China Unveils Its Monumental Two per Thousand Fertility Survey

The largest fertility survey ever conducted—China's Two per Thousand Survey of 1988—was the centerpiece of a recent seminar in Beijing. Seminar papers confirmed the high quality of the survey and its potential for research on topics ranging from rates of sterility to the demography of Tibet. They also suggested that family planning in China is moving on to a wider agenda. The interest of family planners is turning to issues of health, motivation for family planning, and contraception prior to a couple's first birth.

by William R. Lavey

The largest fertility survey ever conducted made its international debut at a seminar sponsored by the Chinese government in Beijing last August. The National Survey of Fertility and Contraception, often referred to as the 'Two per Thousand Survey,' was conducted by China's State Family Planning Commission (SFPC) in June 1988. Some 50 scholars and family planning administrators, including 12 from abroad, took part in the four-day (August 26−29) International Seminar on Fertility and Contraception in China, which provided insights about the new survey, about developments in China's birth planning program, and about China's research environment.

The survey, representing a sample of two ever-married women between the ages of 15 and 57 for ev-
very 1,000 such women in the Chinese population, is the largest survey of its kind ever made. All provinces in the Chinese mainland took part in the survey, including, for the first time, Tibet. Within provinces, various sample fractions were employed, with the aim of obtaining representative data for each province. The average number of persons sampled per province was 75,000. Altogether 2.1 million individuals were surveyed, for whom more than half a million pregnancy histories were recorded. In contrast, the World Fertility Survey, which was conducted in 40 countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, included roughly half that number of women.

The design of the Two per Thousand Survey, an indigenous effort, reflected an accumulated expertise in the practical application of sampling theory and built on extensive experience gained during the 1980s in the conduct of sample surveys in China. Thus, although the sample size was twice as large as that of its forerunner, the One per Thousand Survey of 1982, the Two per Thousand design was less clustered and therefore more efficient. The sampling unit of the One per Thousand Survey was the brigade (now village) and urban street committees, of which 815 were covered in all of China. The Two per Thousand Survey sampled 13,966 small groups, or two out of every 1,000 such groups. The survey sample points fell within 95 percent of China's counties.

The central element of the survey was a pregnancy history, but data on the husband and wife, other household members, and characteristics of the small residence group were also gathered. Among the survey's innovations was a birth history that integrated questions on the adoption of children and on the policy auspices under which each child was born.

Although the survey is a fundamental source of data on fertility, family planning, and contraception in China, its design offers numerous other analytic possibilities. It contains important data on mortality, sex ratios, the biology of reproduction, migration, shifts in nationality status, and other topics. The retrospective depth of the survey also makes it a repository of data for historical reconstruction, and its size and geographic coverage make it an unusual vehicle for the study of demographic variation at provincial levels and below.

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Containing data not only on fertility and family planning but also on adoption, mortality, sex ratios, the biology of reproduction, migration, and other topics, the Two per Thousand Survey design offers numerous analytic possibilities.

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Several seminar papers describing the design and conduct of the survey should be of great value to the survey's users, since little documentation of survey methods has heretofore been available. Papers by Li Honggui and Zhao Xuan of SFPC provided important background. From them one learned, for example, that a special design was used for the survey in Tibet. Because the SFPC has no organization in Tibet,
According to one study based on the survey, an estimated 385 million births have been averted by China's birth planning program since 1971.

Although the primary aim of the survey was to monitor progress in the government's birth planning program, the survey data are providing insights on a wide range of other topics as well. A study by Zhao Xuan estimated that 385 million births had been averted by the birth planning program since 1971. Researchers from the Shanghai Institute of Planned Parenthood Research presented analyses of spontaneous abortion, age at menarche, and rates of infertility that revealed general declines in all three. Wang Shaoxian, Weng Shiguai, and Zhang Ming of Beijing Medical University presented findings on contraceptive effectiveness indicating that use effectiveness of the IUD and the pill was lower in China than in other countries. From the numerous papers devoted to fertility, marriage, and contraception, several recurrent themes emerged.

One such theme was the timing of childbirth as a major determinant of fertility change in the 1980s. Chinese population policy encourages couples to postpone marriage, but a decline in ages at marriage during the 1980s has impeded fertility control. Moreover, age at first birth is determined not only by age at marriage but also by the length of the interval between marriage and first birth, and this interval has become shorter.

Since attempts to reduce completed family size to below two children per family has met with resistance in the countryside, the results of these analyses suggest that more policy emphasis might be placed on the timing of the first birth and on birth spacing as an alternative approach. It was noted that in Hong Kong, 40 percent of couples use contraception prior to having their first child; but among recent marriage cohorts in Beijing studied by Lin Deliang, Tian Meiyin, and Gao Ersheng, only 24 percent do so.

With age at marriage declining and the interval between marriage and first births growing shorter in China, policy efforts to reduce completed family size may need to focus more on birth spacing. One study indicates that even in Beijing only 24 percent of recently married couples use contraception.

Another theme was the usefulness of period parity progression measures, adopted in several papers, including that by Griffith Feehey, one of its important developers. Because China's policy goals are expressed and implemented in terms of the number of children born per couple (or parity), parity progression offers especially relevant insights into program performance. Feehey and Wang Feng of the East-West Center's Population Institute found that the Two per Thousand data concur with earlier studies that have shown a mild rise in total fertility in the late 1980s due to a rising progression to second births.

But the rise was sharper in some regions than in others. In an analysis of parity progression in the eastern province of Anhui, Xie Zhenming of Anhui University found that there had been a distinct rise in completed family size during the 1985–87 period, with the result that more than half of rural women are projected to bear a total of three
or more children. In a different connection, the Feeney and Wang paper pointed out that the Two per Thousand Survey’s inclusion of an adoption question improved the quality of the birth histories and has permitted better estimates of the true rate of childlessness in China (about 4 percent).

Concern over women’s and children’s health issues also emerged during the seminar. Contraceptive side effects, the most appropriate and cost-effective IUD, and the “ideal contraceptive mix” came up for discussion several times. China employs the stainless steel loop (the danbuan, or “single-ring IUD”), but its use effectiveness is low. Seminar participants debated whether this might be due to misplacement of the IUDs (in the cervix rather than the uterus) or to poor training of birth planning workers. Others raised the issue of whether the program was using the most appropriate IUD. One participant argued that the Copper T 220, although 10 times the price of the stainless steel loop—one yuan versus one mao—might be more cost-effective, particularly if costs to women’s health were taken into account. Related issues were vividly raised in a slide presentation on rural health care in India by Dr. R. Rajaram.

Although many of the concerns about health effects were raised by foreign rather than Chinese scholars, to this observer the ensuing discussions about the quality and health effects of the birth planning program seemed to reflect the increasing maturity and routinization of China’s program. Family planning work in China, and research on it, appear to be moving on to a wider agenda. Program performance is beginning to be defined in broader terms than just fertility or contraceptive inputs, and the interest of family planners is turning to issues of health, cost effectiveness, motivation for family planning, and contraception prior to the first birth and even prior to marriage.

Family planning work and research in China appear to be moving to a wider agenda. Interest is turning to issues of health, cost effectiveness, motivation for family planning, and contraception prior to the first birth and even prior to marriage.

The growing number of demographic studies in the 1980s have focused overwhelmingly on fertility, with little attention being paid to mortality—a fact pointed out at the seminar. The Two per Thousand Survey birth histories contain survivorship data that will be fundamental to mortality studies.

One of several papers on infant mortality demonstrated a technique for analyzing sex differentials in survivorship. The preliminary analysis revealed strong regional variations in infant survivorship by sex of the infant. In general, girls in south China fare less well than boys, a phenomenon that seems to reflect social rather than biological factors.

A related issue, that of unusually high sex ratios at birth in China, was raised in an analysis of Two per Thousand data by Sten Johansson and Ola Nygren of Statistik Sweden. Their analysis shows that nearly all in-adopted children in China are girls. (No corresponding data on out-adoptions are available.) If these in-adopted girls go unreported by their birth mothers, which is a possibility if it is assumed that most of the births are illicit, they account for approximately half of the discrepancy in the sex ratio at birth. In the ensuing discussion, one participant questioned the assumption that birth mothers fail to report out-adopted girls in their birth histories, while another maintained that other research in China shows that some “adopted” children are really women’s own children.

The sex ratio and infanticide issue remains highly charged. The Two per Thousand Survey has a high potential for illuminating the issue because it posed direct questions on the incidence of infanticide and abandonment of infants to local-level cadres. But the data have yet to be released, and, perhaps in deference to host sensitivities, no seminar participant inquired about the results of those questions.

