, Papua has objectives in addition to that of political sovereignty. Some have argued that *Merdeka*, the slogan of the nationalist movement, means not just political independence but freedom, and freedom has been defined variously as freedom from poverty, ignorance, political repression, and abuse of human rights. For example, Brigham Golden (2003) contends that *Merdeka* (“independence,” or “freedom”) has a sublime—almost spiritual—significance for Papuans that transcends nationalist aspirations. According to Golden, *Merdeka* is analogous to a “liberation theology,” a moral crusade for peace and social justice on earth. The multiple meanings of *Merdeka* raise the question of whether the freedoms to which Papuans aspire could perhaps be achieved within the Indonesian state. Similarly, it could be asked whether these freedoms would be realized even if Papuans succeeded in establishing an independent nation state. The answer is complex. Many of the disenfranchisements and impotencies that Papuans experience, and which form the basis for their desire for *Merdeka*, reflect the challenges posed by Papuans’

increasing interaction with the outside world rather than simply the nature of Indonesian rule. Yet Jakarta's governance has remained the focus of the Papuan political struggle and national aspirations, and the dominant themes in Papuan political discourse since the early 1960s have related to Papuans' asymmetrical relations with Indonesia and Indonesians. For this reason, Papuan nationalism has tended to distill the multiple objectives of *Merdeka* into the simple demand for political independence.

Yet the political choices Papuans have made over the years have often been shaped by circumstance. For example, though they asserted their right to independence in 1961, many of the early nationalists proved willing to cooperate with the incoming Indonesian administration. Similarly, despite renewed calls for independence in the late 1990s, Papuan nationalists also negotiated the Special Autonomy Law of 2001. For the most part, the Indonesian government's objectives have not been as flexible. Perhaps, therefore, Indonesian government policy could be modified to accommodate some of the *Merdeka* objectives, thus encouraging Papuans to make different choices about their political future.<sup>3</sup> One of the best frameworks for such an effort is the Special Autonomy Law of 2001, which Papuans helped formulate and which incorporates many of the values and ideals Papuans associate with *Merdeka*. However, the potential attractions of the Law's promise of self-rule and autonomy within the Indonesian state have not yet been put to the test, because Jakarta has been reluctant to implement the law. Furthermore, it announced soon afterward its intention to divide Papua into three provinces, a move that has been denounced by nationalists as an attempt to "divide and rule." It remains to be seen whether recently elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia's former security minister, will decide to implement the spirit and letter of the Special Autonomy Law.

The study's examination of these issues is in four parts. Part I examines the role of history and historiography in the development of contemporary Papuan nationalism. It begins by noting that the nationalists' decision in 1999 to declare that Papua had been independent since 1961 was an attempt both to assert Papua's independence without unnecessarily provoking the Indonesian authorities and a conscious effort to build on a

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popular misunderstanding of the events of that year. It goes on to note that this focus on 1961, rather than some other year, as the seminal founding event was rooted in the year's role as a turning point in the development of Papuan nationalism itself. The section therefore unpacks the development of Papuan consciousness as the nationalists of 1961–62 first attempted to persuade the world to allow them a direct say in creating an independent future. The nationalists, confronted by the inevitability of an Indonesian takeover, then debated how to accommodate the incoming Indonesian administration, while still clinging to the forlorn hope of a meaningful version of the plebiscite that had been promised in the agreement that transferred Papua to the Indonesians. This early nationalism was rooted, in turn, in experiences in the 1940s and 1950s that expressed the first stirrings of Papuan nationalism and created the educational infrastructure out of which came the nationalists of the early 1960s.

Part II unpacks the development of Papuan ethnic identity from the colonial period to the present. Throughout this period, the sense of being Papuan has been formulated primarily as an opposition to Indonesians from elsewhere in the archipelago, who are known among Papuans as *amberi* (foreigners). This sense of distinction is based not only on the physical differences between the two peoples, but also on the historical interactions between them. Early in the Dutch colonial period, Indonesians primarily served as the officials administering and teaching in Papua, while the reverse was not true. Papuans also did not participate in the educational institutions centered on Jakarta, and thus failed to develop the sense of common heritage that marked Indonesian nationhood. After the Pacific War and the independence of Indonesia, a new generation of Papuan nationalists, teachers, and officials were trained locally in schools that the Dutch had set up in Papua just after the war. This generation of graduates, the first Papuans to consider themselves “Papuan,” became the leading members of the independence movement of the early 1960s.

The nationalism of this period had a narrow base. The nationalists were few, were culturally isolated from the great mass of Papuans, and had only recently branched out from their own parochial roots. But, ironically, the experience of Indonesian administration has expanded the nationalist base. As the growing reach of government administration has incorporated increasing numbers of previously isolated peoples, they have also come to identify themselves as “Papuans” and as different from “Indonesians.” Furthermore, Papuans collectively have felt displaced by

government transmigration programs and marginalized by the “foreigners” dominance of the economy, a process that many Papuan nationalists have come to consider a version of creeping extermination. Nevertheless, Papuan society still retains a great deal of diversity, and the regional loyalties to which this gives rise create political implications that will be examined further in Part IV.

Part III examines two regions, Fakfak and Serui, to illustrate Papua’s ethnic and religious diversity as well as the varied ways that Papua’s diverse regions have interacted with the outside world. Fakfak and Serui were chosen not because they were representative of Papua as a whole, but rather because, despite also being the homes of some of Papua’s leading nationalists, they were two of the areas that showed the strongest pro-Indonesian sentiment prior to 1961. Today the two locales display different positions on Papuan nationalist issues. In Fakfak the choice between Indonesian and Papuan identities is still hotly contested, while Serui has become anti-Indonesian, reflecting more closely mainstream opinion elsewhere in Papua. The section explores the reasons behind these different outcomes, as a way of shedding additional light on the ways Papuans have negotiated their ways through choices of identity and political orientation. It suggests that Fakfak is somewhat unique in that many of its people were already Muslim long before the Dutch administration. In addition, many of its people, especially its elites, are of mixed descent due to a long history of intermarriages with people in the Maluku islands. Serui, despite its own history of contact with the Malukus, did not have this same degree of identity with people outside Papua. Consequently, despite having been the home base of one of Papua’s pro-Indonesia parties, as Indonesia increased its political and diplomatic pressure in the early 1960s, sentiment in Serui shifted against the Indonesians. The shift of opinion against Indonesia in Serui became even stronger in reaction to the experience of Indonesian rule and Indonesia’s conduct of the “Act of Free Choice” in 1969.

In Part IV, the study goes on to examine Papua’s continuing regional complexity through an analysis of Papuan responses to the Indonesian government’s 2003 decision to divide Papua into three provinces. Much of the established political elite in Papua rejected the partition, regarding it as an attempt to divide and conquer the independence movement and also as a violation of the letter and spirit of the 2001 Special Autonomy Law. However, some local leaders in the regions outside Jayapura have supported partition and been willing to accept positions in the new provinces.

Their responses suggest that regional and tribal interests remain politically salient and that the process of “becoming Papuan” is a work in progress.

## PART I – History

### Correcting the Course of Papuan History

The first step in understanding Papuan nationalism is to understand Papuan history and historical consciousness. Much of the discourse in

*Papuan nationalists...have structured...their demand for independence as an argument about the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia*

Papuan nationalism is an interpretation of history and is itself a product of the movement's political history. Papuan nationalists of the post-Suharto *reformasi* era have structured much of their demand for independence as an argument about the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia. This construction of history, which distinguishes Papua from the rest of Indonesia, is central to an understanding of contemporary Papuan politics and the relations between Papua and the Indonesian government. History is therefore one of the issues in the dispute between Papua and Jakarta. Nationalist historiography is an impor-

tant influence on Papuan political rhetoric, and it shapes the way many Papuan leaders think about political issues.

The nationalist slogan, “Correcting the Course of Papuan History” (*Perlurusan Sejarah*), conveys something of the influence of these conceptions of history.<sup>4</sup> The history that many Papuans want to “correct” is that of the integration of Papua into Indonesia. On the one hand, the nationalist interpretation of Papuan history draws on the pre-colonial past and the presumed historic differences between Papuan and Indonesian cultures. Yet it is also framed by the living memories of many Papuans.<sup>5</sup> This interpretation of history, one that has become dominant in Papuan political circles, is not shared by most Indonesians, and it contrasts sharply with Indonesian nationalist history. The history of Papua's integration into Indonesia is also the history of the Papuan national struggle.

The dominant Papuan view today is that Papua declared its independence on December 1, 1961, the date the Morning Star flag was first raised,<sup>6</sup> but its independence was subsequently denied by an 1962 agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia that was signed in New York

(subsequently known as the “New York Agreement”). In Indonesia’s view, Papuans voted to become part of Indonesia in 1969 through an “Act of Free Choice”; however, Papuans consider that result to have been returned by a hand-picked and intimidated set of individuals who did not represent the will of the Papuan people. Therefore, according to Papuan nationalists, Indonesia’s presence in Papua is not legitimate, and the people of Papua should be granted the freedom to become a nation state. When in 2000 the nationalists formed the *Presidium Dewan Papua’s* (Papuan Presidium Council, hereafter the *Presidium*), it expressed these views in the first three resolutions adopted at the “Second” Papuan Congress (*Kongres Papua*), held in Jayapura from May 29 to June 4, 2000, which said:<sup>7</sup>

***The dominant Papuan  
view today is that  
Papua declared its  
independence on  
December 1, 1961***

The people of Papua have been sovereign as a nation and a state since December 1, 1961.

The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the 1962 New York Agreement on moral and legal grounds as the agreement was made without any Papuan representation.

The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the results of *Pepera* (the “Act of Free Choice”) because it was conducted under coercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and immoral conduct contravening humanitarian principles. Accordingly, the people of Papua demand that the United Nations revoke resolution 2504, of 19 December [sic] 1969.<sup>8</sup>

These resolutions and the theme of the Congress, “Correcting the Course of Papuan History,” convey the importance of history in the way that contemporary Papuan nationalists conceive of their political struggle. According to the first of the resolutions, Papuan independence dates from December 1, 1961, when the national symbols—the *Bendera Bintang Kejora* (Morning Star flag) and “Hai Tanahku Papua” (the anthem “Papua My Country”)—were unveiled. The second resolution refers to the 1962 New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, negotiated under UN auspices and with United States support, in which the

Netherlands agreed to transfer the administration of Papua to Indonesia, after the brief interposition of a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). In turn, Indonesia agreed that Papuans could determine their own future through an “Act of Free Choice” held in 1969. In practice, this ratification was carefully orchestrated by the Indonesian authorities, as Papuan nationalists had feared would happen.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, on November 19, 1969, the United Nations General Assembly “noted” the results of the “Act of Free Choice” in resolution 2504 (Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004: 12–13, 18–21).

The construction of Papuan history represented in these resolutions had developed after the fall of Suharto, during what some observers have called the “Papuan Spring” that extended from mid 1998 to November 2000 (van den Broek and Szalay 2001; Chauvel 2002). This version of history reflected not only deeply held convictions but also an assessment of the political agendas that would be most effective in negotiations with the government and in mobilizing support in Papua. The Papuan Spring began in July 1998, when a coalition of NGO and church leaders, *adat* figures, and intellectuals and officials formed the FORERI (*Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya*, Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya), which developed a political program and reinterpreted the history of Papua’s integration into Indonesia. FORERI’s establishment had been preceded a few weeks earlier by flag raisings and demonstrations in Biak, Jayapura, Sorong, Wamena, Manokwari, and elsewhere in Papua. The military’s suppression of the Biak demonstration, leaving numerous dead, suggested Suharto’s ways of dealing with separatist dissent had not disappeared with his resignation (Rutherford 1999: 40), and the formation of FORERI was a response to that fact.

However, in the Papuan nationalist consciousness, the events of 1998 were not the beginning of Papuan nationalism. In their view, there is a direct continuity from the nationalism of 1961 down through the years of Indonesian rule that ends finally in the post-Suharto revival. In other words, the desire to be separate from Indonesia was not new, but something Papuans had long wanted. Indeed, according to this view, Papuans were integrated into Indonesia against their stated preferences and against their better judgment. Thus, the Papuans of the post-Suharto era were demanding not a new independence, but rather for Indonesian and international recognition of the sovereignty that the Papuans had established in 1961. According to this version of history, the legitimacy of Papuan inde-

pendence was established by the Dutch recognition of the Papuan national symbols and Papua's right to independence, rather than by the subsequent guerrilla struggle against Indonesian control.

Despite this claim to early Dutch recognition, Papuan nationalist ideology also refers to the international context in a negative sense. There was a keen sense that in the early 1960s that Papua was the "object" of an international conflict in which the Papuans were observers rather than participants, despite their desire to have a say. Hence, the nationalists rejected the New York Agreement of 1962, which transferred sovereignty to Indonesia, because Papuans were not party to the negotiations. In Papuan eyes, the New York Agreement, the subsequent UN supervision of the transfer, and the UN's acceptance of the results of the "Act of Free Choice" support the contention that Papua was sacrificed for the interests of others.

It is not the intention of this portion of the study to question the legitimacy or the historical substance of these interpretations. It seeks, rather, to examine the political circumstances in which the events took place and in which the interpretations have evolved. The discussions do so by focusing first on the post-1998 developments in Papuan nationalism, with special emphasis on the diverse nationalist interpretations of the events of 1961 and 1962, and then by discussing the events of 1961–63 as they were discussed by participants at the time.

### **The Evolution of Papuan Nationalism Since 1998**

The *Presidium's* resolutions were not made until the Papuan Spring was already well underway. Earlier, a number of alternative views had been expressed, and even at the time of the Congress there was a diversity of opinions among Papuan nationalists. The present section traces the early post-Suharto development of Papuan nationalist historiography from its beginnings to its assertion that Papua had been sovereignly independent since 1961, including attention to the multiple ways the latter point has been elaborated.

#### *FORERI's Dialogue with Indonesia*

When FORERI was formed in July 1998, independence and the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia were not yet the movement's primary focus. Rather, FORERI sought to establish an open, honest, and democratic dialogue with the Indonesian government in which Papuans could articulate their aspirations and concerns. Accordingly, though the organization called for a referendum (*jajah pendapat*) on the political status of

***in July 1998, independence and the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia were not yet the movement's primary focus***

Irian Jaya, as West Papua was then called, it was worried that the government might unilaterally decide to offer autonomy and thereby preempt a discussion of Papuan concerns. Those larger concerns included FORERI's

desire that the military restrain itself from acts of violence and intimidation, and that Irian Jaya's status as an area of military operations (DOM, *Daerah Operasi Militer*, Military Operations Area) be revoked. FORERI also sought an international investigation of the human rights abuses that had been perpetuated since Irian Jaya's integration in Indonesia, and it desired that the members of the Indonesian security forces who had been responsible for the abuses be brought to justice. In addition, it wanted an end to the

manipulation and provocation of ethnic and religious tensions (SARA; *suku, agama, ras dan antar golongan*; ethnic, religious and inter-group conflicts) (Alua 2002a: 17–18).<sup>10</sup> In sum, FORERI's agenda was about Indonesian governance and how it should be changed.

FORERI's rights-based agenda was much influenced by the thinking of Benny Giay, one of Papua's leading intellectuals and theologians, who argued that it was the suffering of the Papuan people since integration with Indonesia that was causing them to demand independence. Specifically, the government's program of economic development (*pembangunan*) was a new form of colonialism that marginalized Papuans, making them foreigners in their own land while advantaging outsiders. Benny Giay asserted that *pembangunan* was a new ideology—or religion—in which Papuans had to obey what had been determined in Jakarta. Papuans felt despised and denigrated, as they were not involved in the planning for and development of their own land, so it was not surprising that Papuans wanted independence (see Alua 2002a: 21). The ensuing discussions between FORERI and the State Secretariat, known as the Jakarta Informal meetings, included the preparation of a terms of reference document that would constitute the basis for dialogue with Indonesian President Habibie in February 1999. During the discussions, the terms of reference document went through various drafts, in the course of which a number of differences between FORERI and the government were identified. These discussions were also an important stage in the evolution of the Papuan nationalist historiography, for they canvassed a number of com-

peting interpretations of Papua's integration into Indonesia, many of which stopped far short of the bold assertion that Papua had become independent on December 1, 1961. As the discussions continued, both parties prepared competing drafts. The FORERI drafts reflected Papuan aspirations for independence, while those of the government were framed around an offer of autonomy. The final document was something of a compromise. It recognized the injustices and abuses of human rights that had given rise to disappointment in Papuan society, and it included some discussion of the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia. However, the rendering of that history adhered closely to the government's interpretation. According to the document, the process of integration had been legitimate and was accepted by the international community. The only acknowledgement of Papuan dissent was the assertion that some Papuans considered that the "Act of Free Choice" had not been a proper reflection of Papuan opinion (Alua 2002a: 37).

The most elaborate interpretation of Papuan history from the FORERI side was a 1999 compilation by Herman Wayoi, entitled *Quo Vadis Papua: Tanah Papua masih dalam status tanah Jajahan* (Alua 2002a: 59–68), that served as a background paper for the discussions with Habibie. Herman Wayoi was a political survivor from the first generation of Papuan nationalists and one of the founders of PARNA (Partai Nasional, National Party) in 1960.<sup>11</sup> In the paper, Herman Wayoi developed historical and quasi-constitutional arguments that Papua was not part of Indonesia and since 1963 had been a colonized territory in which Papuans had not been treated as Indonesian citizens. Herman Wayoi's critique of the "Act of Free Choice" and what he described as the "Military operation against the Papuan people" foreshadowed the *Presidium's* later rejection of the "Act of Free Choice." Wayoi asserted that the Indonesian Government appeared interested only in controlling the territory, then planned to exterminate the Papuans and replace them with Indonesian transmigrants.

Yet Herman Wayoi's paper did not go so far as to claim, as others soon would, that Papua had become independent with the proclamation of December 1, 1961. Indeed, the date and the flag raising are not even mentioned. Rather, it asserts that Wayoi's generation had hoped and understood that the New York Agreement constituted merely a transfer of administrative authority and that the sovereignty of Papua would be determined by the Papuan people through the "Act of Free Choice."

Unfortunately, the “Act of Free Choice” was implemented with manipulation and intimidation. Therefore, Wayoi was now requesting that Habibie release (“*melepaskan*”) the Papuan people to establish a Melanesian Republic, thereby implementing a long-overdue promise that Indonesia had supposedly made in the “Rome Agreement” of September 30, 1962. In this agreement, which Wayoi claimed had been signed by Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United States (but whose existence is denied by Indonesian officials), Indonesia had allegedly promised it would rule Papua for 25 years and then allow Papua to form its own government.<sup>12</sup>

***it was something of a surprise when Tom Beanal...asserted that West Papua had been independent since 1961***

*Papua Is Already Independent*

Therefore, it was something of a surprise when Tom Beanal, the leader of the “Team of 100” that had been delegated to negotiate with the Indonesian government, asserted that West Papua had been independent since 1961. In his oral presentation to Habibie and his cabinet on February 26, 1999, he asserted

that the basic problem that has created political instability and insecurity in West Papua [Irian Jaya] since 1963 until now is not merely the failure of development, but West Papua’s political status as a sovereign nation among the free peoples of the world, [which it] proclaimed on December 1, 1961. This proclamation offered the best alternative for the future hopes and ideals of the Papuan people. However, Papua was annexed by the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>13</sup>

In effect, Beanal was saying that in 1963 Indonesia had annexed a sovereign nation, and now it needed to return independence to the Papuan people. This was the first time this argument had been advanced, but it quickly became the dominant view within the nationalist movement.

*The Claim Elaborated*

The new view of the events of the early 1960s was elaborated in a variety of ways. One of the more developed of the FORERI’s accounts of Papua’s integration into Indonesia was presented to President Abdurrahman Wahid on his visit to Jayapura for New Year 2000. It asserted that Papua’s independence had been declared on December 1, 1961, by the New Guinea Council through the *Komite Nasional*, and had remained independent until May 1, 1963, the day Indonesia assumed administrative

control. During that period, the Dutch and Papuan flags were flown together as the flags of two independent nations, and the two national anthems were sung, alternating, as the flags were raised. According to this document, the independent Papuan state had even issued its own currency, the New Guinea guilder (Alua 2002b: 28–29). Other statements stopped short of asserting that Papua was already independent, while still asserting that independence was being established. For example, when reporting to President Abdurrahman Wahid on the 2000 Papuan Congress's discussion about Papuan independence, Willy Mandowen, the moderator of the newly formed *Presidium*, asserted that in the early 1960s there had been an “embryo” state of Papua (Alua 2002c: 123). Ironically, according to the *Presidium's* interpretation, Indonesian President Sukarno had himself affirmed the existence of the Papuan state. On December 19, 1961, less than a month after the Papuans had raised the Morning Star flag of independence, Sukarno delivered the *Trikora* speech, in which he ordered the destruction of the Dutch-created puppet state of Papua. This speech initiated a series of military actions that would annex Papua's rights of independence and sovereignty (Alua 2002c: 68, 79). In both the FORERI and the *Presidium* interpretations, the annexation was completed on May 1, 1963 (the day that Indonesia took over the administration from the UN). It was arguments such as these that underlay Tom Beanal's February 1999 demand that Indonesia recognize and return Papua's independence.<sup>14</sup>

The argument that Papua was already independent drew on deep racial, cultural, geographic, and historical roots. The *Presidium* nationalists of 2000 and after asserted that Papuans were racially different from the peoples of Maluku, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sulawesi, and Java. Papuans had black skin and curly hair just like the peoples of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji. Echoing Alfred Russel Wallace, they also argued that the flora and fauna of Papua were different from Indonesia's (see Wallace 1962: 446–58). Viktor Kaisiepo, a member of the *Presidium* and the son of one of the Papuan activists of the early 1960s, pushed the argument further by asserting that even West Papua's natural environment was seen by Papuans as being inherently hostile to Indonesian rule.<sup>15</sup> Every animal, plant, and stone, he said, is a member of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka; the Free Papua Organisation).<sup>16</sup> Geographically, Papua was part of the Pacific, rather than part of the Indonesian archipelago (Alua 2002a: 100).

Given this rhetoric, it might have been expected that Papuans would take out their resentment on the Indonesian settlers who now live among them. Some have indeed done so. However, such instances of violence have been rare, in part because, despite their strong assertions about Papuans' ethnic differences from Indonesians, the *Presidium* nationalists have been reluctant to explicitly use "race" as a means of mobilizing support among Papuans. They have also sought to avoid violence against Indonesian settlers. For example, at the 2000 Papuan Congress the *Presidium* leaders endeavored to reassure Indonesian settlers in Papua that it was not their intention to expel them or consider them as enemies.<sup>17</sup> Later, after an episode of violence in Wamena in October 2000 in which a number of Indonesian settlers were killed, Theys Eluay, one of the *Presidium's* leaders, again reassured the settlers that the proponents of independence would not use violence, terror, or intimidation against them. In his statement, he also explicitly recognized the contributions that the Indonesian settlers had made to the development of Papua.<sup>18</sup>

The *Presidium* also asserted that Papuans did not share *adat istiadat* (customary law) with Indonesians, nor had they shared the Indonesians' pre-colonial experience of kingdoms and Islamic sultanates. The reason these Indonesian political systems were different from those in Papua was because Papuans were Melanesian while the Indonesians were racially Malay. After the establishment of colonialism, the Papuans' historical experience had continued to be different, because they had not been involved in Indonesian political developments. In particular, they had not been involved in Indonesia's struggle for independence, which from the establishment of the first nationalist organization in 1908 to the proclamation of independence in 1945 had been a struggle of the Indonesian people themselves. In addition to asserting these differences from Indonesians, the *Presidium's* argument questioned the process by which Papua had been transferred to Indonesian authority. The argument asserts that Papuans had not participated in the decisions and agreements from 1945 to 1962 that had marked Indonesia's efforts to acquire the territory. They had therefore not been able to articulate their national aspirations, because all the decisions were made by others, particularly Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Nations. In this period, Papua and its people had been objects of the political struggle, not participants in it, and as a consequence they became its victims.<sup>19</sup>

*Alternative Views*

The notion that Papua was already independent was not accepted even by many of the *Presidium's* supporters. For example, during the preparations for the Papuan Congress of 2000, the *Presidium* was under a great deal of pressure from “hardliners”—former political prisoners and those who had been associated with the OPM uprisings—to proclaim independence during the Congress. Implicitly rejecting the argument that independence had already been declared nearly 40 years earlier, the “hardliners” saw the Congress as a “golden opportunity” to finally settle Papua’s political status means of a new proclamation (Alua 2002c: 7–8). The same sense of debate about the events of 1961 was evident during the November 2000 preparations to commemorate the anniversary of the 1961 flag raising. At a meeting of the *Presidium's* organizing committee, much of the discussion debated the meaning of the event. The principal critic of the *Presidium's* position that the flag raising signified independence was Filip Karma, a senior government official and the leader of the July 1998 demonstration in Biak. Echoing the call made by the “hardliners” a few months earlier, Karma advocated that the *Presidium* should proclaim independence during the commemoration.

Even some who claimed 1961 as the start of sovereignty acknowledged that independence had not actually been declared at that time. One of them was Fritz Kirihiio, who like Herman Wayoi was a member of the 1960s generation of nationalists and a former member of PARNAs. In a 2003 interview, Kirihiio recalled a meeting with Theys Eluay and other FORERI / *Presidium* leaders in Jayapura prior to the first of the *Presidium's* mass meetings, the *Musyawaharab Besar Papua 2000* (*MUBES*, Papuan Mass Consultation), which was to be held in February 2000. At that time, Theys Eluay, one of the *Presidium's* leaders, had declared that there must be a proclamation of independence at the mass meeting. Kirihiio said that this was not necessary, as there had already been a declaration on December 1, 1961, and all the Papuans had to do was ask for their sovereignty to be returned. If Papua’s demand was formulated in this way, then no policeman or soldier would arrest Theys Eluay.

