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## EAST-WEST CENTER ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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# Dick Baker Interview Narrative

11-29-2006 and 12/7/2006 interviews in Honolulu, Hawaii

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The **East-West Center Oral History Project** strives to capture the Center's first 50 years as seen through the eyes of staff, alumni, and supporters who have contributed to its growth.

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## Dick Baker

11-29-06, 12-7-06 interviews in Honolulu, Hawaii

### **Personal Background**

I'm Richard W. Baker III, which says something about my father, who wanted to pass his name on, even if it meant I would carry the millstone of a Roman three around my neck all my life. I grew up on the East Coast. My family was very much from the East Coast. New England and the South and Florida, respectively.

I had an older sister and a younger brother, so there were three of us growing up in a rather small household in Princeton, New Jersey. One of the advantages of growing up in a place like Princeton was the presence of the university, and just the atmosphere of learning, and involvement in public affairs, and all the sorts of things that go along with a university town, which of course explains why for my college, I went to Yale.

### **Life Before EWC**

#### *Early Interest in Foreign Service*

But I did come back home for a graduate program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, at Princeton, which is a very well-known public affairs school.

And I did that because by that time I was planning on or wanted to go into the Foreign Service. The reason that I made that career choice is sort of purely anecdotal, because I went to a boarding school, Groton School in Massachusetts. And that school participated in the American Field Service, a student exchange program. And I was selected after my junior year to be the school's participant in that program and the AFS, in their infinite wisdom, sent me to Indonesia to spend the summer.

When I got the letter saying that that was where I was going, an indicator of the depth of my knowledge is that I had to go to a map to find out where it was. And as a typical East Coast, Europe-oriented person, I had no idea or contact outside -- in fact, at that time, I had never been outside the country.

So a trip halfway around the world to Indonesia and to a totally different culture was needless to say, an eye-opening, and for me, a life-changing experience.

Another coincidence was that I spent most of that summer in Surabaya, which is the second largest city in Indonesia, and is on the eastern end of Java Island. And there was an American consulate in Surabaya, and my host family happened to live about six doors down the street from the [U.S.] consul's house. So while I was there, I got to know the consul and a number of people on his staff.

And as a young person of 16, with a vague interest in, you know, public affairs -- civics, what was happening, and beginning to know about politics, and liking history and that sort of stuff in school -- I realized as the summer went on that I thought this idea of Foreign Service stuff was really cool.

And by the time I went back home [*coming home*] we went with students who went to the Philippines and to Japan, and we all came back across the Pacific on a Japanese passenger boat, with a bunch of Fulbright students, and sort of by that time, it was pretty clear to me that what I wanted to do was to join the Foreign Service. And the rest of my educational career and certainly the first 20 years of my professional career were determined by that.

So when I got to college, I studied politics and economics. It was a combined major that Yale offered. And then I went to the Woodrow Wilson School where I studied

international relations. And in the meantime, after my senior year at Yale and again, between the two years at Woodrow Wilson, I did internships at the State Department. And the long and the short of that was that a week after I graduated with my master's from Woodrow Wilson, I and two other members of my Wilson class, were sworn in as new Foreign Service officers.

### *Foreign Service in Asia Pacific*

This was 1967. And there was a certain conflict in Southeast Asia going on at that time. And most of the bachelors in our entering class of 72 [*members*] in the Foreign Service that summer were pegged to go to Vietnam, in the CORDS program, which was an acronym for Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support.

This was a bunch of people who went out to provinces and districts to work with and I guess sort of lobby the local Vietnamese officers, officials, district leaders and such, to do the right thing. And all in the name of promoting responsive politics and development, and beating the Viet Cong.

And that is where I was destined until I am told a week before they handed out our assignments in August, the government of Singapore, after a long delay, gave our embassy in Singapore permission to add a member to its diplomatic staff. The Singaporeans limited us and the Russians on the grounds that if they didn't, we would both populate the whole city with people whose job was to watch each other. So the embassy desperately felt that it needed an additional person, and the Singaporeans finally agreed. And the embassy must have sent a rocket to the department saying, you know, "Send somebody!" And I had been knocking on doors, understandably telling people that I really wanted to go back to Indonesia. So for whatever reason, I got this job.

So I went out to Singapore, and then came back to the department for a stint. Then, in 1972, I got my wish to go back to Indonesia. And the department's computers must have been broken because they sent me to Surabaya, where I had lived previously. And that was by way of some additional language training.

So that was how I came to be a Foreign Service person and where the sort of sentimental center of my Foreign Service career was. My overseas postings ended up being in Singapore, then four years in two different positions in Indonesia: after I was in Surabaya as deputy consul for two years, I went to Jakarta, where I worked as a political officer. Then back to the State Department for a long time. I did almost eight years in the State Department. And then I was assigned as the head of the political section in Canberra, from 1984-1987.

### ***EWC Diplomat-in-Residence***

Before going to Canberra, however, I was assigned a year of -- I think what they called senior training at that time. And through a complicated set of coincidences, I ended up coming to the East-West Center on that program. So I spent an academic year, from August of 1983 to May of 1984, at the East-West Center, as what the East-West Center calls a diplomat-in-residence. That was a new program for the Center, and I was actually the second American to participate in that program.

There had been a previous diplomat, a Fijian named Macu Salato, who had done a year, and then actually went on to work with the Pacific Islands Development Program. But he was officially a diplomat-in-residence, followed by Bill Bodde, who had been the director of the State Department's Office of Pacific Island Affairs, who did the year from 1982-1983. And then I came in for '83-84, followed by various people, right through the

present day.

The irony of that, or poetic justice or whatever, being that when I came back to the Center in 1988, one of the collateral duties that I was given was to be the coordinator of the diplomats-in-residence program. So I have been the contact person and counselor and consultant and/or den mother, depending on the needs, of a whole string of very interesting Foreign Service officers, who we've had at the Center for the last nearly 20 years. And that's been an interesting part of the experience.

The State Department's purpose in sending newly promoted senior officers, or Class One officers to the Center, and various other places in this program, is to give them a chance to get out of the normal bureaucratic State Department routine, and to expose them to broader perspectives, wider sorts of interesting subject matter, to enable them to study new things that they hadn't run into before, to follow their own interests and wishes. It's sort of a combination of what Henry Kissinger called recharging the intellectual batteries and giving people some perspective, and to some exposure to the world of public affairs and international relations outside the Department of State.

