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INTRODUCTION | In 1970, Chinese women were having an average of nearly six children each. Only nine years later, this figure had dropped to an average of 2.7 children per woman. This steep fertility decline was achieved before the Chinese government introduced the infamous one-child policy. Today, at 1.5 children per woman, the fertility rate in China is one of the lowest in the world. Such a low fertility level leads to extreme population aging--expansion of the proportion of the elderly in a population, with relatively few children to grow up and care for their aging parents and few workers to pay for social services or drive economic growth. China’s birth-control policies are now largely relaxed, but new programs are needed to provide healthcare and support for the growing elderly population and to encourage young people to have children. It will be increasingly difficult to fund such programs, however, as China's unprecedented pace of economic growth inevitably slows down. China's Fertility Decline
In November 2015, in part due to this lukewarm response to the partial relaxation of the one-child policy, the Chinese government announced the total lifting of the one-child rule, allowing couples to have two children without getting prior approval. In 2016, the first year following the end of the one-child policy, China reported 18.46 million births, a number that is only 1.4 million higher than the average number of birth in the preceding five years. Despite the government's claim that such a limited increase is within its expectations, this rebound is well below the increase in births that the government had projected, which was between 2.3 and 4.3 million a year. Such a weak response in the early days of a historical policy change illustrates the much broader challenges facing the Chinese government today. In addition to abolishing the one-child policy, China needs to introduce policies and programs that will make it easier for people to have children. Programs are also required to provide financial support and healthcare for the country's rapidly growing elderly population. Low Fertility Is Here To Stay Income levels increased by nearly tenfold, and the share of China's population residing in urban areas nearly doubled. Secondary-school enrollment more than doubled, and college and university enrollment increased eightfold. Two important forces linked to this rapid economic change contributed to China's steady fertility decline--a shift of the cost of childrearing from the collective to the family and intensified pressure to "get ahead," generated by the opportunities and uncertainties associated with a period of hyper economic growth. Beginning in the early 1980s, China's socialist planned economic system started to break down, first in the rural areas and then in the cities. Under the socialist system, the state and the collective had supplied considerable support for childrearing, as well as food, housing, and employment. During the early years of the reforms, in rural areas in particular, public education and healthcare systems deteriorated rapidly, which shifted the cost of education and healthcare to individual families. Since the early 1980s, massive numbers of young people have moved from the countryside to the cities, motivated by unprecedented economic opportunities. Housing prices skyrocketed, especially in China's major cities. Suddenly, young parents who grew up in the post-Mao era realized that having children is truly expensive, both in terms of time and money. The weak response to the government's relaxation of the one-child policy conveys a clear message: Many young Chinese think it is too expensive to have children. Studies of the preferred number of children among Chinese couples all portray a similar picture--the one-child family is the new norm. Indeed, surveys find that less than 30 percent of qualified couples want to have a second child. This suggests that even if the government's birth-control policy were completely dismantled, fertility would increase only modestly. If young Chinese men and women act on their fertility preferences, then China will have below-replacement fertility for a long time to come. Short- and Long-Term Implications
China's three-decades-long enforcement of the one-child policy has also resulted in a special feature--a large share of Chinese families with only one child. China now has more than 150 million families with one child, or one in every three households in the nation. And in urban areas, more than 90 percent of families headed by young couples have only one child. Many of these only children, when they grow up, will face a substantial burden of providing care and economic support to their elderly parents--either through taxes that pay for government pensions and services, or within the family, or both. Policy Response to Low Fertility But even with the latest policy changes, the Chinese government has not given up its control over reproduction: couples are still not allowed to have more than two children. Retaining this last control is perhaps a political face- saving strategy, but it serves no good demographic or social purpose. Apart from reforming birth-control policies, the Chinese government faces two daunting tasks. One is to reform the nation's social security and healthcare systems, and the second is to create more family-friendly conditions for young couples who want to pursue careers and start a family. China's social-security system is currently highly inadequate and inequitable. In 2010, only about 30 percent of the elderly relied on public transfers, such as pensions, as their major source of income, and almost all of those receiving pensions were urban residents. The same is true for the healthcare system. While coverage has been extended in recent years--in principle, to the entire population--the level of coverage varies widely among different segments of society. With costs rising much faster than incomes, the current system is not only inadequate and unfair, but also unsustainable. In addition, the Chinese government will need to initiate policies that support young couples who wish to have children. Today, the lack of accessible and affordable childcare and problems in balancing work and family life are becoming major factors affecting fertility. All these reforms and policy changes will become more difficult to introduce and implement than in the past because China's period of very rapid economic growth has come to an end. The growth rate of government revenue is slowing down just as the demand to support young families and the elderly is going up. It did not take long for China to reach below-replacement fertility. It only took one decade to bring fertility down from more than five to close to two children per woman and only one more decade of fluctuation around the replacement level for fertility to fall even further. What took a long time was the official recognition of fertility decline and the beginning of a policy response. As a result of this delay, China has lost precious time either to slow down the process of population aging or to prepare for the effects of the new demographic reality on Chinese society. Note About the Author
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Center. |