Like many others who had been involved at the time, Kirihiio acknowledged that the 1961 flag raising had not really been a proclamation of independence, but was merely an important step in the process of democratization and decolonization that would pave the way to independence.<sup>20</sup> Yet he advocated that Papuans date their independence from

that event anyway. There were two factors underlying his thinking. Firstly, there were tactical considerations of how to deal with the “trigger happy” security forces. They Eluay could be the first in line for assassination, and it was silly for him to be sacrificed unnecessarily. Secondly, the Morning Star flag that had been raised in 1961 had recognition value in Papuan society. After having been flown on public buildings from late 1961 until the advent of the UNTEA administration in 1962, the flag’s public display had been an absolute taboo from 1963 until 1998. On the second anniversary of its raising the Indonesian government had even organized a public burning at the old New Guinea Council building.<sup>21</sup> However, the flag had not been forgotten by the Papuan people. In November and December 1999, when Theys Eluay drove around Jayapura with the flag, many other flags, seemingly hidden since 1962, began appearing from peoples’ houses.<sup>22</sup> The tears of joy shed in the streets of Jayapura at the December 1999 anniversary of the first flag raising, a scene captured in the *Presidium’s* DVD *Mengapa Papua ingin Merdeka* (Why Papua Wants Independence), would seem to confirm Fritz Kirihiio’s assessment of Papuans’ identification with the flag (see Raweyai and Mandowen 2002).

In adopting 1961 as the starting point of Papuan independence, the nationalist elite’s considerations paralleled those of that earlier period. None of the political leaders of 1961 had considered the flag raising a proclamation of independence, but they were not unhappy if fellow Papuans thought that it was.<sup>23</sup> That perception of the flag’s meaning had persisted to the *reformasi* period. Now, as a new generation of nationalists saw this popular understanding being expressed in identification with and commitment to the flag, the Papuan elite decided that the popular understanding of December 1, 1961, as an independence proclamation was sufficient

motive for asserting that it had been the day that the Papuan nation was founded.

***December 1, 1961, is not the only date that could have been chosen as the beginning of Papuan independence***

*Factors Influencing Choice*

December 1, 1961, is not the only date that could have been chosen as the beginning of Papuan independence. Another potential starting point, supported by some of the *reformasi* nationalists, was the OPM’s independence proclamation

of July 1, 1971. Still others favored Tom Wanggai’s proclamation of December 14, 1988. However, the 1961 emblems were considered to have

greatest legitimacy, not only because of the *reformasi*-era popularity of the flag, but also because of the manner in which it was chosen and because of its official recognition by the Dutch authorities. The selection of the emblems and their status had been debated and accepted by the New Guinea Council, the majority of whose members had been elected and were Papuans. Furthermore, the Dutch had recognized the flag's intended symbolism and confirmed its status by means of Netherlands New Guinea government ordinances.<sup>24</sup>

But the FORERI / *Presidium* leaders' interpretation of the past was more than just a strategic response to the contemporary political situation. It also expressed the leaders' perception of their place in the nationalist movement's history. When the *Presidium* nationalists used the term "*Kebangkitan Papua*" (Papuan Awakening) to refer to the nationalism of their day, they distinguished it both from the nationalist movement of the early 1960s and from the guerrilla struggle of the OPM.<sup>25</sup> The *reformasi*-era movement was different from the earlier ones because it was a mass movement encompassing all segments of Papuan society. Meanwhile, unlike the OPM, it was peaceful and democratic, demanding a national dialogue with the government on Papua's status, and being based on human rights and humanitarian and religious values (Alua 2002a: iii–iv).

Thus, ideologically, the *reformasi*-era nationalists owed much more to the first generation nationalists of the 1960s than to the OPM. Consequently, their rhetoric about the Sukarno and Suharto years focused not on the struggle of the OPM but rather on the suffering of the Papuan people and the abuses of the security forces. In part this preference reflected the personal histories of the key players in FORERI, the Team of 100, and the *Presidium*, few of whom had been members of the OPM, and most of whom were graduates of the Indonesian education system. A few, like Herman Saud, S. P. Morin, J. P. Solosa, Willem Rumsawir, and Agus Alua, had achieved some eminence within the Indonesian system.<sup>26</sup> Benny Gay and Willy Mandowen had received some of their education overseas. In the course of their education, these leaders had imbibed the same humanitarian ideas that shaped the Indonesian *reformasi* movement of the late 1990s, including the commitment to peaceful and democratic change. Consequently, the OPM's armed struggle did not sit comfortably with the FORERI / *Presidium* leadership. In particular, the OPM's involvement in the 1996 kidnapping of 12 members of the Lorentz scientific expedition convinced Papua's *reformasi*-era nationalists that they needed to disassoci-

ate themselves from the OPM.<sup>27</sup> They did so not only because they disagreed with the OPM's violent methods but also because they realized that disassociation from the OPM was necessary if the movement was to attract international support and the sympathy of *reformasi*-oriented Indonesians. Identification with the events of 1961 was a way of asserting a nationalist pedigree while avoiding association with the OPM.

However, that identification raised additional issues that the next sections will now explore. The grounding of the new Papuan nationalism in the flag raising of December 1961 entailed an identification with the developments surrounding that event. As we explore those events and their implications for the development of Papuan nationalism, we will find that many of the themes being voiced today were already being developed at that time.

### **Forerunners – The Papuan Nationalism of 1961–63**

The national symbols adopted by the *reformasi*-era nationalists were devised during a period of great tension in the struggle between the Netherlands and Indonesia, a struggle to determine whether Papua should be decolonized as a separate nation state or as part of Indonesia. The Dutch wished to prepare Western New Guinea for potential independence, while the Indonesians insisted that the territory was theirs, as Indonesia was the legitimate successor to the entire territory of the former Netherlands Indies. The last months of 1961 and the first of 1962 were

the climax of a 12-year-long dispute. It was at this time that the dispute approached the brink of open military conflict. As would again be the case during the *reformasi* era, the nationalists of the early 1960s fashioned their political agenda in an environment of extraordinarily rapid change. Indonesia was sponsoring armed infiltrations, the Dutch foreign minister had proposed internationalizing the area's administration preparatory to a vote of self-determination, and Indonesia was threatening a full-scale military invasion. The US-sponsored negotiations that led to the New

York Agreement of August 1962 took place under the threat that Indonesia would mount a military attack. Papuan nationalist activity was itself a factor in the conflict's escalation, as Indonesia's President Sukarno

*The national symbols adopted by the reformasi-era nationalists were devised during...the struggle between the Netherlands and Indonesia*

realized that Papuan nationalism was a much greater threat to Indonesia's designs than was the continuation of Dutch rule (Sukarno 1965: 500; Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004:11). It was this environment that stimulated and shaped a critical period of Papuan nationalism.

*Manifest Politik and Raising of the Papuan National Flag*

The political developments in Papua were responses to the escalating international conflict. The Papuan leaders' positions were by no means uniform. For Papuan leaders, both pro-Indonesia and nationalists, this period was a political roller coaster. They were alternatively encouraged and demoralized by the international developments. As the tension escalated, the focus of the dispute for Papuans shifted from the rival claims to sovereignty over the territory to the issue of self-determination and the prospect of an independent state of West Papua. The shift was a catalyst to an emerging sense of Papuan nationalism. Among the Papuan political elite there was an awareness that their homeland's fate was at stake. These international developments and the Papuan responses revealed the divisions in the elite and more broadly in Papuan society. Papuan leaders found it difficult to position themselves in the conflict.

The immediate catalyst for the nationalist movement of 1961 was Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns's proposal on September 27, 1961, that an international organization or authority assume the administration of Netherlands New Guinea to prepare Papuans to determine the territory's future. Papuan reaction to the Luns proposal was mixed. On the one hand, many Papuan leaders welcomed the prospect of an international guarantee of Papuan self-determination. On the other hand, many were concerned that the proposal had been made without prior consultation with the Papuans, and they resented the fact that the international decisions about their future were to take place beyond their control. Some members of the New Guinea Council, which had been formed earlier that year,<sup>28</sup> feared that if all they did was passively listen to the competing claims of the Indonesian and Netherlands governments, they would eventually be forced to support one of the two adversaries, and their own voice would not be heard. PARNA, for example, which took the position that independence could be achieved within the framework of the Luns Plan, protested the manner in which the discussion was taking place, particularly the way that Papua was being contested between the Dutch and Indonesia. At a meeting in August 1961, Herman Wayoi, then chairman

of PARNA, protested that Papua was not a commodity, adding, “This land is of and for the Papuans.”<sup>29</sup> Nicholaas Jouwe, another leading member of the New Guinea Council, recalled years later that he had objected to Luns’s initiative on the grounds that the New Guinea Council had not been consulted nor, he thought, had the members of the South Pacific Commission, particularly Australia and New Zealand. Jouwe considered that Papua’s future should be secured in association with its neighbors in the Pacific, rather than with the UN.<sup>30</sup>

It was with this sense of resentment, along with an awareness of the need to assert the Papuan preference for self-determination, that the nationalists took initiatives that resulted in the flag raising of December 1. Shortly after Luns’s proposal to the UN, four of the leading Papuan members of the New Guinea Council—Nicholaas Jouwe, E. J. Bonay, Nicholaas Tanggahma, and F. Torey—called a meeting to consider the situation.<sup>31</sup>

In response to this effort, on October 19, 1961, a group of some 72 people gathered at a meeting in Hollandia, now Jayapura. The delegates were drawn from most regions of the territory, they included both Christians and Muslims, and all but one of them were Papuans. They elected 17 people to form a *Komite Nasional*

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*Papua* (Papuan National Committee), which immediately issued a *Manifest Politik* (Political Manifesto). The *Manifest* asked that the Netherlands New Guinea be renamed West Papua, and it called for the immediate use of Papuan national symbols alongside the Dutch ones. The document, which was addressed to the New Guinea Council and the government of the Netherlands, stated in part:

On the basis of the desire of our people for independence, we urge through the mediation of the *Komite Nasional* and our popular representative body, the New Guinea Council, that the governments of Netherlands New Guinea and the Netherlands take action to ensure that, as of November 1,

our flag be flown beside the Netherlands flag;  
our national anthem, *Hai Tanahku Papua*, be sung along with  
the *Wilhelmus*;  
the name of our land become West Papua;  
the name of our people become Papuan.

On this basis we the Papuan people demand to obtain our own place among the other free peoples and nations. [In addition,] we, the Papuan people, wish to contribute to the maintenance of the freedom of the world.<sup>32</sup>

The *Manifest Politik* was the first assertion of the Papuans' demand to establish their own nation state. It was significant that this demand was expressed at a moment when processes of decolonization were being played out in the forum of the UN. As Kelly and Kaplan have observed more generally, in this period, decolonization involved the imposition of a new political order from top down (Kelly and Kaplan 2001: 5). Papuans understood that the process was largely out of their control, yet in the *Manifest* they attempted to use the language and principles of decolonization to assert their right to become a member of the rapidly expanding club of nation states. Not all the leaders who gathered on October 19 supported the *Manifest Politik*. Yet it was decided to press on, because soon the UN would be deciding the fate of Papua, and the *Komite Nasional* wanted to make sure the Papuans' voice was heard.

The ensuing debate in the New Guinea Council focused not on whether independence was desirable, but on whether the measures proposed in the *Manifest* were the best way to achieve it. Some speakers said that the display of the national symbols should be accompanied by an immediate declaration of independence, while others argued that their display should wait until after independence had actually been granted by the Dutch. F. Torey, who was one of the founders of the *Komite Nasional* and a member of the New Guinea Council, acknowledged that it was unusual to raise a national flag beside that of the colonial power. Nevertheless, he asserted it was appropriate to do so, because the *Komite Nasional* did not intend for the raising of the flag to indicate an immediate transfer of sovereignty. Torey was opposed to an immediate declaration of independence, because independence would mean the departure of the Dutch. If that happened, Indonesia would invade, and Papuans would not have the resources to defend themselves.<sup>33</sup>

Some speakers felt the flag raising was premature. These included M. Achmad, who said that the flag should be raised only after sovereignty had been transferred to Papua and after there had been an information campaign about the flag.<sup>34</sup> Burwos, another critic, thought that many people would not understand the distinction the *Komite Nasional* leaders were

making between flag raising and independence, and he said that many of the people he represented in Manokwari would think that independence had already been granted.<sup>35</sup> Outside the Council there were others who shared this view. PARNA initially argued that independence could be achieved within the framework of the Luns Plan, and in November PARNA insisted that a transfer of sovereignty should take place at the same time as raising the flag.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, despite the various differences of opinion, a majority of the Council members supported the *Komite Nasional's* petition.

Despite the misgivings the Luns proposal had created, when the New Guinea Council came to debate the proposal there was strong support from the Papuan members because of the centrality of Papua's right of self-

***there was strong support from the Papuan members because of the centrality of Papua's right of self-determination in the Luns Plan***

determination in the Luns Plan. On this matter also, Torey was an influential speaker. Arguing that the Luns Plan represented the one chance to resolve the problem of West Papua, he wondered aloud what would happen if the Luns Plan was not accepted. He was certain that Indonesia's demands would grow, and he feared that the Dutch would withdraw. Therefore, he asked what steps would need to be taken by the Netherlands government to guarantee the Papuans' right of

self-determination.<sup>37</sup> As for the Dutch authorities, they accepted the terms of the *Manifest Politik*, but they chose to recognize the *Bintang Kejora* as a *landsvlag* (territorial flag) rather than a *nationale vlag* (national flag) (Chauvel 2003: 41–42). The Dutch also asked that the first flag raising be delayed to December 1, so as not to be seen to be presenting the General Assembly with a *fait accompli* of Papuan independence before the debate on the Luns proposal nor to unnecessarily provoke Indonesia (See Chauvel (2003: 41).

Perhaps the Papuans need not have waited, for on November 28 the Luns proposal was defeated in the UN. The majority of the UN General Assembly delegates supported the principle of Papuan self-determination, but none of the resolutions implementing the Luns proposal gained the two-thirds majority needed for approval. The Brazzaville resolution, which expressed the strongest recognition of Papua's right of self-determination by basing it on the provisions of the UN Charter, received 53 votes in favor, 41 against, and 9 abstentions.<sup>38</sup> The Hague might have expected

Papuan politicians to be disappointed by the outcome, as the government itself was, but the most senior Papuan leaders said they did not expect the decision to impact on their struggle or on the Netherlands' ability to guarantee Papua's right of self-determination. Kaisiepo, for example, told a Dutch journalist that although he accepted the wisdom of the Dutch attempt to obtain an international guarantee for Papua's right of self-determination, he was not disappointed by the rejection of the Luns Plan, for the Papuans themselves had never sought the internationalization that was an integral part of the proposal. Rather, he said, the Papuans wanted the Netherlands administration to continue until self-determination. Another leading politician, Nicholaas Jouwe, directly challenged the notion that the Luns proposal's defeat was a defeat for the independence movement. He contended that the UN result actually offered little support for Indonesia's claim to Papua, as an absolute majority of the UN's members had supported Papua's right to self-determination.<sup>39</sup>

With the UN debate out of the way, the flag raising went forward as planned on December 1, 1961. The major flag raising ceremony took place in Hollandia in front of the New Guinea Council building. Flag raising ceremonies also took place elsewhere throughout the territory. There was particularly strong interest in areas like Biak, which was a stronghold of Papuan nationalism. Even in areas like Serui (on Yapen), where support for Indonesia had deep roots, there was much local interest. The Hollandia event was organized by the *Komite Nasional*. The ceremony there was led by Kaisiepo, the deputy speaker of the New Guinea Council, and by W. Inury, chair of the *Komite Nasional*. It was attended by the governor, senior officials, members of the Council, and political party leaders. Unfavorable weather helped keep the ceremony in Hollandia quiet, and there were also no "incidents" reported elsewhere.<sup>40</sup>

#### *Independence and Pragmatism*

The political developments surrounding the *Manifest Politik* and the flag ceremony of December 1, 1961, together with the way *reformasi*-era nationalists have reconstructed these events as the centerpiece of their nationalist historiography, highlight the importance of independence in the Papuan political discourse. However, the developments of the early 1960s and their reconstruction in 1999 and 2000 provide an insight into the pragmatism and caution of Papuan nationalists. In that latter period, the great symbolic importance of flags and proclamations was paradoxi-

cally combined with pragmatism and caution.

As we have seen, the *Manifest Politik* and the flag ceremony of December 1, 1961, did not constitute a proclamation of independence. Nevertheless, the assertion of Papuan interests that the *Manifest Politik* represented, and the discussion of independence that accompanied it, were central to the Papuan political discourse of late 1961 and early 1962. None of the Papuan politicians directly involved considered that the flag ceremony was an independence proclamation, as indicated by the argument by some of them that Papua should proclaim its independence at the same time as it raised the flag. Leading nationalists were aware that many Papuans would misconstrue the flag raising as an indication that independence had actually been declared, and they were not concerned if this might happen, even though the actual situation was more ambiguous. For some nationalists, the fuzziness surrounding the meaning of December 1, 1961, was remedied when Seth Rumkorem, an OPM leader, issued a declaration of Papuan independence on July 1, 1971, at Markus Victoria. This proclamation was supported by the Papuan leadership in exile in the Netherlands, which included Nicolaas Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo, both of whom had been involved in the *Manifest Politik*. The exiled leaders thought that Seth Rumkorem's proclamation of independence would provide the foundation for promised international recognition by Zambia and Israel while signaling Papuans' formal rejection of the results of the "Act of Free Choice" (Ondawame 2000: 109–10).<sup>41</sup>

More recently, as we have seen, *reformasi*-era nationalists have given the flag ceremony of December 1, 1961, great symbolic meaning as a proclamation of independence. This attribution was largely a pragmatic calculation

***Many were aware that the Manifest Politik and the flag ceremony of December 1, 1961, were not actually declarations of independence***

about how to assert Papua's right to independence without overly provoking the Indonesian authorities. Many were aware that the *Manifest Politik* and the flag ceremony of December 1, 1961, were not actually declarations of independence but were actually Papuan responses to the rapid changes in the Netherlands-Indonesia struggle. Prompted by the Luns Plan to internationalize Papua's administration, they were assertions of the right to independence, but

stopped short of being declarations of independence in themselves. Papua's first formal independence proclamation—that of July 1, 1971—was born

of a similar calculation of how best to further the Papuan independence struggle, in this case in the aftermath of the “Act of Free Choice” and the UN’s acceptance of Indonesia’s sovereignty in West Irian. The July 1, 1971 proclamation still resonated in the *reformasi* era. After the July 1, 1998 flag raising in Biak, Filip Karma told his Indonesian interrogators that he chose this for the day of the demonstration because it was the 27th anniversary of the OPM proclamation of independence (Rutherford 2003: 13).

It is worth noting some similarities between the Papuan nationalist discourse of 1961–62 and that of the “Papuan Spring” of 1998–2000. Both periods were formative in the development of Papuan identity as well as the nationalist movement and its objectives. In both periods, many Papuans shared the objective of an independent Papuan state and they clearly asserted Papua’s right to form such a state. It is as if Papuans were on the verge of a proclamation of independence, but felt constrained by pragmatic considerations from doing so. The constraints in both periods related to not wanting to provoke Indonesia. In 1961–62, the Dutch authorities thought a proclamation of independence would complicate negotiations at the UN and with Indonesia. Papuan leaders in 1961 were also aware that they had not mobilized sufficient support in the broader Papuan society for a credible proclamation. The *reformasi*-era nationalists of 1998–2000 were more confident about their mass support, but were also conscious of the risks of confronting Indonesia. Ironically, the two declarations of independence that have actually been made—the OPM’s of 1971 and Tom Waggai’s of December 14, 1988—occurred when the prospects of independence were more remote than either in 1961–62 or during the “Papuan Spring.”<sup>42</sup>

*Papuans were on the verge of a proclamation of independence, but felt constrained by pragmatic considerations*

#### *The Bunker Plan and the New York Agreement*

The development of early Papuan nationalism did not end with the flag raising of December 1, 1961, though the *Manifest Politik*, with its assertion of Papua’s right to independence, and the flag raising of December 1 shed light on a critical period in the development of Papuan nationalist thinking. Another aspect of this period, which foreshadows and anticipates Papuan thinking in the *reformasi* era, relates to the key issue of self-determination, which Papuans attempted to assert in the face of the New

York Agreement of 1962 and the “Act of Free Choice” of 1969. Collectively, these events had a major effect on Papuan nationalist consciousness. Papuans felt they were left out of the discussions of 1962, and they felt that the “Act of Free Choice” was manipulated by Indonesia. Their frustration over these developments is as keen today as it was in the 1960s.

Papuans’ exclusion from the decisions on Papua’s future was not for lack of effort. On February 16, 1962, for example, the New Guinea Council held a debate on the issue of self-determination. Two of the leading speakers, Tanggahma and Bonay, both asserted Papua’s right of self-determination, but they differed on the means by which that right could be protected, and by which eventual independence should be secured, as well as on whether Indonesia should be involved in the process. Tanggahma argued in favor of leaving Indonesia out, while Bonay said that Indonesia should be included in the discussions. Tanggahma advocated a continued Dutch administration leading to self-determination. He argued that there were four options, three of which were unlikely or undesirable. Integration with Indonesia was undesirable, an association with Australian New Guinea would be possible only when both halves of the island were independent, and a long-term association with the Netherlands was not possible because the world considered it colonialism. Therefore, the only option was continued Dutch administration leading to self-determination. For his part, Bonay argued for a tripartite conference involving the Papuans, the Netherlands, and Indonesia, at which Papua would seek recognition for its right to independence. He felt that Papua would never be able to exercise its right to self-determination as long as there was still a dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Therefore, it was only possible to resolve the conflict if Indonesia were included in the discussions.<sup>43</sup>

But the Papuans continued to be left out of the high-level discussions, taking place among the governments of the United States, Indonesia, and the Netherlands, that were leading to the resolution of the West New Guinea dispute. Neither the pro-Indonesian nor the nationalist Papuan leaders were invited to take part in these discussions. The Papuans could only observe from a distance and send protest telegrams, petitions, and resolutions to those in Washington, Jakarta, and The Hague who were determining their fate. Papuan nationalists were particularly critical of the American intervention, especially the role of US Attorney General Robert

Kennedy, who was sent to Jakarta and The Hague to encourage the parties to the negotiation table.<sup>44</sup>

Soon after the new negotiations got underway, American Ambassador Elsworth Bunker proposed what became known as the Bunker Plan for resolving the dispute. For Papuans, the crucial aspect of the Bunker Plan was when, how, and under whose administration they would exercise their self-determination. Bunker proposed that West Papua should be transferred first to UN jurisdiction, and then to Indonesia's, with eventual self-determination for the Papuan people only after a period of Indonesian administration. The plan sparked consternation among Papuan nationalist leaders, who did not trust Indonesia to follow through with the proposed plebiscite. Indonesia had not allowed self-determination for any of its regions, and it had consistently been rejecting the notion in the case of Papua.<sup>45</sup> For this reason, the New Guinea Council and most other Papuan political groups demanded repeatedly that the plebiscite be held during the period of United Nations administration. In April, for example, PARNA proposed a two-year joint administration, responsible to the UN, by Indonesia, the Netherlands, and West Papua, at the end of which there would be a United Nations-supervised election.<sup>46</sup> As for the New Guinea Council, it sent delegations to The Hague and to the UN Fourth Committee on Decolonization in New York. In June, Jouwe, who had been a member of both delegations, made it clear to Ambassador Bunker that his plan's guarantee of self-determination had to be watertight. Jouwe insisted that Papuans should exercise their self-determination under the supervision of the United Nations and before administration was transferred to Indonesia.<sup>47</sup> The only member of the Council who accepted the Bunker Plan was Bonay, one of the PARNA leaders, who thought it offered the prospect of a peaceful resolution. Another Council member who favored dealing with Indonesia, though he was opposed to the Bunker Plan, was Tanggahma, who tried unsuccessfully in July 1962 to persuade the Council to send a delegation to Indonesia.<sup>48</sup>

In August, as the Bunker negotiations reached their final stage, both the Indonesian and the Dutch governments appointed Papuans to their respective delegations. Governor Platteel had been especially keen that Papuans be seen as participants in the negotiations. The New Guinea

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Council and the major political parties had been demanding participation, and Platteel wanted to avoid any suggestion that the Dutch had excluded them.<sup>49</sup> Accordingly, Silas Papare, Kirihio, and Dimara were invited to join the Indonesian delegation, while Council members Jouwe, Womisor, and Tanggahma were appointed as advisers to the Netherlands delegation.<sup>50</sup> As it turned out, the Papuan advisers arrived in the US after the negotiations had been finalized, as agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands had been reached sooner than anticipated.

The Bunker negotiations culminated in the New York Agreement, signed August 15, 1962, under which West New Guinea (Netherlands New Guinea) would become the Indonesian province of West Irian. On

***The Bunker negotiations  
culminated in the New  
York Agreement***

October 1, 1962, administration would be transferred to a United Nations transition administration (known as the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, or UNTEA) and on May 1, 1963, it would be transferred to Indonesia. In 1969, after six years of Indonesian administration,

the inhabitants of West Papua would have the opportunity to exercise their self-determination through an “Act of Free Choice.”

*Rejection and Resignation: Papuan Responses to the New York Agreement*

Papuan reactions to the New York Agreement were mixed. Though some expressed resignation and a willingness to accommodate at least temporarily to an Indonesian future, others expressed rejection and feelings of betrayal. There was also discussion of possible proclamations of independence. The New Guinea Council building became a focus for large and well-organized demonstrations against the agreement. At the first such demonstration, Markus Kaisiepo condemned the agreement by saying, “We were traded as goats by the Americans.” He agreed with the PARNA leader, Bonay, that the time had passed for Papuans to support Dutch policy. Now the Dutch must support the Papuans.<sup>51</sup> In a later memoir, Bonay recalled two of the chants at the demonstration: “How many dollars for Papua, Yankee,” and “We Papuans want freedom, not Soekarno” (Bonay c1980s: Bab 5, 1).

In response to the New York Agreement, a National Congress was held in mid-September 1962 to discuss how to secure the Papuan national aspirations while reaching some accommodation with the incoming Indonesian administration.<sup>52</sup> Zacharias Sawor, a Dutch educated Papuan

agricultural official, recalled later that the majority of the Congress wanted the plebiscite to be held while the UNTEA troops were present, so as to ensure a proper vote.<sup>53</sup> Others seemed to realize that this was no longer possible, and that the 1969 plebiscite would have to be the next objective of the national struggle. Such was the argument of Tanggahma, who said:

We must give Indonesia no chance to destroy our aspirations. Jakarta would get the opportunity if Papuans were disruptive. Therefore I will urge people to maintain law and order. Papuans must strengthen themselves in order to sustain and preserve their nationalist sentiments until the plebiscite. To this end Papuans must organize themselves in large parties with the same objective: Independence in 1969.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, during the brief period between the *Manifest Politik* of October 1961 and the New York Agreement of August 1962 there was a shift in the Papuan political agenda. The shift reflected the roller coaster ride that the Indonesia-Netherlands dispute generated for Papuan leaders. The nationalist demands of the *Manifest Politik* had been formulated at a time of relative optimism. The *Komite Nasional* members might have resented the fact that the Dutch government had not consulted the New Guinea Council about the Luns Plan; still, the plan held some promise that Papua's right of self-determination would be protected and an Indonesian takeover avoided. The flag raising of December 1 was an expression of this spirit of optimism. By contrast, after the New York Agreement was signed, the focus of the debate was on how to preserve the principle of self-determination. Papuan leaders were keenly aware in 1962 that implementation of self-determination under the UN administration would mean something different from implementation after Indonesia assumed control of the administration.