From the East-West Center's point of view, the value in having a Foreign Service officer, an active Foreign Service officer in residence, is a number of things. It brings the real-time contacts and context that a Foreign Service officer has, from the experiences that they have had in current, contemporary, topical issues as a diplomat. Also, it brings their present-day knowledge of the institution and the foreign policy-making process in Washington. All of those sort of practical sides of the international relations picture that can be very useful for the students at the East-West Center, for some of the projects, for the research fellows.

It also provides a resource to the community, to speak about American diplomacy, about the State Department, about State Department careers, which is one of the things that they do. So it's a kind of triple-edged program, from which everybody benefits. And we've been delighted to have it, and I hope it continues for years.

### ***Retirement From Foreign Service***

I missed something, to which I need to go back, in that hurried run through my career. I explained that I joined the Foreign Service in June of 1967, just out of graduate school. I left the Foreign Service 20 years later, at the end of September in 1987. That is a 20-year career, which is, you know, perfectly respectable. But in fact, I left the Foreign Service early, of my own volition, because -- although I had nothing against the State Department, and it provided a wonderful career for me, and I enjoyed it, I think I made a contribution -- as time went on, working in the sort of institutional environment of the State Department, a number of things just began to wear me a bit thin.

I ended up thinking, did I want to spend another 20 years of 70-hour work-weeks and stresses on the marriage and whatever, for the possible advantage of -- or end goal of being the number two to a political appointee, or possibly being able to be an ambassador in a rather small country? And the costs and the benefits just ceased to balance for me. And as someone whose fundamental interest going into the State Department was foreign policy -- and I mean that at the sort of level that students see it, of how the relationships of the United States are determined, how our policies are determined, how our leaders have dealt with the great issues of the day -- I realize in the Foreign Service that the career is essentially one of involvement in foreign relations, more than foreign policy. Because the State Department implements foreign policy, and it plays an informational

role in the formulation process. But again, because of the way our Constitution works, and by intention, the policy decisions are made at the political level. So this is not only in terms of the relationship between the dialogue between the White House and the Congress, but it is also through the intermediation of the usually politically appointed senior officials in the State Department.

And the third thing was just frankly a matter of the intensity of the career. The State Department, when I was in it, was dealing with three times the number of countries that it had in the late '50s, before decolonization, and it had exactly the same number of Foreign Service officers that it had at that time. The Congress was always reluctant to give resources to the State Department, because they were considered striped-pants-cookie-pushers who couldn't park their bicycles straight (that combines a couple of phrases, the latter of which was I think George Wallace's).

They're very reluctant to do that, and so within the Foreign Service, the pressures -- and if you were ambitious, if you wanted to go up, the pressures were really quite intense. And what I said about 70-hour weeks was not an exaggeration. It can -- whether you're at home, or a desk officer for example, which is what I was in the Department, or on the staff of one of the senior department officials, which I did on two different occasions, it's a very time consuming, very high-pressure job.

And the long and the short of it, after 20 years, or after 14 years of that, I pretty well decided that I didn't particularly like the person that I was becoming under the weight of all of that environment. So what I did, essentially, was I opted out. I used a loophole in the new personnel law, that allowed me to basically refuse to be promoted, at which point we have something called a "time in class provision," which forces you out after a certain

number of years. But you also at the same time, qualify for a pension. So at age 43, in the end of September 1987, I became a pensioner, with my life before me, as I think they say in the *Divine Comedy*.

### ***Congressional Fellow, 1988-89***

I had the opportunity in 1988-89 to serve as a Congressional Fellow in the U.S. Congress. This is a program of the American Political Science Association, in which the State Department participates. And that gives middle-level professionals from academia and government a chance to spend a year on Capitol Hill, working with legislators, and basically seeing on an intimate way, from the inside, how the legislative process works. Or from the legislative side, as opposed to, say, the State Department's side, where I had already been exposed to it. I had the good fortune of working for Congressman Jonathan Bingham of New York, who has since died, but was a very respected international affairs person, had actually helped set up AID in the early days, when it was the "Point Four" program. He was on the International Affairs Committee in the House.

Then I spent the second half of my time with Senator John Glenn of Ohio, who was the chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I got to work with him, among other things, on East Asian community building, which was a subject in which he was interested.

That exposure was truly educational, because much as we in the Foreign Service may think that, you know, we are the ones who know, and we formulate foreign policy, America is a democracy. And the Congress is the place where the government and the people really interface. And as one senior legislator once said, there are two things which

if you like, you don't want to watch them being made, one is sausages, and the other is laws. (laughter)

And the fact of the matter, and the truth of that otherwise amusing saying, is that these are messy processes. And they're messy by intention, because people's opinions differ, people's agendas and priorities differ. And democracy is not tidy.

So for a self-confident, self-considered knowledgeable expert person on foreign policy to be exposed to the real world of political arm-wrestling and such, which ultimately determines the policy outcomes, that was an extremely educational affair. And ever since, I've been glad that I did that.

In fact, at the time -- I believe that at the time that I was on the Hill, while I was working for Senator Glenn, Charles Morrison was working for Senator Roth of Delaware, although regrettably, we never met at that point.

## **Life at EWC**

### ***Joining Research Program***

And at that point, I had had between the time I decided to leave [*the State Department*] and the time that I had actually left -- I had this experience at the East-West Center where I was working directly with Charles Morrison, who had been brought in, really, as the first international relations person at the Center.

That was a very enjoyable experience, and he encouraged me to do some research and to do some writing. And to open up an academic side of my interest, which I really hadn't been exposed to, certainly since graduate school and which I found interesting, also challenging. Because for a practitioner, which is what I by then was, to be exposed to theory and conceptual matters, it's a bit of a struggle, because one tends to, let's say,

emphasize the practical and deemphasize the theoretical. So there was a transition. But I found it interesting.

And as it happened, when in 1987, when I was coming to the end of my time in Canberra, Charles knew that I was leaving the Service, and one day I got a call from him. A particularly important issue had arisen in the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. relationship, around the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear naval propulsion -- and the New Zealand government's decision not to allow nuclear-powered or armed warships into their ports, which led to a split in the ANZUS alliance, between the United States and New Zealand. And that in turn threw in relief the whole question of the evolution of the relationship of the ANZUS alliance, which had by then been going for 40 years.

Charles had the idea, as he has had many ideas, that it would be interesting to do a study of the evolution of those relationships, leading up to and including the nuclear issue, but not focusing specifically on the nuclear issue, but more on the long-term trends and problems. And Charles told me about that, and asked me if I might be interested in coming back and directing that project. Well, I agonized for about a half a second, and I told him that (laughter) -- yeah, I thought I could do that. And my wife, Mimi, also wanted to come. While we had been at the Center before, she had gotten into studying oceanography. And she wanted to come back and study more in oceanography.