Additional titles in the
INTRODUCTION | In 1970, Chinese women were having an average of nearly six children each. Only nine years later, this figure had dropped to an average of 2.7 children per woman. This steep fertility decline was achieved before the Chinese government introduced the infamous one-child policy. Today, at 1.5 children per woman, the fertility rate in China is one of the lowest in the world. Such a low fertility level leads to extreme population aging--expansion of the proportion of the elderly in a population, with relatively few children to grow up and care for their aging parents and few workers to pay for social services or drive economic growth. China’s birth-control policies are now largely relaxed, but new programs are needed to provide healthcare and support for the growing elderly population and to encourage young people to have children. It will be increasingly difficult to fund such programs, however, as China's unprecedented pace of economic growth inevitably slows down. China's Fertility Decline
In November 2015, in part due to this lukewarm response to the partial relaxation of the one-child policy, the Chinese government announced the total lifting of the one-child rule, allowing couples to have two children without getting prior approval. In 2016, the first year following the end of the one-child policy, China reported 18.46 million births, a number that is only 1.4 million higher than the average number of birth in the preceding five years. Despite the government's claim that such a limited increase is within its expectations, this rebound is well below the increase in births that the government had projected, which was between 2.3 and 4.3 million a year. Such a weak response in the early days of a historical policy change illustrates the much broader challenges facing the Chinese government today. In addition to abolishing the one-child policy, China needs to introduce policies and programs that will make it easier for people to have children. Programs are also required to provide financial support and healthcare for the country's rapidly growing elderly population. Low Fertility Is Here To Stay Income levels increased by nearly tenfold, and the share of China's population residing in urban areas nearly doubled. Secondary-school enrollment more than doubled, and college and university enrollment increased eightfold. Two important forces linked to this rapid economic change contributed to China's steady fertility decline--a shift of the cost of childrearing from the collective to the family and intensified pressure to "get ahead," generated by the opportunities and uncertainties associated with a period of hyper economic growth. Beginning in the early 1980s, China's socialist planned economic system started to break down, first in the rural areas and then in the cities. Under the socialist system, the state and the collective had supplied considerable support for childrearing, as well as food, housing, and employment. During the early years of the reforms, in rural areas in particular, public education and healthcare systems deteriorated rapidly, which shifted the cost of education and healthcare to individual families. Since the early 1980s, massive numbers of young people have moved from the countryside to the cities, motivated by unprecedented economic opportunities. Housing prices skyrocketed, especially in China's major cities. Suddenly, young parents who grew up in the post-Mao era realized that having children is truly expensive, both in terms of time and money. The weak response to the government's relaxation of the one-child policy conveys a clear message: Many young Chinese think it is too expensive to have children. Studies of the preferred number of children among Chinese couples all portray a similar picture--the one-child family is the new norm. Indeed, surveys find that less than 30 percent of qualified couples want to have a second child. This suggests that even if the government's birth-control policy were completely dismantled, fertility would increase only modestly. If young Chinese men and women act on their fertility preferences, then China will have below-replacement fertility for a long time to come. Short- and Long-Term Implications
China's three-decades-long enforcement of the one-child policy has also resulted in a special feature--a large share of Chinese families with only one child. China now has more than 150 million families with one child, or one in every three households in the nation. And in urban areas, more than 90 percent of families headed by young couples have only one child. Many of these only children, when they grow up, will face a substantial burden of providing care and economic support to their elderly parents--either through taxes that pay for government pensions and services, or within the family, or both. Policy Response to Low Fertility But even with the latest policy changes, the Chinese government has not given up its control over reproduction: couples are still not allowed to have more than two children. Retaining this last control is perhaps a political face- saving strategy, but it serves no good demographic or social purpose. Apart from reforming birth-control policies, the Chinese government faces two daunting tasks. One is to reform the nation's social security and healthcare systems, and the second is to create more family-friendly conditions for young couples who want to pursue careers and start a family. China's social-security system is currently highly inadequate and inequitable. In 2010, only about 30 percent of the elderly relied on public transfers, such as pensions, as their major source of income, and almost all of those receiving pensions were urban residents. The same is true for the healthcare system. While coverage has been extended in recent years--in principle, to the entire population--the level of coverage varies widely among different segments of society. With costs rising much faster than incomes, the current system is not only inadequate and unfair, but also unsustainable. In addition, the Chinese government will need to initiate policies that support young couples who wish to have children. Today, the lack of accessible and affordable childcare and problems in balancing work and family life are becoming major factors affecting fertility. All these reforms and policy changes will become more difficult to introduce and implement than in the past because China's period of very rapid economic growth has come to an end. The growth rate of government revenue is slowing down just as the demand to support young families and the elderly is going up. It did not take long for China to reach below-replacement fertility. It only took one decade to bring fertility down from more than five to close to two children per woman and only one more decade of fluctuation around the replacement level for fertility to fall even further. What took a long time was the official recognition of fertility decline and the beginning of a policy response. As a result of this delay, China has lost precious time either to slow down the process of population aging or to prepare for the effects of the new demographic reality on Chinese society. Note About the Author
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Center. |