*Faith and Hope: The Continued Expectation of Self-Determination*

A consistent theme in the development of Papuan nationalism from 1962 to the renaissance after Soeharto is the interpretation of the self-determination provision of the New York Agreement, which was the straw of hope to which Papuans clung. Just before his attempt to represent Papua at the UN discussions on the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969, Clemens Runaweri, who had emerged as one of the leading politicians after Indonesia assumed control, prepared a report on political developments in which he accused the UN of shirking its task of safeguarding the Papuans' right to self-determination:

The main problem of the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia was dealing with the political future of the Papuans. And the presence of the UN Representative in this territory is for the purpose of protecting the Papuans right of self-determination. Unfortunately this UN man seem not to be a protector but as an advisor with competence and authority. He is actually a looker watching at a game played by the Indonesian Army Generals against the innocent and unweapon Papuans.<sup>55</sup>

What Clemens Runaweri saw as the crux of the problem, the other interested parties in the conflict regarded as something to be shaded by a fig leaf. The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick had anticipated this back in January 1962, when he wrote that successful negotiations would probably include a 'face saving' formula for the protection of Papuan interests. The Papuans' right to choose their own future would be "entirely dependent on Indonesian good faith" and there would be no way of ensuring that this aspect of the agreement would be carried out.<sup>56</sup>

Runaweri was not the only Papuan who hoped and expected that the Indonesian administration would be followed by a free act of self-determination. Foreign reporting on developments in Papua between the Indonesian assumption of the administration and the "Act of Free Choice" was intermittent and patchy. However, one of the consistent themes in the

*one of the consistent themes...was the hope and trust Papuans placed on the just implementation of the self-determination provisions*

reporting was the hope and trust Papuans placed on the just implementation of the self-determination provisions of the New York Agreement. It was a hope maintained in the face of the overwhelming evidence that Papuans experienced in their daily lives that the Indonesian authorities had a different understanding of the provisions and a contrary outcome in mind. For example, Floyd Whittington, the Counselor of the US Embassy in Jakarta, who visited West Irian in

August 1964, observed that knowledge of the terms of the New York Agreement was widespread in Papuan society and "...the prospect of a plebiscite burns like a talisman of hope for the future. The most remarkable aspect of this problem was the unanimity with which Papuan leaders of varying attitudes toward continued union with Indonesia agreed that it was

of the greatest importance that a fair plebiscite actually be conducted.”<sup>57</sup>

In retrospect, that hope and trust seems misplaced, being naïve and ignorant of the international forces that had facilitated a resolution of the West New Guinea dispute in Indonesia’s favor. Perhaps the Papuan belief in the 1990s that a thorough investigation into the New York Agreement and the conduct of the “Act of Free Choice” would resolve their conflict with Indonesia reflects a similiarly naïve view of the world and how international relations are conducted. Naïve though the Papuan faith in the self-determination provisions might seem, it is a key and consistent ingredient in Papuan nationalism.

#### *The Exiles’ Campaign for Independence*

Several of the most senior Papuan politicians left Papua with the Dutch at the end of 1962. Two of the most significant were Nicholaas Jouwe and Markus Kaisiepo, who established the “Freedom Committee of West Papua/West New Guinea” while in exile. From their base in the Netherlands, Jouwe and Kaisiepo attempted to mobilize support for the Papuan cause and sustained a lobbying campaign with governments and at the UN for the just and proper implementation of the “Act of Free Choice.” Throughout the 1960s, as resistance to Indonesian control grew in Papua, they maintained some communication with supporters in Papua and were recognized as the movement’s leaders. The manner in which Jouwe and Kaisiepo fought for meaningful implementation of the self-determination provisions reflected the changing circumstances in Papua and internationally. In November 1962, for example, Jouwe wrote to President Kennedy to express Papuans’ opposition to the New York Agreement, not only because Papuans were excluded from the negotiations, but also because Indonesia had shown that it was ignoring its international obligations. According to Jouwe, Papuans were concerned about their future, fearing that Indonesia’s increasing military power meant that Papua’s chances of independence were threatened. Jouwe sought Kennedy’s support for realization of Papua’s right of self-determination before 1969 and, if Papua should proclaim its independence, the US’s recognition and protection. In return, Jouwe promised that an independent Papua would join SEATO. As a “free nation” and as a Christian people, he said, Papuans could not be “neutral between good and evil or between the free and communist world.”<sup>58</sup>

Two years later, Jouwe had become even more concerned about the prospects of self-determination, and was forthrightly critiquing the Indonesian government's attempts at "annihilating" Papua's right of self-determination. In support of his critique, Jouwe cited the examples of late 1962 pressures and persuasion applied to "politically inexperienced Papuan individuals" with expenses paid trips to Jakarta, along with "promises, flattery, persistent if gentle pressure, veiled threats and clear intimidation" to encourage the Papuans to endorse two propositions: (1) that the UNTEA transfer administrative authority to Indonesia on January 1, 1963 (instead of May 1, 1963, as provided for in the New York Agreement), and (2) that the plebiscite scheduled for 1969 was unnecessary because Papuans recognized the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the Indonesian State and considered that Papua had been a part of Indonesia since the declaration of independence in 1945.<sup>59</sup> Jouwe was also aware of the 1963–64 campaign of Indonesia's Information Minister, Ruslan Abdulgani, to undermine the "Act of Free Choice." The campaign culminated in the Proclamation of May 16, 1964, read to the province's representative council by West Irian's first Governor, the Papuan E. J. Bonay, which encapsulated the second of the above propositions. According to Jouwe, this proclamation not only expressed pro-Indonesian sentiment but was drafted by the Indonesian government itself. Jouwe argued that this Proclamation and the earlier statements by Papuan leaders reflected the Indonesian government's view that Papua's right of self-determination and the entire New York Agreement no longer existed. The abolition in 1963 of the elected New Guinea Council, its replacement by another council whose members were all appointed by the government, and the dissolution of seven Papuan political parties in December 1963 were all actions contrary to the spirit of the New York Agreement.<sup>60</sup>

***The maltreatment of  
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The maltreatment of Papuans was hardly absent from the discourse used in the earlier lobbying by the Papuan leadership in exile, but after the mid-1960s it became the dominant theme. There was ample reason for this, as maltreatment indeed increased as part of the cycle of Papuan resistance and Indonesian repression that developed after the OPM revolts began in 1965. Thus, for example, Jouwe's Freedom Committee letter to the UN Secretary General in September 1967, entitled "Cry of Distress

from West New Guinea,” included a detailed list of the atrocities allegedly committed against Papuans by the Indonesian security forces, including the detention and mistreatment of former Governor Bonay and the death in Indonesian custody of veteran nationalist Johan Ariks. Jouwe also asserted that Indonesia had no intention of permitting Papuans to exercise their right of self-determination freely, citing Acting President Soeharto’s 1967 Independence Day speech, in which Soeharto stated that the “Act of Free Choice” in 1969 would be an opportunity for the people of West Irian to affirm their decision to remain part of the Indonesian nation. In his letter, Jouwe appealed to the Secretary General to guarantee Papuans’ rights as provided for in the New York Agreement, as therein lies “our only chance of being liberated from the unbearable mismanagement of Indonesia.” The letter continued:

Let the United Nations come to our rescue **now**, in 1967, lest in 1969 practically all Papuans be “wiped out” by the Indonesian colonizers, whose goal it is to keep our island as a place of immigration for the superfluous inhabitants of Java. Our fate and future are in the hands of the United Nations and its Secretary-General.<sup>61</sup>

The exiled leadership’s awareness that Indonesia had no intention of permitting a free expression of Papuan opinion in the “Act of Free Choice” contrasts with the faith that many Papuans in Papua still had. However, neither faith nor appeal had any effect, as the “Act of Free Choice” turned out to be a pre-arranged ratification of Indonesian rule, just as Australian Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, had anticipated back in early 1962.

#### *Rejecting The “Act of Free Choice”*

The methodology for the “Act of Free Choice” was not specified in the New York Agreement, except in so far as it should be in conformity with international practice. The Indonesian choice of a form of consultation with 1,025 carefully selected representatives has been a matter of controversy (see Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004: 19–21; Saltford 2000: Chpts. 8–10). Papuan opinion at the time was highly critical and has only become more so in the intervening years. At the time, Clemens Runaweri described the Indonesian system as “entirely ineffective and undemocratic.” In response to the Indonesian government’s argument that this arrangement was more appropriate than “one man one vote” because the level of education and cultural development of Papuan society was so low,

Runaweri pointed out that the elections for the New Guinea Council in 1961 had already been on the basis of “one man one vote,” as had the 1968 elections for the Assembly in the Australian territories of Papua and New Guinea. As noted above, Clemens Runaweri had no illusions about the role of the UN and the Secretary General’s representative, Otiz Sanz. He and other Papuans had tried unsuccessfully to meet Otiz Sanz to persuade him to change the method and end the Indonesian repression, but they realized that Otiz Sanz was powerless. He asked rhetorically: should Otiz Sanz, after presenting his reports to the Secretary General, “leave the territory and permit the Indonesians to ‘devour’ the majority of the Papuans who actually want their freedom and sovereignty?”<sup>62</sup>

No sooner had the “Act of Free Choice” been conducted than Jouwe’s Freedom Committee protested again to the Secretary-General. The committee claimed that Indonesia had intimidated the 1,025 electors, which it had selected itself. The Committee cited an unnamed resistance leader who allegedly said that the electors could not be called traitors, as the pressure on them had been so heavy. It called on the Secretary-General and the General Assembly to safeguard Papua’s right of self-determination

by placing West Papua under the supervision of the UN, declaring West Papua a non-self-governing territory, and, as soon as possible, holding a “truly democratic referendum.”<sup>63</sup>

Contemporary and subsequent Papuan accounts of the “Act of Free Choice” emphasize repression and manipulation associated with it. A FORERI report noted:

All the Papuan people witnessed the injustice, the deceit and the manipulation. Papuans could not resist. All resistance at the time was suppressed with arms. The widespread murders conducted since then [1969] have instilled the desire for independence in the heart of the people.<sup>64</sup>

As will be discussed later in this paper, Serui, on the island of Yapen, was a center of pro-Indonesian sentiment during the post war period under the Dutch, but its political orientation no longer differs from the rest of Papua. Fritz Kiriho, himself from Serui, considered that it was the conduct of the “Act of Free Choice” that was the turning point in Serui’s alienation from Indonesia.<sup>65</sup>

***Papuan accounts of the  
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### Roots – Earlier Influences on Papuan Nationalism

The *reformasi* generation of Papuan nationalists has framed its nationalism around the history of integration with Indonesia and the subsequent experience of Indonesian rule. The nationalists of the 1960s generation reflected and foreshadowed many of the same themes. However, they also drew on the experiences of their own earlier development as political activists and as the “first Papuans.” One of those experiences was the Koreroi messianic movement active from 1938 to 1943, which expressed aspirations of leading a Papua-wide liberation. The Koreroi movement also reflected strong anti-Indonesian sentiments. Another was the experience of World War II and the exposure it gave to a broader range of outsiders and possibilities. A third influence was the immediate post-war reforms of Dutch Resident J. P. K. van Eechoud, whose efforts to advance Papuan educational and administrative opportunities caused his memory to be cherished years later. These experiences of the earlier generation have largely disappeared from the nationalist histories of *reformasi* generation.

#### *The Koreroi Movement*

The Koreroi movement was significant for Papuan nationalism, as many of the early nationalists were from Biak and Serui, and these people were influenced by, and some participated in, the Koreroi movement. Biak and Serui are also significant contributors to early Papuan nationalism because they were among the first centers of Dutch and missionary education in Papua (a matter whose significance will be discussed in more detail below). However, many of the early nationalists from these areas have explicitly constructed the Koreroi movement as one of the inspirations for their own activities in the 1950s and 1960s. It is how they have used Koreroi in their constructions of Papuan nationalism that is the focus of this discussion.

One of these nationalists was Markus Kaisiepo, who, as is evident from earlier discussion, was one of the senior nationalists in the 1950s and 1960s. Kaisiepo has portrayed himself as a “Koreroi” man, saying, “I was born a Koreroi man from Biak.” Kaisiepo was one of the first Biaks to be trained as a religious teacher, graduating in 1935. As a young teacher before the war, he came into conflict with others in the Church for introducing Koreroi songs to his pupils (Sharp and Kaisiepo 1994: 68, 77, 90). He therefore personified the link between this relatively local and pre-Christian, if not anti-Christian, messianic movement, and the later development of Papuan nationalism as a modern political movement. In his

political career, he made an apparently seamless transition from Christian teacher to “Koreri” man, colonial official, Papuan nationalist politician, and finally leader in exile.

Another early nationalist leader who was impressed by the Koreri movement was E. J. Bonay, who in 1941 was serving as a government official in the office in Serui where Angganita Manufandu, the Koreri leader, was brought for interrogation. Bonay described the significance of the Koreri movement and the clash with the Japanese in 1943 in the following terms:<sup>66</sup>

This heroic and patriotic affair marked the beginning of the national awakening and the independence movement in Papua. The present struggle is a continuation of this affair. The leadership of this movement (Koreri) is no longer, but the people have their spirit (*semangat*). (Bonay c1980s: 42)

The Koreri movement had its strongest following in the communities of the Geelvink Bay (Teluk Cendrawasih), especially on Biak and in Serui. Its memory was cited in the later Papuan nationalist movement by many of the activists from Biak and Serui. The Koreri movement itself developed a broader geographic vision that encompassed all of West Papua. In June 1942, it announced a “revolutionary program” seeking the independence of all West Papua. From Gebe to Hollandia, and from Gebe to Merauke, Papuans had to be united under the Koreri movement (Bonay 1984: 35, 37). It was as if, for the Biaks involved, the Koreri marked one of the transitions from thinking of themselves as Biaks to a broader identity as Papuans. Kamma notes the “strong regionalism and chauvinism of an exclusive character” in this movement. Yet the “line of action” determined at the Koreri army’s (A.B. or America-Blanda) meeting of August 3, 1943, declared a broader vision, stating in part: “The Biak people must show that all the peoples of New Guinea are one. In future years, the Biak people must be regarded, not as plunderers, but as liberators of New Guinea” (Kamma 1972: 198, 281).

As noted at the beginning of this section, the Koreri movement also had a strong anti-*amberi* (Indonesian) tenor. One of the decisions of the Koreri leaders’ meeting of August 1943 was that the *amberi* who were not prepared to join the Koreri army had to be expelled from Papua (Bonay c1980s: 41). Kamma relates an incident where a Biak village leader insisted on an exchange of roles with the *amberi* Assistant District officer and

his policeman, with the Papuans treating the *amberi* as the *amberi* had previously treated Papuans: “The *amberi* had to work for the Papuans, who sat in easy chairs watching the *amberi* perform odious chores in their places” (Kamma 1972: 188–89). Markus Kaisiepo recalled that during the Koreri period it was only in Wardo, his village on Biak, that the *amberi* were safe, protected by his family, while elsewhere on Biak many *amberi* teachers and missionaries were being killed (Sharp and Kaisiepo 1994: 79). Kamma records that the residents of Wardo were opposed to Koreri and for their security the Japanese authorities agreed to move them, including Kaisiepo and his family, to Manokwari in September 1943.<sup>67</sup>

*The Pacific War and Its Aftermath*

The Pacific War transformed Papua’s strategic position in the world while also transforming Papuans’ experience of the outside world. Prior to the Japanese occupation in 1942, Papua had been an isolated and neglected backwater of the Netherlands Indies. In the war, that suddenly changed. According to Arnold Mampioer, Papuans were awakened by the fire of Japan and by the modern science of the “Dollar Country” (*Negeri Dolar*. America). Bonay uses a similar analogy of Papuans being woken up from the dark ages by the war:

***The Pacific War transformed Papua’s strategic position... [and] Papuans’ experience of the outside world***

From the stone age, they [the Papuans] were thrown into the atomic age. The thousand-mile distance between the stone age and the atomic age they took in just one jump, propelled by the first explosions above Hiroshima and Nagasaki and caught up in world revolution from which it was impossible to escape, because the revolution of Papuan independence could not be separated from the world revolution. (Bonay 1984: 80)

Mampioer and Bonay both argue that the coming of the Allied forces toward the end of the war was particularly influential. According to Mampioer, the Hollandia that had lived in darkness for centuries briefly became an American industrial town, then was left again to its own devices. Hollandia was left with the infrastructure of a modern city, but there were no Papuans capable of assuming the senior administrative and professional positions. Among the educated Papuans there were only a few schoolteachers who had the training needed to become local officials,

nurses, clerks, soldiers, and police (Mampioper 1972: 41). Bonay argues that the Allied Forces that “liberated” Papua breathed new life into Papuan nationalism, a nationalism that had been stilled by the suppression of the Koreri movement by the Japanese in 1943. Bonay recalls that Papuans were amazed. They admired the African Americans, both men and women, who served in the Allied Forces. They felt challenged by the Americans:

They [the African Americans] worked and fought shoulder to shoulder with their white comrades. The Negro men flew fighter planes, commanded warships, fired artillery, and drove vehicles and so forth. Many Negro women were in the Women Auxillary Corps along with white women. Seeing this, Papuans asked themselves why can the Negroes do these things and the Papuans not? Is not our skin color and hair the same? (Bonay 1984: 44–45).

By the end of the war, the Papuans had developed a new assertiveness. When in August 1945 Indonesia proclaimed its independence and staked a claim to the whole of the former Netherlands Indies, Markus Kaisiepo, as the representative of the Papuans then studying to become government officials, wrote to Lt. Governor General H. J. van Mook, then heading a government in exile in Australia, stating that Papuans did not consider themselves part of Indonesia and wished to determine their own destiny (Bonay 1984: 49; Sharp and Kaisiepo 1994: 49). The next month, September 1945, people in Biak wrote to the President of the United States requesting that Papua be administered by the US, rather than by the Dutch (Bonay 1984: 45). In that same month, September 1945, *Penyuluh*, a publication of van Mook’s government in exile, printed a letter from Kaisiepo (quoted in Mampioper 1972: 31–32), in which he appealed to both the Netherlands government and his Indonesian brothers to change their attitudes toward Papuans. He hoped that the policies of colonialism would not be practiced again in the new era of equal rights following the Pacific War, as this was the era of freedom and equality. Nevertheless, addressing the dual colonial structure whereby Indonesians occupied most of the junior administrative positions in Papua, Kaisiepo’s letter urged the Dutch to give Papuans greater opportunities to study and to work in government administration and private enterprises, and he urged the Indonesians not to monopolize opportunities in education and employment. He also argued, in a position he later reversed, that one of the rea-

sons why Papuans suffered discrimination was because the name “Papua” was derogatory, and for this reason he wanted it changed to “Irian.”<sup>68</sup>

A third formative influence was the educational administrative reforms of J. P. K. van Eechoud, who was the Dutch Resident of New Guinea from 1944 to 1950. As has just been noted, in the period immediately after liberation from the Japanese, there was a strong anti-Dutch tenor in Papuan opinion. According to Bonay, van Eechoud recognized the Papuan resentment and immediately established schools to train Papuans as officials, police, soldiers, nurses, and skilled tradesmen. Van Eechoud also established a Papuan military force, the “Papoea Bataljon.” The extent to which van Eechoud won Papuan support can be gauged by the title he was given—“*bapak Papua*,” father of the Papuans (Bonay 1984: 45–46). Markus Kaisiepo would later recall a 1945 discussion with van Eechoud at the school he had just established to train Papuans as officials. Van Eechoud told the students that they had to study diligently, because they were the new Papuans for a new New Guinea. Said Kaisiepo, “This is what I have been trying to do ever since. Not only me; all of us.”<sup>69</sup> Van Eechoud’s influence still resonated with his students eleven years after he ceased to be the Resident. In October 1961, during the New Guinea Council debates about the raising of the Morning Star flag, one of the Council members proposed that, if the Morning Star flag were raised, a flower should be placed on van Eechoud’s grave, as he was the one who had planned all that we were now about to achieve.<sup>70</sup>

## PART II – Ethnicity

In the first section of the study it has been argued that Papuan nationalism is about history and has itself been shaped by history. The present section will explore how relations between Papuans and Indonesians, as well as relations among Papuans themselves, have influenced the formation of Papuan identity. The study will argue that there is a paradox about Papuan identity. Very clear distinctions are made between Papuans and Indonesians, yet Papuans themselves are divided among more than 300 ethno-linguistic groups.

### Papuan-Indonesian Relations Before 1963

There has been no one pattern of relations between Papuans and Indonesians. On one end of the continuum, some of the Papuan communities on the western coastal areas and the off shore islands had extensive

contact with the neighboring islands of Maluku long before there was any Netherlands administrative presence in Papua. Communities such as those in the Raja Ampat islands, Biak and Yapen, participated in the political and economic relationships centered on the Sultanate of Tidore, in what is now North Maluku. Meanwhile, the Papuan communities along the southwest coast around Fakfak were part of an Ambonese—Ceramese Muslim community spanning the divide between Papua and Central Maluku. Indeed, the Papuan Muslim communities around Fakfak probably had closer political, religious, and family ties to Maluku than to other parts of Papua. At the other end of the continuum, many highland communities had their first extensive contact with Indonesians only after Indonesia had assumed administrative control in 1963.

Dutch and Indonesian rule has provided the context in which a pan-Papuan identity has formed in opposition to the Indonesian one. The sense of Papuan-Indonesian difference initially took root during the Dutch administration, for Netherlands New Guinea had a system of “dual colonialism” in which a handful of Dutch officials held the most senior positions in the administration and missionary organizations, while Indonesians held many of the middle and low ranking positions as officials, policemen, teachers, and missionaries. Many of the latter were from

Maluku—most significantly the Ambonese and Keiese—as until the Pacific War Papua was administered as part of the residencies and governments based in Maluku. There was also a significant contingent of Menadonese officials and teachers from northern Sulawesi. This “dual colonial” structure was quite distinct from the forms of “indirect rule” found elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies, where members of local elites

were co-opted into the colonial administration, and where local administrative structures were subsumed within the colonial government. Elsewhere, the colonial administrators were drawn from the local elites, while in Papua the officials were nearly all foreigners—a few Dutch and many Indonesians. Papuans would have had greater contact with the latter, as particularly before the war they were more numerous. Thus, the Indonesians were the interface of colonial rule, and the inevitable resentments were directed against the Indonesians rather than the Dutch.

***Dutch and Indonesian rule has provided the context in which a pan-Papuan identity has formed***

The presence in Papua of so many Indonesian servants of the Dutch state had opposite effects on Indonesians and on Papuans. For the Indonesians, the experience contributed to their nationalist sense that Papua was part of Indonesia, while for most Papuans it contributed to a sense of difference. The former governor of Netherlands New Guinea, Jan van Baal, observed that the educated Javanese, Makassarese, and Ambonese deployed as officials throughout the Indies were impressed by the sheer size of the colonial state and came to think of themselves as belonging to it. Their national awareness as Indonesians developed from this experience. Similarly, the Indonesians who participated in the development of Papua, particularly the Moluccans, thought of Papua as part of their country. However, van Baal observed, this experience was not shared by Papuans, for there were virtually no Papuans who participated in the development of Indonesia outside Papua. To the Papuans, the Indonesians working in Papua were not compatriots, but foreigners who were colonizing them and their land. Most irritating of all, these foreigners were occupying the positions that the Papuans wanted, though, according to Van Baal, no one foresaw the tragic consequences this would have for the Papua – Indonesia conflict (van Baal 1989: 166–67; also Rutherford 2003: 180). Benedict Anderson makes a similar observation, saying that Indonesians “more or less sincerely regarded” Papuans as “brothers and sisters,” but these sentiments were not reciprocated by Papuans. He attributes the difference primarily to the influence of administrative tools such as the census and the accompanying colonial logo-maps. However, elsewhere he makes observations similar to van Baal’s, noting that the Javanese, Sundanese, Ambonese, and other future Indonesians who served as the “subordinate cadres” for the Netherlands Indies state and corporate bureaucracies in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries became accustomed to the idea that the entire Netherlands Indies was the “stage” on which they developed their bureaucratic careers. Sundanese officials, for example, held positions throughout the Indies, not merely in West Java (Anderson 1991: 53, 132, 140, 177). As we have observed, this was not the case for Papuans.

Papuans did not become colonial officials in their own land until after the Pacific War, when Papua’s administration was separated from that of

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the neighboring islands of Maluku, although the Resident of New Guinea remained responsible to the Lt. Governor General in Batavia (Jakarta).

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***was the center of the***  
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***pilgrimage***

The new Papuan officials were trained in Papua, and upon graduation they were appointed to positions only in Papua. Thus, Hollandia (Jayapura) was the center of the Papuans' bureaucratic pilgrimage—their Rome—not Jakarta or Ambon. In a process paralleling the one Anderson has observed for the Netherlands

Indies, the deployment of Papuan colonial officials to positions throughout the Papuan territory, irrespective of their ethno-linguistic background, contributed greatly to their becoming the first to call themselves Papuans.

Just as a sense of a common Papuan ethnicity was rooted in the earlier experience of dual colonialism, so too, was the distinction between Papuans and the Indonesians, the latter being known locally as “*amberi*.” Bonay states that during the Dutch period Papuans were using the terms “Papua” and “*amberi*” to distinguish the indigenous peoples of the territory from the Indonesians who had become the police, civil servants, and military officials of the colonial government. In the Papuan view, the *amberi* were “accomplices” and “stooges” of the Dutch colonial government. Their treatment of Papuans was inhuman, as they looked down on Papuans as stupid, dirty, and curly haired. Bonay argued that Papuans took their revenge against the “*amberi*” during the “Koreri” movement of 1938–43. He asserts that the *amberi* sense of superiority had become even worse since 1963, as the Indonesians became the new colonizers of Papua. Thus, the conflict and antagonism between Papuans and *amberi* is a continuity from the Dutch colonial past (Bonay 1984: 84).