The issue of areal differences in China’s population was also highlighted at the seminar. There has been a tendency, even within China, to treat China as monolithic or at best “bilithic,” divided between urban and rural societies—constructions often forced on the analyst by data limitations. Provincial aggregates are sometimes available, but systematic subprovincial analysis is seldom possible.

The Two per Thousand Survey provides data not only about

(continued on page 116)
Young Women's Work and Family Formation in Sri Lanka

Patterns of family formation in Sri Lanka resemble those of wealthier nations, with late marriage, delayed childbearing, and moderately low fertility. This article addresses two questions: How have these family formation patterns emerged in the absence of the normally expected levels of economic development? And what activities have occupied young women in the premarital, prechildbearing period? Answers are suggested by data from three sources: the 1981 census; a set of focus-group discussions on the rights, obligations, and aspirations of young women related to marriage, work, childbearing, and child care; and a sample survey of 1,535 women of ages 15–30 in Kalutara District. The article describes the interplay of socioeconomic and familial forces that have affected the status of young Sri Lankan women.

by Amy Ong Tsui,
Paul Stupp, Victor de Silva,
and Soma de Silva

Sri Lanka has made significant gains in reducing gender inequality in access to such life-improving conditions as education, nutrition, health, and housing. Some expansion of female participation in the labor force has also enhanced the social and economic position of women. Patterns of family formation resemble those of wealthier nations, with late marriage, delayed childbearing, and moderately low fertility, despite Sri Lanka’s low per capita income levels. Yet other indicators of industrial and economic progress reflect stagnation during the 1980s.

Neither marriage nor employment dominates the activities of Sri Lankan women during the period between school and parenthood. The typical woman leaves school at age 15 or 16 and does not marry until age 24. The birth of her first child follows approximately 18 months later. A large proportion of the female labor force consists of unpaid family workers. According to the 1981 census, an estimated 32 percent of women were currently unemployed (Sri Lanka, DCS, 1986).

Accounting for the activities that occupy educated women who are not gainfully employed during the eight-year interval between school and marriage poses a sociological challenge, particularly for understanding how norms and opportunity structures influence women’s roles and status. Most societies do not “tolerate” the extended presence of fecund single women in the natal household. Sri Lanka’s low-income, low-fertility scenario therefore represents an anomalous data point in the conventionally hypothesized relationship between economic development and fertility.

The basic proposition this study explores is that, by reducing gender inequalities in education and opportunities for employment, public-sector measures to improve the welfare of Sri Lankan society can outweigh household-level economic factors in shaping women’s expectations about their adulthood roles and standard of living. The study traces through three levels the influence of key status-enhancing

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events, such as schooling and employment, on women's expectations about work, marriage, and childbearing: the macrolevel, where public-sector investments have raised the quality of life and reduced gender inequality; the community, or district, level, where education and employment can heighten women's aspirations for their personal, marital, and economic welfare; and the micro-, or household, level, where the opinions of significant others in the lives of young women—including parents, community leaders, and eligible male partners—help to define the normative climate for family-formation decisions. Of principal interest is understanding how young women's high educational achievement, inert employment activity, late marriage, and low-fertility expectations are related to their status.

To gain insight into these issues, we use a combination of published census and sample survey results, data from a district survey fielded in late 1989, and focus-group commentary. The study setting is Kalutara District, which lies on the southwestern coast of Sri Lanka (Figure 1). We first report on social, economic, and demographic changes that have affected the structure of opportunities available to young women in Sri Lanka, particularly in Kalutara. This discussion highlights public investments in education, nutrition, health, and employment, which have reduced gender inequality and improved the position of young women in Sri Lankan and Kalutara society. The second half of the article focuses on the microlevel context, illustrating how young women's status is viewed by the women themselves, their mothers, social leaders, and young men. The focus-group discussions reveal the normative support that exists for young women's improved position in modern society.

Figure 1. Districts of Sri Lanka
The context of economic, social, and demographic change in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka, a former British colony that gained its independence in 1948, is an island nation having an estimated 16.9 million inhabitants as of 1991 (UN 1991). A 1986 United Nations study of patterns of social and economic development in Sri Lanka notes that the fertility transition there coincided with a decade of serious economic problems. Earlier rapid population growth exacerbated high unemployment in the 1960s, when insufficient jobs were available to meet the increased labor supply. Adverse trade conditions, reduced foreign-exchange earnings, rising prices, and the high level of unemployment precipitated a series of economic crises that persisted into the 1970s.

In 1977 a change of government and shift in development strategy led to liberalized trade and exchange, strengthened the private sector and created incentives for private investment, and reduced subsidies on food and other consumer goods. Several major irrigation and rural development programs were launched, and a free-trade zone was established. Between 1977 and 1984 the gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of nearly 6%, up from 3.0% during the early 1970s and 4.3% in the 1960s. Per capita gross national product increased from US $230 to the present $420.

Social indicators today portray a positive situation in Sri Lanka, reflecting the welfare-oriented development strategies of past and present governments in the areas of health and education. The most recent estimate (for 1982–87) of the infant mortality rate is 25 deaths per thousand, which is considerably below that of Thailand (43) and even lower than that of South Korea (27). The government’s expansion of free health and medical services undoubtedly accounts for much of the improvement in morbidity and mortality levels. A study by de A. Samarasinghe (1988) identifies several other programs of significance—major emphasis on housing construction during 1978–84; provision of pipe-borne water, especially to rural areas, with cost-recovery measures applied after 1981; and earmarking of funds to improve the health and living standards of estate (plantation) workers and their families. Although further inputs in specific areas of health care are needed, the service infrastructure is much better developed in Sri Lanka than in other countries with similar resource capacities.

On the education front, the policy of free education adopted in 1944 has been translated successfully into an expansion of school facilities, increased student enrollment, and substantial expenditure on education. Adult literacy is high, at 87%. Gender differences exist, but they are diminishing. Female literacy is estimated to be 83% and male literacy 91%, according to 1981 census figures; these levels represent roughly a 30% and a 15% increase, respectively, since 1953. A program to provide free textbooks to school children has been in place since 1981.

A United Nations (1986) review observes that the female labor force grew noticeably between 1946 and 1980 but not at a continuous pace. A 64% increase was recorded during the intercensal period of 1963–71, but the number of females in the labor force declined slightly (by 1.2%) between 1953 and 1963. Unemployment, as best as it can be measured for women, grew at a rate almost double that for men during 1963–71, at 22% per year versus 11%. Age-specific activity rates for females of ages 15–19 increased from 22% in 1963 to 27% in 1971 and then declined to 21% in 1980. Women of ages 20–29 also experienced a decline in economic activity during that period, from about 41% to 37%.

Analysis of the 1975 World Fertility Survey (UN 1985) shows that only 35% of currently married women were working at the time of the survey, the percentages being highest for women between the ages of 30 and 44. The overall picture is somewhat unclear and merits further consideration in light of the difficulty of measuring women’s employment.

The nutritional status of the population has benefited from a national food subsidy scheme begun during World War II. Although the program eventually placed a severe fiscal burden on government resources, it maintained adequate food availability to low-income and rural households (UN 1986:58). The UN study suggests that the program may have also lowered child-rearing costs to parents.

Other rural development programs, such as land settlement, electrification, and a guaranteed agricultural price scheme, have been shown to reduce fertility in recent years as the beneficiaries of those programs increasingly adopted birth control methods (Srisena and
Table 1. Singulate mean age at marriage, by sex and region: Sri Lanka, 1946–81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Colombo</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Kalutara</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Diff.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Diff.</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Diff.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td>u</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
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</table>


Stoeckel (1986). It is widely acknowledged that Sri Lanka, with its emphasis on public-sector investments, has achieved a degree of social progress that exceeds that of other countries with comparable per capita incomes (UNFPA 1986; UN 1986; World Bank 1978).

Postponement of marriage, which has been a dominant factor in Sri Lanka’s fertility decline, may be attributable in part to gains in women’s status; but the country’s economic depression is also likely to have played a role (Namboodiri 1981, 1983; Fernando 1985; UN 1986), leading not only to lower fertility but also to rising age at marriage among both women and men well into the 1970s. The sex differential in singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM), shown in Table 1, declined from 6.3 years in 1946 to 3.5 years by 1981, when SMAMs for males and females were 27.9 and 24.4, respectively. The female SMAM for 1987 has been estimated to be 24.8 (Sri Lanka, DCS, and DHS 1988), indicating little change in the female age pattern of entry into marriage over the 1981–86 period. What is striking is that Sri Lankan marriage ages, even in 1963, were already quite high, approaching those in the United States, a country with an annual per capita income level almost 40 times that of Sri Lanka.

As early as the 1960s, ages at which women were marrying began to rise in Sri Lanka, approaching those in the United States, a country with almost 40 times Sri Lanka’s per capita income level.

