PART I

ARCTIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
2. U.S. Climate Policy in an Arctic Context

Daniel A. Reifsnyder

Dr. Daniel A. Reifsnyder set the stage for the session, where he noted that the U.S. interests in the Arctic region are set forth in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, issued by the U.S. president in the policy of May 10, 2013, which states the United States Government's strategic priorities for the Arctic region, are: "The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic Region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues."

Based on this foundation of U.S. interests and his experience as co-chair of the UNFCCC ADP, along with the other co-chair, Ambassador Ahmed Djoghlaf from Algeria, Reifsnyder led the development of what became known as the UNFCCC COP21 "Paris Agreement." He then focused much of his remarks on the foundations and negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement. He noted that the changes that may be ushered in because of the Paris Agreement will be crucial to the Arctic, both in terms of coping with the impacts already being experienced and in averting the release of the climate change multiplier (such as methane), much of which is currently locked in the permafrost. He posited that the "future is in our hands and it will be up to participants here at this NPAC 2016 conference, as well as millions of others across the globe, to determine what will unfold and what kind of world we will leave to the future."

He then outlined in some detail the elements and framework of the Paris Agreement and its central aim: "to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C." To reach such ambitious goals, there will be a need for adequate financial flows, new technology implementations and an enhanced capacity to mitigate, as well as adapt to change. Additionally, the Agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, including supporting actions by developing countries, that also enables vulnerable
countries to address their needs. Finally, the Paris Agreement also provides for enhanced transparency of actions through a more robust global transparency framework.

His presentation outlined some of the key features of the Paris Agreement:

1. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)⁵:
   - All Parties are to prepare successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), representing a progression beyond the last and reflecting its highest possible ambition.
   - Developed countries should undertake economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets; developing countries should continue enhancing mitigation efforts and are encouraged to move over time to economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in light of different national circumstances.

2. Periodicity of NDCs/Communications:
   - Each Party shall communicate an NDC every five years.
   - CMA first session to consider common time frames for NDCs.
   - First NDC due on ratification/accession, but if a Party has communicated an intended NDC, this requirement is satisfied.
   - Parties with INDCs containing a time frame up to 2025 are urged to communicate a new NDC by 2020 and thereafter every five years.
   - Parties with INDCs containing a time frame up to 2030 are requested to communicate or update by 2020 these contributions and do so thereafter every five years.

3. Global Stock Take (GST):
   - CMA⁶ shall periodically take stock of Paris Agreement implementation to assess collective progress toward achieving its purpose and long-term goals.
   - GST to be done in comprehensive, facilitative manner and consider mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support in light of equity and the best available science.
   - First GST in 2023 and every five years thereafter.
   - Outcome of GST shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.
4. Purpose:
• The Paris Agreement aims to strengthen global response to climate change by holding global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.
• Also, aims to increase ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development.
• Aims to make finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development.
• Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances.

5. Global Peaking and Long-Term Strategies:
• Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible to achieve a balance between human emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the second half of this century.
• Each Party shall strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.
• Parties invited to communicate by 2020 mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategies for publication on the UNFCCC website.
• COP to convene facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of Parties collective efforts re: peaking and achieving balance between emissions and removals to inform preparation of NDCs.

6. Finance:
• Developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries to assist them with mitigation and adaptation.
• Provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation.
• Developed countries shall communicate biennially indicative quantitative and qualitative information on finance, including projected levels of public finance to be provided to developing countries. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.
• Developed countries intend to continue their existing collective
mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of $100 billion per year.

His Presentation then Asked the Question: What’s Next for the Paris Agreement?

1. Initially What’s Next:
   - Entry into Force 30 days after 55 Parties to UNFCCC accounting for 55 percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions ratify.
   - As of July 25, 178 Parties had signed; 20 Parties representing 0.40 percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions have ratified.
   - UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon invited world leaders to ratify at a special event on September 21, 2016.
   - He then suggested that entry into force likely this year.
   - Editor’s note: On 5 October 2016, the threshold for entry into force of the Paris Agreement was achieved. Hence, the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016.
   - He then suggested that entry into force likely this year.
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2. What are Some of the Implications of “What’s Next for the Paris Agreement?”
   - Actions of nations and citizens will determine whether goals of the Paris Agreement will be achieved.
   - One of the most important and significant actions they can take in the near term is to adopt an amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in Kigali, Uganda, in October 2016 to phase down HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons), he noted that it is believed that this action alone could avoid as much as 0.5°C of warming by 2100. (Editor’s note: 140 countries that are Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer adopted, on October 15, 2016, a landmark Agreement, called the Kigali Amendment, that provided for a phase down in the consumption and production of
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are powerful climate-warming pollutants, but did so under the Montreal Protocol, which also addresses climate change issues.)

