INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on the level of trust accorded order and representational institutions in Southeast Asia and relates it to the performance of those institutions. Rothstein and Stolle argue that trust would be reposed on institutions like the army, judges and the bureaucracy if impartial and even-handed, while representational institutions like parliament, parties, and local governments are trusted on the basis of their partisanship, such that people sharing the ideology of the ruling party are likely to trust it and institutions it dominates, such as the parliament or elected officials. After introducing the key concepts and the geographic area, this paper proceeds to the trust and governance processes associated first with order, and then with representational, institutions. Finally it presents key issues and trends found and underscores challenges towards understanding and improving trust in government.

The paper uses extant data on the trust of citizens on their public institutions, and the governance mechanisms related to it. However, such information is not available for all of SEA. Moreover, most studies on governance do not explicitly relate it to trust. Underpinning these limitations is the fact that the region itself is little more than a geographic reality. Thus, situations in one country should not be deemed as applicable to the whole. I have also used only relevant English-language studies of individual countries and the region thus absorbing the sampling limitations of their cases, issues, and language used.

The Concept of Trust

“Trust” is rational when the trusting individual is presumed to have some knowledge of the trusted object. A person may also repose trust on another for relational reasons. Such relational trust may be cultivated by close proximity, transference from experience with similar objects, or simple liking of certain characteristics of the trusted (e.g., “I trust men in uniform; they look so clean-cut.”).

Trust is usually seen as a virtue but that has its limits. For example, one may trust a schemer adept at cultivating confidence and be led to ruin. Thus a certain amount of distrust may be necessary if only to protect the trust-giver.

The primary object of trust in this paper is government, a large-scale institution that is impossible to know intimately. Yet it has been trusted by citizens even though they may know only an infinitesimal part of it (the neighborhood cop instead of the police force, a public school teacher rather than the whole Ministry of Education, a senator rather than Parliament). Such trust may arise from characteristics of both the truster and
the trustee, the citizens as well as government. Higher income, education and social status all seem to work against individuals’ trust of government. More familiarity about an object of trust may push someone toward distrust.

Trust in government may provide a “governance capital” that gets citizens to cooperate with government even when it makes unpopular decisions whose benefits will accrue only in the long run. Ikeda, Yamada and Kohno found that social trust is positively correlated with participation but institutional trust, or confidence in political institutions, is either not related or negatively related to political participation in Japan, Taiwan and Thailand. This counter-intuitive result may empirically evidence familiarity breeding contempt. However, it contradicts findings that “interactions with government are significantly more important than cultural factors in producing trust in government” and that a general trust in other people produces considerable support for democracy.

Government may engender trust by lowering personal investments in monitoring actions of other individuals; by enforcing contracts that give buyers and sellers reason to trust each other; by “restricting the use of coercion to tasks that enhance rather than undermine trust”; and by “eliminating risky personal reliance on another” (e.g., through freeing families of burden of caring for sick members). Rather than seeking society-centered reasons for low trust and social capital, Rothstein and Stolle conclude that it is dysfunctional institutions that cause the lack of social capital.

Missing in most discussions is the idea that liberalism “implies that government officials should trust citizens’ goodness and self-governance unless there is evidence to the contrary.” This suggests that governments can increase trust by reposing trust on their citizens, an idea developed in this paper also.

The Geographic Focus: Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia stretches “from the Southern border of China East across the South China Sea, West to the Andaman Sea and South to the southernmost edges of the Indonesian archipelago.” All but one of the countries covered by this description are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The geography and ASEAN are the main commonalities of the countries in the region. ASEAN members have a host of colonial histories. Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Myanmar were under the British, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam under the French, Indonesia under the Dutch, and the Philippines under the Spanish and the Americans; only Thailand escaped colonization. Their wars of liberation affected their historical trajectories – the wars of independence of the Filipinos, Indonesians and Indo-China (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), the relatively peaceful transfer of power in Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Brunei from Britain and the Philippines from the United States.

The countries had their share of authoritarian rule under indigenous leaders. Indonesia and the Philippines had long-time dictators ousted by non-violent people’s uprisings in the 1980s. Cambodia’s recent history includes Vietnamese domination and a bloody civil war that necessitated a UN tutelage. Timor-Leste, colonized by Portugal, was occupied by Indonesia in 1975 and got its independence in 2002. Separatist
movements and terrorism have rocked Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The region is not alien to wars, and trust here is an important commodity.

With a total population of around 500 million people, ASEAN ranges from Brunei’s population of 383,000 and Singapore’s 6.5 million to Indonesia’s 222 million (Table 1). The first two countries also have the smallest land areas but boast the highest per capita GDP. The middle-income countries are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, which, with Singapore, were the original ASEAN members. Except for Brunei, all the later entrants, collectively known as CMLV, have lower per capita incomes.\(^{13}\)

(Table 1 about here)

The ASEAN array in the 2006 human development index (HDI) follows practically the same ranking. The wide variation within ASEAN should not obscure the fact that no one has a low human development rating, even applicant Timor-Leste, with a rank five steps above the highest low HDI rating.\(^{14}\) Their average rating of .728 is higher than the indices for all developing countries, and for South Asia, the Arab States, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The arrays of GDP per capita and HDI show a close correlation. However, an analysis of Philippine sub-national data cautions against simple acceptance of that relationship and suggests that the balance of the explanation may lie in, among others, the pro-poor reform of institutions and policies. This is consistent with findings in Viet Nam and Thailand.\(^{15}\)

The ranking changes when income inequality is taken into consideration. Using the proportion of incomes of the richest ten percent to the poorest ten percent, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam tend to be the most equal, while Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines are the most unequal. In the Gini index, Southeast Asian countries bunch up in the middle levels with the ranks closely following the first inequality indicator except for the change of places of the Philippines and Singapore.