The total fertility rate for the period of 1982–86 was 2.83 children per woman, down from 3.38 during 1980–82 and 5.0 in 1963. An important factor in the fertility decline has been marriage postponement (Alam and Cleland 1981), but since 1980 another prominent factor has been the use of contraception within marriage (Thapa et al. 1988; Dangalle 1989). Age at marriage and age at first birth have shifted upward (Table 2), the interval between the two events remaining more or less constant at 19–20 months.

Recent international migration streams to oil-producing nations in the Middle East have greatly increased employment opportunities for Sri Lankans. Korale (1986) cites the loss of skilled professionals to Gulf States as an instance of the “brain drain” problem. Although the quality of outgoing labor is of concern to the government, demand for Sri Lankan labor in the Middle East has unquestionably relieved the serious problem of domestic unemployment. Remittances from citizens working abroad have become the second largest source of foreign revenues for the country. Women constitute the largest single group of labor migrants (Brochmann 1987; Eelens and Schampers 1990). Korale estimates that in 1981 about 20,000 women migrated to the Gulf area to serve as domestic workers in Arab households.

Table 2. Median age at first marriage and first birth, by current age, for all women 25–49: Sri Lanka, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current age</th>
<th>Median age at 1st marriage</th>
<th>Median age at 1st birth</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The context of economic, social, and demographic change in Kalutara District

Kalutara District, located on the southwestern coast of Sri Lanka, has about 830,000 inhabitants in 1981, or 7% of the total population. Although it is not entirely representative of the country’s population composition, being primarily Sinhalese and Buddhist, 79% of its population is agricultural (about the same proportion as nationally) and it closely mirrors the marriage and fertility patterns of the country as a whole (ESCAP 1986). We selected Kalutara for our study because it has sufficient compositional heterogeneity to serve as a social microcosm within which to investigate the correlates of young women’s status. According to the 1981 census, women between the ages of 15 and 29 constituted 14% of the district’s population.

To consider changes in women’s status in Kalutara since 1946 as reflected by age at marriage, school enrollment, and economic activity, we have relied primarily on district-level data from the most recent available census, that of 1981. The sex differential in age at marriage, which remained considerably at the national level, behaved similarly in Kalutara (Table 1). Postponement of marriage apparently began earlier in Kalutara and the capital city of Colombo than in the nation at large. The SMAM in those two places is about a year older than the national average for both males and females.

Table 3, presenting fertility and family planning indicators based on 1987 DHS data for Sri Lanka, Colombo, and zone 3 (which includes the three southwesternmost districts of Kalutara, Galle, and Matara), indicates that women in those three districts marry later, delay their first birth slightly longer, are more likely to be currently using contraception and less likely to be using sterilization, regard a somewhat smaller family size to be ideal, and want fewer births but experience more unwanted births on average than their counterparts in Colombo and the country at large. The women in zone 3, in other words, exhibit family-formation behaviors rivaling those in the industrialized nations.

Examining the activities of Kalutara males and females 10+

years of age at the time of the 1971 and 1981 censuses (Table 4), we find that gender differences in literacy favoring males have narrowed in Kalutara as much as they have nationally. More notable is the finding that in 1981, both nationally and in Kalutara, slightly higher percentages of females of ages 15–19 (43% in Sri Lanka and 47% in Kalutara) were attending school than males (41% and 45%, respectively)—a reversal of the ratio in 1971, when female attendance was below that of males.

The census data on employment activity reveal that females were only about two-fifths as active as males, nationally and in Kalutara, during both periods. Unemployment levels for males were higher nationally, at 13%, in 1981, and 2.5 times as high for females, at 32%. The situation was aggravated in Kalutara, where female unemployment was about 13 percentage points higher than the national level and male unemployment was about seven points higher. Moreover, between 1971 and 1981 the gender difference in unemployment in-

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1. Although male migration shows signs of abatement, female migration is expected to grow. Brocmann suggests that this dependency on transitory income can be a potential future problem. Eileens and Schampers note that migration hampers the social emancipation of the individual migrant because women’s status in destination countries is generally lower than in Sri Lanka.

2. The 1991 census was postponed on account of political disturbances in the northern part of the country. There has not been another DHS since 1987.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Median age</th>
<th>% now using FPa</th>
<th>% sterilizeda</th>
<th>Ideal no. of childrenb</th>
<th>TFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st marriage</td>
<td>1st birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 3c</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TFR—total fertility rate per woman.

a. Among currently married women, ages 15–49.

b. Among ever-married women, ages 15–49.

c. Zone 3 consists of Kalutara, Galle, and Matara districts (see Figure 1).
creased to the detriment of females. Their unfavorable prospects for employment probably influenced them to remain in school.

These differentials can be seen more clearly for 1981 in Figures 2 and 3, in which we have subdivided the economically active into the employed and the unemployed (that is, those not currently working but seeking work.) The economically nonactive population is subdivided into students and a residual "other" category.

Nearly half of males and females were enrolled in school in the 15–19 age group, but this proportion was less than one-tenth for both sexes in the 20–24 age group. The percentage of males who were employed was consistently higher than that of females in all age groups, and at ages 25–44 the percentage of women who were unemployed was higher than that of men.

The percentage of females in the "other" category rose persistently with age. This category includes persons who state that they work in their own home or are retired or unable to work. The "other" category thus claimed a greater proportion of older women as larger numbers of women formerly in the labor force left it either because they could not find employment or because they chose to concentrate their activities in the household.

These cross-sectional data suggest that labor force participation for women is a transitional stage between leaving school and starting families. It would be unwise, however, to treat the cross-sectional data as describing the experience of real cohorts of women, especially when we know that school atten-

Table 4. Sex differences in educational and employment indicators: Sri Lanka and Kalutara District, 1971 and 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator and year</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
<th>Kalutara District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% literate (ages 10+)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% attending school (ages 15–19)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% economically active (ages 10+)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% unemployed (ages 10+)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 2. Percentage distribution of Kalutara males by economic activity within age groups

dance at older ages has been increasing and age at marriage has been rising.

Figures 4 and 5 show the four categories of economic activity for the female population of Kalutara subdivided into those single and those ever married or in a union at the time of the 1981 census. Unfortunately, tabulations by marital status were not available that included the student category. Instead we have divided the activities of those not in the labor force into the categories of housework and "other." At ages under 30, those engaged in "other" activities are mostly students, but at older ages they include those unable to work and the retired.

By age 50, some 95% of the female population of Kalutara had ever married, so that the distribution of the older single population by economic activity has little bearing on the distribution of the total female population at older ages. Among single females, 57% of the 15–19-year-olds and 19% of the 20–24-year-olds were engaged in "other" activities, compared with only 5.8% and 3.2%, respectively, of those age groups among the ever-married, indicating that few women who married stayed in school.

Among single Kalutara women between ages 20 and 39, the proportion who were economically active (that is, in the labor force and either employed or unemployed) outweighed the proportion engaged in housework. In contrast, some two-thirds of all ever-married women at those ages were engaged in housework. Remarkably high percentages of single women—40% at ages 20–29, 35% at age 30–34, and
27% at ages 35–39—reported themselves as economically active but unemployed. Among married women the percentages unemployed at those ages were less than half as large. But the percentages of employed women in the 20–39 age groups were only slightly higher for single women than for those ever married.

All of this suggests that Kalutara women are strongly inclined to remain in the work force, holding or seeking employment, until they marry. After marriage those who have been unsuccessful at finding employment probably drop out of the economically active population and define themselves as homemakers. A notable 20–25% of married women between ages 35 and 55, however, remained employed in 1981.

The microlevel context for young women’s status in Kalutara

What are the actual experiences of young women in Kalutara? In an effort to assess both their own and the community’s perceptions of their social position, work opportunities, timing of marriage, and family size, we have drawn upon the results of a survey of young women fielded between August and November 1989 by the Family Planning Association of Lanka. This was a self-weighted probability sample of 2,729 households in which all females between ages 15 and 29 were interviewed.

Trained staff from the Family Planning Association also led discussions with focus groups in Kalutara to explore perceptions of the rights, obligations, and aspirations of young women. Participants in the focus groups included young, unmarried, employed and unemployed women; young men; community leaders; and the mothers of women in the 15–29 age group.

Average age of the 1,535 women interviewed was 21.5 years. Approximately one-fifth were currently married. A majority (78%) of the young women were Sinhalese, and the next largest ethnic group consisted of Moors (20%), who are predominately Muslim. Only 11% had less than a primary school education, 24% had completed primary school, 34% had completed 10 years of schooling constituting the ordinary, or O, level, and the balance (31%) had had some higher secondary education. Among the last group, 17% had completed 12 years of schooling (the advanced, or A, level). More than four-fifths of the sample listened to the radio daily or read a newspaper each week.