So I told her that I had determined our career for 20 years, and taken her away from the Space Program, which was her first professional association, you know, helping find out where people are going to land on the moon, and took her to places like Indonesia and such. I thought it was only fair that she had a major part in deciding the next step. So if Hawai'i was good for her, I would go along.

That wasn't completely a white lie, but it was a win-win situation. So anyway, we came back, and have been here ever since.

## **Institutional Transitions**

### ***Research Program***

One bit of background on the Center at that point. I said that Charles Morrison was the first international relations appointee on the Center research staff. The East-West Center had gone into research in about 1968, if I recall correctly. And the first area that they worked in was population. Well, if you think quickly about the context in 1968, it's rather like the context in 1967 when I entered the Foreign Service.

The international relations scene was pretty well-dominated by Vietnam, and American foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region was overwhelmingly dominated by Vietnam.

And here was the East-West Center, which wanted to do research on projects and issues which would promote understanding between the governments and peoples of the Asia Pacific and the United States, as it said in our congressional charter.

Well, politics was a pretty delicate subject in those days, not only internationally, but at home. There were demonstrations on the University of Hawai'i campus, as there were elsewhere. So the political and policy elements of U.S. foreign relations were not a field that was susceptible to understanding and smooth relationships. So I used to say that at that time, the Center's motto, as we set up the research programs, should have been and as a practical matter was, "Check your politics at the door, and come in and work on the real-life practical issues that are faced by the peoples of the region."

So basically the Center was working in what you might call technical sorts of issues. We worked in population. We worked in resources. We worked in environment. We

worked in communications. We worked in culture. The research institutes at the Center were basically looking at functional issues.

I think, at one point, they had a project that looked at pollution from cook stoves. And we brought people from throughout the region to try to figure out if there was a better way for, say, Indian women to do their cooking than over dried cattle dung, which was poisoning their lungs as they did it. And so that's a classic example of a technical sort of an issue on which collaborative research was appropriate. In this case, it was a laboratory issue, and it was one of the few actual hands-on laboratory things that the Center did, although we did some other things in food.

### *Centerwide Programs*

Anyway, that was the theory. Well, if you fast-forward to post-1975, by 1980, this concept that we really shouldn't touch politics was increasingly outdated. And the Center found that visitors to the Center increasingly were asking questions like, "Let me talk to your Japan person." "Let me talk to your foreign policy person." Our guests and our collaborators wanted the East-West Center to be able to speak to international relations and political issues in the region. So [*President*] Victor Li and [*Vice-President*] Doug Murray took what I thought was a very wise decision, to set up that program, or to start working in that area, and which led to Charles' hiring.

The Center has to exist on two levels. It exists on a cerebral level, looking at the policy agenda, and the substantive agenda of the region, with which we want to work. But it also exists at an institutional, structural level. And so there's always a question of how we use the structure to explore the agenda. And this is something, of course, that I came to work with a great deal later, when Charles became president in the late '90s.

But the problem there in the 1980s was that we had no box, no pigeonhole for international relations. And this was also true of some other subjects at that time. Economic development in some of its aspects we dealt with under an outfit called the Resource Systems Institute. But there were elements of economic development theory that didn't quite fit comfortably there. So what Victor and Doug did was set up a program that they called "Centerwide Programs."

And that's a nice umbrella to do basically anything you want to do, that doesn't fit some place else. Doug Murray ran the Centerwide Programs. So Doug, I believe, was the one that actually hired Charles, although I'm not absolutely certain. But Charles was working for Doug. And there were a bunch of us that, including the diplomats-in-residence, that were under Doug's supervision, until he left, I believe, in 1990, I think it was.

I can't actually remember whether Doug left, whether just at the end of my time as a diplomat-in-residence in '84, or just after I got back. I don't recall. But I do recall his leaving, which was a sad affair.

### ***International Relations Program***

Anyway, Centerwide Programs was the house into which we put international relations. After Doug left, Centerwide Programs was, I believe, dismantled. And the international relations effort then basically continued under Charles, as I recall, and it was called International Relations, or some version of that. And by the time I came back in 1988, it was the International Relations Program, which was a free-standing program, although not a research institute. I'm not even sure where institutional support came from, but I think there was a separate administrative support structure.

In any case, by that time, International Relations had not grown too much, but it had become firmly established as one of the areas in which the Center was actively involved in research and in conferencing, and in dialogue with the region.

So that's an example of the evolution of the Center, and I was part of the expansion of that program, as was Muthiah Alagappa, who Charles brought on at about the same time, first as a visiting fellow, and then he went on staff. And so the three of us, the sort of three musketeers, or the three nerds, or whatever you wanted to call us, were the institutional center of the international affairs effort. And I did this project on Australia-New Zealand-U.S. relations, which took me several years, and then took on a project on Indonesia.

### ***Reduction-in-Force (RIF)***

*[In 1994]* the Republicans swept the Congress, rather like has just happened in the opposite direction. Bill Clinton suddenly found himself with a Republican-controlled Congress. And at that time, the most serious national issue was the deficit.

We were operating with these huge budgetary deficits, which the Democrats never tired of saying that Ronald Reagan had tripled, and it was everybody's favorite issue in the Congress, and the Democrats had been saying you need to do something about this to the Republicans. And all of a sudden, the Republicans were in charge, and there was a Democrat president, and the Republicans were sort of on board, too. Anyway, what happened was, that led basically to the balancing of the budget, the next year, when the new Congress met in 1995.

It was very clear politically that everybody wanted to balance the budget. And they did it. Well, in the process, some fairly major things happened, which are necessary to

balance an American budget, but also some very broad things happened. And there was a lot of grass that got trampled, as the elephants charged towards their goal of a balanced budget. And the East-West Center was part of the grass. We lost 50 percent of our budget. That was our great Saturday Night Massacre.

And the trauma for the East-West Center, as most everybody who was here knows, was that not only did we sustain a 50 percent budget cut, but the administration and the Congress put us on a five-year phase-out. They were intending to eliminate us. But they gave us five years to call ourselves off.

Where that's important (to the Center's leadership story) is that as he had succeeded Victor Li, Kenji Sumida took over as acting president from Mike Oksenberg. And when the Board realized that we had an economic -- a budgetary -- catastrophe to deal with, it also recognized that therefore, frankly, we were going to have to fire people.