Buddhism is dominant in the Greater Mekong Area comprising Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The Confucian ethic is evident in Singapore. Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei have Muslim majorities while Thailand and the Philippines have Buddhist and Christian majorities, respectively, with restive Islamic communities. Public policy tends towards religious tolerance and moderation but the region has been caught up in some extremist politics and terrorism which can affect both peace and trust.

Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand were among the economic tigers of the late twentieth century. High standards of living, low birth rates, and steady improvements in health and education accompanied their booming economies. Their performance inspired even the Communist states of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos to open up their economies and embrace globalization. Then the financial crisis of 1997 exposed the economic weaknesses and the social costs – among them growing inequality and jobless growth.
despite prosperity. They have since bounced back, but the crisis raised questions about the state of their governance.\(^{16}\)

At the start of the century it would have been acceptable to describe Southeast Asia as home to fledgling democracies. The democratically elected strongmen of Singapore and Malaysia had passed on the torch to new leaders, confident of their economic and political legacies. The Philippines and Indonesia had shaken off their dictators and promulgated new constitutions. The communist states of Viet Nam and Laos had embarked on economic reforms which also opened up their political systems; Cambodia had just completed a type of UN trusteeship. Only Myanmar seemed impervious to a democratic transition. Then along came Thailand’s coup in 2006, ending more than a decade of regular, elective successions of leadership. That event laid bare not only the political weaknesses of one country. It also provided a capsule look at the state of governance in much of Southeast Asia – personalistic leadership, populism, corruption, politicized militaries, and poorly functioning institutions.

TRUST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Against the backdrop of those governance deficits, one would have expected a frustrated people unwilling to trust their governments. However, the trust expressed by East Asia in the Global Barometer Survey is the highest among the regions of the world (Table 2). The East Asian data are from only five countries - three Northeast Asians (China, Japan and Korea) and two Southeast Asians (Philippines and Thailand).

(\text{Table 2 about here}\)

Albritton and Bureekul list the institutions accorded trust from eight ABS nations, adding Hong Kong, Mongolia and Taiwan to the earlier set\(^{17}\) (Table 3). The inclusion of three more countries maintains the standing of the region as the most trustful in the world. Although SEA has lower trust levels than East Asia as a whole, it still has higher trust levels than any region in Table 2.

(\text{Table 3 about here}\)

Most people trust governmental institutions, except parties, in East Asia but order institutions enjoy more trust than representational institutions. Southeast Asians tend to accord less trust than all East Asia on all institutions.

SEA countries in the ABS and WVS all evince trust on order institutions (Table 4). These institutions also tend to be more trusted than representational institutions in all countries except Vietnam.\(^{18}\)

(\text{Table 4 about here}\)

A large majority of Thai respondents express trust in government in both the direct question (“You can generally trust the people in government to do what is right”)
or as the mean response for all the institutions covered. This is also the case for Vietnam and the Philippines (WVS). The Philippines (ABS) and Indonesia (WVS) also lean in that direction. It is thus reasonable to conclude that Southeast Asians tend to trust their governments.

This finding follows Asia as a whole but differentiates the region from the rest of the developing world. The high trust in SEA public institutions is significant, considering that their level of generalized trust is not high (Table 5). To the query: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?,” most respondents in all SEA sample-countries except Thailand line up on the distrust side.

(Table 5 about here)

Why a low generalized trust? Most Asian cultures still have strong insider-outsider divides when dealing with people. Francis Fukuyama has described those cultures as not inclined to spontaneous sociability beyond the family or family-like small circles. Thus, when dealing with large institutions, they tend to deal with people they know. He has found, for instance, that firms in China (as in France, Italy and South Korea) tend to emerge from family corporations, and as such center on industries where human relationships are not trumped by hierarchy and companies tend to be small. He contrasts them not only with Germany and the United States but also with Japan which with its Buddhist tradition bases its large network organizations on generalized social trust rather than family and kinship. Japanese Buddhism sanctifies economic activity and pushes towards perfectionism in everyday activities, much like an Asian variant of the Protestant Ethic.

This may be the same reason Thailand stands out as the only Southeast Asian country high on generalized social trust.

Ironically, when low-social-trust Asians do deal with outsiders, they do not trust them to be fair, so that they seek patrons or surround the outside relationship with rules and contracts. Again, Fukuyama shows Korean large corporations getting much government support for their ventures unlike Japanese and American firms. The governments in those countries imbibe the culture with this narrow compass of trust, and become centralized and hierarchical, with watchers at every turn supervising other watchers.