Some contemporary observers of Papuan society have argued that the term *amberi* has acquired other meanings in the context of relations among Papuans and between Papuans and Indonesians. Danilyn Rutherford observed in the early 1990s that in Biak the term *amberi* could denote not only ethnicity but also class. Not only were Euro-Americans and non-Papuan Indonesians “*amberi*,” but so too, were members of the Biak elite. Civil servants, teachers, ministers of the church, and village chiefs were also “*amberi*.” In effect, the Dutch efforts to cultivate a Papuan elite and the subsequent expansion of education under the Indonesians has caused many more Biaks to become “*amberi*” (Rutherford 2003: xviii, 202). Thus, while in the discourse of Papuan nationalists the term

“*amberi*” refers primarily to their Indonesian tormenters and rivals, the Papuan nationalists themselves, being members of the educated classes, are considered *amberi* by many of their Papuan compatriots. Though Bonay and his generation of educated Papuans were the first to think of themselves as “Papuans,” rather than simply Biaks or Seruiese, ironically they were the most “Indonesian” of their compatriots. Papuans themselves also recognize the new class and cultural meanings of *amberi*. Rutherford relates a joke that has one highlander telling another what will happen when West Papua is independent: The Biaks will become *amberi* and the rest of us will become Biaks (Rutherford 2003: xviii).

Nevertheless, in the discourse of Papuan nationalism, it is the distinction from the Indonesians that is most important, and it is a distinction rooted in the experience of colonial domination. Observations similar to Bonay’s were voiced in an official Dutch study of the emerging Papuan political elite, authored by G. W. Grootenhuis and completed in 1961, which argued that the Papuan elites’ attitudes toward the Netherlands-Indonesia dispute were influenced by differences in the way they were treated by Indonesian and Dutch officials. Grootenhuis’ informants had told him that during the pre-war period Papuans were treated as “animals” (*binatang*) by the Indonesian officials. After the war, when there was increasingly direct interaction with the now more numerous Dutch officials, Papuans were treated as “humans” (*manusia*). Though the postwar period also brought better material conditions, Grootenhuis argues that the improved treatment by the Dutch officials was the critical factor in this perception of improved treatment. Papuans resented the discrimination they had suffered at the hands of Indonesian teachers and officials. Those who had been schooled by Indonesian teachers resented having been treated as dumb and unable to speak good Malay (Indonesian). Those Papuans who had obtained positions in the administration felt that they were kept in the lower positions by Indonesian officials, who regarded them as incapable of anything better. By contrast, the Dutch officials were regarded as bearers of development, or “progress” (Dutch: *voortgang*; Indonesian: *kemajuan*), in the form of education, Christianity, and improved material wealth. Though the Indonesians were not the only sources of discrimination and prejudice, they were suspected of working against the progress offered by the Dutch. Grootenhuis’ informants feared that if Indonesia was successful in gaining control of Papua, it would mean a return to the “*binatang*” period in which they were treated as “animals,” and that Papua

would be cut off from the source of progress (*kemajuan*). Thus, as young educated Papuans contemplated independence in 1960 and 1961, they were anxious about the potential future role, if any, of the Indonesian officials, teachers, and missionaries. Even those who thought the Indonesians should be permitted to remain felt there should be conditions set on their presence.<sup>71</sup>

As might be expected of an official investigation written at this point in the Netherlands-Indonesia dispute, Grootenhuis's report supported his government's policy objectives. Nevertheless, its argument is consistent with points that Papuan nationalists have raised in other contexts. For example, in the 1960s, when Markus Kaisiepo proposed, from his place of exile in the Netherlands, that Papua join with Maluku in a "Greater Melanesian Federation," Saul Hindom, then an OPM leader, objected by noting that for many Papuans the widespread anti-Indonesian feeling had its roots precisely in the attitudes that Moluccans had shown toward Papuans. Not only had the seeds of Papuan nationalism been sown by the condescending attitudes of the Ambonese, Keiese, and other Moluccans who had served under the Dutch, but even in the 1960s, Moluccans were still humiliating Papuans (Hindom n.d.). Something of Grootenhuis' "good cop, bad cop" depiction of Dutch and Indonesian officials is echoed even today in the recollections of many older Papuans, who say that they did not feel colonized (*dijajah*) by the Dutch. Though this discourse may say more about Papuan experiences since 1963 than about the dual character of colonialism under the Dutch, it is nevertheless an important and reoccurring theme in informal Papuan nationalist discourse. Moreover, it is a theme that is rarely found elsewhere in Indonesia.

It would be misleading to assume that all relations between Indonesians and Papuans were as antagonistic as Grootenhuis's report suggests. Prior to 1949, during Indonesia's struggle for independence from the Dutch, several Indonesian nationalist politicians had worked to mobilize Papuan support for the Indonesian independence movement. One of these men was Soegoro Atmosprasodjo, a pre-war political detainee in Boven Digul, a prison camp located north of Merauke in southeastern Papua.<sup>72</sup> During the war, he had worked for the Dutch in Australia. He then returned with them to Hollandia, where in 1945 he was appointed head of a training school for Papuans. Another Indonesian active in Papua was Dr. Sam Ratulangi, the Republican Governor of Sulawesi, who was sent into exile in Serui in 1946 along with his closest assistants and their families. As

I have shown in a separate study (Chauvel 2003: 10–13), both these men worked hard to disseminate Indonesian nationalist ideals during their time in Papua, working both among the small group of graduates of the missionary schools and van Eechoud's training schools and also among the larger numbers of less sophisticated villagers. Both were experienced and skillful politicians who interacted with Papuans in a manner very different from that of the East Indonesian officials, teachers, and missionaries who are the subject of Papuan nationalist rhetoric. Soegoro, in particular, showed a capacity for speaking to Papuans in terms of their own interests, arguing how these could be advanced within an independent Indonesia. Nevertheless, the relations best remembered by the Papuan nationalists were the negative ones, and these experiences intensified after 1963.

### **Papuan-Indonesian Relations After 1963**

The transition to Indonesian rule was never likely to have been easy. The Indonesians thought they were liberating Papua. A few Papuans agreed. Most were cautious, but saw little alternative but to accept and cooperate. In the event, Papuans' relations with Indonesians after the takeover in 1963 were conditioned by the experience of the first months and years of the new administration. As the earlier discussion has indicated, there were prominent members of the Papuan elite who were prepared to cooperate with the incoming administration. It was their experience of disillusionment and alienation that established the pattern for later relations between the Indonesian authorities and Papuan society. Three of the PARNA leaders, E. J. Bonay, Herman Wayoi, and Fritz Kirihio, who had been among the leading nationalists and were thought to be the best educated and most politically progressive, were prepared to participate in the administration, and all three initially held important positions. Yet all three became disillusioned with Indonesian rule. Bonay, the first Papuan governor under the Indonesians, was removed from office and jailed for a time because of his nationalist sympathies.<sup>73</sup> Herman Wayoi's account of the post-1963 government describes a situation of racial discrimination in which Papuans did not enjoy the same rights as other Indonesians. He characterizes post-1963 Papua as a "colonial territory" within the Indonesian state.<sup>74</sup> The rivalries and antagonisms between Papuans and Indonesians identified under the Netherlands regime by Bonay and Grootenhuis were even more apparent after Indonesia took control. According to Wayoi, Papuans were never given the opportunity to be integrated into the administration either

at provincial or national levels. No Papuans were appointed as Ministers or as senior officials in central government departments.<sup>75</sup> Nor were Papuans ever appointed to positions as governor or other senior officials in provinces elsewhere in Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesians from Aceh to Maluku flooded into Papua to assume positions that had previously been held by Papuans. From the lowest to the most senior levels of the bureaucracy, Papuan officials were excluded from the administration and “became observers and foreigners in their own country.”<sup>76</sup> Wayoi was not the only

***The rivalries and antagonisms between Papuans and Indonesians... were even more apparent after Indonesia took control.***

Papuan to make this observation. Clemens Runaweri relates that many of the Papuans who were prepared to work in the Indonesian administration were removed from their positions, because of their nationalist political views. Another leading nationalist who was eventually stripped of his position was Nicolaas Tanggahma, who had served until early 1968 as head of the Bureau of Public Administration. Even less political senior Papuan officials, such as Arnold

Mampioer and M. B. Ramandey, lost their positions in the period leading up to the “Act of Free Choice.” Furthermore, though the Papuan political elite had been well represented in the New Guinea Council elected in 1961, after 1963 they were increasingly excluded from the legislative positions. For example, in 1963 the New Guinea Council was replaced by what Clemens Runaweri describes as “a new Indonesian democratic institution with appointed members.” The new council was a symbolic institution headed by the governor and with no powers to make laws—in Runaweri’s terms, a “farce democracy.” This council, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah-Gotong Royong (Provincial Parliament–Mutual Assistance, DPRD-GR), of which Clemens Runaweri was one of the members, was itself abolished in November 1968, because the majority of its members were thought to be subversives and separatists.<sup>77</sup>

E. J. Bonay, Herman Wayoi, Fritz Kiriho, and Clemens Runaweri had been among the Papuan beneficiaries of the Netherlands policies of rapidly expanding educational opportunities, political advancement, and Papuanization of the bureaucracy. They were the formulators of Papuan nationalism and, if the Netherlands’ plans for decolonization had been realized, they might have been the leading politicians of an independent West Papua. Their pragmatism and initial acceptance of Indonesian rule

notwithstanding, the transition to the new regime was unlikely to be easy. They shared the rivalry with and antagonism against the Indonesians that had been experienced in the Netherlands administration. After 1963, they had had to deal with many more Indonesians in the positions of authority. It was as if, to use Grootenhuis' terminology, they had been cut off from their source of advancement. Thus, their experience of Indonesian rule turned their initial acceptance to alienation and rejection. As Clemens Runaweri observed in 1969, the Indonesian government's attempts to extinguish Papuan nationalism by these means were counterproductive, for they served to increase Papuan national consciousness and alienated people from Indonesia.<sup>78</sup>

*the Indonesian  
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The sense of competition with Indonesians for positions within the bureaucracy and the resentment felt about Indonesian domination of key positions remains a strong motive force in Papuan nationalism among the educated elite. For example, Michael Menufandu, a senior Papuan civil servant in Jakarta and a former Mayor of Jayapura, complains of the intellectual arrogance of officials who believe that policy can only be made in Jakarta, even though it is the local people who know the region and its problems best.<sup>79</sup> Another cause of resentment among Papuan officials is that they not only have to compete with Indonesians for senior positions in Papua, but also are rarely appointed to positions in other provinces.<sup>80</sup> A parallel point was recently made in the context of the controversy over the Indonesian government's intention to divide Papua into three provinces. In response to the proposal, the Rev. Socrates Sofyan Yoman argued that the division of the province was intended simply to create more jobs for Indonesian civil servants, as there would not be sufficient numbers of Papuans with the qualifications and experience needed to fill the most senior positions in all three provinces.<sup>81</sup>

### **Indonesianization, Marginalization, and the Fear of Extermination**

The rivalry with and antagonism toward Indonesians was felt most keenly by educated Papuans, because they aspired to the jobs that had been held by Indonesians and Eurasians. This circle of educated Papuans had been growing since the Pacific War. More Papuans were completing primary education, and schools had also been established to train Papuans as

officials, police, and teachers. Although still relatively small in number, this Papuan educated elite had played a disproportionate role in the formulation and articulation of Papuan nationalism.

During the Dutch period, the rivalry between Papuans and Indonesians had involved but small numbers of Indonesians and Papuans.

The massive demographic transformation Papua has experienced since

1963 has changed the dynamics of Papuan-Indonesian relations for all of Papuan society and has given Papuan nationalism a sharp ethnic expression. In 1960, the “Asian” population, consisting mainly of Javanese, Chinese, and eastern Indonesians, numbered just 18,600 (2.5%) out of an estimated population of 736,700.<sup>82</sup> Forty years later, the 2000 Census indicated that the number of non-Papuans residing in the province

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ing lost control of their  
own homeland***

was 772,684, or 35% of the population. In some areas, the percentages were even higher, being as much as 68% in urban areas of Jayapura, Sorong, and Fakfak.<sup>83</sup> The largest groups of settlers were Javanese, Buginese, Makasarese, Ambonese, Menadonese, and Bataks.<sup>84</sup> This influx of Indonesians has given Papuans a sense of having lost control of their own homeland and caused them to feel they have been made marginal to Papua’s political and economic life.

Migration to Papua has come in two forms, which have involved two different patterns of settlement (McGibbon 2004b). The first type of settler is the transmigrants, coming mostly from Java, that the government has settled in rural areas. Overall, the transmigrants are still a small minority of the province’s rural population, but in the transmigration sites around Jayapura, Merauke, Paniai, Fakfak, and Sorong they have overwhelmed the local Papuan population. For example, in Arso, located between Jayapura and the border with PNG, the Papuan population of 3,000 has been dwarfed by 18,000 transmigrants. Not only are they outnumbered, but the Papuans in Arso have felt isolated, marginalized, and culturally dominated, as they can not compete economically and politically with the more numerous and better connected transmigrants. Moreover, the communities have tended to live and work separately, with limited interaction and cooperation.<sup>85</sup>

The second kind of immigration is the influx of voluntary migrants who were attracted by the economic opportunities in the urban areas of

Papua. In some places, such as Jayapura, these settlers are so numerous that the city has essentially become “Indonesian,” as the settlers dominate the city’s economic life. The new economic hierarchy can be seen visually in the streets of Jayapura’s central market. The shops are owned by Indonesian Chinese and other settlers, and settler traders also run the market stalls in front of the shops. Meanwhile, in front of the stalls sit Papuan traders, mainly highlanders, selling small quantities of fruit and vegetables. As a Papuan observer has noted, the “presence of the settlers has created a colonial economic structure, where only the traditional sector is run by the indigenous population.”<sup>86</sup>

Mark Worth’s documentary film, *The Land of the Morning Star*, has captured something of the demographic transformation of Hollandia / Jayapura. In May 2000, it filmed Clemens Runaweri, evidently pleased to be back after 31 years in exile in PNG, as he wandered through the market in Hamadi, a suburb of Jayapura. “There is no place like home,” he said, but it was not the home he remembered. Runaweri explained that Hamadi used to be a suburban paradise full of nice houses inhabited by Papuans. Today it was a market filled with traders from South Sulawesi. As he paused to listen to the call to prayer from a nearby mosque, he said, “Now you can hear Muslim sounds in the midst of what used to be Melanesia. So strange, but that is the reality.”<sup>87</sup>

Twenty years earlier, Bonay had also commented on the demographic change that he had seen during the first seventeen years of Indonesian rule. Bonay likened the Papuans’ experience with that of the Indians in North America, the Aborigines in Australia, and the Maoris in New Zealand. He said the Papuan experience was even worse, because the World Bank had paid for the transmigrants’ settlement, while in the New World the European immigrants had at least been using their own capital. Bonay said the “flood” of transmigrants had generated tensions between indigenous Papuans and the settlers, as Papuans had been forced to leave the lands of their ancestors.

Some Papuan critics of Indonesian immigration believe it will lead to the extermination of the Papuan people. Bonay, for example, cites Alfred Russel Wallace’s prediction, made a century earlier, that if the Europeans were to colonize Papua it would lead to the extinction of the Papuan people.<sup>88</sup> Bonay rejects

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Papuan people*

Wallace's assumption of the superiority of some races over others, but retains Wallace's conclusion about the outcome of colonization, in this case by the non-Papuan Indonesians. In Bonay's opinion, Papuan extinction will be the natural outcome of this colonization, for the Papuans are being inundated by the tidal wave of Malay (Indonesian) migration.<sup>89</sup> Herman Wayoi was even more blunt in his assessment of the process:

It was as if the Indonesian government sought only to "dominate" (*menguasai*) the territory, then planned to exterminate the ethnic Melanesians and replace them with ethnic Malays from Indonesia. Transmigration "proved" this impression; transporting thousands from outside to settle in the fertile valleys of the land of Papua. (Alua 2002a: 64)

Benny Giay records similar sentiments expressed by a delegate from Nabire at the *Musyawarah Besar Papua 2000* (MUBES, Papuan Mass Consultation) of February 2000, who said:

Indonesians have never given Papuans a proper place. Because indeed they are Indonesians and we are Papuans. We are murdered, enslaved and colonized by Indonesians. In another 10 years time Papuans will be finished, murdered by the Indonesian military. Because of that it is better that we just become independent. (Giay 2000: 15)

Much of the Papuan resentment of Indonesian governance and the Indonesian presence is grounded in notions of fundamental differences between the two groups. It is compounded by the resentment felt at the treatment of Papuans. Papuan theologian Benny Giay cited a fellow minister, Mrs. Agu Iwanggin, who gave the difference between Papuans and Indonesians a God-ordained quality. When in August 1998 Indonesia sent a parliamentary delegation to investigate why people wanted a Free Papua, she told the delegation the following: At the root of the issue is God, because God created people to be different. Papuans are different from Javanese, and different from other people, too. God gave Papua to Papuans as a home, so they could eat sago and sweet potatoes there. God gave them the penis gourd (*koteka*) and loincloth (*cawat*) for clothes. God gave them curly hair and black skin. Papuans are Papuans. They can never be turned into Javanese or Sumatrans, or vice versa. By contrast, the Javanese were given Java. *Tabu* (soya bean curd) and *tempe* (soya bean cake) is their food. Their skin is light and their hair straight (Giay 2001).

Like his fellow minister, Benny Giay asserts that Papuans cannot be

turned into Javanese or Sumatrans (Giay 2001). Some Papuan nationalists felt that is exactly what the Indonesian government had been trying to do since 1963. Writing in 1969, Clemens Runaweri argued that in the 1960s the government had implemented a policy of “depapuanization,” by which he meant the spreading of Pancasila and the history of the “Great Revolution of Indonesia,” as well as the spread of Islam, Communism (at least before 1965), and Javanese culture. He cites the building of mosques in areas where the great majority were Christians. He also cites instances in which the Army, through its civic mission, gave material support to Papuan Muslim villages in Fakfak and the Raja Ampat islands, while only pretending to help the Christian villagers: “In order to create a calm sphere among the village people [Christians] they pretended to help them in building up their churches.” Consequently, according to Runaweri, by 1969 Papuans regarded the government as an agent of Islam and Communism that was intent on eliminating the Papuans’ religion in a clandestine manner. Thus, though Indonesia thought of West Papua as a “missing son” that had been returned to the family to enjoy “a free life in peace and harmony,” Papuans felt they were enduring a “colonial life” controlled by their “new Master of Asia.”<sup>90</sup>

From the late 1960s onward, economic development (*pembangunan*) was the centerpiece of the New Order government’s policy framework and political legitimacy. But in the eyes of Papuan nationalists Jakarta’s economic development policies have brought suffering to their people. Benny Giay has characterized the impact of these policies in the phrases, *Memoria pasionis: penderitaan bangsa Papua dalam 35 tahun pembangunan* (Narrative of suffering: the suffering of the Papuan people through 35 years of development). Benny Giay argues that the Jakarta-centric development policies have actually served to incapacitate and marginalize Papuans. There was no proper place in these policies for the dignity and status of the Papuan people, for in Indonesian eyes Papuans have no value. In Benny Giay’s opinion, the Indonesian government valued the resources of Papua more than Papuan people. In support of this argument, he cites the development of the gold and copper resources at the Freeport Mine, where the Amungme and Komoro people, the owners of the land on which the mine operates, were moved, intimidated, and murdered (Giay 2000: 30, 35, 55).

### **Ethnic Preservation and the Special Autonomy Law of 2001**

In many respects the Papuan proposals for the Special Autonomy Law

were grounded in this feeling of being marginalized, colonized, and under the threat of extermination, a feeling that had persisted and intensified through four decades of Indonesian rule. The promotion and protection of Papuan interests was central to the Papuan proposals, as a clear distinction was made between the indigenous Papuans and the non-Papuan residents of the province. The governor and deputy governor had to be

***the Papuan proposals for the Special Autonomy Law were grounded in this feeling of being marginalized, colonized, and under the threat of extermination***

Papuans, and Papuan domination of the legislature was assured through the creation of a Papuan upper house (MRP, *Majelis Rakyat Papua*, Papuan Peoples Assembly) consisting of customary (*adat*), religious, and women's representatives. The deployment of military units by the central government in Papua would be made after the deliberations (*pertimbangan*) of the Papuan parliament and government (though not necessarily needing its approval), and Papua would have its own police force responsible to the governor.

Furthermore, there would be no more transmigration, and priority would be given to the employment of Papuans in all sectors of the economy. Finally, under the Papuan proposals for Special Autonomy, the Provincial government would be obliged to protect and develop Papuan culture. To this end, the Special Autonomy proposals included provisions for the protection and representation of traditional institutions, the advancement of human rights, and the promotion of ecologically sustainable economic development.<sup>91</sup>

### **The Process of Becoming Papuan**

The ethnic identity that has emerged as a part of Papuan nationalism is replete with paradox and irony. Firstly, while Papuans assert a Papuan ethnicity in opposition to Indonesians, the Papuans themselves are comprised of some 310 ethno-linguistic groups. This diversity presents a challenge to the forging of a common Papuan identity. Secondly, the formation of Papuan identity has more in common with that of its Indonesian rival than it does with the identity of some of its regional counterparts in Indonesia. Unlike, say, the Minangkabau or the Buginese, Papuans lack the background of a shared communal, cultural, and historical experience. Rather, the contacts among Papua's diverse societies have often been mixed, often limited, and recent. Moreover, over the past century and a half the disparate

societies that constitute Papua have come into contact with the outside world and with each other often through the mediation of the Netherlands Indies and the subsequent Indonesian administration. Thirdly, Malay / Indonesian has become the language of both Indonesian and Papuan nationalism. In Papua, the Dutch mission education was taught in the Malay dialects of eastern Indonesia. As a result, Malay became the lingua franca for educated Papuans and the language of Papuan nationalism, just as it was for Indonesian nationalism. Benedict Anderson has noted this irony.

However, he notes that the paradox is not as great as it seems, for in contrast to flags and folk-dances, which act as “emblems” of nation-ness, the role of languages lies in their capacity for generating imagined communities and creating solidarities (Anderson 1991: 133, 177–78).

Despite these paradoxes, the fact remains that the Papuan relationship to Indonesian identity differs from the relationships between regional and national identity that prevail elsewhere in the archipelago, where, at the risk of oversimplifying, it can be said that being Sundanese, Balinese, or Batak has come to complement and enrich being Indonesian. This accommodation of regional and national identities has taken time and has been the subject of much debate and political struggle, yet to varying degrees accommodations have been reached. In most of Papua, this accommodation has not taken place. Fakfak and Serui, the two cases discussed in Part III, once appeared to be exceptions to the general pattern. But even there the identification with Indonesia has failed to take firm root. As will be discussed in those case studies, during the Dutch colonial period some sections of Papuan society in Fakfak and Serui had developed an identification with Indonesia and supported Papua’s integration with Indonesia. However, in the late 1990s, the contest between Indonesian and Papuan identities remained a live issue in Fakfak, while in Serui pro-Indonesian identification had begun to shift in 1961–62 and was further undermined by the Indonesian conduct in the arrangement of the “Act of Free Choice” in 1969.

At the same time as Papuans were developing this sense of separateness from Indonesia, they were experiencing another transformation—that of becoming Papuan. The Dutch and mission education system were key institutions in this transformation, acting to expand horizons from the

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tribal and the local to the Papuan and the Indonesian. As has been noted earlier, the Papuan graduates of the mission schools and van Eechoud's schools of the late 1940s were in some sense the "first" Papuans. In addition to being the first generation of Papuan nationalists, it was they who first began to think of themselves as members of a broader pan-Papuan society, rather than simply members of particular ethno-linguistic groups. A pan-Papuan identity was not the only possible outcome. Papuans in Fakfak, for example, were negotiating more complex choices created by their Muslim religion and by their familial, economic, and cultural ties with the neighboring islands of central Maluku. However, most Papuans elsewhere lacked these prior ties, and for them the affirmation of a common Papuan-ness was the more common pattern of the journey into the larger world, being facilitated through their experiences of the Dutch colonial and Indonesian states.

Here, again, the colonial experience had an effect on Papua that differed from its effects elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies. In both places, the institutions of colonial education played a critical role in promoting what Benedict Anderson has called "colonial nationalisms," particularly for the first generation of students, because the colonial education system was a highly centralized hierarchy employing common textbooks and standardized programs. Moreover, for most of the Indies, Java was the center of a system whose highest institutions drew students from all over the region, though not from outside the Netherlands Indies, in a "pilgrimage"

*Papuans were an exception to this network, however, because very few of them made the educational "pilgrimage" to Java*

inward and upward. For these students, the common educational system instilled a common "territorially specific imagined reality which was everyday confirmed by the accents and physiognomies of their classmates" (Anderson 1991: 121–22). Papuans were an exception to this network, however, because very few of them made the educational "pilgrimage" to Java, at least not until 1963.<sup>92</sup> For them, the center of the educational system and the "territorially specific imagined reality" it promoted was Papua itself. Although the education system's scale in Papua was much smaller, and though the level of education it provided did not reach the tertiary level, the expansion of schools and training institutions after the Pacific War, promoted the development of a pan-Papuan identity just as the Java-centric system had promoted the develop-

ment of a pan-Papuan identity just as the Java-centric system had promoted the develop-

ment of a pan-Indies consciousness among future Indonesians. Indeed, this promotion of a Papuan identity was one of the objectives of Dutch policy in the post-war years.

By the early 1960s, the colonial educational institutions had already produced a new local elite, many of whose members were actively involved in formulating a distinctively Papuan nationalism. The institutions and processes of social change were much the same as those which had produced an earlier generation of Indonesian nationalists. In his 1961 study of the emerging Papuan political elite, Grootenhuis observed that the more progressive and better-educated members of that elite, such as the leaders of PARNA, were moving out of the milieu of their own ethno-linguistic group into greater contact both with Papuans from other regions and with non-Papuans. Many of the PARNA leaders were men from Serui who were the first members of their family to enjoy an education higher than village primary school. Many had moved to Hollandia, where they tended to live in Hamadi among Papuans of diverse backgrounds. There they were active in community organizations such as trade unions and youth and sports groups, where they also came into regular contact with Dutch residents of Hollandia. In addition, these men read the local newspapers and listened to radio broadcasts of the Dutch government and from Indonesia. Nevertheless, Grootenhuis argued that these PARNA members had taken but the first step out of their local milieu. For example, though they lived among people of diverse backgrounds in Hollandia, their spouses were mostly from their own group.<sup>93</sup> PARNA sought to unite all Papuans and create a national identity, yet its leaders were still bound up in their own ethno-linguistic group.