And over the course of the next, I think it was six months, certainly during the course of 1995, we fired half our staff, we downsized our student body by about half, we had to cut our budget by half. We changed the Research Program to say to researchers that in future there would be no Center money for research. Researchers were responsible for raising funding for all of their own research projects. And they were also made responsible for raising 50 percent of their own salary.

As of today, there's a nominal 25 percent objective that researchers are hoped to raise, which would offset a portion of their salary, but the connection isn't as direct as it was. Anyway, it was a painful time. And the Center emerged from that certainly leaner. You could argue whether it was stronger. We lost a lot of researchers, including most of our economists, because many of the new hires were economists. At about the same time, I

believe Seiji Naya left to join the State *[of Hawai'i]* government administration. He had been the director of the economics area (the so-called "Resource Systems Institute.")

*[After the reduction-in-force the International Relations group was placed under the Program on Resources, Energy and Minerals which was supervised by Vice-President Lee-Jay Cho]*

### ***Morrison Presidency***

It was in August of 1998, when after another very long and complex political process, and to the great surprise of most of the people in the room, the nominating committee of the Board of Directors nominated Charles as their only candidate for president to succeed Kenji. And so he was made president.

Here let me say that I think the real institutional issue faced by the Board in considering Charles was whether somebody from inside could do what needed to be done. And one of the points that a number of us made to the Board in urging that they seriously continue to consider Charles was that Charles had two things that none of the other candidates could reasonably have. He had intimate knowledge of how the Center worked, and you know, what the structure was, and the whole context of everything, the whole decision-making process.

But he also had a vision for where he thought the Center should go. And he had been spelling out that vision for years. And had spelled it out in considerable detail. As I said earlier, Charles had very clear ideas about what he wanted to do with the Center.

He also had a good deal of what I would call "political experience" in working with other senior figures. I mean, working for David Packard in the Wise Men's Commission on Japan and working for the Tri-Lateral Commission and, you know, with people like

Henry Kissinger. So, he was no stranger to that field, but he had never run a large organization and so there was inevitably a kind of a learning curve involved for him. And for someone who had never been in that kind of a management position before, in my humble but thoroughly biased opinion, he did really remarkably well. He started out, perhaps not chronologically, but certainly in terms of importance, by working fairly intensely with the Board of Governors and particularly former Governor George Ariyoshi who was the chairman of the Board at that time.

I would give credit to Governor Ariyoshi for having played a really major role during that period, in this sense. Having elected Charles president with a mandate to review the Center -- everything about what the Center was doing, and make the necessary changes -- Governor Ariyoshi had a very clear idea that the Board's role in that process was to consult closely with Charles, to listen to him, to hear about what his plans were, and to contribute whatever ideas they had but that basically, having satisfied themselves or kept themselves satisfied that Charles was moving in the right direction, that their role then was to sort of be the flywheel, as it were, to keep the momentum going.

And they ended up having a very cooperative partnership and it worked extremely well. Now, what did Charles do? The first thing he really did was to sit down and work out a strategic plan, called the *1998 Action Plan*. And he worked through that and it identified the places where he thought the Center needed to make some changes. Of course, he took a lot of input from people.

So basically, Charles's idea for where the Center had to go started with the adoption of a new overarching operational mission that would bring together everything the Center was doing under an explicable objective.

That was the operational mission of supporting the emergence of an Asia Pacific community, which has been the objective, in varying wording, ever since. At the same time, I might say, he was assembling his team. He asked Muthiah Alagappa to take over as director of Research, a position earlier occupied by Bruce Koppel.

### ***Reorganization/Research Program 1998***

Charles asked Muthiah to take that position and as part of the strategic plan (one of the points in the plan) to integrate the Research Program, eliminating the institutes and bringing the entire Research Program together under one director -- to eliminate the separate administrative structures and support staff.

So Muthiah took that job and had it for actually only about 18 months. He took it in late '98 and did it through April of 2000, but he basically accomplished the restructuring of the Research Program.

Charles' other, I would say, closest staff associations -- that went back the longest -- were with Jeanne Hamasaki and myself. Jeanne had been working with Doug Murray and then served as the program officer for the International Relations Program when Charles started and had done various things since then, and she was also someone who was very interested in change at the Center and moving things toward a new direction. And, obviously, I had been sort of Charles' understudy and chief of the cheering section during most of the previous chapters, so I knew what he was trying to do and obviously completely shared his objectives.

What he did ask me to do was to coordinate the look at the administrative side of the Center.

### *Price Waterhouse Coopers Survey 1998*

We contracted with Price Waterhouse [*Coopers*] to do an administrative survey of the Center. And I really supervised that operation, in the last months of 1998. They had a very good group who were very impressive, you know, the usual sort of management consultant operations – Price Waterhouse, McKinsey Company and these kinds of whiz kid operations.

They were all very bright, very verbal, very adept, quick-on-their-feet folk. And what they came up with was basically a very well-organized statement of what everybody already knew. They talked to a lot of people and then they pulled together their initial results and then they gave a briefing to the staff in, I think, December. And I was there at the briefing. I looked around the room and what you saw was nodding heads.

Almost every major point they made, people were saying, yeah. And again, it wasn't surprising because, for example, we had a bunch of working groups that sort of worked for and with them. One was on, I don't know, information technology, another was on maybe paper processing, another was on budget and such. And these were made up of people from the inside so they all knew where the duplication was, you know, where the bodies were buried, where the problem areas were.

And a couple of people, in particular, were just extremely helpful and creative and willing. This included one person whose name I won't mention just because she never sought any publicity, but she was leaving the Center and she occupied a fairly important position in the administrative/financial apparatus and she had lots of ideas about how we could do things much more efficiently than we had. She was a whole-hearted participant in the operation as kind of, what I think in her mind was her last contribution to the East-

West Center. She was fabulous and without her -- it wasn't so much identifying the problems -- but without her we wouldn't have been able to handle stage two, which was trying to work out proposals for a new, more streamlined system that could ultimately get the support ratio down.

One of the unexpected outcomes of the management assessment was the identification of information technology as a huge area where the Center was behind and not being well-served. And what the Price Waterhouse Coopers team said to us was, IT is a major element of your institutional future and if you don't integrate IT with every aspect of what you are doing, from the administrative services to housing to salary and payroll to information-gathering and information projection, you are going to be, you know, the quill pen in a century of electronic printing.