Only 14% reported themselves as currently working, for either an unrelated employer or a family business or farm, whereas 35% were seeking work. Of the 2,729 households sampled, about one-third had members who were working away from home; one-half of the absent workers were women, of whom 30% were married. About 40% of those working elsewhere had jobs abroad, whereas the rest were working in Sri Lanka. The most common local destination was Colombo (40%); the most likely foreign destination was the Middle East (36%). These findings are consistent with the results of other

Figure 5. Percentage distribution of ever-married Kalutara females by economic activity within age groups


(continued on page 109)

This book is the result of research initiated in 1986–87 and partially updated in 1989. It views urbanization processes from a rural perspective, and, as stated by the authors, can be read on two levels. The more universal level concerns transformations of peasant life and livelihood generated by the expanding influences of large urban agglomerations. The authors are careful to point out that these transformations precede actual absorption of rural areas into the “limits of city growth.” In other words, they are concerned with areas that still look rural but have begun in many ways to act urban. They are thus not focusing on urbanization as a physical process marked by the expansion of a built environment that is familiarly urban, but rather on what Pearse and others long ago referred to as an incorporative drive whereby peasant societies are transformed through their inclusion in the orbit of an expanding metropolitan-centered market economy and the increasing reach of a modernized bureaucratic state.

At this level, and contrary to the authors’ assertion (p. 3) that because the book “breaks new ground” they cannot relate it to other past or present rural studies, the adopted framework is closely associated with a large body of literature on rural transformations that covers such themes as the penetration of capitalist modes of production into precapitalist agrarian societies; the collapse of the “moral economy” of the peasantry; the liberation of the “rational” peasant; the commercialization of agriculture stimulated by the urbanization process; and the transfer of labor from agriculture to nonagricultural occupations, along with an expanding bid-rent curve of urban land uses. The book does not sustain discourse on this level, however, and gives only indirect hints about how the richness of data that fills it can also provide insights into the many theoretical debates that have been central to much of the literature on agrarian change.

The book’s main contributions are to be gleaned from the second level of discussion, namely, the presentation of an impressive amount of data on in situ urbanization of villagers in selected villages around the expanding metropolitan region of Kuala Lumpur. As the subtitle of the book declares, it is concerned with what happens to “villages, villagers and their land” as forces of urbanization move into rural areas. It explores the ways in which land relations are transformed in a dynamic matrix of dissolving customary land uses, the presence of state regulation, and the increasing dominance of market forces.

One of the more interesting aspects of these relationships revealed in the analysis is how the commodification of land has created twists in government regulations that, instead of fulfilling their intended purpose of protecting the Malay from land price inflation, actually result in widespread rises of land prices and the inability of peasants to resist processes of social stratification associated with inequalities in access to land. But, again, the ramifications of these processes are largely left to the reader to pursue outside of the text of the book.

Chapter 1, “Problem, Context and Approach,” puts forth a major, and often-repeated, observation that contemporary transportation revolutions have made the rural–urban dichotomy of decreasing utility as rural areas are “swallowed” and experience in-situ urbanization. The theme is well taken, and had the authors given more attention to the wider literature on it, they could have made valuable contributions to such current discussions as those put forth by McGee and others on desakotasa (rural–urban-ization), on new forms of labor mobility and circular migration, and on such questions as whether these processes are uniquely Asian (e.g., associated with “rice cultures”), pertain only to developing countries, or are occurring on a world scale.

Chapter 2, “Malays and Their Land,” characterizes the arrival of capitalism as a radically transforming process that, inter alia, initiates freedom of individual ownership and land speculation, which undermine the self-sufficient corporate village in which usufruct rights traditionally prevailed. Some of the
most interesting discussions about changes in land use are found here. The precolonial social classification of unused land as "dead," which allowed it then to be used by someone other than the "owner," is contrasted with the market system's allowance of holding idle land. The commodification of land is found to have undermined the communal adat system and, along with it, the common-property aspects of land use (which, unfortunately, are not discussed).

Changes in the institutional arrangements regulating land use also induced new forms of social conflict, enabling the British and Chinese subsequently to use the new rules governing land ownership to accumulate land. Thus the theme is presented that the Malay are marginalized in the colonial economy, and this marginalization is further aggravated by Malay land losses and exacerbated by the emergence of a cash economy, the ability to use land as collateral for loans, and new patterns of consumption linked to the need for cash—all of this despite the establishment of Malay land reservations and the adoption of many laws designed to protect the Malay.

This conflict between bumiputra (indigenous Malay) and other racial and ethnic groups is a long-standing theme in Malaysian politics and academic studies. Although it is captivating, there is a tendency to treat the Malay population as having little internal stratification—a tendency reminiscent of Geertz's classic study of agricultural involution on Java.

Chapter 3, "Changes in Land Use," and Chapter 4, "Land Tenure, Transfer and Sale," continue the analysis into postcolonial times through a study of four communities, each within the orbit of but at a different distance from Kuala Lumpur. Rich in historical detail in changes in land use, the discussion is useful for bringing home a much overlooked feature of what is often summarized as "rural," namely the great variation among villages even within a relatively small geographical area.

Most of this detail is discussed in relation to a single proposition: distance from the metropolitan core explains, to a great extent, degree of commercialization and changes in land-use and land-ownership patterns. Given the focus on land-use changes, one of the many dimensions that could have been added is the changing built environment they bring. Elsewhere, such as in the rural areas being incorporated into the Bangkok metropolis, in situ urbanization is producing land-use changes that are overlaid by a topsy-turvy "postmodern" pattern in which large areas of paddy land are taken over by grass grown for golf courses and are dotted with second homes with subsistence gardens sprouting huge science-fiction-like satellite dishes for weekenders from the city. More attention to this layer of change would have given the reader a more complete understanding of the ramifications of in situ urbanization.

The main point brought out in the focus on land-use changes is that great spatial variation exists in the levels of external ownership and the health of the agricultural economy. Price inflation of land in the 1970s and 1980s led to the withdrawal of labor inputs in agriculture, which, particularly near Kuala Lumpur, facilitated land transfers to urban uses and a boom in nonagricultural employment. Similarly, urbanization is found to be on a continuum in the four communities, ranging from incipient in the periphery to almost total near the outer edges of the capital city. In assessing winners and losers in the in situ urbanization process, the authors group households into four categories: residents with a landed stake in the community; residents who have purchased land outside the community; absentee landholders; and tenants. Since land laws protect Malay from outright eviction, they are brought into the urban sphere in other, more subtle ways: through the growth of new employment opportunities, new land uses, undreamed of prices for land, access to urban facilities, and new outlooks and patterns of consumption.

The analysis provides a useful feel of the socio-spatial texture of ongoing changes. The reader's understanding is further increased by Chapter 5, "The People of the Four Communities," which is based on observations made by the various authors during two- to three-week stays and the undertaking of a survey covering a total of 731 households in the communities. The authors are careful to note that the survey was not random and therefore the findings cannot be said to be representative of the communities in question.

The findings themselves contain few, if any, surprises, and are not directed toward raising points of theory or debate. They mostly serve to confirm what a vast body of research has documented elsewhere. Demographic conditions, for exam-
found to be closely related toomic ones; thus children from the household are likely to be working in the city or other locations.

Chapter 6, "Inequality within and between Communities," expands on the theme that inequality in land use is the basis for inequality in income, which are profound. Rice farmers and rubber tappers comprise 45 percent of the poor in Malaysia, and more than one-fifth of the households were found to be living in poverty at the time of the survey in 1988. But around Kuala Lumpur, the rapid growth of employment severely limits the employment classification to describe relations between and within the rich. In the four villages, the average income is from traditional employment; this range from more than RM 1000 to nearly RM 3000 per month, with or without the help of a monthly pension or other income source. The chapter provides and expenditure data by occupation and shows that the pro-poor households are those where the incomes of the family members are significant. The data do not suggest any bias; they are presented in a way that reveals the extent of the problem.

The text of the concluding chapter, "The Body of a Village; the Mind of a City," is extremely brief and is absorbed by observations about changing attitudes toward land and land use. The section "Implications for Method and Theory" repeats the observation that the dichotomy between rural and urban is breaking down in mega-urban regions. Since this is already a well-established view among many geographers and regional planners, the absence of any effort either to extend it theoretically or to draw implications for policy and planning makes the exhortation to overcome the limitations of the rural–urban dichotomy of less use than the authors proclaim it to be.