This lack of generalized trust may not contradict findings of trust on public institutions in three ways. First, the people may have found culturally sanctioned ways of dealing with government. Whereas Westerners may regard these entities objectively, Southeast Asians deal with bureaucracies by personalizing them, either by identifying them with staff and officials they know, or by seeking persons in those offices who humanize the contacts. To the rest of the world, fixers are symbols of corruption, but they may not be so regarded by a Southeast Asian entering the strange world of the bureaucracy. For their part, fixers regard their work as legitimate and significant.
Mediation does not have to be corruptive. NGOs may also be mediators, either by being the people’s advocates to government, by providing the service themselves, or by organizing the community so that trust is engendered outside the family bond. Civil servants, too, may make the bureaucracy less forbidding with greater service orientation and participatory methods. Gene Brewer has found government employees to be more active than other citizens in civic affairs. As such they can serve “as catalysts for building social capital in society at large.” In other words, humane mediators can mitigate the effects of low generalized trust.

Second, people may place trust in government on a Churchillian scale, accepting a lesser evil when a better situation is not available. Most Southeast Asians have lived under such oppressive regimes that the current one, despite its many problems, becomes worthy enough of trust.

The third explanation is connected to the second and draws, this time, from positive psychology. Trust may have been expressed because people hope that the legitimacy so proffered can then make the object feel accountable to the trustee. That hope may be ill-founded but can still affect outcomes. Citizens may show a kind of collective hope that is “empowering, action-oriented, subject to cold analysis, and authentic through their engagement of the state.” On the part of the government as the object of trust and hope, the answer is to prove worthy. In many ways, the quest for trustworthiness is the reason for reinventing government.

TRUST IN ORDER INSTITUTIONS: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Southeast Asian nations, from the “Asian miracles” of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to the Communist states of Lao PDR, Vietnam and Cambodia, have introduced reforms such as corporate governance, market-orientation, privatization and deregulation. These have mixed implications on trust on government. On one hand, these have enabled governments to be more efficient, innovative and better able to deal with globalization. These should have positive implications for trust as they counter waste, unresponsiveness and corruption. On the other hand, a pro-business orientation could also diminish the sense of connectedness between government and citizens and exacerbate inequality, undermining trust.

These neo-liberal reforms were blamed when the 1997 financial crisis hit along with growing inequality and unemployment. Global Integrity ratings also show generally poor executive performance. These should have reduced the legitimacy and support for SEA governments. Yet trust is generally high, suggesting the validity of the lesser-evil and hope hypotheses (Table 6).

(Table 6 about here)

Consider Vietnam. The weak GIS rating may be due to insufficient and inconsistent finance and budgeting policies and very low salaries. Budgets are in accord with the size of an agency instead of its performance. Staffing and staff development planning are not yet rationalized. However, the doi moi economic reforms and the
Communist Party now allow for more openness and consultations than before. Moreover, the 1996 State Budget Law and civil service reforms have developed a coherent financial and personnel management system.\(^{28}\)

Most Indonesians report trust on a government which remains weak in its structure and performance. The patrimonial politics Suharto exemplified along with shortcomings of the bureaucracy have not been entirely removed despite attempts at modernization. The budget process’ weakness is due to very large discretionary accounts and insufficient allocations for programs, providing pressure for corruption, non-performance and patronage. Privatization has consolidated ownership in a few families, firms allegedly having been sold at manipulated prices or serving as hidden sources of funds for government officials.\(^{29}\)

Trust and performance seem to go in tandem in the Philippines, with its strong showing in privatization, a highly qualified staff and a bureaucracy in step with all modernization trends. It has a rationalization program which can be a textbook case of agency-level decentralization. However, implementation lags behind the modern plans. Trust on the executive branch and the latter’s performance also do not correspond to the twenty-year polls which show a downtrend in net satisfaction for all presidents (Table 7). This suggests trust as an expression of hope, not as an appraisal of actual conditions.

(Table 7 about here)

The next sections will describe the levels of performance of the executive branch and its different order institutions and processes. Please note that the three countries with available (high) trust levels tend to be at the lower end of the performance scale in most of the indicators that follow, again, an apparent triumph of hope over reality.

Service Delivery and Access

The principal contact of citizens and government is through the efficient and effective delivery of goods and services. Efficiency and economy get at the rules, funds and personnel which are inputs to government services. Quality or effectiveness captures the performance of government.

Economy and efficiency

Three questions from the Global Competitiveness Index get at economy and efficiency: the extent of red tape, waste in government spending, and personnel quality personnel\(^{30}\) (Table 8).

(Table 8 about here)

Singapore and Malaysia stand out as least wasteful of their clients’ time, while Thailand is most burdened by red tape. Singapore again is first in economy, followed by
Thailand and Malaysia. Vietnam and Indonesia are adjudged the most wasteful. Singapore has public officials comparable in competence with the private sector with Vietnam as a far second, while everyone else is deemed at low competence levels.31

Southeast Asia as a whole has streamlined rules and regulations, is close to the theoretical middle (3.5) in reining in waste, but leaves a lot to be desired in the capacity and performance of its human resources. The short time needed to get over red tape probably results from the deregulation that all the countries have instituted. Procurement reform and more judicious spending have also decreased waste.