- The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC),\textsuperscript{9} initiated in February 2012, is also working on the so-called “short-lived climate forcers,” such as methane, black carbon & HFCs.

3. He Noted that Two Events Are on the Horizon that Bear on the Arctic:

- The Third Our Ocean Conference\textsuperscript{10} that Secretary Kerry will host in Washington, D.C. from September 15-16, 2016; and
- The first ever White House Arctic Science Ministerial,\textsuperscript{11} which is designed to be hosted at the White House in Washington just one year after President Obama’s historic trip to Alaska.

(Editor’s Note)

- Science Ministers from 25 governments and the European Union met at the White House to discuss Arctic research priorities and signed a Joint Statement\textsuperscript{12} on increased international collaboration on Arctic science and inclusion of Indigenous peoples in understanding and responding to changes in the Arctic.
- After the ministerial meeting, the U.S. issued a Fact Sheet\textsuperscript{13} that summarized the accomplishments of the Arctic Science Ministerial to advance international research efforts in four thematic areas:
  - Theme I: Arctic Science Challenges and Their Regional and Global Consequences.
  - Theme II: Strengthening and Integrating Arctic Observations and Data-Sharing.
  - Theme III: Applying Expanded Scientific Understanding of the Arctic to Build Regional Resilience and to Shape Global Responses.

In Summary: The results of the Paris Agreement and other developments that were discussed, bear importantly on implications, challenges, and opportunities that climate and other socio-economic changes present for the Arctic.
Notes


2. The UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action that lead the negotiations that created the so-called “Paris Agreement” on climate change.


4. On 5 October 2016, the threshold for entry into force of the Paris Agreement was achieved. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016.


6. Meeting of the Parties


10. The conference focused on the key ocean issues of our time, including marine protected areas, sustainable fisheries, marine pollution, and climate-related impacts on the ocean. http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/oceanocean/2016/

11. On September 28, 2016, science ministers from across the globe gathered in Washington, D.C., for the first-ever White House Arctic Science Ministerial.


Japan’s Arctic Policy
Kazuko Shiraishi

Let me start by expressing my sincere appreciation to the East-West Center and the Korean Maritime Institute for hosting this North Pacific Arctic Conference. It is truly an honor for me to be able to participate at the East-West Center’s important gathering and of course, truly a joy to be able to come to the Aloha State.

When I received an invitation to this conference, I was very much looking forward to spending relaxing time on beach in a stylish swimsuit. But on receiving the program I recognized it had been an exaggerated expectation.

The East-West Center, as President Charles Morrison said in his introduction, has made tremendous contributions towards promoting better relations and understanding among people of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific. Japan has a long history of cooperation with the Center through various projects, such as the Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP) and the Northeast Asia Forum. I am excited that we can now add the Arctic to our long list of cooperative efforts.

ARCTIC AND JAPAN

Today, I would like to take this opportunity to give you the overview of Japan’s policy towards the Arctic.

Let me begin by showing you a map. Its center, as you can see, is the North Pole. It may surprise you all, but Japan is located fairly close to the Arctic region geographically. A sailor navigating through the Arctic Sea Route from the west will come upon Japan soon after passing the Bering Strait. Although Japan is not an Arctic state, we see ourselves as a neighbor of the Arctic region. So the question emerges: Is Japan interested in the Arctic region solely because of its location? My answer is partly “yes” but partly “no.” This answer begins with the fact that a changing Arctic brings both opportunities and challenges for Japan.

The changing Arctic also presents urgent challenges for the international community. Challenges related to climate change in the Arctic in particular are extremely serious, since they could affect not only the
Arctic region, but also the entire global environment.

**JAPAN’S ARCTIC POLICY**

Based upon this recognition, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe adopted our first comprehensive and strategic Arctic policy, “Japan’s Arctic Policy,” last October. This policy demonstrates our firm commitment to addressing Arctic issues.

Japan’s Arctic Policy aims at taking strategic actions regarding the Arctic from multiple and interconnected perspectives. Through these actions, Japan seeks to contribute to the international community as a major player in addressing Arctic issues.