The one policy issue touched upon in the concluding chapter is the authors' advocacy of the removal of what they see as an anachronistic and counterproductive Malay land reservation system. The implicit acceptance of private ownership and commodification of land seems, however, to be at odds with the general tone of the foregoing historical analysis. Without further elaboration, it remains a curiosity rather than a cogently presented position. It is linked neither to the larger context of social and economic inequalities nor, since the first author of the book has written extensively on the topic elsewhere, to the recent interest in the relationship between property regimes and environmental management questions. The latter topic has generated much concern in view of the environmentally threatening expansion of the urban-industrial economy of Kuala Lumpur and the Klang Valley.

In sum, the book is likely to be of most use as a reference and data source for an audience of readers interested in ongoing transformations in Malaysia. It is rich in statistics on changes in land use, access to land, employment structures, and social and economic inequality. Many of the data and themes suggested in the book can be linked with existing literature and debates on agrarian change; but, as indicated by the almost complete absence of references to this literature in the book's bibliography, making these linkages is left largely to the reader.
What the book does successfully portray are many of the land-related impacts of an accelerated pace of urbanization in a country that once had one of the smallest capital city regions in Asia. For that reason alone, it is a useful addition to the library of work on contemporary urbanization processes in Asia.

—Mike Douglass
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This is the latest of the biennial population updates for urban and rural areas prepared by the Population Division of the UN’s Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Data from new censuses and surveys have been used to estimate and project the size and growth of the urban and rural populations for all countries of the world, and for urban agglomerations with populations of at least one million by 1900.

Chapter 1 describes past trends and prospects for urban and rural populations. Mid-1900 figures show 45% (2.4 billion) of the world’s population living in urban areas and nearly two-thirds of urban dwellers living in less developed regions.

Thirty-seven percent of the population in the less developed regions (1.5 billion) and 73% of the population in the more developed regions (0.9 billion) were urban. The projections indicate that the level of urbanization for the world as a whole will reach 51% by the year 2000 and 58% in 2025. The less developed regions will contain 70% of the world’s urban population by the year 2000 and 80% by 2025.

Although the urban population growth rate is now declining in both developed and developing regions, the urban population growth rate for the world as a whole has continued to rise. This anomaly is due to the increasing proportion of the world’s population living in the less developed regions, which are exhibiting faster urban and total growth rates than the developed regions.

Chapter II presents trends and prospects for the world’s largest urban agglomerations and describes their regional distributions. By 1990 one-third of the world urban population was living in agglomerations of 1 million or more inhabitants and one-tenth lived in agglomerations of 8 million or more. Mexico City, with a population of approximately 20.2 million, had become the world’s largest urban agglomeration, surpassing Tokyo/Yokohama, São Paulo, and New York in population size.

In 1950 seven of the 10 largest urban agglomerations were in the more developed regions. By 1990 only three of the 10 were in more developed regions. By the year 2000 there are projected to be 28 mega-cities (urban agglomerations with 8 million or more inhabitants each), only six of which will be in the more developed regions. Many of these cities will be primate cities, containing sizable proportions of their countries’ populations. Population growth rates between 1970 and 1980 indicate a generally strong statistical relationship between total population growth and mega-city growth.

Chapter III provides the sources of data for each country and adjustment procedures used for estimating the population of urban areas and urban agglomerations. This information should be of interest to researchers and planners who wish to do further analysis of urbanization trends.

Fifteen annex tables present detailed characteristics of urban and rural populations and urban agglomerations. Annex tables A.1 to A.4 provide, for each country and regional aggregate, the percentage of the national population residing in urban areas and the sizes of urban, rural, and total populations. Annex tables A.5 to A.7 present average annual rates of change for urban, rural, and total populations in every country and regional aggregate. Annex tables A.8 and A.9 give the rate of urbanization and ruralization for countries and regions. Population trends of urban agglomerations from 1950 to 2000 and related indices are shown in annex tables A.10 to A.15.

United Nations monographs such as this provide authoritative statistics that are extremely useful to researchers and planners. Persons wishing to use the data in computer format have the option of buying diskettes formatted in ASCII and Lotus 1–2–3 for IBM-PCs and compatible microcomputers or in ASCII (text) and Microsoft Excel for the
Landlessness and Migration in Nepal

An increasing volume of migration from the hills of Nepal to the Tarai lowlands, a region of endemic malaria until the 1950s, has been the most conspicuous feature of Nepal’s population dynamics in recent decades. In 1981 nearly 400,000 hill people were recorded as intercensal lifetime migrants in the Tarai. This migration occurs overwhelmingly between rural areas and traditionally has taken the form of frontier land colonization. As a consequence, the forests of the northern Tarai and inner Tarai are rapidly being lost or degraded.

The conventional view of this phenomenal migration, which regards migration as an amalgamation of individual movements, has tended to offer a simple explanation: high population–land ratios and consequent economic and ecological problems “push” people out of the hills, whereas low population–land ratios, relatively high productivity of agriculture, and prospects for spontaneous settlements “pull” land-hungry hill folk to the Tarai. Rarely has Nepalese frontier migration been seen as a socioeconomic and eco-demographic process, or have explanations been sought in the realm of the social relations of production borne out of Nepal’s policies as a dependent, patrimonial state.

Nanda Shrestha’s book Landlessness and Migration in Nepal breaks new ground in providing an essential political-economy perspective, and in so doing provides the most cogent and comprehensive analysis available on the causes, consequences, and implications of frontier migration in Nepal. Unlike others who have dealt with Nepal’s migration issue, Shrestha situates the problem in its proper context and provides altogether new and novel insights.

He reformulates theoretical constructs and makes them relevant to the Nepalese situation. In its approach and methodology, in its theoretical rigor and innovative uses of census and survey data, his book is a landmark for Nepalese studies in general and Nepalese migration studies in particular. Its central thesis is that frontier migration in Nepal has helped to propagate landlessness, near-landlessness, and spontaneous settlement at the frontier, thereby undermining local as well as national development.

Chapter 1 presents a profile of Nepal’s agrarian economy and an overview of interregional migration. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical basis for analyzing the Nepalese migration process. Shrestha describes how, in the course of the last century or so, the politically dominant hill region of Nepal has degenerated into an economic periphery. He attributes contemporary hill underdevelopment to a biased allocation of resources in a context in which underdevelopment, dependency, and migration reinforce each other. In that context migration “is a manifestation of, and necessary response to, the social and spatial arrangements and rearrangements of the national economy in which the dependent state plays a determinate role through its control over the social as well as spatial distribution of capital” (p. 53).

In his theoretical analysis of migration in relation to the social factors of production and uneven geographical development, Shrestha discerns three major issues: who migrates, why migration occurs, and how migration affects migrants and developments. The class position of migrants and their consequent migration choice (strategic versus survival) form the basis of the author’s structural theory of migration. For the migrants of the lower classes migration becomes merely a holding action, “a transitory spatial escape from the harsh realities of one regressive social structure to a different but equally prohibitive one” (p. 65).

With this theoretical background, he presents in chapter 3 a lucid historical analysis of external migration and underdevelopment in the context of Nepalese state policies. He regards contemporary migration as the perpetuation of a process begun in the early phase of underdevelopment in the hills, which resulted largely from regressive institutional arrangements.

Chapter 4 provides the theoretical basis for analyzing landlessness and near-landlessness in the context of
frontier migration. The author presents an innovative theory of landlessness and near-landlessness anchored to the concept of eco-demographic relations of production. Viewing people’s production relationships with land within the context of the existing class structure, Shrestha argues that high population growth tends to aggravate eco-demographic problems of production and creates conditions for an increase in landlessness and near-landlessness, which in turn induce outmigration. These conditions can be seen in the Nepalese hills.

Whereas the first four chapters provide an overview of the causes of landlessness and migration, the last three deal more directly with the process and consequences of frontier migration. Chapter 5 analyzes the social and economic origins of Nepal’s land-colonization policy, showing how in recent years the policy has been the “great conciliator between the vested interests of large landowners and the survival needs of the land hungry peasants” (p. 146). The author demonstrates how a patrimonial state is inherently incapable of solving poverty and its attendant problems of landlessness, and how planning has failed to effectively convert the potential for surplus production to an actual surplus.

How has frontier migration affected hill migrants? The answer to this question, which is central to Shrestha’s thesis, forms the core of chapter 6. After tracing a brief history of the colonial and peripheral status of the Tarai during the evolution of the Nepalese state, he presents an analysis of data from a survey he did of how hill migrant households fared at the Tarai frontier in the two Tarai districts of Chitwan and Nawal Parasi in 1988. The analysis reveals that for most migrants migration has been a “transitory spatial escape” from the harsh social and economic realities of the hills. The same socioeconomic and demographic processes, however, are operative in the destination, making the structural trap complete. In spite of increasing migration, settlement, and land encroachment, near-landlessness is on the rise.