In much of the rest of what they were doing, what you could say is that the team, like many management consultants, provided legitimacy to a desire on management's part for change. And since folks in the system knew that things were needed, it gave external legitimacy to all of that, which was one of the things that made it possible to actually make the changes with inside people. We didn't bring anybody in from the outside. We didn't hire a hatchet man, which is what industry very often will do. We did it ourselves. Once the report was accepted, then Charles asked Jeanne Hamasaki and me to coordinate the implementation phase. That went on for, I would say, at least six months and we had various committees and subcommittees where various people worked out plans to do the necessary.

The Center-wide meetings, which Charles regularly called, were another innovation right from the beginning. Charles called this series of meetings to let people know what was

happening and what he was doing and what he was thinking and that was such a kind of total change of style from I guess everyone previous, except for Kenji. Kenji was, in a way, sort of a transitional period. He also was very aware of communicating with the staff.

Charles had a not light, but a personable and human kind of level of communication which was good. People needed to know what was going on and Charles did fill that gap quite well. And Jeanne and I used to regularly report at those meetings about the process of the implementation program until that eventually wrapped up.

### ***Budgetary Measures 1998***

Now, there was one other thing. I've talked about the strategic plan and I've talked about the reorganization -- in each of which I played a different degree of a role. But the third thing that was in Charles's critical agenda -- and I can't tell you actually which one was most important except that the Center wouldn't have existed without the third one, so maybe that was intrinsically the most important -- was our budget.

After 1995, not only was the Center's budget cut in half -- I think it went to \$15 million -- but both OMB [*Office of Management and Budget*] and the House Appropriations Committee lined us out. They phased us out. They had us on a five-year phase-out track. So, I believe our budget was supposed to go 15, 12 and a half, 10, seven and a half, five, two and a half, zero or sometimes in jumps larger than that.

Charles came in during the 10 year [*\$10 million*], which was the lowest we got.

Charles's first major achievement -- which was unsung, I think, in the sense of a lot of attention within the Center at that point -- was to convince OMB to straight-line us instead of zeroing us out. He got OMB to agree to keep us at \$10 million and his basic

point was, “OK, you want the Center to move to a more private funding, you want it to be less dependent on the federal government for its full budget.” His point was that if everyone knows that the federal government is dropping us, everyone else is going to say, “Why should we? This is a public diplomacy operation, why should we contribute to something when the federal government doesn't even have confidence in it, doesn't believe in it enough to support it.”

Anyway, Charles managed to turn that around. Within the first year, Charles got a turnaround in the OMB position and that was a huge and really a very personal victory. Now, he had, you know, he had some help from some Board members in opening some doors and such and he was working a piece of territory that the Center really hadn't worked before because we hadn't had to, so he was opening some paths.

### ***Administrative Reorganization***

Anyway, so that was the third major area for Charles at the beginning. So, you had overall strategy, you had administrative reorganization and you had a budgetary heroic measures cum life-saving operation. Now most of that time I was, you know, upstairs in the Research Program, in the International Relations Program, but eventually a point came -- I think it was in the spring but I can't really remember -- when Charles sort of said to me, well, I think you'd better move downstairs.

So, I moved downstairs and at about that time I think formally I ceased being a Fellow and I became an International Relations Specialist, which meant that I was not in the Research Program. And not a union member. I was basically serving Charles. (And later I became a special assistant -- I guess it was when I came back *[in 2003]*.) So I

went downstairs and basically was working with Charles. And he asked Jeanne to become the Human Resources officer, so she moved into HR.

So at that point, you had Muthiah in research, Jeanne in personnel, and I sort of in the office as “Odd Job” and those were, to use kind of Mao Tse-tung speak, the closest comrades-in-arms, I think you could say. But at the same time, of course, when Myrna Nip left, who had been the administrative chief, Charles asked Ricky Kubota to move into that job as, again, part of the restructuring of the administrative side. So, Ricky then became someone who Charles had appointed on the kind of management team.

And the other thing that he did organizationally, and another person who was programmatically very important to him, was Sheree Groves who he asked to organize a proper Seminars Program.

One of his ideas was that Seminars should be a more active and expanded program, eventually with the objective of becoming a separate division beside Education and Research. And that vision has been realized, of course.

After Sheree left, we searched for a different kind of a director with a different kind of background, and hired Ray Burghardt who obviously brought a lot of visibility and management experience and a network of contacts and whatever to that. And at that point Seminars really kind of took on its own existence. (I think before that it had been administratively a part of the Education Program.)

So that process started with Charles asking Sheree Groves to sort of coordinate the overall exercise and that included the Media Program, the Jefferson Fellows and such.

So again, Sheree was another person who was a Charles Morrison team person.

Now Education went through a series of people. I think when Charles first came in, Larry Smith was the director. Then Larry wanted to go on and do some other things and Betty Buck had been running the ASDP [*Asian Studies Development Program*] and the teaching about teaching side of the Education Program (as opposed to the part managing students). And so Betty came in [*as Director of Education.*] Over time this process led to the point where we hired Terry Bigalke. And Terry was hired originally as, in effect, the dean of students, I mean the head of the student program. Then when Betty wanted to step back down so to speak, to basically retire as director but to retain her association with the Asian Studies Development Program, then Terry moved up into the directorship and Mary Hammond was hired to do the student job [*Dean of Education*]. And, of course, Mendl Djunaidy was also there.

There are actually two programmatic areas: The Asian Studies Development Program [*ASDP*], and what used to be called the Consortium for the Teaching of Asia Pacific in the Schools [*CTAPS*], which is now called AsiaPacificEd. And that operates at the secondary school level. So we have the tertiary university level program, which is the Asian Studies Development Program, and we have the secondary program, which is AsiaPacificEd. Betty and Peter Herschok work in ASDP and Namji Steinemann is now the leader of the AsiaPacificEd program. Namji is new also. So sort of one-by-one bunches of new people came in.

Karen Knudsen [*director of External Affairs*], I think, is the only member of the current group of directors left from the previous administration. Then when Muthiah in 2000 moved to Washington to start the Washington office, having done the basic restructuring of the Research Program, which Charles had asked him to do, the question was, “Who

succeeds Muthiah?" And by that time most of my management stuff had really been done, so I told Charles that I didn't consider that I brought the academic cards to be a credible director of Research, but I would do it on an interim basis until the end of the year.

So I became interim director of Research in 2000 and then was followed by Jeff Fox as interim director, bridging until they hired Nancy Lewis who is from the University [*of Hawai'i*]. Nancy came in I guess mid-2001 or maybe later 2001.