Human resources training, not only in competence but also in service orientation, seems to be indicated in the third result since it gets at not just ability to do the job, but also compares it with the private sector. The perspective of trying to please the client, engendered by competition in the market, can be developed by government even in areas where it has a monopoly.

**Quality of government services**

GCI asked business executives regarding the quality of basic services (Table 9). Some may argue that since they hardly use these services, they are not in a position to judge their quality. However, because they may avoid them precisely because of their poor quality, executives may be a better source of such rating than those who have no choice but to seek public services.

(Table 9 about here)

In general, SEA is above the theoretical middle in the services rated here. Still, except for Singapore, there is much room for improvement.

**Equality of access**

Government is supposed to serve everyone, particularly those marginalized by poverty, low education, rural residence and ethnic minority status. Such policies would not only be social justice, but would also affect the stability of the nation and therefore of security of investments. GCI thus asked business executives to gauge the extent of equality of benefits (Table 10).

(Table 10 about here)

Social transfers are generally adjudged to equally benefit the rich and the poor, except in Singapore where the perception is greater benefit for the disadvantaged. A large gap is perceived, except in Singapore and Malaysia, regarding the educational and health facilities accessible to the rich and the poor.
The fourth indicator describes the performance of individuals, not institutions. Nevertheless, it is arrayed like the others, with Singapore leading the pack and the Philippines and Indonesia, whose educational and health care institutions are at the bottom, also having government officials who play favorites. It may be that the organizational ethos of favoring the well-connected are infused also into the officials implementing policies. These data are significant because it shows the perception of those who probably benefit from the inequality.

With their current inequality levels, more attention to the needs of the disadvantaged is still called for. However, in the public sector reform in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore, principles of political neutrality, responsiveness and equal opportunity have been de-prioritized in favor of competition, efficiency, public-private partnership and profitability.\textsuperscript{32}

**Increasing Access through ICT**

Information and communications technology has theoretically solved the problem of access, since anyone can communicate with any other practically at will. Nevertheless, the digital divide is related to past disadvantages of lack of wealth and education, or wrong ethnicity and gender. Thus to take advantage of ICT and to ensure it provides better access, government has to enable its use and propagate its benefits whenever possible.

GCI tried to determine if government has promulgated ICT policy and programs. ICT policy is gauged by whether or not ICT is a government priority, and whether laws have been enacted to regulate electronic commerce and consumer protection (Table 11). The regional mean is high, indicating that all countries have recognized the importance of ICT for their economy and society.

(Table 11 about here)

To find out how well ICT programs are faring, GCI uses public access to the Internet and the quality of ICT competition and general ICT availability. Availability of government on-line services and the success of government ICT programs measure government use of ICT (Table 12).

(Table 12 about here)

Again, the regional mean is above the middle, except for government on-line services. State enabling of competition and ICT service has the best rating; government ICT programs are deemed successful also. Singapore’s Public Service 21, aimed at “being on time for the future,” is probably the model to study.\textsuperscript{33}

**The Military and the Police**


The military is supposed to defend the country against external threats and the police is a civilian force to maintain internal peace and order. That differentiation in roles is not clear in countries with politicized militaries that presume they can govern better than civilian authorities. No Southeast Asian nation has escaped being under military rule, albeit with varying levels of repression and participation of civil authorities. The military remains a constant presence even under civilian government in areas with separatist movements or rebel strongholds and with the heightened need for security amidst threats and acts of terrorism.

Except for the Philippines relative to the police, most respondents express trust in both institutions. However, the military is more trusted than the police in all countries (Table 13).

Most Indonesians and Vietnamese favor military army rule, as does large minorities in the Philippines (Table 14). Only Singapore and Thailand give a ringing refusal of such an eventuality. With their military reluctant to stay in the barracks, these results can be a problem for democrats.

There is ambivalence in the responses, since most respondents assess a democratic political system as good. However, support for democracy is lower for the two countries that would be happy with military governments.

Accountability, Transparency and Anti-Corruption

Corruption is a serious SEA problem.\textsuperscript{34} In the 2006 Corruption Perception Index, Singapore ranks among the world’s least corrupt countries, and Malaysia and Thailand are above the median. The rest score below 3, “indicating that corruption in these countries is … endemic”\textsuperscript{35} (Table 15).

A similar judgment is rendered by the Global Competitiveness Report, based on answers to four questions: “How commonly do firms in your industry give irregular extra payments or bribes: (a) connected with import and export permits; (b) when getting connected to public utilities; (c) connected with annual tax payments; and (d) connected with public contracts/investment projects?” (Table 16).

Global Integrity Scorecard gives a different picture (Table 17). Aside from considering breaches of rules like the other two indices, GIS takes into account relevant
laws and institutions, providing a governance perspective to the issue. The trust data tend to be more aligned with the generally more positive GIS ratings.

(Table 17 about here)

Philippine trust in the civil service and government as well as the moderate-to-strong rating in the Integrity Scorecard does not jibe with high corruption in the GCI and CPI reports. The strong showing in the GIS recognizes the legal and institutional apparatuses it has set up to tackle anti-corruption and accountability. However, conviction of high officials is rare and public perception of the extent of corruption corresponds with the TI information. Quah underscores the importance of political will and independent single institutions in the relative progress of Thailand vis-à-vis the Philippines and Indonesia. However, Prime Minister Thaksin’s fall showed the ineffectiveness of post-1997 anti-corruption reforms. Meanwhile, political will can be manifested by going after the big fish, as Indonesia and Malaysia have done recently.