The final chapter focuses on the politics of land and explores the prospects for an agrarian revolution in the frontier. The politics of common land in the Tarai has given rise to “professional landless” and “pretenders” to landlessness. Middle peasants, who historically have formed the core of a peasant revolution, in Nepal are conspicuous by their absence. Ironically, spontaneous settlements have acted as the immediate roadblock to an agrarian revolution. Shrestha concludes that despite persistent near-landlessness, the likelihood of an agrarian revolution in the frontier appears remote, though not entirely out of the question.

Landlessness and Migration in Nepal should be required reading for students of contemporary Nepalese affairs, and for Nepalese policymakers whose task it is to make a break from the policies and designs of a patrimonial state.

Nevertheless, three issues that deserve attention do not find an adequate place in the author’s analysis.

The first relates to the root cause of frontier migration: the underdevelopment of the hills. Underdevelopment indicates the existence of potential that remains to be realized. Given the absence of an analysis of that potential and of the conditions under which it might come into use, one wonders whether the underdevelopment of the hills is a fait accompli.

The second issue concerns the social classes in Nepal’s hills. Although class structure remains central to the study, the distinctive characteristics of the hill people and their social relations of production are not addressed explicitly in this study.

The third issue relates to the increasing urbanization of the Tarai. Many frontier settlements are emerging as market centers and small towns. Their growth has been facilitated by the development of roads. Rural-to-urban migration also appears to be on the rise in Nepal. What are the implications of this process for the contemporary class configuration in the Tarai? Does it have the potential to hasten the proletarianization of the near-landless that has been postponed thus far? One hopes that Nanda Shrestha will provide scholarly insight to these issues in the future.

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Michel Oksenberg Assumes Post of East–West Center President

Michel Oksenberg, a noted Asia scholar and former White House adviser, was selected by the East–West Center’s board of governors to head the Center and began his tenure as president on 6 January 1992, replacing Interim President Kenji Sumida. Oksenberg came to the Center from the University of Michigan, where he had been director of the Center for Chinese Studies and professor of political science.

Oksenberg, 53, received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University in 1969. He joined the Michigan faculty in 1973, after teaching at Stanford University for two years and Columbia University for eight years. From 1977 to 1980, on leave from Michigan, he served as a senior staff member of the National Security Council in Washington, D.C., with special responsibility for China and Indochina. He has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since 1973, serves on the editorial boards of two scholarly journals, and is the author of numerous publications on China’s domestic affairs, foreign policy, and relations with the United States.

During his first months as president, Oksenberg plans to interview individual researchers and key staff members and to hold meetings with community leaders to discuss the Center’s roles and mission. At his request, Sumida has agreed to serve as executive vice president for several months.

Fourteenth Population Census Conference Scheduled for Tokyo in May

The East–West Center’s Population Institute and the Statistics Bureau of Japan will hold the Fourteenth Population Census Conference in Tokyo, Japan, during 26–29 May 1992. The conference will focus on two broad themes—use of data from the 1990 round of censuses and planning for intercensal surveys. Heads of national statistical offices or their designees from 20 countries and several organizations are expected to attend. Takeyuki Sasajima of the Statistics Bureau of Japan and Griffith Feehey of the East–West Population Institute will coordinate the meeting. The conference is being held in conjunction with the Sixth Meeting of the Heads of National Statistical Offices of East Asian countries, which immediately precedes the Census Conference.

Conference sessions will include status reports on the recent censuses, data processing, sample surveys, planning for future operations, analysis of census data, and dissemination and use of the data.

Countries to be represented at the conference are Australia, Bangladesh, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Organizations taking part include the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Statistical Institute of Asia and the Pacific, and the South Pacific Commission.

Fertility Estimation Programs Available from the East–West Population Institute

EASWESPOP — Fertility Estimate Programs Version 2.0, an interactive software package, is now available from the Population Institute of the East–West Center. The package contains the following indirect methods of fertility estimation:

- P/F Ratio Method from United Nations Manual X
- Parity Increment Method from United Nations Manual X
- Rele’s Method
- Palmore’s Regression Method
- Gunasekaran–Palmore Method
- Complete Own-Children Method by Cho et al.

Features new to Version 2.0 include:
- On-line help
- A menu-driven interface
- A full-screen text editor
- The ability to save input data to a hard disk

Minimum system requirements are IBM compatibility, DOS 3.0 or higher, and 512K RAM. The software is available on a 5¼-inch diskette and comes with a user’s manual. Price is US $15.00. Send orders to:

Distribution Office
East–West Center
1777 East-West Road
Honolulu, HI 96844, U.S.A.

Institutions and individuals in developing countries of the Asian–Pacific region are eligible to receive the package without charge. Address requests to:

Data Analysis Officer
Population Institute
East–West Center
1777 East–West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848, U.S.A.
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ALSO NOTED


This English-language newsletter contains articles on a variety of topics likely to be of interest to health and population professionals in the Philippines, such as the national health plan and the transmission of the AIDS virus through commercial blood banks, to mention two from a recent issue. It also contains announcements of new publications and descriptions of research projects and proposals.

Diarrheal Diseases in the Southern Philippines: A Case Study Approach by Marilou Palabrina-Costello and Michael A. Costello. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1992. Available from International Development Research Centre, 250 Albert Street, PO. Box 8590, Ottawa, Ontario K1G 3H9, Canada; and from the authors, c/o Research Institute for Mindanao Culture, Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines.

According to a recent announcement in the HRV Health Research Network (see item above), this report by two researchers at the Research Institute for Mindanao Culture, Xavier University, in Cagayan de Oro City "analyzes the factors involved in the transmission and case management of diarrhea, particularly as found among lower income families in Cagayan de Oro and a rural municipality in Bukidnon province. Unlike previous researchers, Palabrina-Costello and Costello utilized an anthropological-type approach, so as to discover in a better way the deep-seated attitudes ... held about diarrheal disease by the respondents. The emphasis is therefore upon both disease-related behaviors and the reasons given by the people for acting in the way they do."


The Scalabrini Migration Center (SMC) is a nonprofit research institute founded in 1987 to encourage and facilitate the study of socio-demographic, economic, political, psychological, historical, legislative, and religious aspects of human migration and refugee movements from and within Asia. According to Editor Battistella, "the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal is expressly dedicated to an interdisciplinary approach to the topic [of migration] and the region and aims to gather and foster the interest of scholars, policymakers and practitioners for a more thorough and informed analysis of migration and its relevance" (Vol. 1, No. 1, p. iv).


The International Statistical Programs Center (ISP) of the U.S. Bureau of the Census has trained more than 11,000 statisticians, computer specialists, and data users in Washington, D.C., headquarters and throughout the world during the past 46 years. This publication describes its 1992–93 training program, which offers 32 options for long-term training and workshops. Course descriptions cover the subject areas of computer technology, data collection and dissemination, sampling and statistical methods, demography, and economic statistics. The booklet also contains a quick reference guide to the available training options; information about the ISP and an overview of the training programs; information about costs, admission procedures, and sponsorship; and two application forms, a reply card, and a calendar of activities.
Young Women's Work and Family Formation . . .
(continued from page 100)

studies mentioned earlier, which reported substantial overseas female labor migration. Three-quarters of the households with labor migrants reported receiving remitted earnings from the absent workers.

Social position. The survey results confirmed the strong educational achievements of young women in Kalutara, as did focus-group comments from mothers acknowledging their daughters’ acquisition of education-based skills. Referring to differences between their daughters’ social status compared with their own at the same age, several mothers commented on their daughters’ superior knowledge:

In education they [the daughters] have improved. They know more about health than we do.

They know many things we didn’t know then.

With progress in science they have come to know many things.

We say that something is not good. They think it is good. When we think about it, they turn out to be right.

Some mothers identified their daughters’ ability to interact with others in public as a significant aspect of the change in their daughters’ social roles:

Our daughters say “We know how to move in society, unlike our mothers.”

In those days we were [too] shy to face society, even to talk. Now they are not.

They go out and mix with people.

They speak boldly.

The mothers perceived their daughters’ education as empowering the daughters to deal with barriers:

They are not afraid to face problems and find problems.

If they stay with us [at home], they will not have a future.

Some mothers, however, tempered their enthusiasm about the extent of change between their own generation and that of their daughters:

Today they are also headstrong.

There are times when some children use their freedom in the wrong way.

Unmarried young men (ages 25–29), when asked about the social position of young women, also expressed ambivalence about the changes:

This is happening all over the world, not only here. They [young women] think of equal status. They think once they are educated, they should invariably have a job also.

They get together and mix in large numbers. Their freedom has increased. They exchange ideas and build up their own world and values.

They tend to disregard and give up the restrictions imposed on them earlier and enjoy their new freedom. It is not a good thing. They are not using their freedom in a beneficial way.