So if you look at the roster of people now, you have Nancy in Research, you have Terry in Education, you have Ray Burghardt in Seminars, you have Ricky in Administration, you have Karen in External Affairs and then you have Jeanne in HR which is sort of a separate area in the sense that it reports dually both to Charles and to Ricky, so Jeanne sits in on those meetings.

Carleen Gumapac as Corporate Secretary is a member of the management team. I am a member of the management team. And, of course, the most recent hire is Carol Fox who is now the director of Strategic Planning and Partnerships and has taken over the whole development effort. So, she is another member that sits in on those meetings.

Then there are other sorts of special cases, for example, when we had the Pacific Disaster Center contract, Allen Clark as the East-West Center's manager for that operation, he would sit in. We have the Pacific Islands Development Program, which is a special program that got started in 1980, for which the director is Sitiveni Halapua. Sitiveni, when he is in town (which is relatively infrequent now that he's the sort of full-time peace negotiator, facilitator in the Pacific Islands), he sits in the meeting as well. And I think that's sort of the group.

## ***Media Program***

*[In December 1997]* a guy dropped by my office. This was Dennis Donahue, who had been a USIS officer and who had just finished his USIS career in Singapore but had previously been the public diplomacy person or the USIS representative at the Pacific Command. He was on his way from Singapore back to Washington to retire, and came by just to sort of shoot the breeze and inquire as to what was going on and, you know, about the change, and how things were going at the Center. And he said, you know, "If there are things to do, keep me in mind." He didn't have anything particular he was going back to in Washington and he was going to retire from the service.

*[Editor's note: The position of Media Programs director and Jefferson Fellows program coordinator was suddenly vacated about six weeks before the Jefferson Fellows program was to start.]*

So, then I called Dennis who, by that time, was doing sort of freelance editing for a couple of newsletters and such. So in 10 days, I think, he was out here -- on a plane out here.

*[In 2000]* Charles hired Susan Kreifels as a special assistant to the President. That's why she spent a couple of years in the President's Office and one of the things she did was the International Education Week. She got that started here and did a crackerjack job on that, and she also started the East-West Wire series.

The Wire related to another of the ideas in the Action Plan, which was presenting ourselves more effectively to the public, both our colleagues and peers, and people in the region, and the audience, and our financial supporters (i.e. the public and the Congress in the U.S.).

Susan who was, of course, a career reporter herself, had this idea to sort of do a wire service. She got it started and she did all the writing -- very productive. As things organizationally evolved at a certain point and I think it may have been when John Williams, who was our press guy, got sick (and later died) -- there were other jobs needed doing in the External Affairs -- (the public affairs office). So Susan actually moved from the President's Office to public affairs and then when Dennis retired and we advertised the job again, Susan bid for the media programs job and got it.

Now, by virtue of both the importance of the Media Program and the fact that she was there before Ray was there and that she had been a special assistant before that, Susan also is sort of a courtesy member of the management team, as am I.

As I say, Karen Knudsen is the only holdover. I think she became director of Public Affairs under Kenji [1995]. Of the others, directorial positions, all of them are people who came in to the Center from outside the Center -- except Jeanne and Ricky and Carleen. Actually Karen and Carleen are the only holdovers.

Carleen is the corporate memory and Corporate Secretary. She even has all the documents, would you believe? Thank God, she does, because when we need one, she can find it.

And, of course, Muthiah Alagappa as director of the EWC Washington office is on the management team, too. He participates in the meetings by teleconference, as does Mark Borthwick in the Washington office.

Mark is the director of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Council, the new high-level membership organization that we sponsor and provide the support services for, that supports U.S. membership and participation in Asia Pacific organizations -- including the PECC, which

is the Pacific Economic Corporation Conference, a sort of a track two APEC operation and PBEC, the Pacific Basin Economic Council. There were national committees for each of those and they were basically both supported by AID, and AID money ran short, so we tried to combine the two in this new office in East-West Center Washington.

Mark Borthwick had been the executive secretary for the PECC operation. Bob Lees was the secretary of the overall PBEC organization and had an office here in Honolulu. I think it has now moved to Hong Kong. But that's the international secretariat, and the U.S. national committee was run out of Washington. However, they are now running their own thing, which leaves our U.S. Asia-Pacific Council tying into the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and therefore to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, APEC.

People like Richard Holbrooke, and Stapleton Roy and a whole galaxy of important Americans are members of that committee, a good group of people, and Mark and Charles have done a very good job recruiting them. So, you have two people in Washington who are management-team level people running different new programs out of the Washington office that is also new.

But the basic point here is that after eight years Charles has pretty well put his stamp certainly on the personnel leadership of the organization., and you would expect that.

### ***Pacific Disaster Center***

We were asked to bid for a [U.S.] Defense Department management contract to run the Pacific Disaster Center, which is a Defense Department-funded disaster information processing, training and coordination organization on Maui. It's completely separate from us. It was founded after Hurricane Iniki.

In 2001 we were asked to be one of the bidders for the management contract which runs in five-year cycles. And so we bid and somewhat to our surprise, actually, we won the bid. So it's a \$6 million annual contract so we've had that every year for five years. Allen Clark [*was*] really perfect for the job because he was with the U.S. Geological Survey for many years, and then was here in the minerals area doing such things as writing legislation for Asia Pacific countries governing extractive resources and how you work contracts with foreign extractive organizations. He was just the logical person to be the liaison with this Pacific Disaster Center.

We hired a manager who had been, I think, on board in another capacity and he worked at it for maybe two and a half years or three years of the five-year contract. At that point Allen became the full-time manager of PDC. I think he started in 2003 because it was after I came back, but certainly in 2004 he was there, so the last three years of the contract I guess you could say he was the hands-on director.

When he is in town he participates in the management team because although technically that's under the Research Program, it is its own organization. Eileen Shea was sort of a satellite because she is setting up a regional NOAA office, for which we were a sort of incubator. I have seen her attending management team meetings, but she didn't do it that regularly.

### ***Northeast Asia Economic Forum***

The other transitional situation was Lee-Jay Cho, because he had had the Northeast Asia Economic Forum. He had gotten that started under Mike Oksenberg, who gave him a two-year sort of leave-of-absence. I think part of the dynamic there was that they

probably both agreed that it was not the best thing in the world to have one former interim president and one president in the same house at the same time.

Lee-Jay then came back after the two years and was here under Kenji and has been here under Charles. The Northeast Asia Economic Forum really is an independent operation the way he [*Lee-Jay*] set it up. Lee-Jay is now with his operation, separately located.

They have their own office and they are doing their thing. Those activities that they were doing at the Center, like the conferences with KDI that Choong Nam Kim or Y.H. Kim sort of run and broker, they are still at the Center. So I would call that a transitional evolution under Charles.