Vietnamese GI data align with the CPI and GCI but not with the trust surveys. Bribes for everyday services like teaching and health care are commonplace. In a Swedish-sponsored study of corruption done by the Communist Party, two-thirds of respondents in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City admit to committing bribery to get things done and a third of the civil service admitted to receiving them.

On a positive note, the Party launched an anti-corruption self-criticism campaign in 1999, an Anti-Corruption Law was passed in 2005 and the National Assembly required the disclosure of assets of officials in 2006. The reforms may have further engendered trust because the citizens perceive doi moi as not being foreign-instigated.

Indonesia moved up in the Public Integrity Scorecard in two years, with the improvement of administration and civil service and anti-corruption. The exposure of “Buloggate” was made at the turn of the century. An Anti-Corruption Commission was set in place by 2004. E-procurement was launched in 2006. All these might have been taken into account only in the post-2004 assessment. Anti-corruption attacks continue through 2006 although conflict of interest and lack of independence mar the relationship of regulatory agencies with the private sector and other clients.

**Trust in the Judiciary**

A key problem of governance is providing justice to all citizens. The World Bank Enterprise Survey asked a stratified sample of entrepreneurs from 94 countries and 60,000 firms to describe the impact of their country’s investment climate on their firm. They report on their actual experiences, not just their perception of the general country situation. The Southeast Asian mean confidence level in the judiciary is 63. This is lower than the mean for all East Asia and Pacific (66), the Middle East (67) and OECD (74).

Trust in the judiciary is reported by most ABS and WBES respondents except in Cambodia. Their data largely correspond with the GCI judicial independence measure.
(Table 18). Trust in courts is related to how independently the judiciary makes its decisions, one finding here where trust is merited by government performance.

(Table 18 about here)

The Global Integrity ratings convey a different information from the others. For Indonesia, the very weak rating may be attributed to the “astonishing corruption in the judiciary,” all the way to the Supreme Court. The strong showing in 2006 may be traced to the start of judicial reform and the conviction of several high-profile officials on corruption charges in 2005 and 2006. This contrasts with the pre-2004 lack of prosecution of similar individuals.

For the Philippines, the higher rating in 2005 may be due to reforms including removal of corrupt judges, streamlining the court system, and resolution of some high-profile cases. However, other cases were unfinished as of 2006, leading to the weak rating that year. The mean of the two ratings may be more credible as the judiciary is indeed trying to reform itself, but insinuations of continued tenure of “hoodlums in robes” (in the colorful words of President Estrada) and the very slow resolution of cases push the court performance down. SWS surveys say citizens do not expect the successful prosecution of corrupt officials, but have greater trust on the court’s ability to protect property rights.

Vietnam’s very low GI rating may be traced to lack of judicial independence and the arrest and detention of government critics. On the other hand, fraud and corruption charges have been lodged against high ranking officials since 1999.

Cambodia is the only country where only a small minority trusts the judiciary. The TI National Integrity System study explains why by inference:

The Supreme Council … must be reformed and its independence guaranteed. Members should be non-partisan and properly qualified… The Court’s secretariat must be … equipped with an autonomous budget. Likewise, all judges, prosecutors and law enforcement agents should be free of political affiliation to ensure their impartiality.

TRUST IN REPRESENTATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

For people to be empowered, they would need to have a say how they are governed. This is why representational institutions are significant for enhancing trust in government.

Electoral Processes
Representation is supposed to be ensured by citizens’ participation in the choice of those who will sit in their place in the halls of parliament. Electoral processes therefore need to be transparent, honest and efficient to garner the people’s trust. Trust in SEA electoral processes and parties tend to be low, except in Thailand’s election commission and Vietnamese parties (Table 19).

(Table 19 about here)

The Philippines has had the longest experience in electoral democracy in the region. However, it is still burdened by the poor quality of its electoral system, control of a few families, lack of party loyalty, and a focus on personalities. The low trust in political parties is understandable given that one does not even know which political party exists at any given time, as each election coughs up new “parties” created primarily for a particular candidate(s).

The very low rating of the Philippines in political financing gets at the vote-buying and political corruption nexus; its scores in the other GI indicators acknowledge that electoral institutions are in place, and elections take place regularly. However, if their quality had been taken into greater account, the ratings would have corresponded more to the level of the trust indicators.

Indonesia’s 2004 elections have been called “the most complex and challenging elections to have faced any democracy, let alone a new democracy like Indonesia’s.” They were held in three phases and had 448,705 candidates in 24 political parties for 15,276 positions. 75 percent of an eligible 147 million voted. The presence of electoral institutions and the regularity of the electoral process are reflected in the GI indicators.

Low trust in political parties may be due to their sheer number, their lack of clear differentiation, and the inability of incumbents to deliver promised economic and social benefits. The disclosure of party finance is generally believed not to be credible, and vote buying is assumed to be rampant.

The Thais in the ABS put low trust on political parties as they are “shifting coalitions of interest groups, bound together by some perceived affinity and mutual advantage, but prone to defections and shifting alliances.”