Freedom is necessary, but there must be limits. Full freedom must not be given. They take advantage. They are not mature enough to de-

cide on their own.

With respect to the optimal means for guiding young women in exercising their new freedom, however, the young men had differing views:

Usually parents are responsible for these affairs. They must be more tactful with their children. They should treat their children and speak to them like friends and discuss and settle their personal problems.

But these things cannot be 100% successful. Rules must be laid down and [young women] made to follow [them] strictly or otherwise [be] punished.

You cannot expect them [young women] to be of good behavior by enacting a set of rules or by compulsion. They must be made to understand [the rules’] usefulness and follow them on their own.

Among community leaders, one, a businessman, commented,

Young women now enjoy much more freedom, and with freedom can come more privileges. But with freedom can also come more complications for them. Twenty years ago you never saw so many young women getting about very freely, very differently dressed [from the way they are] now, and you never saw them moving so freely with young men. With this freedom some may be creating complications, but generally I think it is for the better.

Another proprietor remarked,

It is quite clear that not only
young women but even young men have more rights and privileges. This is a good thing. They are generally better educated now, and it is only fair that they should have a greater part in deciding their own future.

The focus-group comments suggest the existence of considerable communal and maternal support for the new social skills that young women have acquired along with higher levels of education. The comments of young men, on the other hand, evidence concern about the ability of the young women to use their new social freedom appropriately. The discussions provided insights into the relationship between young women’s education and work that could not be easily explored in the survey questionnaire. At the same time, they suggested that those closest to young women must make social adjustments in response to changes in the women’s social status.

**Work opportunities.** In the focus-group discussions young unmarried and unemployed Kalutara women were asked how they felt about working outside the home. Virtually none of them identified any barriers to such employment. Typical of their comments were the following:

- **If I can get a job I like, I can work outside. There would be no restrictions.**

- **Even if there are difficulties, I do not mind going outside to work.**

- **We have decided to get a job, and it will help us economically. So we don’t mind going outside and may not listen to our parents sometimes.**

Some of the women recognized potential problems caused by working away from home, particularly in the growing garment-manufacturing industry, which provides the largest source of nonagricultural female employment:

- **We have heard stories about girls who have gone outside and had trouble, but if we have self-confidence and persist, then we can face the problems and be safe.**

- **There may be problems if we get jobs in the garment factories. Because if we go there, there is no freedom and the workload is heavy. Although the work finishes at 5 o’clock, sometimes you have to stay longer.**

The young women had a strong desire to find employment, as the survey results shown in Table 5 indicate. More than half of them stated that it was very difficult to find regular paid employment, and another third judged it to be difficult. Comments from the focus-group participants illustrate the problems they faced:

- **I left school in 1986, and since then I have been sending in job applications but have not yet been successful.**

- **I have sent in many applications, but I have received a reply for only one. That one was from the Apprenticeship Board [AB]; they asked if I would like to go for dressmaking. I applied for other jobs under the AB but so far have not received any appointments.**

- **I apply for all the jobs that I see in the papers, but I haven’t gotten one so far.**

- **Whenever we meet anybody from**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>% distribution or % responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How difficult do you think it is to find regular paid work these days?</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very difficult</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After leaving school did you plan to work right away?</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel there are enough work opportunities locally for persons with such skills as yours?</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If not, what about in a nearby or larger town or city?</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(For those not currently working:) Are you now looking for work?</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of employment search</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 12 months</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12–23 months</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24–35 months</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 months or more</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times respondent applied for jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three times</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four to six times</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven or more times</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How confident are you that you will find a paying job soon?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat confident</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not confident</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of respondents = 1,555</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Colombo, we ask them to find a job for us.

A teacher’s comment confirms the young women’s perceptions:

_The main issue is employment. This is the main reason for the youth unrest. This applies to both men and women. We have provided them with a good education and left them in the lurch._

_When asked about work opportunities, 93% of young Kalutara women replied that it was difficult or very difficult to find regular paid work. Eighty-two percent had been looking for work for at least 12 months. Only 34% had any confidence that they would find a job soon._

More than one-third of the women surveyed planned to work after completing their education. Only one-fourth believed that adequate job opportunities existed locally or that more jobs might be available in a larger town or city nearby. Forty percent were currently seeking employment, and more than half had applied for jobs at least four times. About half had been seeking work for two or more years. As a result, about as many were dubious about finding employment soon.

_Volunteerism as a job substitute._ We hypothesized that for young women a possible alternative to employment in Kalutara’s sluggish labor market might be civic volunteerism. In an environment of limited paid job opportunities, we reasoned, volunteerism might function as a shadow domain offering work experiences qualitatively similar to formal employment and would have similar effects on fertility aspirations. A recent study by de Silva (1988) of the 4,092 volunteers of the Family Planning Association of Sri Lanka found that 85% were females, 87% had a tenth-grade or higher education, and 85% were single. Moreover, a great majority of volunteers were young: one-fourth were under age 20 and another 62% were in their 20s.

We could find little formal documentation of the extent of volunteerism in Sri Lanka, but informal observations made to us by Sri Lankans indicate that young women with a secondary education represent an important source of unremunerated labor for community development initiatives, serving as local agents for public health, community, and other social service programs. Because such activities may have work-related value for young women, by providing them with training in useful skills and giving them opportunities for interaction with the public, we aimed to assess its prevalence in the posteducation, premarital period.

The survey results indicate that only 13% of the young women had such experience. Nevertheless, that percentage is as high as the percentage of young women who were gainfully employed at the time of the survey. Of the 205 women with volunteer experience, 76% had worked or were working with government-sponsored programs. More than 90% of them believed their volunteer service would help their chances of finding paying jobs because of the skills training (89%) and the job references they could expect from their volunteer organizations (67%). Other advantages of their volunteer service mentioned by the woman included making a contribution to community welfare (52%), having something meaningful to do (44%), and being able to work away from home (40%).

The following comments from volunteers in a focus group illustrate their desire to be socially useful:

_I was doing nothing at home. I thought of doing some service. When a youth committee was formed in the village, I joined it._

Many young, unmarried women in Sri Lanka work as volunteers for service organizations. Those shown here are volunteers for the Family Planning Association in Kalutara District.
After leaving school, I wasn't doing anything at home. I volunteered willingly.

There are a variety of deficiencies in our village, such as health problems, and so on. I thought that some service could be done to the community through such an association. I got them latrines, etc. I thought we could share what we learned and be useful.

When I was young, I had an idea to get a job in a health institution. I took the course at St. John's Ambulance. Unfortunately, I couldn't continue my studies. There are many problems facing the villages. Children suffer from illnesses due to the mothers' ignorance. The health officer held meetings; we were asked to help at the family planning and immunization clinics, distribute Thripsha (weaning foods), and so on. I couldn't proceed further in my studies. I thought this service would be helpful. We derive some satisfaction from this work.

Young women who were in the job market but unemployed were asked if they thought the volunteer experience would help them find jobs. Although some of the responses were positive, others were equivocal or pessimistic:

We have some freedom. We get to know people. We get away from the monotony at home.

Earlier I had hopes like that, but now I don't know. Now I have served for about five years. I have not lost hope.

We want jobs, but no, we don't expect them through voluntary service. We have a record book and officers have made entries regarding our work. There are commendations. We can present them when we go for interviews.

In our village almost 90% of the youth are engaged in voluntary work. How can all these people get jobs?

The young women's perceptions of their family members' reactions varied as well:

Our mother likes it. She thinks it will help in getting a job, especially for my older sister.

My mother also approves. She thinks that some sort of job could come from this work.

[My family members] don't like it. People at home scold us. They say it's better to stay at home and attend to household work. They think, particularly the old folks, that as in the old days the woman should stay at home. They say we have been working so long but have gained nothing. Our brothers and others, however, don't condemn us as much.

When there is plenty of work to do at home, my sister scolds me, saying that I am going out and she can't attend to all the work at home alone.

Community leaders emphasized the training value of voluntary work:

Most young women want particular jobs to do. They won't do just any job that is available. Most of them that I know want to become nurses, but that is a very difficult job to get. You can't get trained for it. You have to first get the job and then they will train you.

Mr. P. [quoted above] is correct. That is why so many do voluntary work with the Health Department, hoping this will help them to become nurses.

The remarks of the young women quoted above suggest that volunteer work is as much an important community service as it is potentially a means of qualifying for gainful employment. Buddhism's strong emphasis on community work reinforces this notion. The Kalutara survey did not ask women to judge the relative benefits of such service but did confirm that for young women volunteer activity was at least as prevalent as employment. Even more important, the data from the survey and focus-group discussions reveal that the increased opportunities for young women to interact with the public have gradually removed their domestic confines.