Taking these objectives into account, Japan defines seven basic policies as follows:

1. **Science and Technology**—Make full use of Japan’s strength in science and technology with a global perspective.
2. **Environment**—Give full consideration to the Arctic environment and ecosystem, which is vulnerable and not very resilient to change.
3. **International cooperation**—Ensure the rule of law and promote international cooperation in a peaceful and orderly manner.
4. **Indigenous People**—Respect the right of Indigenous People to maintain continuity in their traditional economic and social foundations.
5. **National security**—Pay full attention to the national security implications of Arctic activities.
6. **Economic and social compatibility**—Aim for economic and social compatibility with climate and environmental changes.
7. **Arctic Sea Route and development of resources**—Seek potential economic opportunities to use the Arctic Sea Route for resource development.

Based on these priorities, Japan has proposed three specific initiatives to achieve these goals.

The first initiative is research and development. While Arctic climate change has become a focal issue globally, many unknowns remain. The most important need is to understand ecological changes in the Arctic
and calculate their impact on the global environment. Japan will further strengthen its science and technology in this area.

The second initiative is international cooperation. Japan has various interests that dovetail in the Arctic. Japan engages in constructive discussions such as international decision-making and rulemaking on the Arctic, particularly by sharing its scientific expertise. Moreover, Japan further strengthens its contribution to the Arctic Council by dispatching more experts for further study.

Sustainable use of the Arctic is the third initiative. In order to prepare for utilization of the Arctic Sea Route, Japan calls for the establishment of a maritime navigation system to help ships to travel through the Arctic safely. Japan also is taking actions to enhance its economic activities in the Arctic, especially in the exploitation of natural resources, fisheries, and other marine resources, by working with other countries to create a framework for preservation and sustainable use.

MAKING BEST USE OF JAPAN’S STRENGTHS

Japan regards science and technology as our priority. Having spearheaded international efforts in this area, Japan has accumulated scientific expertise through more than 50 years of observation and research on the Arctic, both abroad and at home. We celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Ny-Ålesund Observation base in Norway this past September. The fruits of this endeavor include Japan providing the international community with scientific analysis on ongoing environmental changes in the Arctic, such as declining thickness and density of sea-ice and increasing ocean acidification.

Last year, as a further step forward, Japan launched a new research project of an unprecedented scale: the “Arctic Challenge for Sustainability” project, or ArCS. This is a five-year project, for which Japan is allocating $6 million in FY 2015, and more than $6.8 million in FY 2016.

ArCS has three aims: to understand climate change in the Arctic holistically as well as its global impact in various fields through comprehensive and integrated research; to predict future changes and assess their potential socio-economic impacts; and to deliver robust scientific information to stakeholders and policymakers, including those in the Arctic Council, to use in decision-making and solving issues concerning the Arctic.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let me touch upon the way forward for Japan’s Arctic policy from a foreign policy perspective.

My prime responsibility as ambassador in charge of Arctic affairs is to create a bridge between international stakeholders like those of you in this room and domestic stakeholders in Japan. Ever since I assumed the current post, I have been very keen on attending international conferences on the Arctic, following ongoing developments, and exchanging views with my counterparts and leading experts in order to identify potential cooperative initiatives with other states. I have then taken this new information back to Japan to infuse renewed momentum as well as fresh perspectives in our policy-making.

As I mentioned, Japan adopted its first Arctic policy this year. Now, our challenge will be to ensure that Japan strategically implements this policy. We are now tackling this challenge.

We continue to ask ourselves: How can Japan translate our scientific assets into international cooperative initiatives? How can Japan align our scientific assets with ongoing developments among the Arctic states as well as non-Arctic states?

Therefore, attending international forums and conferences, having the opportunity to present Japan’s initiatives with my own words, and getting feedback from you all provide very valuable input for the strategic implementation of Japan’s Arctic policy.

The Arctic Council is a premier forum to achieve this end. Other forums such as the Arctic Circle, the Arctic Frontier, and of course, international conferences like this one, also allow non-Arctic States like Japan the opportunity to present our initiatives. This is very meaningful. We also greatly appreciate the leadership of the United States, the chair of the Arctic Council, in its pursuit of the theme, “one Arctic,” and for encouraging active participation of non-Arctic States and promoting international cooperation within the framework of the AC.