Nevertheless, PARNA's very existence was a step in the direction of nationhood. Indeed, its very name (*Partai Nasional*, or National Party) suggests that PARNA sought to unite all Papuans in a common national identity.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, the region-specific nature of PARNA's leadership, and the expression this gave to Papua's regional divisions, drew comment from the journalists of the day. For example, in 1960 the Catholic weekly *Tifa* published an article, entitled "Nationaal Partai," which noted that all the PARNA leaders were from Serui and that none were from Biak. The article went on to observe that the struggle between Biak and Serui was the oldest in Papuan politics. After the Pacific War, for example, Markus Kaisiepo, from Biak, had been the leading pro-Dutch politician, while Silas Papare, from Serui, led the pro-Indonesia forces.<sup>95</sup> Regional rivalries

such as these continued to be an issue as Papuan resistance to Indonesia grew after 1963. For example, Papuans identified the OPM, initially led by Permenas Awom in the Bird's Head Region and in Biak by Noah Rumaropen, as a Biak-led organization. Other anti-Indonesian Papuans feared that if the OPM was successful, independence would be the prerogative of the Biak leadership. Saul Hindom detected the influence of Koreri in the conviction among Biaks that the leadership of the struggle for independence should come from Biak. He proposed the establishment of a representative body with the authority to achieve independence and unite all the Papuan organizations with the one objective of independence (Hindom n.d.).

The leaders of PARNA in the early 1960s were among the best educated of their contemporaries and the first to begin the move from the milieu of their own ethno linguistic group into a broader pan-Papuan sphere. Not only were they among the first to call themselves "Papuans," but they also helped create the ideological framework for being Papuan today. Rupert Stasch's study of the Korowai, who live in a relatively isolated rural community, provides insights into the way people are becoming

***Rupert Stasch's study of the Korowai...provides insights into the way people are becoming Papuan***

Papuan today. If the leaders of PARNA were among the first Papuans, then the Korowai are among the more recent members. The Korowai lands are located in the southern interior lowlands of Papua some two hundred miles north of the district capital of Merauke. The speakers of Korowai language number about 4000. The presence of the Indonesian state there is still limited.

As late as the 1990s, police and civilian representatives of the government visited the Korowai lands only about once a year, though a more permanent but still erratic presence was provided by highland Papuan schoolteachers and a Papua-born Javanese health nurse. These were not the only outside contacts, however. For example, highland Dani airstrip workers and Digul church functionaries had been living among the Korowai for twenty years. Furthermore, non-Papuan traders, many from Sulawesi, operated in the area selling mass-produced commodities and buying forest products. Nevertheless, in recent years the Korowai have acquired a keen sense of being "Papuan," and their involvement in the Indonesian administrative system has been an important part of that process.

An important part of the Korowai's interaction with the outside world has come as the village leaders traveled on business to the sub-district centers of administration. Over the past fifteen years, dozens of Korowai have been appointed as village government officeholders, and in these capacities they have, collectively, made perhaps a hundred one-to-three-day walks to the sub-district administration centers, where most of the officials have been non-Papuans. Through these back-and-forth movements, the Korowai have come to distinguish between "Indonesians" and "Papuans" and have come to associate themselves with other "short hair" Papuans in distinction from "long hair" Indonesians. Furthermore, though some Korowai have developed cooperative relations with the non-Papuan traders, most Korowai have come to characterize the non-Papuans as exploitive profit-seekers. Korowai have come to find that they form relations most easily with other Papuans, while experiencing frustration in their commercial relations with non-Papuans. In addition, in the course of their back-and-forth travels, and through their contacts with the Papuans living among them, the Korowai have become aware of the independence movement and the conflict between Papua and Indonesia. In the process, they have begun to identify with Papuan nationalism. The Dani and Digul men have been the main source of the Papuan nationalist sentiments, being responsible, for example, for the prolonged flying of a Morning Star flag in 2000 (Stasch 2003).

### **Colonial Boundaries, Ethnicity, and Nationalism**

This part of the study thus far has examined the dual processes through which members of Papua's mosaic of ethno-linguistic groups have come to think of themselves as "Papuans," together with the clear distinctions they have come to make between themselves as "Papuans" and "Indonesians." There is also a broader comparative context to these transformations. Both in Indonesia and in the neighboring Papuan and Melanesian society of PNG there is evidence that other factors are at work besides ethnicity. We have already discussed how Dutch colonial education and bureaucratic employment fostered the development of an Indonesian nationalist "imagined community" in the Netherlands Indies and later a Papuan "imagined community" in Netherlands New Guinea. Closely linked to this argument, Benedict Anderson has identified the importance of colonial boundaries and the institutions that developed within them in bequeathing the territory to colonial nationalism. In the Netherlands Indies,

including West Papua, the Dutch brought together under one colonial administration a huge population, plural by every measure of ethnicity, religion and language. The territory of the Netherlands Indies grew in an ad hoc manner over three centuries, reaching its final form in the first decade of the twentieth century, and this colonial territory created new boundaries between and connections among ethnic and national identities. For example, at the other end of the archipelago from Papua, Anderson cites the people of the east coast of Sumatra, who prior to the division of spheres of influence between the Dutch and British in 1824, had strong ethnic, religious and trading relations with their fellow Malays on the other side of the Straits of Malacca in modern day Malaysia. Anderson argues that the Malays of the east coast of Sumatra have come to regard the Ambonese of Maluku, with whom they share neither ethnicity, language, nor religion, as fellow Indonesians, while they now regard the Malays of Malaysia as foreigners (Anderson 1991: 120–21).

The pattern of interaction across the border at the Papuan end of the archipelago is somewhat more ambiguous. As Anderson notes, the colonial border, which bisects the island of New Guinea along the line of 141 degrees longitude, corresponds to nothing on the ground (Anderson 1991: 176). Accordingly, as we have seen, much of the West Papuan construction of a Papuan identity has been done in explicit or implicit contrast to Indonesians, with oppositional comparisons being made in cultural, physical, and nearly civilizational terms.

***The relative absence of identification with fellow Papuans in PNG suggests the enduring importance of colonial boundaries***

In making this contrast, Papuans often identify themselves as Melanesians. Herman Wayoi wanted Papua to separate from Indonesia and join with Australian-administered New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea, or PNG) to form a Melanesian Republic (Alua 2002a: 67). Clemens Runaweri found it odd to hear the call to prayer from a mosque in an area that used to be (non-Muslim) Melanesia. Yet, surprisingly, Papuans today rarely identify

themselves with their neighbors in the independent state of PNG in the eastern half of the island of New Guinea, even though an earlier generation of nationalists did so in particular circumstances. The relative absence of identification with fellow Papuans in PNG suggests the enduring importance of colonial boundaries and the different educational and administration systems that developed within them. Papuans on both

sides of the border have been part of separate administrative and educational systems, the first centered on Jayapura and Jakarta and the second centered on Port Moresby and Australia. Even the name “Papuan” has come to have a different range of meanings in the two territories. In West Papua, it refers, at least in theory, to all the Melanesian inhabitants of the island (at least the ones living west of the demarcation line). In PNG, by contrast, people in the former German territory in the north refer to themselves as “New Guineans,” while the residents of the former British / Australian territory in the south use the term “Papuan.”<sup>96</sup>

The West Papuan nationalists’ lack of identification with the Papuans in PNG is especially surprising given the Dutch and Australian endeavor, dating from a 1957 Joint Statement, to promote cooperation between the two halves of the island in hopes of forming a greater Melanesian state by merging the two colonial territories upon independence. Some of the West Papuans who visited the PNG and the Pacific islands in the context of the Dutch-Australian cooperation of this period, or who traveled to these places due to their membership on the South Pacific Commission, accepted the idea that Papua should become part of the Melanesian world of the Pacific.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, from 1962 onward, Port Moresby was a center for West Papuan exiles, and in the early years of the Indonesian administration these exiles were part of a network that linked the resistance inside West Papua to the leaders in the Netherlands.

There are several reasons why that sense of commonality has failed to endure. To begin with, the poor economic development record and fragile governance in PNG has made the idea of unification between the two halves of the island less attractive for West Papuans than it might have been in the 1960s. Second, governments in PNG have closely followed the Australian Government’s advice to avoid giving any public support to the West Papuan struggle. Although there has been some sympathy in PNG society for the plight of fellow “Papuans” on the other side of the border, PNG has been preoccupied with internal political struggles of its own, including the struggle to develop its own sense of national identity. Ironically, the independent nation of PNG has been less successful than the frustrated nationalists of West Papua in developing a sense of shared identity. While being just as culturally diverse as West Papua, PNG lacks the unifying influence of the shared struggle against Indonesia. As a consequence, the development of a national identity remains far from unfinished. And at the same time that West Papuans have been trying to separate

from Indonesia, governments in PNG have been confronted with their own separatist rebellions, most notably in Bougainville.

Ironically, in the late 1990s the *reformasi* era nationalists received more support among the other nations of the South Pacific than they did from PNG. West Papuan nationalists have received support at various times from Nauru and Vanuatu, and they have a representative office in Vanuatu. The Pacific Islands Forum annual meetings have been another fruitful lobbying arena for West Papuans. The assumption underlying the Papuan lobbying activity in the Pacific has been the mutual identification among fellow Melanesians. However, among their closest Melanesian neighbors, the leaders of the PNG, the West Papuan appeal has fallen largely on deaf ears – ears made deaf by the geopolitical situation PNG governments have found themselves in.

### **PART III – Creating National Identity in Heterogeneous Societies**

We have seen how the colonial boundary in the island of New Guinea has imposed a territorial limit to the “imagined community” of West Papua. This has occurred despite the rhetorical identification West Papuan nationalists continue to make with “Melanesians” and not “Indonesians.” However, the more pressing challenge for West Papuan nationalists, as for their Indonesian and PNG counterparts, has been to create a national identity in a highly heterogeneous society. As we have seen, there has been significant consolidation of a pan-Papuan identity, but local and ethno-linguistic loyalties remain salient, and the dynamics underlying the development of pan-Papuan identity are not entirely in the nationalists’ control. To examine the complexity of those dynamics in more detail, this paper now presents case studies of two regions, Fakfak and Serui. These regions are not chosen because they are representative of Papua as a whole in ethnic or religious terms, but rather illustrate how religion, geography, and political circumstance have offered different choices to be negotiated, than those that prevailed in most of Papua. In the early 1960s, they were somewhat distinctive, as, for most of the post-war period under the Dutch, some of the Papuan groups in Serui and Fakfak were among the most pro-Indonesian in all of Papua, though the two regions were also the homes of some of the leading figures in the pro-independence movement of 1961. After 1961, however, the two regions have gone in different directions. Since Indonesia assumed control of the administration in 1963, Fakfak

has remained distinctive in the Papuan context, due largely to its religious complexion and strong links to neighboring Maluku. In Fakfak, the choice between identification with Indonesia (through Maluku) and with Papua remains highly contested, with different parts of the Fakfak community making different choices. Meanwhile, the pro-Indonesia political orientation that once made Serui so distinctive in Papua has faded. Beginning in the early 1960s with the rise of Serui leaders in the nationalist PARNA party, and intensifying by 1969 with the alienation from Indonesia generated by the conduct of the “Act of Free Choice,” Serui has come to reflect much more the Papuan political mainstream.

### **Fakfak – The Struggle between Papuan and Indonesian Identities**

The region around Fakfak, on the southwestern coast of Papua, has a long history of interaction with the outside world that distinguishes it from many other regions of Papua. This history, together with their family, religious, and economic ties with the neighboring islands of central Maluku, has given Muslim Papuans in Fakfak choices between Papuan and Indonesian identities and the different political orientations that flow from them. This section explores the history of those dynamics, and details how they have been playing out in recent political activity. It will be argued that, as elsewhere in Papua, there is no simple correlation between religious belief and political orientation in Fakfak. This sketch of Fakfak’s recent political history suggests how history can shape the range of alternatives, while not determining the outcomes.

#### *Muslim Papuans in Fakfak [had] choices between Papuan and Indonesian identities*

##### *Fakfak as Muslim Papua*

The coast where Fakfak is located is geographically proximate to the islands of central Maluku, particularly east Ceram, Ceram Laut, and Goram. From the sixteenth century the region was part of an extensive trading network that extended through the archipelago and into Melanesia. Textiles, beads, and other products were traded for Papuan slaves and forest products, including timber and bark from the *masooi* tree. Fortified trading settlements, called *sosolot*, were established along the coast where Ceramese traders established local monopolies and intermarried with local communities. The Muslim leaders of these communities bore the title *Raja*, in the manner of village leaders in central Maluku. Though they had some Papuan ancestry, they also had strong family links

to the *Raja* of east Ceram. The *Sosolot Raja* and their followers were active participants in trade and the associated warfare and piracy. Galis records a long history of Papuan raiding parties going as far as Buru and the Kei islands. Rumbati, near present-day Fakfak, was also a base for pirate attacks on passing shipping (Galis 1953: 16, 36, 38; Goodman 2002).

Although the Dutch East Indies Company and the Indies government had a major trading and administrative center in nearby Ambon, it was not able to maintain a presence on the southwest coast until 1898, when Fakfak and Manokwari were established as the first administrative posts in Papua. Contrary to the practice that would later be followed in the other regions of Papua, once they were established in the Fakfak area the Dutch recognized the *Sosolot Raja* as the principal local leaders and endeavored to incorporate them in the colonial administration, just as had been done with their fellow *Raja* in the neighboring Maluku islands. Nevertheless, the early Dutch administrators did not regard the *Raja* as being from the place, referring to them instead as “foreigners,” because of their marriage links to Maluku localities. For example, the *Raja* of Rumbati was described as being more Goramese than local, and it was said that he favored his subjects of Goram descent over the locals (Dumas 1992: 7). The pattern of intermarriage that gave rise to this observation continued into the early decades of the twentieth century, at least among the *Raja* families. For example, the wife of the *Raja* of Fatagar was from Ceram, while the *Raja* of Sekar was married to a Muslim from Ambon. This pattern of intermarriage extended well beyond the *Raja* families, as much of the coastal population was of mixed Ceram, Goramese, and Papuan background (Seijne Kok 1992: 51).

The Fakfak area also differed from the rest of Papua in that the ruling elite were Muslims, at least nominally. According to Seijne Kok, one of the early Assistant Residents of Fakfak, in the late 1910s most of these people

*the ruling elite were  
Muslims, at least  
nominally*

were Muslim in name only, though several members of the *Raja* families had made the pilgrimage to Mecca. He also observed that the local religious leadership was provided by outsiders, presumably from Ceram and Goram. Outside the ruling elite, the majority of the population

around Fakfak were “heathens” or “animists,” though a part were Muslim. There was also a small but slowly increasing number of Christians, as Fakfak had been one of the earlier Papuan mission fields of the *Utrechtsche*

*Zendingen Vereeniging* (Utrecht Missionary Society).<sup>98</sup> In the late 1910s there were two missionaries (presumably Dutch) and sixteen schools, the latter staffed by Ambonese teachers and missionaries. Sijne Kok described the Ambonese teachers as straightforward (*eenvoudige*) people, who in their way were pioneers of civilization.<sup>99</sup> Thus, the initial effect of Dutch colonial and missionary activity was to increase Fakfak's contacts with Maluku, while adding to the existing contacts with the Maluku's Muslim communities some new contacts with groups such as the Protestant Ambonese and the Catholic Keiese.

During the first flowering of Papuan nationalism in the late 1950s, Fakfak was not a major center of political activity, yet it was one of the half dozen administrative centers that participated in the emerging political entity. At the time, the community around Fakfak could be divided crudely into three groups: Christian Papuans, Muslim Papuans, and (mostly Muslim) Indonesians. The dividing line between the latter two groups was ill defined, if there was one at all, as many of the Muslim communities along the coast were of mixed heritage. In 1961, the region elected two representatives to the New Guinea Council, Nicholaas Tanggahma and M. Achmad. Both became members of the *Komite Nasional*, and both worked to promote its ideas. Nicholaas Tanggahma was a particularly influential among the first generation of Papuan nationalists. He was a Christian from Mamoer village, not far from Fakfak, who had served as head of the district administration in Etnabaai prior to becoming a member of the New Guinea Council. The Dutch had identified him as an especially promising young member of the Papua-orientated political elite they were trying to cultivate.<sup>100</sup> Tanggahma was one of the four Council members who called the meeting that formed the *Komite Nasional*. Meanwhile, back in Fakfak, he did much to propagate the ideas of the *Komite Nasional*, the use of the *Bintang Kejora* (Morning Star flag) as the national flag, and the principle of Papua's right of self-determination.<sup>101</sup>

However, Tanggahma and Achmad were not the only members of the local political elite, nor were they necessarily the most influential, for in the early 1960s the *Rajas* were still prominent figures in Fakfak. The Dutch had supported the *adat* authority of the *Rajas*, and many of them were members of the local representative councils established by the Dutch. Haji Ibrahim Bauw, the *Raja* of Rumbati, was the most politically active and influential of these leaders. He also had a substantial timber business with markets and business associates in Japan. Like most of his

fellow *Rajas*, Ibrahim Bauw had strong family links in Maluku, and his political involvements straddled the divide between “Papua” and “Indonesia.” Thus, though he was a strong supporter of the *Komite Nasional* and the independence of Papua, he was also the chair of the *Kesatuan Islam Nieuw Guinea* (KING, Muslim Association of New

***in the early 1960s the  
Rajas were still promi-  
nent figures in Fakfak***

Guinea). KING had a mixed Indonesian and Papuan membership, including many of Bauw’s fellow *Raja*, and there was some disquiet among them when Ibrahim Bauw attempted to use KING to promote the Papuan nationalist ideals of the *Komite Nasional*. Papuan and Indonesian

members alike were discomfited by Bauw’s argument that Papuans did not wish to be oppressed by the Indonesians any more than they wanted to be oppressed by the Dutch.<sup>102</sup>

Many of the other *Raja* were pro-Indonesia. One of them, *Raja* Achmad Uswanas of Fatagar, had been an unsuccessful candidate in the elections for the New Guinea Council. Feeling that Papuan voters had held his Ceram family background against him, he let it be known in early 1962 that he intended to leave for Indonesia, allegedly saying that “through his family descent he felt more Indonesian than Papuan.”<sup>103</sup> Another pro-Indonesian was Ismail Bauw, son of the *Raja* of Rumbati. Together with the son of the *Raja* of Fatagar, Ismail Bauw was involved

***the Muslim  
Papuans...were the part  
of Fakfak society that  
faced the most difficult  
choice between compet-  
ing identities***

with the *Gerakan Rakyat Irian Barat* (GRIB, Peoples’ Movement of West Irian), which supported Indonesia’s claim to Papua and sought to improve relations between Indonesians and Papuans.<sup>104</sup> However, the GRIB was not a unified movement. Dutch records reveal that there appears to have been a struggle within the party between the Papuans, who held the formal positions of leadership, and some of the Indonesian members, who wanted a more radical stance in

favor of Indonesia.<sup>105</sup> The support of the Muslim Papuans was the focus of this struggle, for they were the part of Fakfak society that faced the most difficult choice between competing identities. To what extent did they feel themselves Papuans, and to what extent, due to their religious, cultural, and family ties to Maluku, did they feel Indonesian? Indonesians tried to appeal to these historical ties while nationalists appealing to their sense of

being Papuan asked them not to forget the discriminatory treatment they had suffered at the hands of Indonesian officials.

*Satgas Papua, Satgas Merah-Putih, and Laskar Jihad*

Fakfak's cultural, religious, and family ties with central Maluku are still salient today. In 1999 and 2000, Fakfak was one of the few places where both pro- and anti-independence militia developed in the Papuan communities. These were the *Satgas Papua* (Papua Task Force) and the *Satgas Merah-Putih* (Red and White Task Force [red and white being the colors of the Indonesian flag]), respectively. The latter soon developed associations with the *Laskar Jihad*, the Java-based radical Muslim group that became involved in the Christian-Muslim conflict in the Ambonese islands of central Maluku in mid-2000. An ELSHAM report, *Latar Belakang Hadirnya Laskar Jihad Di Fakfak* (The Background of *Laskar Jihad* in Fakfak), explained the emergence of the anti-independence *Satgas Merah-Putih* in terms of the social position of the Fakfak area *Raja* families and their links to Ceram.<sup>106</sup> ELSHAM argued that in the late 1990s the *Raja* families felt their position and privileges were being challenged. They were also concerned that if Papua became independent, Muslim Papuans would be a minority in the new state. ELSHAM asserted that the *Satgas Merah-Putih* was also supported by senior Muslim Papuans in the local government, including Ismail Bauw, who had succeeded his father Ibrahim Bauw as *Raja* of Rumbati.<sup>107</sup> In 2001, after the *Laskar Jihad* had become involved, ELSHAM Coordinator John Rumbiak noted that militants from Ceram were active in both the *Satgas Merah-Putih* and the *Laskar Jihad*, and he speculated that most of the militia being trained in Papua were local Muslims who had family links to Ceram.<sup>108</sup> Ahmad Bauw, the *Satgas Merah Putih-Laskar Jihad* militia leader who was detained by police in January 2002, was one of those who wanted to transform the matter of Papuan independence into a religious issue. He argued that if Papua became independent, it would be a Christian state and the Muslims in Fakfak would be forced to convert to Christianity.<sup>109</sup>

It was the contested nature of Papuan politics in Fakfak, together with the entanglement of religion and politics, that made Fakfak distinct from much of the rest of Papua during the *reformasi* revival of Papuan nationalism. Elsewhere the position of FORERI (and later the *Presidium*), together with that of the pro-independence *Satgas Papua* militia, was relatively unchallenged in Papuan society. In Fakfak, however, the *Satgas Papua* had

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a formidable opponent in the *Satgas Merah Putih*, supported as it was by some local Papuan Muslim leaders. In 2000, both the pro- and anti-independence militias were active and held their training exercises in public as demonstrations of their strength. The political and social tensions generated by the activities of the rival militias were a concern for local government leaders. After a week of activities by the rival militias in July 2000, the head of the local government administration, W. Y. Watken, expressed the hope that people would remember the *Agama Keluarga* (literally, “family religion”), the cultural values of the parents that bound together the children of different faiths. Referring to another part of Indonesia that was then beset by interreligious strife, he said, “We hope that this town will remain peaceful and that we will not suffer like our brothers and sisters in Ambon Town.”<sup>110</sup>

The events surrounding the December 1, 2000, commemoration of Papuan “independence” provides additional insight into the area’s complex political dynamics and into the struggle between the two political groups, each with deep roots in the local community. Concerned that their position in Fakfak not be diminished, the pro-Indonesia leaders of the *Satgas Merah-Putih* militia were not prepared to let the Independence Day commemoration go unopposed, especially since, they claimed, Christian Papuans dominated the pro-independence groups, while Muslim Papuans were not involved (strictly speaking, this claim was not true, as we will see in a moment). They wanted a dialogue between the two Papuan religious communities. In the event, on December 1 the Morning Star flag was flown at dawn for a couple of hours, the police then insisted that it be lowered. During the afternoon of December 1 there were also clashes between the Brimob (Police Mobile Brigade) and pro-independence supporters from a Christian village, Wayati, which left two villagers dead.<sup>111</sup>

Despite their complaints about the Christian complexion of the pro-independence movement, the relationship between religious affiliation and political allegiance is not as straightforward as the anti-independence leaders maintain, for many Muslims and *Rajas* could be counted among the advocates of Papuan independence. Cundradus Bauw, the leader of the pro-independence group *Panel*, was also the head of the *adat* organization representing the Muslim *Raja* around Fakfak. Ismail Bauw, one of the

*Satgas Merah-Putih* leaders, had been another advocate of independence, at least early in the *reformasi* period when he and Cundradus Bauw had been members of the “Team of 100” Papuan leaders who met with President Habibie in February 1999 to demand independence. The *Raja* of Wertuar, Musa Haremba, is yet another Muslim *Raja* who supports Papuan independence. He represents part of Kokas along with a Catholic mountain region west of Pik Pik.<sup>112</sup> In addition, at the level of provincial politics, Thaha Al Hamid, a Muslim Papuan from Fakfak, is Secretary General of the pro-independence *Presidium*.

This brief sketch of Fakfak’s political history and contemporary politics illustrates the lack of a simple correlation between religious belief and political orientation in Papua. Fakfak shows that history and culture can shape the range of political alternatives, but they do not determine the outcomes. The Muslim Papuan community of Fakfak continues to be divided between its Papuan and Indonesian identities. Furthermore, the family cultural and religious networks extending to Maluku have a strong influence on those who feel most loyal to Indonesia, yet for some Muslims in Fakfak, even from the *Raja* families, identification with Papua has been more influential than the historical links with Maluku. The Maluku links have not had the same appeal for the Christian Papuans of the area. Their entrée into the modern world, as for Christians elsewhere in Papua, has been through the churches and through missionary education, and these have been based in Papua itself.

### **Serui – How Indonesia Found a Foothold in Papua, and Then Lost It**

Like Fakfak, Serui has had a long history of interaction with the neighboring islands of Maluku. Also like Fakfak, it was home to the most significant and durable of the pro-Indonesia political groups in Papua during the post war Dutch regime. In Serui, the basis of support for integration with Indonesia rested not on the kind of religious, cultural, and family ties with Indonesia that prevailed in Fakfak, but rather on particular political

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circumstances immediately following the Pacific War, together with the relatively high levels of education and the relatively extensive experience of the outside world that enabled the Papuans in Serui to form identifications and make political choices that were uncommon in the Papua of the time. In the early 1960s, however, Serui experienced a significant decrease in support for Indonesia due to negative local reactions to the resolution of the Indonesia-Netherlands conflict and to Papua's integration into Indonesia. Consequently, during the *reformasi* era revival of Papuan nationalism, the spectrum of political opinion in Serui more closely reflected that of the rest of Papua that had been the case four decades earlier.