Work, marriage, and childbearing. The focus-group discussions were perhaps most revealing of young Kalutara women's aspirations as productive and reproductive adults. The women regarded employment income as both a means of replacing marriage dowries provided by their parents and as a means of supporting themselves and their families after marriage. Comments from mothers generally supported the daughters' desire for self-reliance through work, whereas prospective husbands were less enthusiastic about the idea of having wives in the labor force.

The mothers regarded employment as important for their daughters' economic security. All the mothers interviewed wanted their daughters to have a job, implying that working was essential to to-
lay's society. Typical of their comments were the following:

_We would like them to marry, but when we want them to find a job because of the poor economic situation. They still have time for marriage._

They must be able to live without rouble, our daughters say. If they have a job, they can see to their needs at least.

Not all jobs would be acceptable, however, especially for women with good education. Daughters reported that their parents preferred them to have jobs appropriate for their ducational level. Examples of jobs mentioned as acceptable to their parents were clerical positions and government service. Jobs considered inappropriate included garment work and other manufacturing assembly work. The mothers condemned these biases.

As for the appropriate age for marriage and motherhood, most young women stated that women should marry around age 25 and wait two years before having a child. Young men on average recommended age 25 for women and age 28–30 for themselves.

The following comment by a young single woman reflects the economic reality faced by many like herself:

_I the past [women] married quite young, at 16 or 18. Now our parents think we should marry between [ages] 22 and 28. But to tell you the truth, we are not in a position to do that. Our economic position doesn't permit it. When we marry, we expect to have children. Married life is not complete without a child, and the child must be brought up in good health and given a good education. To face this, we must enter marriage only after strengthening our economic position._

The female survey respondents were asked to identify and rank the important qualities they desired in husbands. By far the most important requirements of a husband were that he have a job (mentioned by 73% of respondents) and a good character (71%). Least important were such traits as caste, physical appearance, and horoscope (mentioned by only 1% or 2%). Their work experience and the importance to them of having their own jobs colored some young women's perceptions of their marriage prospects or the type of husband who would be appropriate.

_I will have to select a husband now considering the status of my job. My husband must have a similar job status._

When a girl works, she gets to know people, how to behave and how to deal with different situations, and that also will help her to find a husband. Some men prefer a bride who has had some social experience.

_I don't think a very high level of education is necessary for a successful married life. I think that more than education, she should have a wide understanding of society._

Others felt that having an educated wife was desirable:

_Nowadays we have to mix in society and keep company. For that my wife must have sufficient knowledge and education. That is important._

Should women work after marriage? Should they work after having children? The comments from employed women were surprisingly "modern," echoing many of the tensions expressed by working couples in Western societies.

_Today it is difficult to live on one person's wages. If two persons rely on that salary, it may be possible but not indefinitely. Therefore the wife has to work._

_I can't think of a transfer in the kind of work I do. So the husband I select will have to be a person who will work and live near me._

_I know someone whose husband asked his wife to leave her job in order to live with him near his workplace. Although he could request a transfer to work near her job, he wouldn't do that._

Before I went to work, I thought that a husband and a wife must have jobs. But after working, I think that only the husband needs to have a job. If both are employed, there can be problems. When both work, it is troublesome and you can't lead a peaceful life.

Focus-group participants expressed ambivalence about whether
the costs of women's labor force participation outweighs the benefits when children's welfare is at issue. Young men expressed the least enthusiasm for the idea of mothers holding jobs, viewing child rearing as a primary responsibility of women.

If our economic position is good, the wife needn't have a job. She has to look after the children. When she goes to work early and returns home later, she has no time to attend to the children. There must be someone responsible to look after the children. The mother's absence is one reason why children go astray. The mother's influence is more important than the father's.

Because of economic difficulties at present, many mothers are prompted to seek employment overseas. Thus, many children are subject to stress and strain. I know of many such cases. One mother near our home was bringing up the children quite well until she went overseas for a job. Now there is nobody to care for or control them. Mothers' love and kindness actually has a great influence on the children. If a mother does have a job, she must choose one which will enable her to devote enough attention and time to the children.

The women also expressed concern about the problems of working mothers, especially when the children are young.

It can be troublesome. I know a woman who must bring her children to her mother to care for while she works, and she doesn't arrive at work until 9:30 or 10:00 and can't work very well. She fights with the people in the office because she is late. In these instances, the wife should not work.

These problems arise when the children are small. But when the children are big, the wife may sometimes want to find a job because she feels lonely staying at home.

Although the survey data provided only limited insight about respondents' views on the timing of childbearing and family size, the focus group commentaries illuminated the conflicts that young Kalutara women face in attempting to juggle their work, marriage, and childbearing goals.

Discussion

Given the issues discussed in the focus groups, someone unfamiliar with the context might assume that the participants were from an economically developed country. It is necessary to be reminded that annual per capita income in Sri Lanka is less than US $500 and that the patterns observed in women's status measure coexist with fundamentally poor economic circumstances.

Females between ages 15 and 29, a subpopulation that represents 13% of Sri Lanka's population, are highly literate and well educated compared with their counterparts in other South Asian nations. They marry at age 24, on average, and bear their first child one and a half years later. Their ideal family size ranges between 2.1 and 2.5 chi-

Information about women's economic activities in Sri Lanka comes from a variety of sources, including the census and national surveys. Here a government enumerator interviews a young wife in Kandy District.
children, depending upon the age group. In spite of the formal education they have received, fewer than one-fourth are employed and nearly one-third report themselves to be in the labor market but unemployed. In Kalutara District the percentages unemployed are somewhat higher, particularly among single women, among whom job demand is strong.

Social programs established by Sri Lanka’s Socialist government prior to 1977 improved the welfare of most Sri Lankans, at the expense of private entrepreneurship and industrial economic growth. The Socialist efforts appear to have paid off in reducing gender inequality in health and educational status. The slow economic recovery in the post-1977 period, however, has been unable to absorb the expanding labor force, and meet job demand, especially that of young women.

At the individual level, the strongest impact of the social programs was perhaps to raise women’s expectations about their personal, marital, and economic well-being. As the young man quoted earlier commented, “They think once they are educated, they should invariably have a job also.” Maternal support for their aspirations and the tolerance of other family members and the community, reflective of the social status accorded to Sri Lankan women, have enabled Sri Lankan women to delay marriage. In addition, high unemployment among eligible males and opportunities for women to serve as volunteers have contributed to the postponement of marriage, even after women have completed their schooling.

The Sri Lankan case does not fit modernization theories of development, according to which social, economic, and demographic changes proceed together through predictable stages. Instead, social and demographic changes have out-paced economic development in this still largely agrarian island nation. Besides the social welfare policies of the state, we may also need to consider historical and cultural factors in searching for an explanatory framework that includes the Sri Lankan case. Political economy models of fertility change, for example, appear promising (Rouyer 1989; Greenhalgh 1990). de A. Samarasinghe (1988) calls attention to an important fact, that Sri Lankan women, as well as men, were first allowed to vote in a national election in 1951.

We have peered through a social microscope to gain a view of the aspirations and expectations of young Kalutara women, their mothers, and their male counterparts regarding work, marriage, and children as portrayed against the broad social and economic patterns of the country. The exercise has revealed how “modern” are conditions in Sri Lanka, where poor economic prospects have created job demand for women as well as men and expectations of the need to coordinate women’s labor force participations and childbearing.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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REFERENCES


**China Unveils . . .**

*(continued from page 92)*

provinces, but also about regions, localities, and communities throughout China. It thus holds out the opportunity for analyzing demographic processes within specific economic and cultural contexts. Although none of the seminar papers analyzed data below the provincial level, there was a clearly expressed interest in extending demographic research to explore socioeconomic and cultural variations in China.

Another impression gained from the seminar concerns the state of demographic studies in China, scarcely more than a decade since their political restoration. One mark of progress is the increasing accumulation of demographic knowledge. To an unprecedented degree, papers presented at the seminar compared and juxtaposed data from a number of censuses and surveys. This feedback process has resulted in work of improved quality and value, as was repeatedly mentioned in the seminar discussions. It also bears emphasizing that the Two per Thousand Survey itself represents a new level of achievement in survey design and organization in China. The same may be said about the technical sophistication of many of the analyses presented at the seminar. It was especially gratifying to observe the considerable accomplishments of a new generation of young scholars, many of whom had returned to China after study abroad.

The seminar environment was also notable for its openness. Compared with earlier population conferences in China, this seminar had a strong scholarly orientation and discussions with a healthy amount of give and take. There were also ample opportunities to meet our Chinese counterparts in informal settings, a valuable aspect of the meeting. Although the environment for international collaboration on research has deteriorated recently in some government ministries, the State Family Planning Commission and its subordinate units have continued to pursue linkages with foreign researchers, and there were no signs that this would change.

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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