I would like to again express my appreciation to the East-West Center and the Korea Maritime Institute for this precious opportunity. I look forward to further discussions with all of you.
Korea’s Arctic Policy
Chan-Woo Kim

I am pleased to present at the 2016 North Pacific Arctic Conference (NPAC). Since last year, several important changes have taken place: Ministers from more than 190 countries agreed on a new post-2020 climate change regime in Paris last December; and the Arctic Council is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year. Today, as international Arctic cooperation is growing more important than ever, I expect this conference, which brings together the leading North Pacific Arctic states with the non-Arctic states, will make a meaningful contribution to realizing a sustainable future for the Arctic.

The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) projects that the extent of Arctic sea ice will, depending on various scenarios, decrease by a minimum of 43% to a maximum of 94% compared to 1950 by 2100. This is approximately a 20% to 90% decrease in comparison to the present level. This outlook leads to the conclusion that despite efforts made by the international community (such as the Paris Agreement), the Arctic will continue to warm at a significant rate, with many implications not just for the Arctic but also for global climate systems.

On the basis of the current situation and future projections for the Arctic, the Korean government developed its Arctic policy by adopting the Arctic Policy Master Plan in December 2013, followed by detailed action plans. Korea’s vision of the Arctic is for its sustainable future and Korea’s contribution to that end. Korea has been conducting Arctic-related activities for decades, but the President Park Geun-hye administration was the first administration to establish a systematic policy on the Arctic.

Overall, Korea’s Arctic policy is based on two pillars. The first pillar is to contribute to resolving Arctic climate change challenges by promoting scientific research activities. The second pillar is to seize business opportunities in the Arctic, especially those arising from the utilization of emerging new Arctic sea routes. In order to support these two pillars, Korea set up an inter-Ministerial coordination mechanism headed by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and has been pursuing international cooperation activities.

Let me touch upon the first pillar, scientific research activities. The importance of Arctic scientific knowledge cannot be emphasized enough.
The most thoughtful and enduring solutions will be found through accurate scientific analysis of on-going phenomena related to climate change. Increased scientific knowledge about the Arctic can be considered as a global public good. However, one problem is that the amount of scientific research being conducted by the international community still falls far short of the tremendous challenges facing the Arctic. Korea will, despite its relatively short history of Arctic activities, contribute to fill this gap with its world-class research capacities.

In advancing Arctic scientific knowledge, the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI) has played an important role at the Dasan Arctic Science Station in Svalbard, and with its first icebreaker research vessel, Araon. Korea’s scientific findings include investigating the relationship between Arctic warming and the severe winter cold in the northern hemisphere, which has been noted by the international scientific community as the “Arctic paradox.” Korea plans to further strengthen its current Arctic scientific activities by establishing a second science station and building a second icebreaker research vessel. If such plans proceed smoothly, Korea’s polar research capacities will be greatly enhanced.

The second pillar is to tap the business potential of the Arctic. The Korean government is also interested in making use of business opportunities that a changing Arctic provides. Guggenheim Partners, a global consulting company, is projecting that 25% of container shipping between Asia and Europe will take place along the Northern Sea Route in 2030, and infrastructure demands in the Arctic will reach a staggering $1 trillion in the next 15 years. In addition, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that 13 percent of the world’s untapped oil resources and 30 percent of untapped gas resources are buried in the Arctic region.

The Arctic is one of the last terrestrial frontiers left to humankind. Arctic sea routes will assume a pivotal role in utilizing the opportunities to be found there. However, Arctic sea routes are quite vulnerable to potential shipping accidents. The introduction of the IMO Polar Code requiring strengthened ship safety and environmental standards is very timely. When energy, mineral resources and goods move along the Arctic sea routes, the Arctic will be re-born as a new zone of prosperity.

The big question we should raise at this moment is this: How can we address the challenges and realize these opportunities in an environmentally sustainable manner?
Since its establishment in 1996, the Arctic Council has handled Arctic issues with its highest authority and expertise. As we marking its 20th anniversary in 2016, it is high time for the Arctic Council to consider its future governance for the next 20 years. Challenges such as climate change in the Arctic have global impacts, even as they open new global opportunities. The Arctic Council should be reformed in such a way to strengthen its relations with non-Arctic states and treat them as partners, which is in line with the perception of a “Global Arctic.”