Lee-Jay, although he was officially a special assistant to Charles, was not a member of the management team. He had very much a dotted-line relationship, and did his own thing. It was in the building, it was an East-West Center collaborative exercise, but he was not otherwise engaged in the management of the Center at that point.

### *Affiliates*

Another special situation that would be worth mentioning in this context is Seiji Naya who, of course, was the director of the Resource Systems Institute in an earlier period. He then left and became the director of the Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism of the State [*of Hawai'i*] under Governor Cayetano. He also had a position at the University, and he left both. So when he finished at DBEDT, at the end of the Cayetano administration four years ago, he looked at a number of things and ended up coming back to the Center, but as an affiliate, in effect, not as an employee, but doing some of the same kinds of things that he did before, such as a study he did of U.S. relations with the ASEAN countries.

He had done one when he was in RSI [*EWC Resource Systems Institute*]. Mike Plummer had worked with him on it. Seiji came back, he got a contract from the U.S. Trade Representative (because the government was looking at a free trade area agreement with the ASEAN states) and he coordinated a study with USTR money of that subject matter. So, he has an office here, but he is not on payroll, he is not on staff.

We have several affiliates. I'm not even sure if Seiji's proper title is affiliate, but he's here, but he's not a Center employee. But again there is a connection, and that is a way that the Center gets an extension into another area of activity, which is constructive for us. Seiji gets an office and a sort of a base, an institutional base from which he's operating which is an advantage for him. So, again, all of these are agreements that are worked out to fit whatever the specific situation.

### ***Special Assistant to the President***

I guess that these days I'd have to call myself an organization man. As an organization man you always want to have a set of rules, operating procedures that let you deal with new situations when they come up, but I'm not against individual arrangements because, particularly in an organization of our scale, you are forever coming up with unique kinds of situations that don't quite fit the mold. So, if you make your mold into a procrustean bed, you're either going to have to cut the bits off -- the individuals you are trying to put through the bed -- or you break the mold, if you think of the cookie-cutter analogy. And that's often more trouble than its worth and it can become slightly obsessive to insist that everybody fits the same set of rules.

Today I don't think so. I did that for the first period, before I became the Research Program director. I called myself "Odd Job" or "Man Friday" or something, but then I

did the Research Program until the end of 2000 and at the end of 2000 I retired and I was out of here for two years.

In 2000, I became an adjunct, so I was still around, I was on the Publications Committee and various things, but I was not on the payroll.

I only came back on payroll in March of 2003 when Charles hadn't found somebody to kind of fill that niche with State Department and foreign affairs experience, etc. And, of course, that was before Ray Burghardt came on board. So I came back and that was when I formally became special assistant.

I think you could actually say that I'm another anomaly. In terms of the organization chart it's not an anomaly. I'm in a little box right below the President as special assistant, that is easy enough. But functionally, I'm an anomaly because my functions don't really readily fit anyplace in the organization chart or any really regular pattern. I basically take on special assignments from Charles.

I have done a couple of personnel cases. I've looked into program possibilities. I talk to a number of people, people who come in from the outside with ideas of things that they'd like to do with the Center, and maybe it's not worth Charles' time to go through all those details -- particularly since in most cases it really isn't feasible for us, so I deal with those people.

And I have a certain public affairs role because again, Charles is a super international relations generalist but he's just not there all the time. And so, when the odd query comes in from the press about an international relations or regional thing that we don't have a particular specialist on, I handle that. I do some speaking.

### *Lingle Administration/BOG Changes*

Now there is one other major East-West Center management-leadership-oversight point that I think needs to be made in connection with this historical study, and that is the funny thing that happened in November of 2002. Linda Lingle got elected governor. A Republican became governor for the first time in like 40 years, and the governor appoints five members to the Board of Governors of the East-West Center. And because they are here in town, the Hawai'i members tend to play a very important role. They have a more immediate sort of interest in contact.

They have tended in the past to be business people, or government or former government people like Richard Collins, for example, who had worked for one of Inouye's committees and then became an independent consultant.

By the time Lingle came in, the Cayetano administration had not reappointed a number of the members of the Board, so I think three out of the five slots were either empty or due for reappointment.

Lingle did not do as Cayetano had done when he came in after Waihee, another Democrat, which was to name immediately five new members, five totally new members who he viewed as his people.

Linda Lingle didn't do that. She chose to do things as positions came open, so it meant that the last two positions were filled over time. Lyn Anzai [*Flanigan*], for example, I think stayed on for an indeterminate period and Joan Bickson also stayed on. So, those two were the last of the members but the others, including Governor Ariyoshi, their terms had been technically up so the governor replaced -- appointed new people in those three

positions, in the spirit of change, fresh look, re-invigorate Hawai'i, new directions, vision, etc. etc.

Lingle's appointees included Miriam Hellreich who is the Republican National Committeewoman for Hawai'i and a major figure in Linda Lingle's political operation, someone with a fairly extraordinary level of energy. And Roland Lagareta, whose wife Kitty was appointed to the University [*of Hawai'i*] Board of Regents and is now, I think, the chair of the Board of Regents.

You know the East-West Center is part of Hawai'i. It's a major institution in their view and in the governor's view, which it hasn't always been in the past, but was a link for Hawai'i with the larger regional community and it plays a role and could potentially, in their view, play even more of a role in increased visibility for Hawai'i in the region. So, as part of reinvigoration, new directions, Hawai'i as the regional center, etc. (a concept that a lot of new governors come in with and that was certainly on Lingle's platform), they wanted to kind of pick up the organization and shake it and do something with it.

Do something new. [*Former Congresswoman*] Pat Saiki was another of these members.

And then in addition to the five appointed members, the governor has a liaison person.

She can come to the Board meetings, as an ex-officio member, but governors almost never come to the meetings, so they designate an ex-officio representative. At the beginning actually, that was Roland [*Lagareta*]. Now, it's Puongpun Sananikone, he's the governor's rep. (At least, I believe he's in that position now.) But it means that, effectively, he is another member of the Board. So effectively, the governor has her six appointees on the Board, six out of 18, counting the ex-officio. And then they have a member of the alumni community that meets with them, so that, you could say, it is 19

and I'm not sure what else. But the voting members are 15. Ex-officio 18 and then observers, invited observers who sit at the table, but only one or two.