Serui's relatively pro-Indonesia stance of earlier years stemmed from a variety of factors. Organized pro-Indonesian activity dates from June 1946, when the Indonesian governor of Sulawesi, Dr. Sam Ratulangi, five of his closest assistants, and the six men's families were exiled to the island of Yapen, off the north coast of Papua. Serui, the main town on the island, was already a center of missionary education and was the site of a teachers college. Prior to the arrival of Ratulangi and his entourage, there appears to have been little political activity in the area. However, in December 1946 the *Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian* (PKII, Indonesian Independence Party in Irian) was established, with the Papuan Silas Papare as its leader and Ratulangi as the patron. The PKII maintained strong support for integration with Indonesia long after Ratulangi had returned to Indonesia.

In early 1947, the Dutch authorities observed that Papuan support for the exiles' pro-Indonesia stance was increasing. Indonesian flags were being flown openly, and the Dutch were being greeted with cries of *Merdeka* (Freedom). J. W. van Eek, a *Controleur* on Yapen, observed that the exiles were able to use their considerable freedom of movement to spread their ideas among the educated sections of the population, thereby awakening desires for independence as part of Indonesia. These educated recruits were then used as cadres to influence traditional leaders in the villages, who in turn used their authority to influence the village communities. In addition, the PKII had supporters working among the local Dutch administration, the police, the post office, the missions, and the local health authorities.<sup>113</sup>

PKII's founding leader, Silas Papare, was an important factor in its success. He was a skilled nurse who had developed a considerable reputation both before and during the Pacific War as an effective mediator between the authorities and his people. During the war he remained loyal to the Allied cause, and the returning Dutch officials recognized that he had a "good war record." Some of his local reputation was based on the story that he had been picked-up by an American flying boat and taken off to work for Dutch intelligence (NEFIS). Then, after returning to Serui, he ran the hospital in the absence of the Dutch doctor. Prior to Ratulangi's arrival, Papare was known for his forthright anti-Indonesian views. In 1946, despite his close relations with Resident van Eechoud and other senior Dutch officials, Papare's reputation as an "*Amberi* [Indonesian] hater" caused him not to be chosen as the Papuan representative at the Malino conference that set up the pro-Dutch "State of East Indonesia,"<sup>114</sup> due to fear that he would alienate the Ambonese whose support was essential to the plan's success. Partly for this reason, Papare developed an intense feeling that his services to the Dutch and Allied causes had not been sufficiently recognized or appreciated. Thus, when Ratulangi arrived in Serui, Papare was already alienated from the Dutch. This, together with his reputation among his people, made Papare, the nurse, an ideal collaborator with Dr. Ratulangi, the medical doctor turned politician. Locally, Papare acquired the status of a messianic figure. In 1949, he had gone to Indonesia after traveling to the Netherlands to attend the Round Table Conference of 1949. However, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, there were great expectations that he would return to Western Papua to solve Serui's problems.<sup>115</sup>

The immediate cause of the rise of the PKII in Serui was, of course, the chance exile of the Ratulangi group and the particular experience of Silas Papare. However, the PKII's early success was not entirely attributable to those chance events. In the late 1940s, Serui was an unusual society in the Papuan context. It had an exposure to the outside world and to foreign ideas that distinguished it from most regions of Papua. For example, it was one of the regions of longest contact with the Dutch. It also had ongoing contacts with Tidore in North Maluku. And, as noted earlier in the discussion of the *Koreri* movement, it was a center of education. With its relatively well-educated population, people from Serui found employment throughout Papua as teachers, missionaries, and officials. The nearby island of Biak shared many of these characteristics and much of the historical

experience, but, in contrast to Serui, the political orientation was initially pro-Dutch and then, in the late 1950s, more pro-Papuan. As noted earlier, there was an intense political rivalry between Serui and Biak. Both societies were well represented in the emerging Papuan elite. However, in the late 1940s, there was an equal possibility of these experiences being a basis for identity with the Indonesian Revolution, and that was exactly what Papare and the PKII were creating in Serui society.

The Dutch authorities were perplexed by Serui and its support for integration with Indonesia. How could it be that a relatively well-educated and privileged Papuan community, in their eyes not very different from neighboring Biak, should be obstinately pro-Indonesian? Ratulangi and his colleagues were sent back to Indonesia in early 1949, and Papare did not return after the Round Table Conference of 1949, except as a member of the Indonesia delegation in the joint 1950 Indonesian-Netherlands Commission investigating Papua's status. Yet Papare and Ratulangi's influence persisted. The PKII was the dominant local party throughout the 1950s and its influence was only challenged in the early 1960s. Such was the Dutch obsession with Serui's pro-Indonesia stance that when, at the time of the New York Agreement, there was some opposition to the Indonesian takeover, the Dutch *Resident* described it as a spectacular *volte-face* of political outlook.<sup>116</sup> Another reflection of the Dutch authorities' pre-occupation with Serui was when Grootenhuis prepared his study of the

***The Dutch authorities were perplexed by Serui and its support for integration with Indonesia***

emerging political elite: he presented his study in two volumes, one on Papua as a whole and one just on Serui. In his explanation of Serui's politics, Grootenhuis looked beyond the chance relationship between Ratulangi and Papare. He looked particularly at Serui's experience during the war, arguing that, in contrast to Biak, in Serui the

Japanese occupation had not been an entirely negative experience. The Japanese authorities had established relatively good relations in Serui, and the locals' comparisons with the pre-war Dutch administration were not unfavorable to the Japanese. The experience of the Japanese occupation in Serui suggested that the Dutch were not the only avenue to modernity and to a favorable position in the outside world. Furthermore, though in Serui there had been some support for the Koreri movement, the Japanese suppression of the movement was not as severe there as it was in Biak. In Grootenhuis' view, the Japanese confirmed the generally positive experience

of Serui's earlier interaction with the outside world and predisposed them to be open to sources of foreign ideas other than the Dutch channels.<sup>117</sup>

As the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia reached its climax in 1961–62, Sukarno's *Trikora* speech pledging to liberate West Irian prompted PKII supporters to prepare themselves to support possible military action by Indonesia. Sukarno's speech heightened tensions among the politically active inhabitants of Serui, with the PKII and other Indonesia loyalists forming one group, and PARNA and other supporters of the government's self-determination policy forming the other. At this time, the older generation of Silas Papare loyalists who dominated the PKII continued to support union with Indonesia, while a younger generation of nationalists (Kirihio, Bonay, and Wayoi) had become the leaders of pro-independence organizations such as PARNA. By December 1961, there was sufficient activity and rumor to prompt the HPB (Hoofd van het Plaatselijk Bestuur, head of the local administration) in Serui to request additional military support to control any disturbances, as there were fears that military conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands would spill over into conflict among the local political groups.<sup>118</sup> In addition, there were rising tensions with Biak, where pro-independence sentiment was stronger than in Serui. Owing to rising political tensions between the two islands, during March and April 1962 the Serui residents of Biak returned home. Many of the returnees had been involved in pro-Indonesia organizations; their "trek" was partly to avoid conflict with the Biak islanders and partly to mobilize support for the potential Indonesian invasion.<sup>119</sup>

The tensions generated by Sukarno's speech and the Serui-Biak conflict were signs that political opinion in Serui was shifting away from the previous strong support for integration with Indonesia. Reflecting the shift in Yapen society against Indonesia, the local councils and some village heads, teachers, and officials came out in opposition to the prospective Indonesian administration.<sup>120</sup> By August 1962, when the New York agreement was signed, anti-Indonesian feeling in at least part of Serui society had consolidated, and support for PARNA's nationalist stance was now more clearly articulated. The Dutch *Resident* reported to Hollandia that in his judgment there had been spectacular *volte-face* of political outlook in Serui.<sup>121</sup> Even within the PKII, there was a new willingness to cooperate

***Sukarno's speech heightened tensions among the politically active inhabitants of Serui***

with the local representative council (*streekraad*) and to recognize the New Guinea Council as representing the peoples of Papua. There were even some within the party who were attracted to the idea of self-determination, though the ultimate objective of integration with Indonesia remained strong.<sup>122</sup> For example, in May 1962, when the Netherlands

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Government formally accepted the Bunker Plan as the basis for negotiations, one group within the PKII supported PARNA's demand for Papuan participation in tripartite negotiations. Yet, among those who remained pro-Indonesia PKII supporters, there was a growing sense of anticipation as the Bunker negotiations progressed and Indonesian paratroop landings increased in frequency and size. In June, one of

these pro-Indonesia leaders told a group of Serui islanders that their support was acknowledged and that they would be given appropriate positions in an Indonesian administration.<sup>123</sup>

The prominence of the younger generation of politicians from Serui in Papuan politics reflected the shifts in political opinion in Serui itself. The checkered careers of Kirihio, Bonay, and Wayoi under the Indonesian administration influenced opinion in Serui itself. Kirihio, Bonay, and Wayoi were important figures in the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule. They were Papuan nationalists, but they were also pragmatists. They recognized earlier than many of their contemporaries that the dispute was likely to be resolved in Indonesia's favor. As we have seen in Part I, Bonay recognized that Indonesia had to be involved in any resolution, while Fritz Kirihio caused great controversy among his colleagues by visiting Indonesia at Sukarno's invitation in January 1962 in the belief that if there was military conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands, Papuans would be the ones to suffer (Chauvel 2003: 35–36).

The three PARNA leaders' political experience, standing in Papuan society and willingness to cooperate with the Indonesians meant that they were offered positions in the administration. However, their background as nationalists brought them into conflict with the authorities. Bonay was appointed the first Governor and Wayoi and Kirihio held important positions. Bonay's tenure as Governor was brief. He was a political prisoner before he went into exile. Wayoi was a member of the DPRD-GR (Provincial Parliament) that was disbanded in 1968 because it was critical

of the method Indonesia proposed to use in the “Act of Free Choice.” This study has made extensive use of Bonay and Wayoi’s writings as well as interviews with Kiriho to trace the development of Papuan nationalist thinking. The three of them reflect a much broader pattern of change among the elite in its relations with Indonesia—from cooperation to alienation.<sup>124</sup>

Floyd Whittington, the Counselor from the American Embassy, observed the transition in Papua over the first fifteen months of Indonesian rule. A small handful of Papuan leaders had loudly welcomed Indonesian rule, while most of the politically aware reserved judgment. By August 1964, most Papuan opinion had turned violently against the Indonesians.<sup>125</sup> Bonay, Wayoi, and Kiriho had not been among those who had loudly welcomed the Indonesians, but they had been prepared to accept high profile positions in the administration. They were among the Papuans with whom Whittington had contact, and his general observation also reflects their disenchantment with Indonesia. Serui was not an exception to Whittington’s observation of a stiffening in opposition to Indonesia. Indeed, the reaction against Indonesia might have been more intense in Serui, because, as noted earlier, PKII leaders in Serui had hoped that their support would be rewarded with positions in the Indonesian administration, a hope that was largely unfulfilled. As discussed in Part I, Indonesia’s conduct of the “Act of Free Choice” was central in the development of Papuan nationalism and Papua’s alienation from Indonesia. Nearly forty years later, Kiriho considered that this factor was the turning point in Serui’s relationship with Indonesia.

Serui’s significance in the history of Papuan nationalism and the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule lies both in the prominence of many Serui leaders in Papua’s politics and in Serui’s transformation from being a stronghold of pro-Indonesia sentiment (from the late 1940s through the early 1960s) to its adoption of a predominantly anti-Indonesian position, a position not much different from that of most of the rest of Papua. The shift of opinion in Serui was first evident at the height of the Netherlands-Indonesia conflict. Its increasing alienation continued with the experience of Indonesian rule during the 1960s. As with many other regions in Papua, it was Indonesia’s conduct of the “Act of Free Choice” that is remembered as a symbolic turning point in the development of Papuan nationalism among the residents of Serui.

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## PART IV – Threat of Partition and Prospects of Nationalism

### The Threat of Partition

Despite the strong and clear expression of Papuan identity and demands for independence since Suharto, regional diversity and local interests have remained strong in Papua. The ability of the *Presidium* to establish a province-wide organization in 2000 suggested that the sort of regional differences discussed in the cases of Serui and Fakfak had become less significant than they had been in the 1960s. The strength of the *Presidium's* support in regions like the highlands, where there had been little participation

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in the first phase of Papuan nationalism in the early 1960s, gave the impression that Papuan identity had spread and consolidated under Indonesian rule, not least as a Papuan response to Indonesia's heavy reliance on violence to maintain its authority in the province. However,

though this was true, the pattern of Papuan politics since the central government's decision in early 2003 to divide the province indicates that local, regional and ethno-linguistic differences are still critical.

The decision to divide the province actually preceded the enactment of the Special Autonomy Law of 2001. In 1999, partly in response to the "Team 100's" demand for independence, the Indonesian government had enacted Law 45/99 (UU 45/99), which created additional provinces and districts in Papua, claiming that doing so would enable the government to improve the provision of services across the territory. The law's promulgation sparked widespread protests in Papua, and in response the government backed off from implementing the law, which most of the Papuan elite later assumed had been superseded by the Special Autonomy Law of 2001 (21/2001) (see Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004: 37–39; McGibbon 2004a: 10–11). However, the law was never formally revoked, and by late 2002 Papuan legislators seemed aware that President Megawati was contemplating a new effort at implementation. Again they attempted to oppose the move (Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004: 37), but this time they did so to no avail, for in January 2003 Megawati issued an instruction (*Inpres* 1/2003) to accelerate the implementation of the 1999 Law (UU 45/99), thereby creating the new provinces of West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya (the easternmost province, administered from

Jayapura, which would still be known as Irian Jaya).<sup>126</sup>

The decision to implement UU 45/99 has created confusion and political violence in Papua. The most severe occurrences were a clash between pro- and anti-partition Papuans and another between anti-partition Papuans and pro-partition non-Papuans, both of which occurred in August 2003 in Timika, about the time of the attempted inauguration of the province of Central Irian Jaya.<sup>127</sup> Timika had been designated as the prospective capital of the province. Following the violence in Timika, the central government put on hold the establishment of the new province. Still, the political jockeying continued. In April and May 2004, there was a concerted campaign from a section of Biak society to have the province of Central Irian Jaya established with its capital in Biak. The pro-partition group in Biak sought to persuade the government that Biak was a more suitable capital than Timika and that Admiral Henk Wabiser, himself from Biak, should be appointed as acting Governor.<sup>128</sup>

Partition created a new regional dynamic in Papuan politics. Three patterns are discernable in the responses to partition from regional Papua. Firstly, there was some local Papuan support for the new provinces that Jakarta wanted to create, particularly in the centers that the government had selected as the capitals of the new provinces. Secondly, there were demands for still more provinces or different provinces to be established other than the ones the government had proposed. For example, in February 2003, highlanders from Pucak Jaya, Jayawijaya, Paniai, and Nabire demonstrated in Jayapura in support of the establishment of a province of Central Irian Jaya, based in the highlands.<sup>129</sup> The district heads (*bupati*) of Merauke, Yapen-Waropen, and Fakfak wanted their own districts to become new provinces (in addition to the three proposed by Jakarta). Thirdly, there were those regional leaders, as we have seen in Biak, who supported the creation of one of the government's new provinces, provided that their own district became the new province's capital. As in Biak, the leaders in Nabire considered their town a more appropriate capital than Timika for the government's province of Central Irian Jaya.<sup>130</sup>

The Government's decision to partition Papua into three provinces poses a particular challenge to Papuan nationalists and tests the strength of pan-Papuan identity. With partition there would no longer be one provincial government that can claim legitimacy to speak on behalf of all of

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Papuan politics***

Papua. The regional autonomy policy framework, particularly the central government's power to change the boundaries of both provinces and districts, as happened with the partition of Papua into three provinces, is a powerful weapon in Jakarta's hands, as it has the capacity to devolve decision-making authority and resources to elites at various levels of society. From the central government's perspective, the Special Autonomy Law of 2001 risked empowering a Papuan elite in Jayapura that it did not trust. By creating new provinces, Jakarta could choose to patronize local Papuan elites other than the ones in control of the existing provincial government in Jayapura.

The partition decision changed the focus of political debate among Papuans. Previously, they had been debating whether the best course was independence or autonomy. Now, even some of the advocates of independence were defending the Special Autonomy Law as preferable to partition. Advocates of the Special Autonomy Law argued that much that Papuans wanted from independence could be achieved through autonomy. The threat of partition prompted many of pro-independence supporters (who were also critics of the Special Autonomy Law) to demand that the government implement Special Autonomy. This is not to suggest that the advocates of independence had abandoned their ideals; rather, they regarded the autonomy law as far preferable to partition. The Special Autonomy Law did much to strengthen Papuan identity and facilitated Papuan control of the provincial government. Partition was seen as a divide and rule strategy that threatened Papuan identity and political solidarity. Even the *Presidium*, a public opponent of Special Autonomy before the partition decision, criticized the partition as unconstitutional and inconsistent with the Special Autonomy Law. The *Presidium* has had difficult political gymnastics to perform. It could not directly abandon its public advocacy of independence and embrace autonomy. However, its leaders recognized, at least in private, that there was much in the Special Autonomy Law that could enhance Papuan welfare and Papuans' control over their society. The *Presidium* understood that partition was a threat to the nationalist values they shared with the advocates of the Special Autonomy Law. Defending Special Autonomy did not mean abandoning independence; it was, rather, to be seen as a step in the right direction. In line with this reasoning, Thaha Mohammad Alhamid, the *Presidium's* secretary general, demanded that the government hold a referendum on whether the Papuan people wanted autonomy or partition. Otherwise,

Thaha argued, the Presidential decision should be revoked.<sup>131</sup>

The strength of support for partition in Papua's various regions is difficult to assess, but it is sufficient to suggest that pan-Papuan solidarity is not robust enough to counter the financial rewards and political status that partition provides. This is not to suggest that the supporters of the new provinces consider themselves any less "Papuan," yet they are willing to engage with the central government in a manner different from those advocates of the Special Autonomy Law who dominate the provincial government in Jayapura. Clearly, a region's prior stance on independence is not a good predictor of its stance on partition. For example, while the existence of pro-Indonesia sentiment in areas like

Fakfak might have been expected to make them relatively open to the proposal, that was not the case with Biak, which had been a center first of pro-Dutch, and then of Papuan nationalist, sentiment. In 1998, Biak was the site of the most significant of the pro-independence demonstrations, yet now it was jockeying for position in the new provincial arrangements. Similar issues pertain to Manokwari, which was the base of OPM

activities in the 1960s yet also expressed some support for partition. Access to the resources and position that partition offers can be attractive to those members of the Papuan elite who are out of power in Jayapura. Nevertheless, the interest in new provinces that has been expressed in places like Fakfak, Merauke, Serui, Biak, Nabire, and the highlands has been conditional on those locales becoming the administrative centers. Thus, at least on this one issue, pragmatic considerations seem to weigh more heavily than the desire to maintain Papuan solidarity vis-à-vis "Jakarta."

The Papuan responses to the threat of partition raise critical questions about both the relations between levels of government and relations between provincial and local elites in Papua. If, for example, the 2001 Special Autonomy Law was implemented, how could decision-making power and revenue be devolved to the regions in Papua in a way that could meet the local interests that have been expressed so clearly in the responses to the government's partition decision? Thus far, the political debate in Papua has not addressed this issue. In December 2003, the Provincial Parliament in Jayapura attempted to facilitate a discussion on the issues of

***pan-Papuan solidarity is not robust enough to counter the financial rewards and political status that partition provides***

autonomy and partition by holding a two-day meeting called *Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum* (RDPU, Meeting to Hear Public Opinion).<sup>132</sup> The meeting was a response to the violence and tensions within Papua generated by the central government's determination to divide the province, particularly the violence in Timika some four months earlier. The meeting was attended by an enthusiastic gathering of around a thousand people, but was avoided by the proponents of partition and also lacked the formal representation of the district administrations.<sup>133</sup> The meeting urged that the Indonesian government immediately implement the Special Autonomy Law (UU 21/2002) and demanded that it revoke the Presidential Instruction 1/2003 and the 1999 Law (45/1999) to divide Papua into three provinces.

Prior to the meeting, John Ibo, the pro-Special Autonomy speaker of the Provincial Parliament, was reported to have said that he saw its objective as one of reconciliation among the political elite, community leaders, and Papuan society over the issues of Special Autonomy and partition.<sup>134</sup> Ibo asserted that if there were two rival political elites, one pro-partition and the other pro-autonomy, the unity required to develop Papua would not exist. He argued that since Papua had more than 300 ethno-linguistic groups, its citizens had to be united, mutually understanding, and mutually supportive in order to overcome the problems of poverty, backwardness, and ignorance. Papua's problems could only be overcome by Papuans and Papuans could not be dependent on the central government. Ibo said that the leaders of the Provincial Parliament hoped the proponents of partition would attend, so they could explain their reasons for supporting partition rather than Special Autonomy. However, as we have just seen, the leading supporters of partition did not attend the meeting, nor was there formal representation of the district administrations.<sup>135</sup> Thus, though the pro-Special Autonomy and anti-partition views expressed at the meeting might reflect a consensus of elite opinion in Jayapura, they did not necessarily represent the views of Papuan politicians and officials in the regions outside Jayapura, who, as we have seen, have been jockeying for advantage in the prospective system of devolved provincial authority.

### **The Expanding Base of Papuan Nationalism**

Despite the December 2003 organization of the "Meeting to Hear Public Opinion," in recent years the expression of pro-independence and anti-Indonesian political ideas that marked the "Papuan Spring" of 1998-2000

has become subdued. At the time of writing, the public expression of Papuan nationalism and the mobilization of support for independence were for the most part greatly restricted due to countermeasures taken by the Indonesian government. Papuan leaders, including those holding senior positions in the administration, were now under considerable scrutiny and pressure. In addition, the prospective division of the province was testing the strength of pan-Papuan identity and political solidarity. The relatively open political space created during the “Papuan Spring” seemed like another country.

Nevertheless, beneath the surface, Papuan identity and commitment to independence remains stronger and more widespread than it was in 1961 and 1962. Those involved in the 1961 movement had been drawn primarily from a small elite that had been educated, politicized, and employed in the urban centers of Netherlands New Guinea. From the perspective of today, they were the pioneers of Papuan nationalism. Coming from diverse regional and ethnic backgrounds, they were the first to articulate an identity as Papuans. Yet they were a relatively restricted core of activists. When the *Komite Nasional* issued its *Manifest* and the New Guinea Council agreed that the Morning Star flag should be displayed as the symbol of Papua, many of the elites outside Hollandia were dismayed. They felt that they had not been informed and that the decisions of the *Komite Nasional* and the Council had been imposed upon them (van der Veur 1963: 65). The restricted nature of the nationalism of the time can be seen furthermore in the local reactions to the flag raisings of 1961, which appeared to have meaning only for the elites of the towns. For example, the Dutch *Controleur* of Mimika, in the Residency of Fakfak, reported that the flag raising ceremony there had attracted some interest but little understanding among the local population, who had only a vague idea of what the word “Papuan” meant. At that time, most people thought not in terms of Papua, but in terms of locality and region. It was being part of Mimika that had meaning.<sup>136</sup> Consequently, when in late 1962, during the first days of the UNTEA administration, Indonesian officials first came into direct contact with Papuan nationalists, they found that they posed much less of a threat to their authority than anticipated. Indonesia had planned on having to employ a high degree of military repression and had also made provision for political indoctrination, but during the UNTEA administration it quickly realized that these measures would not be necessary, as for the most part the nationalists had failed to

develop an organized mass opposition to its rule.<sup>137</sup>

Today, the sense of Papuan identity has a much broader base and involves a wider range of people than it did in 1961. After the *Kongres Papua* in mid 2000, a Department of Internal Affairs intelligence document observed that even at the village level the atmosphere was one of euphoria and enthusiasm about *Merdeka* (independence). The “conspiratorial groups” supporting *Merdeka* were increasingly cohesive and were endeavoring to “socialize” the results of the *Kongres* throughout Papua.<sup>138</sup> The broadened base of Papuan nationalism was especially evident in the increased awareness and activism of Papua’s highlanders. As of 1961, much

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of the densely populated highlands had only recently been brought under Dutch administration, if they were under Dutch control at all. But in 2000 the process of “socialization” was intensive and far-reaching. An example of this can be seen in the participation of delegates from Wamena, in the Baliem Valley. These delegates from Wamena made a mark at the *Kongres Papua*, not only because of their traditional attire, but because many of them had walked the 300 km to

Jayapura for the occasion. One of these delegates told the *Kongres*, “I was born naked and brought up naked. I walked here from the highlands to the coast. Some of you came by planes and boats. I walked on my own two feet. I just want independence.”<sup>139</sup> Back home in the Wamena area, senior members of the *Presidium* as well as local leaders worked to propagate the results of the *Kongres*, holding mass gatherings and giving inspiring and often emotional speeches. As another report observed, “The element that most of all found a place in the hearts of people of the Baliem [Valley] and Papua in general was that the demand for independence was non-negotiable.”<sup>140</sup>

### **Nationalism’s Roots in History and Circumstance**

Papuan nationalism is young, dynamic, and flexible. This study has shown that Papuan nationalist discourse about history, particularly the history of Papua’s integration into Indonesia, has been influenced both by contemporary political circumstances and by the history that it interprets. The Papuans’ resentment about being objects rather than participants in the struggle for decolonization reflects Kelly and Kaplan’s point about the top-down process of decolonization—decolonizing without the colonized

(Kelly and Kaplan 2001: 9–10). Yet, though decolonization has denied Papuans their own nation state, it has also provided a set of principles and a language with which Papuans argue their case for an independent state today. The principle of self-determination and how the principle was not upheld in Indonesia's conduct of the "Act of Free Choice" have become the centerpieces of Papuan nationalism. This rhetoric best illustrates the manner in which Papuans have used the language and principles of decolonization. There has been remarkable consistency, in both language and ideas, in the way Papuans have endeavored to argue their case for an independent state, beginning from the *Manifest Politik* of 1961 and continuing through Jouwe's international lobbying campaign of the 1960s and 1970s to Tom Beanal's 1999 demand that Indonesia recognize Papua's independence. The detailed recollection by Papuans of the self-determination provisions of the New York Agreement, which the US Counsel remarked on in 1964, is still in evidence four decades later.