Last April, senior Arctic Officials of Korea, Japan, and China convened in Seoul. The three countries shared the view that they should continue their commitments to contribute to the Arctic Council and enhance the three non-Arctic countries’ cooperation at various international forums. They also concurred with the view that scientific research is among the most promising areas for their joint activities. The trilateral Arctic dialogue among Korea, Japan and China is one example demonstrating the will of non-Arctic states to contribute to the sustainable future of the Arctic. Arctic governance should improve to actively engage these aspirations and expertise of non-Arctic countries.

The Arctic, once forbidding and distant, has come into a different focus in the current century. We are currently viewing it from a different angle and entering into “New Arctic Age,” especially since the Arctic environment has changed so rapidly due to climate change. The Arctic has been reacting to greenhouse gas emissions from human activities since the Industrial Revolution. Ironically, however, climate change caused by these greenhouse gases is shedding new light on the Arctic and enlivening interest in its fate. Today, the Arctic is being seen a “7th Continent,” providing us with new opportunities and challenges. We should prepare for this “New Arctic Age” with what distinguished economist Alfred Marshall stated should be a “cool head, but warm heart.”

Lastly, I would like to deeply thank the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) and the East-West Center for their tireless efforts in organizing today’s conference.

Thank you.
Russia’s Arctic Policy
Yuri Sychev

I am not a politician, so I cannot present the official position of the Russian Federation with regard to our relationships in the Arctic.

However, being a member of the Russian State Commission on Arctic Development, I can briefly describe my vision for the main directions and priorities of Russia’s Arctic policy.

First, I’m confident in stating that the Russian leadership proceeds from the premise that a policy of cooperation in the Arctic is the only viable way forward. Every problem can be solved through good neighborliness and constructive dialogue. There are no problems that require military solutions. This is Russia’s position, which Arthur Chilingarov, the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctica, has asked me to communicate to you.

Despite inevitable contradictions that arise from the respective policy positions of individual Arctic nations, we can say with cautious confidence that together we will be able to maintain the level of Arctic cooperation achieved in previous years.

Second, Russia supports and will actively participate in the work of the Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Region Council, Nordic Council and other international organizations and forums to effectively discuss and develop joint positions of Arctic states and states having interests in the Arctic at different levels. I believe this conference is also an important event that allows for us to place a cornerstone to help us build even more international cooperation in the Arctic together.

I would also like to take this opportunity to announce that Russia is planning to organize an international forum, “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue,” after a three-year break. The forum’s organizer is the newly established State Commission on Arctic Development, and a tentative date is set for spring 2017.

Third, Russia has created an important instrument to implement the state policy in the Arctic, the aforementioned State Commission on Arctic Development. The Commission was established by a Russian Federation Presidential Order of February 3, 2015. The Commission’s main objective
is to ensure interaction among federal and regional authorities, local authorities and interested organizations related to the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin was appointed the Chair of the Commission.

The Commission has shown its effectiveness in its one and a half years of work to date. In particular, the Commission has formulated and is implementing a new policy regarding the development of the Northern Sea Route, which I will mention in my report later.

Thank you for your attention.
Inuit's Arctic Policy
Okalik Eegeesiak

Thank you for welcoming me to address this plenary. My name is Okalik Eegeesiak. I was born and raised in Iqaluit, Nunavut on the shores of Frobisher Bay in Arctic Canada.

I would like to thank the East-West Center and the Korea Maritime Institute for their kind invitation to speak at this unique Conference once again, especially in such a beautiful and inspiring venue and with the assembled participants, who share an awareness of the value of the Arctic and its peoples.

I am also chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), an international organization with official status within the United Nations and one of six Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. The ICC gives voice to the 160,000 Inuit living in Canada, Greenland, Alaska and Chukotka. Inuit people may be a small population in a global sense—but we have proven to be a strong, unified voice for more than 40 years.

I would like to share my perspective on Arctic Policy.

Look around and take in the beauty of this place. Honolulu, or "calm port," is home to many cultures, including the indigenous Native Hawai‘ians. Let the ocean inspire us to move beyond the discussion of the challenges that the Arctic and its peoples face. Let us consider instead the possibilities that Arctic peoples can achieve by working together with you—scientists, policy makers, industry leaders, conservation groups and governments—all people who truly believe in meaningful partnerships with Arctic peoples.

I don't think I need to remind those of you in this room that Arctic peoples need to be actively involved in discussions about the Arctic. I believe you already see us as Arctic partners, whether we are Inuit or Saami, Aleutian or Russian, Gwich'in or Athabaskan, as a positive force in your work. I certainly believe you do not take this stance out of duty, but rather out of conviction. The number of Arctic representatives already here is proof enough.