### ***Strategic Plan 2005***

So, here we were, if you can kind of picture it, after four years of Charles' presidency and his action plan, and then an update of the action plan at about the same time. The idea was to ask, Where are we? Where do we stand on our program and where are we trying to go? But there was a good deal of enthusiasm on the part of the new Board members to rethink the strategic plan, and it was out of that desire on their part that the recent strategic planning exercise evolved.

And Carol Fox's arrival [*as director of Strategic Planning and Partnerships*] at the Center coincided with the last phases of that strategic planning process. So, one of the first things that she did was to take a hold of the substance of the strategic plan committee's thinking and work to shape it into a form in which it could be communicated to the wider audience that she is trying to reach, both for fundraising and for profile-raising for the Center.

So, that is the strategic plan for which Carol organized a launch, and there's been a film and all sorts of things, but originally all that came out of this major change in the composition of the Board of Directors [*Board of Governors*] who, you know, appraise Charles' performance and give him -- or don't give him -- his job.

So, that was another necessary exercise that I would say was made into a very useful opportunity both to educate and to integrate a new activist group in the Board, but also to rethink: OK, where are we going? What are our strong points? What are our weak points? What do we need to work on? This was more than Charles could do with an action report

to which the Board gave a sort of rubber stamp approval. So, there was a lot of give and take, a lot of participation by people, and the exercise came up with a multi-point set of objectives that have to do with institutional development as well as external programs -- you know, where are we going to go in Research and Seminars and overall, addressed at boosting the activity level and the visibility, the impact of the Center.

They are working on a brochure now. The one that I am now working on is an East-West Center brochure that will incorporate some of the principles from the mission plan. But it's the "little red card" that is the encapsulated results of the strategic planning operation, with six whatever categories, which includes some institutional strengthening and some program objectives.

I think at Charles' level, community-building was a very good tag, so to speak, to provide what I called a "bumper sticker" that could tell people what they needed to know in answer to the question of, "What do you do at the East-West Center?" Actually, we do a lot of things, all of which are aimed at helping to facilitate the emergence of this regional community, which sort of started *tabula rasa* in about 1960 and is now going like gangbusters.

We don't know where it's going to go exactly. It's not going to be like the European Union, but there is a regional community and we think that we are an American institution that can really participate in that and that's what we want to do. Since then, other organizations (e.g., the Asia Foundation) have adopted a community-building slogan.

I won't say that everybody is using it, but it's no longer quite as eye-catching as it was. So the question has been, maybe not changing the institutional mission, but how do we project ourselves.

### ***Branding EWC***

One of the things that Carol [*Fox*] has been working on in addition or in connection with this brochure, is what the current marketer generation calls a "branding" process. We are trying to brand the East-West Center to give it [*snaps fingers*] a substantive identity, or a recognition factor.

That is about where we are, in the beginning of a new kind of re-energized next step forward.

And so if Charles is going to be here 10 years, which he clearly is, he can't just govern under the action plan for the first five years, so there is this campaign, and if you look at our finances and you see where we are right now, we need to build an endowment. This institution has to have an endowment. You know, we don't even own our own buildings. So, what we need to do is to get our message out there, get our name out there, get people to recognize who we are, what we are doing.

That is what branding is all about and we need the branding, we need to communicate to an audience -- a special audience who have the funds and who are looking to make contributions to wider good and to leave legacies. We need to get into those circles. And that is what Charles, working with Miriam Hellreich, recruited Carol for.

So, that's where we're at now. We've got a regional office in Washington. Charles is working on having more outposts" so-to-speak in the region. Whether the next one will

be Delhi, or Singapore, or Hong Kong is not clear, but I am sure that within the next year or two, we will have an office in the region. That's one step out.

## **Intellectual Innovations**

### ***Islamic Initiative***

When Charles wanted to do the Islamic initiative after 2001, that was one of the things that was on my plate when I came back, and so working with Dennis Donahue we developed our Islamic journalists seminar. And have done a couple of other things with Islamic visiting scholars and getting money to support Muslim participants in some of the ongoing programs like APLP [*Asia Pacific Leadership Program*] and even some of our student programs and seminars like the young leaders or the women's seminar, etc.

I also help out with the annual Senior Policy Seminar. I've been one of the co-organizers of that, first with Charles and Muthiah, and now with Charles and Ray Burghardt. I think that one is going to migrate more and more into Ray's program, which is really where it belongs, so I'm kind of on a phase-out path with that. But I still coordinate the report -- Ray travels so much that it is hard for him to do things like getting the report out, so I can perform a useful function there.

### ***Asia-Pacific Security Outlook Series***

And I coordinated something called the *Asia-Pacific Security Outlook* series, which was a book we put out through a Japanese organization that funded it for nine years, with funds from their foreign ministry. But the money ran out, so they could no longer afford to support the workshop or publish the book. So, instead, I have organized an online questionnaire that we administer to security specialists around the region and we produce

a report. The report that came out for this year, 2006, was the first of those and we will do another one for next year.

The report is online, and the questionnaires are also administered online. We actually print (desktop printing) a limited number of copies, just to have them to show people and to hand out for special occasions, but it is not a printed work and, therefore, as you can imagine, the costs of processing and producing the report really come down to just mental-intellectual time. And since that's already paid, that's something we can do in a very economical way. It is not as effective as the original approach, which brought in individual analysts, mostly younger analysts, from each of the countries to exchange ideas, so it was forming a mini-network of younger security analysts in the region. Of course, by the time we had been doing it for nine years, many of our younger analysts had become much more senior and so it probably was time for rejuvenation. But in any event that phase has ended and now we have a less intensive participation by a larger number of people and we'll see how that goes in the future.

I think that is probably true that it is the first only online report that we've put out. A lot of our reports have been available online, like the *Senior Policy Seminar Reports*, but yeah, this is probably, in that sense, an innovation. Hey, I'm an innovator! Oh good Lord, my life is complete! And you can put that on my tombstone. Innovation has not, traditionally been one of my strongest suits, but I am responsive to suggestions, particularly from my boss. OK. So that's where I fit in.

## **Ties That Last**

### ***Alumni Network***

We've reinvigorated the alumni network. That's one of the things that the alumni conference in Hanoi is all about and one reason that 23 some staffers from the Center are now, as we speak, in Hanoi, working with 500 some alumni from the region -- building up and boosting and reactivating, developing new forms of activity for this very interesting and capable group.

So if you look at all of that you see that the future is exciting and that is the way I look at it. So as I approach my own retirement -- my second retirement, but this one's going to be genuine -- sometime in the next couple of years anyway, I will be able to look back and say, like the Lone Ranger, "My job is done." (laughter) And that's all I have to say.