Vietnam is a one-party state and all senior government positions may be filled only by members of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). This explains the low GI ratings on elections. The Vietnamese trust in parties is unproblematic because the referent is clearly the one party respondents know. It may convey approval of the government, or reflect fear of expressing dissent.

Parliamentary Processes
Parliamentarians are supposed to make citizens present in spirit (“re-present”) in their deliberations and decisions. In practice, of course, few citizens think of themselves as the principals of those in parliament nor do they demand that their representatives make decisions for the public good. This is why Rothstein and Stolle posited that trust in representational institutions may find enhancement in partisan/personal accomplishments instead of fairness.

Parliaments are trusted by large respondent groups but legislative accountability is adjudged weak in all the selected countries (Table 20).

(Table 20 about here)

Filipinos have been electing their representatives to a law-making body since American colonial rule, interrupted only by Martial Law (1972-86). The Philippine Congress is a functioning institution, thus the GI index of 2004. Despite political dynasties and continued elite domination, it has managed to enact social reform, economic liberalization and other landmark laws. However, the quality of its performance and questions of how members get elected and perform are issues of legislative accountability which GI rates as weak in 2006.

Thailand has been a constitutional monarchy since 1932 and has had 50 different governments until 1992, an alternation of products of military coups and elections. From 1992 to 2006, it had a functioning parliament until the elected Thaksin government, burdened by corruption charges, was overthrown by a coup. At that time, it was working under a 1997 Constitution, widely known as the “People’s Charter.” The 2001 ABS probably reflects not only the trust of the Thais in their parliamentary processes but also embodies the hopes they have reposed on it. It follows the first election of the Senate in 2000, ending almost seven decades of political patronage for military and civil service officials.

Vietnamese’s high trust of their parliament may seem misplaced in a one-party state. However, the 1992 constitution had instituted the National Assembly which performs an oversight role over, and appoints officials for, all state bodies. Moreover, the Communist Party has allowed debate on, and even rejection of, some draft legislation in the Assembly. The high trust accorded this fledgling institution may express the hope that it would stay the course

Indonesia's rating on trust in parliament is low in all the indicators. Parliament has been in place since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order in 1998; there have been national and provincial elections, an amended constitution and basic freedoms of the press, assembly and association. However, the multi-party system has produced a fragmented parliament that allows neither the president nor the parliament a base to make hard decisions for the country. Aside from the quality of their performance, legislators are also under fire for selling their votes to those to those who need legislative endorsement.
Local Governments

Decentralization is a growing phenomenon. As early as 1999, Work (2003) reported that 76 percent of the world’s 126 countries have at least one elected sub-national government. SEA is at the front of this revolution. Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia all have newly strengthened devolution regimes. Decentralization was at the heart of Cambodian rehabilitation. Even Singapore has become more deconcentrated. Information on how these have affected trust in SEA is available only for the Philippines and Thailand (Table 21). Majorities accord trust on local governments; this is to the same extent as the national government in the case of Thailand. However, their answers to related queries are not a resounding approval of decentralization. Filipinos perceive a lot of corruption in local levels (though by a smaller group than those complaining of national-level corruption), and also suggest more national oversight over local governments. Thais do not see much corruption in local government, but more of them recommend national oversight over local decisions. (Table 21 about here)

KEY ISSUES, TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

This exploration has yielded some surprises. The first is that Southeast Asians trust their governments, its order institutions to a much greater extent than its representational institutions. This surprises because it does not jibe with the worldwide trend of either low levels of trust, or its decline from some higher point.

The second source of surprise is that trust on government is expressed by peoples who do not exhibit generalized trust of others. Like much of the developing world, Southeast Asians proceed from a *gemeinschaft* culture, valuing face-to-face interaction, we-feeling and distrust of strangers. Their kind of social capital tends to focus on bonds, not bridges. And yet, they accord trust on government, no matter how the question is phrased. The availability of mediators, the Churchillian idea of a lesser evil, and trust as a means of expressing hope were offered as possible explanations for according trust to governments when it is not proffered generally to others.

The third reason for surprise is that so much of it seems not to be merited. Current levels of governance leave much to be desired. Weaknesses are evident in the performance of institutions for order and impartiality, whether it be in the efficiency and quality of service delivery, the equality of citizen access, the use of and access to ICT, the performance of the military and police, the implementation of anti-corruption processes or the provision of justice. There are also shortfalls in the performance of representational institutions, but at least on them, the people accord less trust and so there is less of a sense of betrayal.
The reasons for expressing trust for undeserving institutions call to mind the same Churchillian and hope hypotheses. Expressing trust may signal the citizens’ acceptance of current situations because they are not as bad as others they have experienced. Most of the region has undergone authoritarian regimes, civil wars or occupation by an outside army. The current one – though still lacking in efficiency, quality, accountability and fairness - may still seem much better in comparison.

Beyond Churchillian relativity, trust may have been given in the hope that it would beget positive outcomes. It could work for citizens when their governments are sincerely trying to serve the public interest, and deserve to receive more encouragement in their endeavors. If governments are not responsive, citizens’ hope may propel them to action, and lead toward their empowerment. As Braithwaite reminds us, hope allows us “not only to dream of the extraordinary but also to do the extraordinary.”