I see this Arctic partnership as a source of new knowledge, a new and improved way of looking at the future of the Arctic, and a means to enhance a collective mandate—whether that is for commercial activities,
conservation, science, or policy. There is no longer the time for an “us-versus-them” Arctic. Instead, we must aspire to create an Arctic that helps foster the sustainability of Arctic communities and protects the Arctic for the global commons. This approach will inevitably lead to a prosperous, safer and more secure Arctic, which in turn benefits not only the Arctic but the global community as well.

To improve Arctic policy, we need to take a longer-term view. We need a 30-year vision for the Arctic, which we might call “Arctic 2050.” Inuit believe in a vision for the Arctic that looks both backward and forward. It’s a vision that is guided by our past in order to inform our future. I want to share with you a few thoughts that I hope will stimulate the discussion. I will speak about current Arctic Policy, and later in I will tell you about the challenges that rapid and unpredictable change is bringing to my Nunaat—my “source” and my home.

Inuit have occupied the circumpolar Arctic for millennia, carving a pragmatic culture from the snow and ice. We have lived through famines, the Little Ice Age, Vikings, whalers, missionaries and residential schools, and successive governments.

Inuit live in four countries with four very different political realities and relationships their respective states—yet we are one through our language and our culture.

As I travel to bring the Inuit voice to the world I constantly meet people who express great interest in the issues the Arctic faces, in our culture, and in our land. This conference is such an event. The Arctic truly has the global consciousness spellbound, not only for those who want to use it, ship through it, explore it, and mine it, but also for those who want to study it, learn from it, and protect it.

For Inuit, the Arctic defines who we are: a pragmatic hunting culture. Inuit base decisions on our indigenous knowledge of our past, of our present, and of our future. It’s a knowledge system based on thousands of years of observing and testing, with an oral tradition that passes down this collected wisdom from generation to generation. Inuit continue to acquire knowledge today as we adapt to meet the challenges and embrace the opportunities of a rapidly changing world.

We must be proactive rather than reactive and identify key investigations and studies for economic opportunities. We must plan for development and growth, and analyze potential risks arising from climate change or other hazards. We must use the very best knowledge to make
evidence-based, informed decisions.

The Arctic is vast and each community is unique, both within nation states and among Inuit states. Any visioning exercise will be unique for each community, and the opportunities and challenges associated with Arctic change will vary significantly over time and place.

Different communities face different risks from a changing Arctic, and have different perspectives regarding the implications of those risks as well as the most appropriate response options. Being partners in planning, research, and the development of Arctic policy as well as the governance of our Arctic future will ultimately lead to more sustainable decisions in Arctic communities.

There remain uncertainties. For example, the evolution of governance systems and the economic stability of the Arctic depend on global demands for energy and the exploitation of Arctic resources. The economics of this sector are based more on commodity prices and global markets than on ice thickness. Over the last decade, the geopolitical context for which many Arctic policy statements have been written has changed. It is a dynamic Arctic, indeed.

The world is waking up to the Arctic. We have seen significant commitments by the U.S. through the Glacier meeting and the White House Arctic Science Ministerial held in September 2016. In 2009, the Russian Government released its Russian Arctic Strategy 2020. Canada’s was drafted in 2010, Iceland delivered their Arctic Strategy in 2011, and we have seen an incredible interest in the Arctic Circle meetings that Iceland has promoted. The Kingdom of Denmark released their 2011-2020 Strategy, and the U.S. and Finland released theirs in 2013. Norway’s strategy was released in 2014, and Sweden delivered its new environmental policy for the Arctic in 2016. I am sure we will see a revised strategy as Finland assumes the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2017.

Non-Arctic states are also taking note of their neighbors to the north. The EU presented its new Arctic strategy in 2016. The Republic of Korea, Japan and Singapore also have Arctic policies and host Arctic meetings.

The landscape has shifted. The Arctic is a truly global commons.

But what of the indigenous peoples who call the Arctic Nunaat—our home? We need to have more of a say about our future. About our children’s future. About our grandchildren’s future.

Engagement with Arctic residents, especially including Indigenous
Peoples, is not just an asset. It is a requirement. We must be partners in the development of any Arctic policy that wishes to share our land, our snow and ice, our water, our wildlife, and our resources.