That Papuans should have developed a pan-Papuan identity separate from an Indonesian one was not a foregone conclusion, for ever since the Pacific War Papuans have been confronted by a number of alternate visions of their future. Indeed some Papuans did support Indonesian visions of a future. In Serui, for example, many Papuans, influenced by the work of Ratulangi, were once attracted to the idea of Papua being part of an independent Indonesia. That ideal also found Papuan supporters in Hollandia, especially among the students at the training school who had been influenced by the Indonesian nationalist Soegoro, the head teacher. It is not without irony that Soegoro's school was established as the vehicle for an alternative Dutch vision of a future Papua independent of Indonesia. Soegoro and the school's founder, Resident van Eechoud, were offering the Papuan students alternative and competing visions. Soegoro envisaged Papua as part of an independent Indonesia. Van Eechoud thought that Papua's future was as a Melanesian society separate from Indonesia. As we have seen, van Eechoud's vision found support in his students' experience of Netherlands New Guinea's curious system of dual colonialism. From the 1940s, Papuans made choices between the Indonesian

*The principle of self-determination and how the principle was not upheld in Indonesia's conduct of the "Act of Free Choice" have become the centerpieces of Papuan nationalism*

and the Dutch visions of the future. It has been argued in this paper that it was in the context of the struggle between the Netherlands and Indonesia

***That Papuans should have developed a pan-Papuan identity separate from an Indonesian one was not a foregone conclusion***

in the early 1960s that Papuans, many of them graduates of the Dutch schools, fashioned their own national ideals, in part in response to the resentment they felt that their future was being determined by others.

The paper used regional case studies of Serui and Fakfak with references to Biak and the Korowai to discuss the different ways Papuans have negotiated the competing identities and political visions of their future. Closely intertwined was the process through which the territory's diverse peoples have come to think of themselves as Papuans, in addition to being members of local ethno-linguistic communities. Serui was notable in the immediate postwar years for the choice many of its people made in favor of integration with Indonesia. The paper shows how the political choices made in Serui changed to a more anti-Indonesian position during the 1960s, in response to the resolution of the Indonesia-Netherlands dispute and the subsequent experience of Indonesian rule. As for Fakfak, central to the choices Papuans made there was the region's religious, kin, and trade relationships with the neighboring islands of Maluku. The indigenous Muslim communities in Fakfak have negotiated between alternative Papuan and Maluku / Indonesian identities. The question remains whether they have

***Identity, especially for Muslim Papuans, remains...highly contested in Fakfak***

felt closer to their kin and fellow religionists in central Maluku rather than with the Christians in Fakfak and with Papuans elsewhere in the territory. Identity, especially for Muslim Papuans, remains highly contested in Fakfak. The discussion of Serui, Fakfak, the Korowai, and Biak has provided insight into the process of "becoming

Papuan." It also illustrates how this process has been taking place in different times and contexts over the past six decades, beginning with those Biaks involved in the Koreri movement of the 1930s and 1940s and continuing more recently with relatively isolated communities such as the Korowai. The divergent Papuan responses to the government's decision to divide Papua into three provinces suggest that the evolution of a politically salient pan-Papuan identity remains a work in progress, somewhat, and

sometimes, in contrast to the sharp distinctions drawn between Papuans and Indonesians.

Indonesia's victory over the Dutch in 1962 and its subsequent ability to enforce its authority in Papua together with the many shifts in government policy have changed the parameters in which Papuans have made a choice between Indonesian and Papuan futures. Indonesian rule has meant that these political choices for elite Papuans have been decisions of far reaching consequences for their own and their family's security, education, and employment prospects. Few members of the elite made the decision to go to the bush and join the OPM struggle against Indonesian rule, however much they might have identified with the ideal of independence. It has also been the case that there have always been Papuans who have been willing to accept senior positions in the Indonesian administration. Some of them, like Bonay and Wayoi in the 1960s, and many of the senior government officials in Jayapura today, have been nationalists. In some cases, this has meant that their tenure has been brief, while in others it has meant that the office holders have not been trusted by the authorities in Jakarta. The seemingly dual and shifting allegiances of the many Papuan nationalists who have worked as senior Indonesian officials can perhaps be symbolized by Filip Karma, leader of the 1998 Biak demonstration and a senior civil servant. In late 2000 the author saw him in Jayapura dressed in conventional Indonesian bureaucratic attire, yet with a large Papuan flag pinned on his chest.<sup>141</sup> As indicated by this display, the means that Indonesia used to maintain its authority did much to consolidate pan-Papuan identity and Papuans' commitment to independence. As a result, when the *reformasi* of the late 1990s again allowed open expression of dissent, Papuan nationalism turned out to have developed broader and deeper roots. The success with which the *reformasi* era nationalists mobilized support throughout Papua is a measure of the growth and spread of Papuan identity in the intervening decades. Thus it was that during the "Papuan Spring" of 1998–2000, the debate among Papuans was not simply a debate between a Papuan future and an Indonesian one. Rather, it had become a more specific one between forms of greater Papuan control over their own land, that is, between either independence from or greater autonomy within Indonesia. Since the government's recent decision to divide Papua into three provinces, the debate appears to have shifted yet again to a choice between partition and the full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law. Yet, despite the current limited space for the

expression of nationalist values and political mobilization, the commitment to independence remains strong, as illustrated by a joke that was circulating in Jakarta and Jayapura in early 2004. In a jibe at Jakarta, some optimistic and defiant Papuans had reinterpreted OPM to mean *Otonomi* (autonomy), then *Pemekeran* (partition), to be followed by *Merdeka* (inde-

pendence) (You [the government] have offered us autonomy, then partitioned us, but we will be independent in the end).<sup>142</sup>

*the commitment  
to independence  
remains strong*

In its investigation of the “pedigrees,” or inheritances, of Papuan nationalism, this study has outlined three factors contributing to its current emphases. All three inheritances relate to the ways relations between Papuans and Indonesians have evolved. Firstly, many Papuans share a historical grievance about the integration of their homeland into Indonesia. They considered the advent of the Indonesian administration to have happened against their expressed wishes and without their participation, and they regard the “Act of Free Choice” as a fraud. Secondly, the curious “dual colonialism” of Netherlands New Guinea, followed by the Dutch policies of Papuan political advancement and papuanization of the administration, and then followed still later by the de-papuanization of administration under Indonesian rule, have over time created an intense rivalry between the Papuan elite and Indonesian officials, with the Papuan competitors in this competition becoming the principal formulators and articulators of Papuan nationalism. Thirdly, the demographic transformation of society in Papua, especially the great influx of Indonesian settlers, has engendered a widespread feeling that Papuans have been dispossessed and marginalized in their own land. That Papuans face extinction is an extreme but by no means uncommon expression of this conviction.

**Future Prospects**

The beginning of this study posed the question: Are there changes that can be made in Indonesian government policy so as to accommodate Papuans’ interests and values well enough to encourage them to accept a future within the Indonesian state? Some Papuan leaders do conceive of this possibility. For example, former governor Barnabas Suebu, an advocate of Special Autonomy, is also open to the possibility of an Indonesian future. He has likened Papua’s integration with Indonesia to a forced marriage, with the “Act of Free Choice” being the marriage ceremony. Like it or not,

that's history, and it cannot be changed. However, he argues, it is often the case with forced marriages that if life at home is good and harmonious, and if the reluctant bride is happy, she will forget that she was forced into the marriage. If the wife is happy, why would she want to divorce? For Barnabas Suebu, Special Autonomy offered the prospect of marital harmony and Papuan acceptance of the marriage. But the future of Special Autonomy is uncertain, and Papuans don't know what the future will bring. Though the Special Autonomy Law still exists, the problem is Jakarta's intentions.<sup>143</sup>

*But the future of  
Special Autonomy  
is uncertain*

Barnabas Suebu's sentiments reflect something of the flexibility and adaptability this study has identified in Papuan nationalist thinking. The Papuan participation in the formulation of the Special Autonomy Law, particularly the manner in which Papuans imbued the law with Papuan ideals and interests, suggested that the Papuan ideals of *Merdeka* could be accommodated within the Indonesian state. However, even if the law were implemented effectively, Barnabas Suebu and his fellow elite supporters of the Special Autonomy Law would still face a great challenge in convincing their more skeptical compatriots that the government's commitment to Special Autonomy is to be believed this time and that the Law will create a political system that is an acceptable alternative to independence from Indonesia. Indeed, the enactment, of the Special Autonomy Law, followed by the failure to implement it, confirmed for many Papuans their deep-seated distrust of Jakarta's promises and intentions. In the Papuan interpretation of the past four decades of Indonesian rule, the failure to implement the Special Autonomy Law was but the most recent example of Jakarta's empty and unfulfilled promises. When the Special Autonomy was being debated, the question was often asked: Why should we believe Jakarta now? The issue is one of trust, and whether and how it can be restored.

However, this challenge has not yet been confronted, because the central government has not implemented the Special Autonomy Law. Indeed, with the partition of Papua, the central government has sought to undermine Special Autonomy. As noted earlier, the Special Autonomy Law offended deeply held Indonesian nationalist values and would have involved the devolution of decision-making powers and revenue to a Papuan elite in Jayapura that many in the central government did not trust (also see Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004). Whether there is a form

of autonomy that would be acceptable to nationalists in Jakarta, while also having credibility in Papua as an acceptable alternative to independence, is not clear. The securing and retention of Indonesian sovereignty in Papua has been an objective that all governments in Jakarta have shared, and the commitment to that objective has increased since the separation of East Timor. Consequently, it is difficult for governments in Jakarta to make the accommodations necessary to render the forced marriage acceptable. In reaction to this Indonesian determination to retain control, Papuans have channeled the range of ideals encompassed by *Merdeka*, a concept that some feel could be realized in the context of autonomy, into the straightforward demand for a separate nation state. This focus on a struggle for independence appears to have inhibited Papuan leaders from separating their numerous disenfranchisements and impotencies from the nature of Indonesian rule and the struggle for independence. It is possible that some of the disenfranchisements and impotencies—poverty, ignorance, political repression, and abuse of human rights—could be addressed within the Indonesian state, and it is also possible that some of them would still not be overcome even if Papua were independent.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election as President has created another chance for Indonesia to grasp the historic opportunity created by the Special Autonomy Law. Some of the new President's statements suggest that he has a preference for political rather than military solutions and accommodation rather than repression.<sup>144</sup> The President has expressed to Papuan leaders a commitment to implement Special Autonomy and review the government's decision to divide Papua into three provinces.<sup>145</sup> In the first concrete step toward this commitment, on December 22, 2004, he signed a Presidential decree for the establishment of the Papuan People's Council (MRP, Majelis Rakyat Papua), the institutional centerpiece of Special Autonomy.<sup>146</sup> If the President continues to follow through on these commitments, there will be a strong possibility of reopening the dialogue so sought after by Papuans.

# Endnotes

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1. The name of Indonesia's easternmost province has been a matter of political dispute since the 1940s. The official Dutch name was Netherlands New Guinea (Nederlands Nieuw Guinea). Most Papuans preferred Papua, and in 1961 the Dutch agreed with the National Committee's request that the name should be West Papua. However, Indonesians and Pro-Indonesia Papuans preferred the term Irian, and when administration devolved to the Indonesians in 1963 the former Dutch colony became known as West Irian. In 1973, the Indonesian government officially changed the name from West Irian to Irian Jaya. Papuans had continued to prefer the name Papua, however, and in 2000 President Abdurrahman Wahid gave his blessing to the notion of making Papua the name of the province. The following year, with enactment of the Special Autonomy Law in 2001, Papua became the official name. The Presidential Instruction No. 1/2003 on the partition of the province reverted to Irian Jaya, but, reflecting the policy confusion in Jakarta, both Papua and Irian Jaya are used in official publications and in the mass media. In this paper, the author uses the various nomenclatures as appropriate to the context. Anthony Smith notes that a collective proper name is an essential marker of nationhood (Smith 2002: 17). That the name of the territory should be contested by Papuan nationalists and successive Indonesian governments underlines the contested nature of Papuan nationhood. For a more detailed discussion of the politics surrounding the name, see Mote and Rutherford (2001: 120–121); also Chauvel (2003: 3–4).
2. The percentages come from McGibbon (2004b), who also notes that the three largest groups, the highland Lani, the highland Dani/Ndani, and the coastal Biaks, each have populations of about 150,000. The 2000 Population Census found that the population of Papua was 2,233,530, of whom 1,460,843 were Papuans and 772,684 were non-Papuans. *Tifa Papua*, Minggu ketiga Mei 2002, p. 5.
3. Indonesian government policies and attitudes toward Papua are discussed in Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (2004).

4. Fritz Kiriho has accredited Thaha Al Hamid, the *Presidium* Secretary General, with the idea of *Perlurusan Sejarah* (“Correcting the course of Papuan History”). Interview, Fritz Kiriho, Jakarta, July 5, 2003.
5. I am indebted to Danilyn Rutherford for this observation.
6. According to David Webster (2001: 507–28), this flag raising was the “foundational moment” for Papuan nationalism.
7. Though it was not the first of the *reformasi*-era nationalist organizations, the *Presidium Dewan Papua* quickly became the foremost organization advocating independence. The late Theys Eluay was its best known leader. The *Presidium* developed out of an earlier movement known as FORERI (Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya, Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya), which had been a more broadly based coalition of Church, *adat*, and NGO leaders. The *Kongres Papua* was dubbed the “Second” Congress, because the first had taken place in October 1961. That earlier congress is described later in the present section.
8. Resolusi, Kongres Papua, Port Numbay (Jayapura), June 4, 2000. The UN resolution was actually passed on November 19, 1969.
9. The ratification was issued by a congress of 1,025 carefully selected representatives. As discussed below, this act has long been criticized by Papuan nationalists.
10. The three books edited by Agus Alua (2002a, 2002b, 2002c) are collections of documents recording developments from the founding of FORERI in mid 1998 to the Papuan Congress held in mid 2000. They were published by the *Presidium Dewan Papua* in its series on Papuan political education.
11. PARNA sought to unite all Papuans, develop a Papuan identity, and achieve independence within 10 years. See van der Veur (1963: 62, 64).
12. This assertion was made even though, a year earlier, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (1998) had already denied the existence of the “Rome Agreement,” stating that there had been no agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia concerning Irian Jaya apart from the New York Agreement.
13. Alua (2002a: 51). Some of Tom Beanal’s language reflects that used in the 1961 *Manifest Politik*, which is discussed below. Copies of *Manifest Politik* were still in circulation, and the following year photocopies would be distributed at the 2000 celebration of the anniversary of the first flag raising.
14. The idea that Papua had once been independent and that the nationalist movement was struggling to reclaim it was not new in Papuan thinking, although 1961 had not always played such a central role in the account. E. J. Bonay, in his history of the Papuan national awakening, argues that Papuans were independent before the foreign colonizers arrived in the eighteenth century. The foreign colonizers repressed the Papuans and deprived them of their liberty. The struggle of the Papuan people has been to recapture their right of independence, taken from them first by the Dutch imperialists and now by Indonesia (Bonay c1980s: Bab 1, 1).
15. Viktor Kaisiepo is the son of Markus Kaisiepo, one of the leading members of the first generation of Papuan nationalists and a man whose ideas and activities are discussed below.

16. Viktor Kaisiepo's assertion that even the animals, plants, and stones are members of the OPM is cited in Kirksey (2003). The OPM was an armed Papuan resistance movement that was established in 1965 and issued its own declaration of independence in 1971. The movement's place in nationalist historiography is discussed below.
17. Hasil Rapat Lengkap Presidium Dewan Papua, April 16–18, 2000, Jayapura, [www.kabar-irian.com](http://www.kabar-irian.com).
18. "Theys Imbau Warga Pendatang Tetap Tenang," *Kompas*, October 11, 2000.
19. Alua (2002b: 68–69). The Presidium overstates the case, as some Papuans indeed participated in Indonesia's struggle for independence, though their participation was not extensive. See Chauvel (2003: 10–13).
20. Interview, Fritz Kirihiio, Jakarta, July 5, 2003.
21. Bonay (c1980s: 58). Bonay was the governor at the time. According to Bonay, this event, together with the destruction of the monument marking the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Hollandia (Jayapura), was a great insult that contributed to the development of Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule.
22. Interview, Fritz Kirihiio, Jakarta, July 5, 2003.
23. Another 1960s activist who recognized that the 1961 flag raising was not a proclamation of independence was Herman Wayoi. He recalled debates at the time over whether it was appropriate to have a national flag when there was not yet a sovereign state. In his view, the notion that the flag raising constituted a proclamation of independence was a reinterpretation that developed in 1999 (Interview, Herman Wayoi, Abepura, November 15, 2000). A similar assertion was made in an interview, conducted in Jayapura on April 10, 2004, by a retired senior Papuan official who had been active in the Dutch and Indonesian administrations. This official said that there had been no independence proclamation on December 1, 1961; and that the flag raising had simply been meant to lay the foundations for later independence (*Proklamsi belum, tapi Rumah Papua berdiri*).
24. Interview, Retired senior Papuan official, Jayapura, April 10, 2004; Interview, Agus Alua, Abepura, April 10, 2004. Fritz Kirihiio was another who asserted that the 1961 flag raising had greater legitimacy, though he also noted the OPM proclamation of July 1, 1971.
25. OPM was not the only Papuan resistance organization active between 1963 and *reformasi*, but for many Papuans it was the primary bearer of the nationalist ideals. Other resistance organizations, most of them now forgotten, included GENAPA (*Gerakan Nasionalis Papua*, the Papuan Nationalist Organization) and *Front Nasional Pemilihan Keluar Republik Indonesia* (National Front Electing Separation from Indonesia), both of which the Indonesian authorities often confused with the OPM itself (See Hindom n.d., Osborne 1985).
26. Of the five individuals mentioned, two were churchmen, one a politician, one a civil servant, and one an academic.
27. In January 1996, 12 members of a joint European-Indonesian scientific expedition were kidnapped for over four months by an OPM group led by Kelly Kwalik. On May 9, two Indonesian members of the expedition were killed in the course of a rescue attempt. Details are from the document "Summary and Conclusions of the Investigation into the Events of May 9, 1996, in Western Papua," entrusted by the ICRC to an Outside Consultant, March 15, 2000, cited in *Memoria* (2001: 82–83).

28. The New Guinea Council was formed in early 1961 as part of the Dutch decolonization program. All but a few of its members were Papuans. The Council had 28 members, 16 of whom were elected by a combination of direct and indirect mechanisms.
29. Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de Maanden august-september 1961, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA.
30. Interview, Nicholaas Jouwe, The Hague, December 5, 2001.
31. Details from Monthly Report—Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea—October 1961, DEA file 3036/1/1/1, CRS A1838, National Archives of Australia, hereafter NAA.
32. “Manifest Politik,” Hollandia, October 19, 1961, *Pengantara: het nieuwsblad voor nederlands-nieuw-guinea*, October 21, 1961; Politiek Leven over Oktober 1961, Hollandia, November 28, 1961, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA. The *Bintang Kejora* was chosen as the national flag from three designs. The *Hai Tanahku Papua* was composed by the Dutch missionary Kijne in 1925.
33. Nieuw Guinea Raad Handelingen (New Guinea Council Hansard, hereafter NGR Handelingen), October 30, 1961, pp 13–18.
34. NGR Handelingen, October 30, 1961, p. 21.
35. NGR Handelingen, October 30, 1961, pp. 40–41.
36. Telegram 9316, Platteel 435 to Bot, November 9, 1961, Archief Kolonien 2.10.36.17, ARA.
37. NGR Handelingen, October 31, 1961, pp. 19–20. Nicholaas Jouwe, one of the Council members who had helped call the meeting that created the *Komite Nasional*, was not present during the Council’s debate. Interview, Nicholaas Jouwe, The Hague, December 5, 2001.
38. Telegram 7189, Bot 488 to Platteel, November 28, 1961, Archief Kolonien 2.10.36.17, ARA.
39. Telegram 10109, Platteel 482 to Bot, November 29, 1961, Archief Kolonien 2.10.36.17, ARA.
40. Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de Maanden november en december 1961, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA; Maandverslag over de Maand December 1961 van de afdelingen Geelvinkbaai en Centraal Nieuw-Guinea, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16726, ARA; Telegram 10228, Platteel 485 to Bot, December 2, 1961, Archief Kolonien 2.10.36.17, ARA.
41. Despite these hopes, the promised recognition never came.
42. The author is indebted to Dr Danilyn Rutherford for drawing his attention to the comparison.
43. Telegram 3131, Hollandia 61 to Bot, February 16, 1962, Archief Kolonien 2.10.36.17, ARA.
44. Monthly Reports—Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea—March & April 1962 File M 341, 5, NAA.
45. Monthly Report—Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea—April 1962 File M 341, 5, NAA.
46. Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de Maanden Maart en April 1962, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA.

47. Interim Report—Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea—June 19, 1962, File M 341, 5, NAA.
48. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, July 14, 1962. Apparently, the reason Tanggahma's motion failed was because a majority of members considered it improper to send a delegation to Indonesia while Indonesia was still carrying out military activities against Papua.
49. Telegram, Platteel to Bot, August 7, 1962. His position differed from that of J. H. van Roijen, the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington and head of the negotiating team. Van Roijen had advised against including Papuans in the Dutch delegation, as they would be seen as "stooges" by the Indonesians and others. Telegram, Bot to Platteel, August 7, 1962. Kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG, Dossier 12, Nieuw Guinea Archief, ARA.
50. Papare, Kirihió, and Dimara were notable pro-Indonesian Papuans, but were not members of the New Guinea Council. The political careers of Papare and Kirihió are discussed below in the Serui portion of Section III.
51. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, August 11, 1962; Interim Report—Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea—August 14, 1962, File M 341, 5, NAA.
52. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, September 21, 1962.
53. Sawor (1969: 83–84). When a delegation from the Congress went to Jakarta, Sawor recorded Indonesian Foreign Minister Soebandrio as telling them that the Indonesian Government would do its best to establish security through peaceful and diplomatic means, but if that was not possible troops would be sent in. Soebandrio forbade the delegates to express their views on self-determination until they had seen the conditions in other parts of the country. It is our principle that Indonesia does not claim anybody else's territory, Soebandrio is supposed to have said. Sawor went on to note that just a few months later Indonesia launched its confrontation campaign against Malaysia.
54. *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 24-8-62.
55. Clemens Runaweri, "Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the Act of Free Choice in July – August 1969", p. 18 (English original) DEA file 3036/2/1 Pt. 16, CRS A1838 T 184, NAA.
56. Submission 10, West New Guinea, "Where is the Dispute Heading", G.E. Barwick, 11 January 1962, Prime Minister's file C508 pt 2, CRS A4940, NAA.
57. Airgram A-207 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, Washington, 11 September 1964, West Irian – August 1964, Floyd Whittington, p. 9. Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-66, Box 2307, POL 2.
58. Letter, Nick Jouwe to President Kennedy, 21 November 1962, DEA file 3036/6/1 part 84.
59. Despite the statements of support solicited from Papuan politicians at this time, Indonesia was not successful in persuading the UN, the US, or the Netherlands to change the date of transfer of administration from UNTEA to Indonesia. The transfer took place on May 1, 1963, as originally agreed.

60. Protest Letter, Nicolaas Jouwe and Filemon T.J. Jufuway, Freedom Committee of West Papua / West New Guinea, to the President of the XIXth General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, 20 November 1964, DEA file 30036/6/1 part 84, NAA; see Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 2004: 14–15, 19–20 for a discussion of the Indonesian government’s attitude towards New York Agreement and the right of self-determination in the years following the signing of the agreement.
61. “Most Urgent Appeal of the Papuans of West New Guinea/ “West Irian” to His Excellency the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York, signed by Nicholaas Jouwe and 9 other Papuan members of the “Freedom Committee of West Papua/West New Guinea”, Poptahof-Noord 299, Delft, The Netherlands, 19 September 1967. The emphasis is Jouwe’s.
62. Clemens Runaweri, “Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the “Act of Free Choice” in July – August 1969”, pp. 15, 17–19. DEA file 3036/2/1 Pt. 16, CRS A1838 T 184, NAA. The emphasis is Runaweri’s.
63. Note of Protest, The Freedom Committee of West Papua / West New Guinea to the President of the XXIVth General Assembly and the Secretary General of the UN, 22 September 1969.
64. *Laporan Foreri*, cited in “Gus Dur Minta ke MPR, Thom Bilang Dialog Internasional”, *Tifa Papua*, 10–15 January 2000.
65. Interview, Fritz Kirihio, Jakarta, 5 July 2003. It should be noted, however, that, as discussed below, Dutch officials thought there had already been a shift in sentiment against Indonesia in 1961–62.
66. The clash Bonay refers to occurred on October 10, 1943, on a beach near Manswam, Biak. After repeated warnings, the Japanese fleet opened fire on the men, women and children who had gathered on the beach, believing that they had supernatural protection. The action left between 600 and 2,000 Biaks dead (Rutherford 2003: 200).
67. Kamma 1972: 199–200. Danilyn Rutherford (personal communication, July 2004) suggests that one of the factors in Kaisiepo’s changed position on Koreri was the decision of the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church (Hervormd Kerk) on 5 July 1956 to oppose Papuan independence and support Papua’s integration into Indonesia. This decision was a reversal of the Church’s position at the time of Papua separation from the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949 and marked a significant stage in Kaisiepo’s development as a Papuan nationalist and as a Christian. See Kaisiepo’s account in Sharp and Kaisiepo 1994: 95–97; Appendix I: Kejataan Pendirian Dari Nieuw Guinea, 1956, pp. 119–21.
68. In 1961, when he was serving as a member of the *Komite Nasional* and the New Guinea Council, Kaisiepo supported Papua as the name of the territory. Nevertheless, in the course of the discussions he recalled his earlier argument that “Papua” was considered derogatory. According to Kaisiepo, the term had only been used by seafarers for the western coastal areas and the islands off the western coast, and it had not been applied to the mainland or the islands to the north. He argued that the Indonesians had been clever in adopting “Irian” for their own references to the territory, because they knew Papuans favored the term and that its use would make Papuans more favorably disposed toward integration with

- Indonesia. Vraaggesprek met Kaisiepo and Jouwe, October 13, 1961, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, dossier 35, ARA.
69. Vraaggesprek met Kaisiepo and Jouwe, October 13, 1961, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, dossier 35, ARA.
  70. Nieuw Guinea Raad, Handelingen Eerst Buitengewone Zitting, October 30, 1961, p. 33.
  71. Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G. W. Grootenhuis in NNG, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen," 1961, Ministerie van Kolonien, ARA, Dossier 11575, Deel I, pp. 15–17, 106.
  72. Boven Digul was established after the 1926–27 communist uprisings in Java and Sumatra and was used to inter Indonesian nationalists and communists. Anderson argues that Boven Digul had a central place in the folklore of the Indonesian nationalist struggle and was "a sacred site in the national imagining." However, as can be seen from the text of the present study, Anderson is mistaken when he contends that, apart from the internees, no Indonesian nationalists saw Papua with their own eyes until the 1960s (1991: 176).
  73. As noted in Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, the Indonesian government had appointed Bonay out of "a desire to have as governor an Irianese with credibility and some local support rather than a clearly pro-Indonesia Irianese or even a non-Irianese Indonesian" (2004: 15). The government knew of Bonay's activities as one of the leading nationalists, but, as discussed above, Bonay was one who believed from the signing of the New York Agreement onwards that Papua's problems could not be solved without engaging with the Indonesians.
  74. Herman Wayoi, "Quo Vadis Papua: Tanah Papua (Irian Jaya) masih dalam status Tanah Jajahan," in Alua (2002a: 63).
  75. Wayoi's report, prepared for the February 1999 meeting with President Habbie, was written before Freddy Numberi was appointed Minister for State Administration in the Wahid Government in October 1999 and Manuel Kaisiepo was appointed as Junior Minister for the Accelerated Development of Eastern Indonesia in Megawati Sukarnoputri's cabinet in 2002.
  76. Herman Wayoi, "Quo Vadis Papua."
  77. Clemens Runaweri, "Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the 'Act of Free Choice' in July – August 1969," pp. 4, 9–11. DEA file 3036/2/1 Pt. 16, CRS A1838 T 184, NAA.
  78. Clemens Runaweri, "Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the 'Act of Free Choice' in July – August 1969," p. 10. DEA file 3036/2/1 Pt. 16, CRS A1838 T 184, NAA.
  79. "Michael Menufandu, Senior Advisor Masalah Otonomi Daerah untuk Irian Jaya," Tokoh, Denpasar, 20–26 Desember 1999, p. 26.
  80. "Papuanisasi Jurus Jitu dan Sederhana," Papua Post, Jayapura, 25 November 2000.
  81. "Desak MRP Disahkan: Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum Rekomendasikan Beberapa Poin Penting," *Cenderawasih Pos*, 17 Desember 2003. More detailed discussion of the partition issue can be found in Part IV of the present study and also in Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (2004: 36–42).