These findings hurl challenges for governments to be more trustworthy. This closing section will cite extant models from Southeast Asia itself that can be built upon to respond to these challenges.

The improvement of service delivery and access is the first concern, as this is the first point of contact between government and the people. It deserves notice that general Southeast Asian ratings on efficiency, quality and ICT access are above neutral, suggesting the efficacy of public sector reforms. Nevertheless, governance needs to be improved, through, first, the continuous encouragement of innovation. A possible model here is Singapore’s “The Enterprise Challenge” (TEC) which recognizes that innovation is fraught with uncertainty, and that agencies must be provided a safety net for venturing into the unknown. Thus TEC provides funds for the risk that the agencies will take in trying that innovation.

The second challenge is to recognize and keep the human beings that run the civil service content but challenged. To have better performing human resources, Malaysia offers its “apex mechanism for reform.” Distinguished for comprehensiveness and synergy, the reform package recognizes the following as vital ingredients in the administrative reform loop: awards and recognition, guidelines, promotion and training, advice and consultation, and inspectorate and audit.

The third challenge is made necessary by the fact that equality of access to services does not seem to be as highly prized as efficiency,effectiveness and technological development. Thailand’s Balanced Scorecard of Public Sector for 2007, involving effectiveness, quality of service, efficiency of operations and organizational development, shows the way. Its quality of service dimension emphasizes customer satisfaction, people participation and transparency. It needs only an explicit concern for equality and justice which needs to be emphasized so that growth will not redound to simply a bigger gap between the rich and the poor.

Corruption remains a scourge in Southeast Asia, but it is not an intractable problem. Swift and severe retribution especially of big fish has been Singapore’s slogan.
since the 1970s, and its approach has worked excellently.\textsuperscript{63} It embodies the political will and institutional focus that are primary ingredients in fighting corruption. Transparency of operations and judicial independence and accountability would also help to root out corruption. This is not to forget the role of individuals imbibed with ethics and accountability on both the private and public side of the transaction.

For its part, Transparency International pushes for each country to ratify the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) as an indicator of commitment at the highest level. Meanwhile, ADB and OECD have focused on procurement which is a major avenue of government corruption. Hopeful signs are shown in self-assessments done by 25 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region. For instance, a third of the countries have substantially overhauled their rules of procurement or passed new comprehensive laws between 2000 and 2006. In addition, internet-based, anonymous procedures, rotation of personnel, panel reviews, and integrity pacts are becoming common.\textsuperscript{64}

TI joins the UN, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank as well as many scholars in pointing out the role of citizens and their organizations in rooting out this scourge. In the Regional Global Forum held in Korea in 2006, the experience of the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government was presented as a best practice in this regard.\textsuperscript{65} CCAGG’s approach is effective and also offers lessons on the complex relationship of trust and anti-corruption. What pushed for CCAGG’s creation was a distrust of government, inflamed by the obvious corruption and inefficiency shown by the poor record of road construction it had witnessed. Yet for poor rural lay-people to take on powerful experts and to plunge into the corruption assessment that it did required a certain level of trust also: perhaps not in that part of the government that it was criticizing, but in the larger governmental system to which it filed its report. It was also bolstered by social trust - received from the CCAGG membership itself, trust in democracy as a system that permits dissent, and a hope fueled by empowerment and cold analysis.

The other key challenge related to order institutions is to point out the danger of too much trust in the military. The option is not to sow distrust of an important public institution. Rather, what is called for is better civic education, so that such democratic principles as a loyal opposition, dissent expressed in dialogue and not through guns, civilian supremacy and respect for minority rights and the basic freedoms are learned and appreciated by all citizens.

For representational institutions, avenues for political and moral reform should touch on the integrity of electoral processes, and the performance of legislatures and local governments. One must tackle the improvement of political parties, the electoral process, the parliament itself, and concomitantly, campaign financing. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems recommends improving the electoral process, through a code of conduct for political actors, intensive voter education, the use of election observers and the effective operation of independent election commissions.\textsuperscript{66} UNDP has assisted in direct reforms for political parties in the Philippines through projects incorporating advocacy for improved election laws and a political party summit. As
Ghoshal said, speaking of Indonesia in the 1960s, “parliamentary democracy would not have failed if the political parties took pains to establish their base among the people through party building and interest mobilization.” The advice is still relevant today.

Decentralization as a governance process has been accepted by most of the world’s nations. However, it is not an unmixed blessing, and civil society as well as national governments should be alert to the possibility that decentralization might nurture local tyrants or produce an imbalance in development. At the same time, it should be recognized that decentralization is a national policy and is not the responsibility of local units alone. Instead, the central government has the duty of fostering a national vision, maintaining national standards, providing assistance to disadvantaged units, and checking local tyrants so that decentralization does not become an excuse for leaving poorer, more conflict-ridden or more elite-dominated local units behind. On the other hand, decentralization is also about letting go and allowing local units the autonomy, flexibility and accountability to be confronted by their own citizens. Therefore, general supervision rather than controls are called for, and trust must be accorded the newly emancipated local governments. The citizens themselves play an important role in nurturing local levels to be more trustworthy. An example is Indonesia’s program that recognizes the major role that decentralization can play in poverty reduction. But rather than bombarding them with central rules, it provides for participatory assessments at the regional level to accommodate views of the poor while fostering local autonomy.