82. Netherlands Government Annual Report to the United Nations on Netherlands New Guinea, 1960, The Hague, pp. 6–7.
83. *Tifa Papua*, Minggu ketiga Mei 2002, p. 5.
84. In 1990 the largest settler communities in Papua, grouped by place of birth, were as follows: from East, Central, and West Java and the Special Region of Yogyakarta 131,801; South Sulawesi 58,377; Maluku 28,698; North Sulawesi 8,944; and North Sumatra, 6,434 (*Penduduk Indonesia* 1990: 69).
85. M. C. Rumbiak, “Migrasi Spontan dan Transmigrasi,” unpublished paper. Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Cenderawasih, Jayapura, pp. 7, 8, 9.
86. Jhon Wanane, Mth, “Politik Ekonomi dan Migrasi Bangsa Melayu di Tanah Papua.” *Tifa Papua*, 11–16 Desember 2000.
87. Mark Worth, *The Land of the Morning Star*, Film Australia / Australian Broadcasting Corporation production, 2003. Broadcast, ABC TV, February 2, 2004. Clemens Runaweri had been permitted to return to Papua to attend the Kongres Papua.
88. The passage reads: “If the tide of colonization should be turned to New Guinea, there can be no doubt of the early extinction of the Papuan race. A warlike and energetic people, who will not submit to national slavery or to domestic servitude, must disappear before the white man as surely as do the wolf and the tiger” (Wallace 1962: 455).
89. Bonay c1980s: Bab 1, 3–4.
90. Clemens Runaweri, “Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in July – August 1969,” p. 18 (English original) pp. 6–7. DEA file 3036/2/1 Pt. 16, CRS A1838 T 184, NAA.
91. RUU Republik Indonesia Nr 21 Tahun 2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Propinsi Papua Dalam Bentuk Wilaya Berpemerintahan Sendiri. See Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (2004: 31–32). Though the Special Autonomy Law for Papua (21/2001) was passed in November 2001, it was the product of a long process of negotiation between the Papuan provincial government and a special committee of the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). A number of the Papuan proposals discussed in this paragraph were not accepted in the Law, for example those relating to the deployment of military units and the establishment of a Papuan police. Though the Law did contain some provisions to protect Papuan interests and others that reflected Papuan nationalist values, for example the establishment of the MRP, it has been precisely these provisions that the central government has been most reluctant to implement. For further discussion, see McGibbon (2004a); Sumule (2003).
92. Petrus Kafiar was one of the first Papuans to obtain some education in Java, attending the Protestant Seminary in Depok (West Java) in the 1890s. He became the first Protestant teacher and evangelist in his native Biak (Rutherford 2003: 32–33).
93. Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G. W. Grootenhuis in NNG, “Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen,” 1961, Ministerie van Kolonien, ARA, Dossier 11575, Deel I, pp. 26–27.

94. *Tifa* (Hollandia), No. 226, August 27, 1960.
95. *Tifa* (Hollandia), No. 226, August 27, 1960.
96. I am indebted to Danilyn Rutherford for this observation.
97. Interview, Nicholaas Jouwe, The Hague, 5-12-2001.
98. In 1925 there were 2,767 Christians in Fakfak. Van Geuns, Seijne Kok's successor, was not able to give a figure for the total population, as no census had been taken. He commented that the vast majority of Papuans were animists and that neither Islam nor Christianity was making great inroads. However, he noted that, as Islam had been established much earlier in the region, there were many more Muslims than Christians (Geuns 1992: 129–30). It would appear that over the next three decades Christian missionary activity was successful in creating Christian Papuan congregations of greater size than the Muslim community. By 1953, the figures for the three major religious communities of Papuan society in Fakfak were Muslims 6,022, Protestants 6,909, and Roman Catholics 2,374. Amongst the Indonesian community, the figures were Muslims 1,390, Protestants 400, and Roman Catholics 150 (Maurenbrecher 1993: 277, 279).
99. Seijne Kok (1992: 51, 55, 57).
100. Letter, W.G.F. Winia, Resident of Fak Fak to the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, May 3, 1960, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG, Dossier 17, "Prominenten Papoeas," ARA. As noted in Part II, Tanggahma later served under the Indonesians as head of the Bureau of Public Administration, but he was stripped of this position in early 1968.
101. Bestuursverslag van de afdeling Fak-Fak over de maand oktober, 1961, Resident of Fakfak, J. W. van Eek, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16721, ARA.
102. Politiek Overzicht van de afdeling Fak Fak over de maand november 1961, van Eek, December 5, 1961, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16721, ARA.
103. Politiek Overzicht van de afdeling Fak Fak over de maand januari 1962, van Eek, February 8, 1962; Politiek Overzicht van de afdeling Fak Fak over de maand juni 1961, van Eek, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16721, ARA.
104. In January 1962, GRIB presented a motion to visiting Dutch State Secretary Th. H. Bot stating these objectives. In his subsequent report to The Hague, Bot noted this motion as evidence of pro-Indonesia sentiment among Papuans. He said this sentiment was particularly strong in Fakfak, which was the one place in Papua where Bot had been confronted by a largely Papuan pro-Indonesia demonstration. Far from being discomfited by the demonstration, however, he expressed his hope that this open expression of dissent might help the Government convince the international and Netherlands public of the Papua administration's objectivity. Draft telegram, Bot to Toxopeus, end January 1962, Collectie Th. H. Bot, inv 221.281.566 collectie 565, doss, nr. 44, ARA.
105. Politiek Overzicht van de afdeling Fak Fak over de maand februari 1962, van Eek, March 12, 1962, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16721, ARA.
106. ELSHAM (*Lembaga Studi Dan advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia*) is also known in English as the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, West Papua. It is not to be confused with the Elsham news service, which is also based in West Papua.

107. ELSHAM, Lembaga Studi Dan advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia, *Latar Belakang Hadirnya Laskar Jihad Di Fakfak*, Fakfak, January 24, 2001. Ismail Bauw had taken over from this father Ibrahim as Raja of Rumbati in the 1960s. He was a candidate for the DPR in the 1999 elections and was strongly opposed by local Christian communities. He was much disliked by pro-independence Papuans, despite the fact that he had been a member of the "Team of 100" that demanded independence from President Habibie in 1999. Tom Goodman, e-mail correspondence, November 23, 2002.
108. "Muslim militants training Papua militia: rights group," AFP, Jakarta, January 22, 2002, [www.kabar-irian.com](http://www.kabar-irian.com).
109. Els-Ham, Lembaga Studi Dan advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laskar Jihad Dan Satgas Merah Putih Meningkatkan Aktifitas Latihannya*, Fakfak, January 30, 2002.
110. "Kota FakFak Tegang: Muncul Pro-Merdeka dan Pro-Otonomi," TEMPO Interaktif, July 25, 2000, <http://www.tempo.co.id/news/2000/7/25/1,1,24,id.html>.
111. ELSHAM, Lembaga Studi Dan advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Khusus Situasi Sosial Politik Di Seluruh Wilayah Papua Barat, Menjelang Dan Pasca 1 Desember 2000*, December 5, 2000.
112. Tom Goodman, email correspondence, November 23, 2002.
113. Memorie van Overgave van de Onderafdeling Japen van de Controleur J.W. van Eek, 1954, MMK 400, ARA, p. 56.
114. The Malino Conference was the first of two conferences that led to the establishment of the State of East Indonesia. Frans Kaisiepo represented Papua at the first of these conferences, but there was no Papuan representative at the second (the Den Pasar Conference of December 1946), and in the end Papua did not become part of the State of East Indonesia.
115. Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G.W. Grootenhuis in NNG, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen," 1961, Ministerie van Kolonien, ARA, Dossier 11575, Deel II, pp. 6, 7, 12, 13. Despite these hopes, the author is not aware that Papare ever returned.
116. Verslag Afdeling Geelvinkbaai over de Periode 15–25 Aug. 1962. Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA
117. Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G.W. Grootenhuis in NNG, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen", 1961, Ministerie van Kolonien, ARA, Dossier 11575, Deel II, pp 3–5, ARA
118. Maandverslag over de Maand December 1961 van de afdelingen Geelvinkbaai en Centraal Nieuw-Guinea, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16726, ARA.
119. Politiek Verslag van de Afdeling Geelvinkbaai over de Maand Maart 1962, April 1962. Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA.
120. Maandverslag Afdeling Geelvinkbaai over de Maand Mei 1962, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA.
121. Verslag Afdeling Geelvinkbaai over de Periode 15–25 Aug. 1962. Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA.
122. Maandverslag over de Maand Januari 1962 van de afdeling Geelvinkbaai; Bestuursverslag van de afdeling Geelvinkbaai over de Maand Februari 1962, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16726, ARA

123. Vervolg politiek verslag van de Afdeling Geelvinkbaai over de Maand juni 1962. Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16725, ARA
124. Although Silas Papare never returned to Papua, his political career in Jakarta was a checkered one that reflected something of the same alienation from Indonesia as was experienced by the three PARNA leaders in Papua. David Webster claims that by 1961 Papare was telling the US Ambassador in Jakarta that he supported an independent Papua, but could not say so publicly for fear of arrest by the Sukarno Government (David Webster, "Dialogue on history," July 5, 2002, [www.kabar-irian.com](http://www.kabar-irian.com)). Indeed, Papare was imprisoned in 1962–63. However, he later served as a member of the national parliament. In 1966, he and other Papuan parliamentarians criticized the government's neglect of Papua and demanded that the Act of Free Choice be held (*Antara* news bulletin, March 22, 1966). Papare was particularly critical of the government's military actions in the campaign against the OPM revolts in the mid-1960s (Justus M. van der Kroef, "West New Guinea: The Uncertain Future," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 8 [August 1968], p. 699). Silas Papare is one of three Papuans who today are recognized among the national heroes of Indonesia. A navel vessel and a school of political and social sciences in Jayapura are named after him.
125. Airgram A-207 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, Washington, 11 September 1964, West Irian – August 1964, Floyd Whittington, p. 5. Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-6, Box 2307, POL 2, National Archives, Washington.
126. Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 1, Tahun 2003, tentang Percepatan Pelaksanaan Undang Undang Nomor 45, Tahun 1999 tentang Pembentukan Propinsi Irian Jaya Tengah, Irian Jaya Barat, Kabupaten Paniai, Kabupaten Mimika, Kabupaten Puncak Jaya dan Kota Sorong.
127. "More blood spilled fresh in Papua" *The Jakarta Post*, 2 September 2003.
128. Elsham News Service, 17 April, 2004. The campaign consisted of demonstrations in Biak and lobbying in Jakarta by a group calling itself the "Tim 12". It is important to note that there were also groups in Biak opposed to the new province. Pither Yarangga, the head of the Dewan Adat Biak Numfor (Adat Council of Biak Numfor), sought the intervention of the DPRD TK II Biak Numfor (District Council) so that the Council did not support the new province.
129. "Demonstrators give backing to new Papuan province", *Jakarta Post* 19.2.2003.
130. Democratic Center Cenderawasih University "Principal Thoughts Concerning Development Policies In Papua Province Critical Considerations on Implementation and Implications: "The Validity of Undang-Undang No. 45/1999, Undang-Undang No. 21/2001 and Inpres No. 1/2003", Jayapura, June 2003; "Biak Lebih Siap Jadi Ibukota Provinsi Papua Tengah", *Harian Papua Pos*, 11 Maret 2003.
131. "Jajak Pendapat Otsus Atau Pemekaran Papua: Hukum di Indonesia Tidak Konsisten", *Suara Pembaruan*, February 8, 2003.
132. "Dewan Mantapkan Pelaksanaan Rapat Akbar: Kemarin Dibahas Bersama Dengan Para Dosen Uncen," *Papua Post*, 02 Desember 2003.
133. "Diminta Bukan Untuk Pertentangan Pemekaran: Sebagian Besar Pemateri RDPU Tak Datang," *Cenderawasih Pos*, 16 Desember 2003. Ministers invited from Jakarta also did not attend.

134. "Segera Digelar Rekonsiliasi Besar Masyarakat Papua," *Kompas*, November 27, 2003.
135. "Diminta Bukan Untuk Pertentangan Pemekaran: Sebagian Besar Pemateri RDPU Tak Datang," *Cenderawasih Pos*, 16 Desember 2003. Ministers invited from Jakarta also did not attend.
136. Bestuursverslag van de afdeeling Fak-Fak over de maand December, 1961, Resident of Fakfak, J. W. van Eek, February 14, 1962, Nieuw Guinea Archief, Dossier G 16721, ARA.
137. Cable, Goedhart 121. Hollandia to The Hague, December 8, 1962, Archief Kolonien G 41793, ARA.
138. Nota Dinas, Direktur Jenderal Kesbang dan Linmas, Ermaya Suradinata to Menteri Dalam Negeri, June 9, 2000, 578/CD/kesbang/D IV/VI/2000.
139. Mark Worth, *The Land of the Morning Star*, Film Australia / Australian Broadcasting Corporation production, 2003. Broadcast, ABC TV, February 2, 2004.
140. Tim Kemanusiaan 2001 - Wamena Bagian Investigasi, "Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena, 6 Oktober 2000, Sebelum Dan Sesudahnya: Sebuah Laporan Investigasi," Jayapura, Januari 2001.
141. Filip Karma was arrested on December 1, 2004, for leading a rally to celebrate Papuan "independence" day. In mid-December he was reported to be on hunger strike. "Treason Suspect on Hunger Strike," *Jakarta Post*, December 15, 2004.
142. This complex set of relations between the Papuan elite and the Indonesian authorities is discussed from the perspective of the Indonesian authorities in Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (2004: 44–46).
143. Interview, Bas Suebu and Simon Morin with Danilyn Rutherford and Richard Chauvel, Jakarta, June 22, 2003.
144. See for example: Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang. 2003a. "Global Security in the New Millenium." Royal United Services Institute, Canberra, October 9. [www.kbri-Canberra.org.au/speeches/2003/031009Polkam.htm](http://www.kbri-Canberra.org.au/speeches/2003/031009Polkam.htm).
145. Ridwan Max Sijabat, "Court ruling perpetuates conflict in Papua," *Jakarta Post*, November 18, 2004.
146. Nethy Dharma Somba, "Papua Government Gears Up for People's Council Election," *Jakarta Post*, December 28, 2004.

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


### **Background of the Papua Conflict**

The Indonesian province of Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) is a territory whose political status has long been subject to debate. Western New Guinea first appeared as part of the Netherlands Indies in official documents issued in 1828 and 1848; yet neither the Dutch, nor the Tidoran sultans, whose rule over the “Papuan Islands” provided the basis for the Netherlands’ claims, exercised effective control in the territory. It wasn’t until 1898 that the Indies government established the first permanent post. This situation changed following World War II, when the Dutch retained western New Guinea after the rest of the Indies gained independence as the Republic of Indonesia. In the Round Table Agreement of 1949, a clause stipulated that the territory’s fate would be decided within a year. When bilateral talks broke down, Indonesia lobbied for the recovery of the territory, which it called West Irian, first through diplomacy then by threatening war. The Netherlands initially responded by accelerating the colony’s passage towards self-rule. Dutch officials oversaw elections for a New Guinea Council, which inaugurated a flag and regalia for a future West Papuan state on December 1, 1961. Eventually, the Netherlands yielded to American pressure and agreed to a settlement with Indonesia. The New York Agreement of 1962 called for western New Guinea’s transfer to the United Nations, then Indonesia, which was to hold an Act of Free Choice in which the territory’s inhabitants would chose between independence and integration into the republic. On May 1, 1963, Indonesia took control of the territory, and in 1969, 1022 carefully supervised (some say intimidated) individuals voted unanimously in favor of integration. An armed separatist movement waxed and waned over the first three decades of Indonesian rule, accompanied by military reprisals and widespread reports of human rights violations. After the resignation of Indonesia’s President Suharto on May 21, 1998, the independence movement took on a more inclusive, nonviolent form. At a February 26, 1999 meeting in Jakarta, a Team of 100 provincial leaders presented then President Habibie with a demand for West Papua’s independence. Back in the province, pro-independence activists convened talks that coalesced in the Papuan National Congress of May 21–June 4, 2000. The Congress resulted in a resolution confirming the leadership of the Papuan Presidium Council and directing this executive body to pursue independence through peaceful dialogue. Following the Congress, the

central government launched a crackdown involving the arrest of pro-independence leaders and the banning of the West Papuan flag. On November 11, 2001, Theys Eluay, the Presidium chairman, was found murdered; members of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) later were convicted of the crime. During the same month, the Indonesian legislature passed a bill based on a draft prepared by a group of Papuan intellectuals granting the province special autonomy and a new name. The fate of the 2001 special autonomy law (UU No. 21/2001), which provides the province with a greater share of the territory's vast natural resource earnings and calls for the founding of an indigenous upper house, came into question in January 2003, when President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed an instruction (Inpres No. 1/2003) ordering the immediate implementation of a 1999 law (UU No. 45/1999) dividing Irian Jaya into three new provinces. Between August 23 and September 7, 2003, rioting between pro-and anti-division groups in the mining town, Timika, cost five people their lives.

# Map of Papua Province, Indonesia



- Provincial Capital
- Other Towns
- ⚡ District Boundaries (pending legislation)

*Note: Map boundaries and locations are approximate. Geographic features and their names do not imply official endorsement or recognition by the UN.*

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## Project Information



## The Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflicts in Asia

### Project Rationale, Purpose and Outline

Project Director: Muthiah Alagappa  
 Principal Researchers: Edward Aspinall (Aceh)  
 Danilyn Rutherford (Papua)  
 Christopher Collier (southern Philippines)  
 Gardner Bovington (Xinjiang)  
 Elliot Sperling (Tibet)

#### *Rationale*

Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian political landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coups d'état, regional rebellions, and revolutions. Many have been protracted; several have far reaching domestic and international consequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the break up of that country in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the political and territorial integrity of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan, Bangladesh (1991), and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramatic political change in those countries; although the political uprisings in Burma (1988) and China (1989) were suppressed, the political systems in these countries as well as in Vietnam continue to confront problems of political legitimacy that could become acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stability in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India. In all, millions of people have been killed in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been displaced. And the involvement of external powers in a competitive manner (especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had negative consequences for domestic and regional security.

Internal conflicts in Asia (as elsewhere) can be traced to three issues—national identity, political legitimacy (the title to rule), and distributive justice—that are often interconnected. With the bankruptcy of the socialist model and the transitions to democracy in several countries, the number of internal conflicts over the legitimacy of political system has declined in Asia. However, political legitimacy of certain governments continues to be contested from time to time and the legitimacy of the remaining communist and authoritarian systems is likely to confront challenges in due course. The project deals with internal conflicts arising from the process of

constructing national identity with specific focus on conflicts rooted in the relationship of minority communities to the nation-state. Here too many Asian states have made considerable progress in constructing national communities but several states including some major ones still confront serious problems that have degenerated into violent conflict. By affecting the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as the physical, cultural, economic, and political security of individuals and groups, these conflicts have great potential to affect domestic and international stability.

### ***Purpose***

The project investigates the dynamics and management of five key internal conflicts in Asia—Aceh and Papua in Indonesia, the Moro conflict in the southern Philippines, and the conflicts pertaining to Tibet and Xinjiang in China. Specifically it investigates the following:

1. Why (on what basis), how (in what form), and when does group differentiation and political consciousness emerge?
2. What are the specific issues of contention in such conflicts? Are these of the instrumental or cognitive type? If both, what is the relationship between them? Have the issues of contention altered over time? Are the conflicts likely to undergo further redefinition?
3. When, why, and under what circumstances can such contentions lead to violent conflict? Under what circumstances have they not led to violent conflict?
4. How can the conflicts be managed, settled, and eventually resolved? What are policy choices? Do options such as national self-determination, autonomy, federalism, electoral design, and consociationalism exhaust the list of choices available to meet the aspirations of minority communities? Are there innovative ways of thinking about identity and sovereignty that can meet the aspirations of the minority communities without creating new sovereign nation-states?
5. What is the role of the regional and international communities in the protection of minority communities?
6. How and when does a policy choice become relevant?

### ***Design***

A study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investigated in the study. With a principal researcher each, the study groups comprise practitioners and scholars from the respective Asian countries includ-

ing the region or province that is the focus of the conflict, the United States, and Australia. For composition of study groups please see the participants list.

All five study-groups met jointly for the first time in Washington, D.C. from September 29 through October 3, 2002. Over a period of four days, participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issues pertaining to the five conflicts investigated in the project. In addition to identifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facilitated the development of cross country perspectives and interaction among scholars who had not previously worked together. Based on discussion at the meeting five research monograph length studies (one per conflict) and twenty policy papers (four per conflict) were commissioned.

Study groups met separately for the second meeting. The Aceh and Papua study group meetings were held in Bali on June 16–17, the southern Philippines study group met in Manila on June 23, and the Tibet and Xinjiang study groups were held in Honolulu on August 20–22, 2003. The third meeting of all study groups was held in Washington, D.C. from February 28 to March 2, 2004. These meetings reviewed recent developments relating to the conflicts, critically reviewed the first drafts of the policy papers prepared for the project, reviewed the book proposals by the principal researchers, and identified new topics for research.

### ***Publications***

The project will result in five research monographs (book length studies) and about twenty policy papers.

*Research Monographs.* To be authored by the principal researchers, these monographs present a book-length study of the key issues pertaining to each of the five conflicts. Subject to satisfactory peer review, the monographs will appear in the East-West Center Washington series *Asian Security*, and the East-West Center series *Contemporary Issues in the Asia Pacific*, both published by the Stanford University Press.

*Policy Papers.* The policy papers provide a detailed study of particular aspects of each conflict. Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 15,000- to 25,000-word essays will be published in the East-West Center Washington *Policy Studies* series, and be circulated widely to key personnel and institutions in the policy and intellectual communities and the media in the respective Asian countries, United States, and other relevant countries.

***Public Forums***

To engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of the project to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in conjunction with study group meetings.

Two public forums were organized in Washington, D.C. in conjunction with the first study group meeting. The first forum, cosponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society, discussed the Aceh and Papua conflicts. The second forum, cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and the Sigur Center of The George Washington University, discussed the Tibet and Xinjiang conflicts.

Public forums were also organized in Jakarta and Manila in conjunction with the second study group meetings. The Jakarta public forum on Aceh and Papua, cosponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, and the southern Philippines public forum cosponsored by the Policy Center of the Asian Institute of Management attracted key persons from government, media, think tanks, activist groups, diplomatic community, and the public.

In conjunction with the third study group meetings, also held in Washington, D.C., three public forums were offered. The first forum, cosponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society, addressed the conflicts in Aceh and Papua. The second forum, cosponsored by the Sigur Center of The George Washington University, discussed the conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang. A third forum was held to discuss the conflict in the southern Philippines. This forum was cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace.

***Funding Support***

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## About this Issue

Papuan nationalism is young, evolving, and flexible. It has adapted to and reflected the political circumstances in which it has emerged. Its evolution as a political force is one of the crucial factors in any analysis of political and cultural change in Papua, and the development of relations between the Indonesian government and Papuan society. This study examines the development of Papuan nationalism from the Pacific War through the movement's revival after the fall of President Suharto in 1998. The author argues that the first step in understanding Papuan nationalism is understanding Papuan history and historical consciousness. The history that so preoccupies Papuan nationalists is the history of the decolonization of the Netherlands Indies, the struggle between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the sovereignty of Papua, and Papua's subsequent integration into Indonesia. Papuan nationalism is also about ethnicity. Many Papuan nationalists make strong distinctions between Papuans and other peoples, especially Indonesians. However, Papuan society itself is a mosaic of over three hundred small, local, and often isolated ethno-linguistic groups. Yet over the years a pan-Papuan identity has been forged from this mosaic of tribal groups. This study explores the nationalists' argument about history and the sources of their sense of common ethnicity. It also explores the possibility that the Special Autonomy Law of 2001, if implemented fully, might provide a framework in which Papuan national aspirations might be realized.

## About the Author

Richard Chauvel is Director of the Australia Asia Pacific Institute at Victoria University in Melbourne, Australia. He can be contacted at [Richard.C Chauvel@vu.au.edu](mailto:Richard.C Chauvel@vu.au.edu).

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