In many of these challenges, civil society engagement has been mentioned. That is as it should be. Trust in government necessitates the involvement of the citizens in governance, not as onlookers or passive recipients but as full participants and decision makers in the process. Yet, despite the trust that Southeast Asians accord to their undeserving governments, the latter have not responded in kind. A few windows have been opened: the reining in of red tape and the welcome to e-governance might suggest an increased trust of citizens by government. The making of the Thai Constitution of 1997 also showed a government willing to trust citizens with no less than the basic law. On the whole, however, government tends to put barriers between itself and its citizens. The multiplicity of agencies to fight corruption is a case in point. It shows a government not only distrusting its citizens but also not trusting its officials and employees.

If trust in government is to be promoted, the radical idea is for government to also put trust on citizens as a guiding principle. This will mean not trusting money and goons to deliver election results, but believing that citizens will make rational choices. This will mean less favoritism in making decisions but trusted by the unknown people who place their credentials before you are as qualified as someone you know. This will mean less document requirements and fewer guards guarding guardians because integrity holds sway. It will make both citizens and government more responsible for their actions. It will still require spot checks by government, evaluations by citizens and vigilance all around. But the model is promise-keeping exemplified by Brunei’s client charter and other citizens’ charters around the globe.
Trust begets trust. Southeast Asians have accorded trust to governments which have as yet not shown themselves as trustworthy. But the citizens have begun the experiment to trust first, so that they may pressure the other party to earn that trust. Can governments take the plunge and accord trust on its citizens too?

When they do, they shall have entered not just the politics of trust, but also the new politics of hope, to dream of extraordinary things, and thence to do them.

2 Trust data are from two sources: the Global Barometer Survey (GBS) and its Asian arm, the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), and the World Values Survey (WVS). GBS grew out of the Euro Barometer in the 1970s and has since become a network of several regions. Its Asian member is based in National Taiwan University. ABS is used unless discussing results beyond Asia. WVS is based in the University of Michigan and has been investigating socio-cultural and political change in a global scale since 1901. Governance indices are listed in the United Nations, Governance Indicators: A Users’ Guide, 2004. http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/policy-guide-IndicatorsUserGuide.pdf. Retrieved May 12, 2007.
6 “Social trust” is indicated by answers to a four-point scale between “most people can be trusted” and “One can’t be too careful in dealing with them.”
10 Rothstein and Stolle, op. cit. 2007.


The Philippines is the only country of overlap of GBS and WVS. Even though WVS respondents tend to be more positive, the trust ranking of Philippine institutions is the same.


This point is inspired by what Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin, “Do East Asians View Democracy as a Lesser Evil? Testing the Churchill’s Notion of Democracy in East Asia,” Working Paper Series No.30, Taipei: Asian Barometer Project Office, National Taiwan University and Academica Sinica, 2005. Park and Shin allude to Winston Churchill’s remark that “democracy is the worst form of government, except those other governments that have been tried from time to time.” They find that support for democracy is genuine, rather than an acceptance of it as a lesser evil, the argument this paper is making.


GIS consists of peer-reviewed scores, commentary and references on 292 integrity indicators. Using local teams of researchers and journalists, GIS considers the existence of anti-corruption mechanisms and practices, their level of effectiveness, and the extent to which citizens can access these mechanisms. The Philippines and Indonesia were included in 2004; Vietnam was added in 2006. Global Integrity is funded by the investment firm Legatum Global Development, Sunrise Foundation, the Wallace Global Fund and the World Bank. See Global Integrity, “Reports on the Philippines and Indonesia 2004.” [http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2004/2004/country.html. Retrieved May 21, 2007.]


The Global Competitiveness Index has been drawn from publicly available data, plus the results of an expert opinion survey of 11,000 business leaders in 125 economies worldwide. GCI is a product of the World Economic Forum which describes itself as “an independent international organization committed to improving the state of the world by engaging leaders in partnerships to shape global, regional and industry agendas.” Founded in 1971, it is supervised by the Swiss government. See WEF (World Economic Forum), “History and Achievements,” 2007. [http://www.weforum.org/en/about/History%20and%20Achievements/index.htm. Retrieved May 15, 2007.]

This validates the lament of the UN Regional Forum that huge sums have been invested for capacity building with very little results. See Southeast Asia Sub-Regional Working Group II, “Report of the Sub-Regional Working Group II,” United Nations Regional Forum on Reinventing Government in Asia. Korea, September 8, 2006.

Haque, op. cit, 1998.


GI, op. cit., 2006; ADB/OECD 2006.


Wahid’s masseur and business partner allegedly tricked Bulog, a partially privatized government agency, to transfer funds to secret relief operations in war-torn Aceh province. A special parliamentary commission found the president acting improperly on this and other issues. Wahid was impeached and dismissed. See Global Integrity, op. cit., 2006.


GI, op. cit., 2006.


Ghoshal, ibid.; GI, op. cit., 2006.


GI, op. cit., 2006.


64 ADB/OECD, op. cit., 2006.