Our Inuit or indigenous knowledge has value to add to the discussion and to the development of evidenced-based decision-making. Who would not want the best knowledge to move forward on any Arctic policy?

Implementing strong, thoughtful Arctic policies, regardless of the country from which they originate, is a way to strengthen Arctic communities, whether the subject is trade or sustainable economic development. International Arctic policies can be framed as a means to accomplish domestic Arctic policy throughout the eight Arctic nations, while still allowing for the differences each country has in relation to their respective Indigenous Peoples’ governance structures.

The Arctic Council’s 20th anniversary provides an opportunity to move forward by reflecting on the past. The value of the Arctic Council as a governance mechanism must be strengthened and the role of the ICC and other PP’s strengthened. The utilization and value of our knowledge systems must be better recognized and better employed.

The Arctic Council has supported persistent and consistent themes to include and engage and reflect Arctic voices, including cooperation, collaboration, and bringing the human dimension into every discussion.

Canada, about which I am most familiar, has a longstanding historical role in Arctic politics. This includes establishing the Arctic Council, with its foundations drawn from Franklyn Griffith’s 1989 report, *Towards an Arctic Basin Council*. It also finds continuity in Bill Graham’s 1997 House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade report, *Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation Into the Twenty-First Century*, and the work of Mary Simon, the former leader of the ICC and Canada’s first circumpolar ambassador.

Simon was recently appointed to the role of Minister’s Special Representative (MSR), responsible for leading engagements and providing advice to the Government of Canada on the development of a new shared Arctic leadership model. Canada announced a commitment to work in partnership to implement land claims and agreements to realize the social, cultural, economic potential of Indigenous People and northern communities. They pledged as well to develop a plan and timeline for alternative energies in the Arctic. Canada also committed to address the challenges of mental wellness, education, indigenous languages, and skill
development, particularly among indigenous youth. This model of Arctic leadership will be advanced through the Arctic Council and other venues where Arctic issues are discussed.

There are various visions for the future of the Arctic. We must recognize our commitment to the United Nation Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as we must recognize and reflect on the potential threats and risks emerging from geopolitical tensions in the Arctic. We must address the immediate and urgent social issues facing Arctic communities. We must act now on the environmental issues of climate change and contaminants that are forcing unprecedented change in the lives of Arctic peoples. These challenges are so big they can only be overcome in global partnerships.

Inuit opened the door to positive change and to productive and respective partnerships when the ICC was created to represent Inuit internationally. Our vision remains the same: A sustainable and enduring Arctic.
Canada’s Arctic Policy
David L. VanderZwaag

Canadian Arctic policy is contained in several sources with some key pieces. The 2009 *Northern Strategy* put forward by the Harper Conservative government is the primary piece at the moment. Many of the initiatives launched under that strategy are ongoing initiatives and have not been renounced by the new Trudeau Liberal government. This strategy has four major pillars:

1) Exercising Canadian Sovereignty—Arctic patrol vessels are being built; NORDREG, a mandatory vessel reporting system, has been instituted; the Hans Island territorial dispute is being addressed; the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute has been placed on the “back burner”; and Canada’s legal position on the Northwest Passage is clear.

2) Social and Economic Development—The Canadian Northern Economic Agency (CANNOR) has been created; and a small craft harbour has been built in Pangnirtung.

3) Protecting Arctic Environmental Heritage—The Canadian High Arctic Research Station is being built; and a national marine conservation area is being proposed for Lancaster Sound.

4) Improving and Devolving Northern Governance—Devolution agreements with the Northwest Territories and Yukon have been concluded; and strengthening the Arctic Council is a priority.

A second piece is Canada’s Foreign Policy Statement (2010), which puts some glosses on past policies. For example, it outlines Canada’s approach to continental shelf extensions in the Arctic.

More recent pieces of the Canadian policy picture have been enunciated in the March 2016 Trudeau-Obama Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership.

Ministerial mandate letters sent to members of the Trudeau government, which relate the Prime Minister’s expectations, approach, and priorities, are also relevant to the Arctic. Efforts are being made to increase the number of marine protected areas in the Arctic. Canada is again engaged on climate
change issues.

There have also been policy commitments on Arctic fisheries. An agreement has been reached with the Inuvialuit to institute a moratorium on commercial fisheries in the Beaufort Sea until more science is done. A Fisheries and Oceans Canada policy on Managing the Impacts of Fisheries on Sensitive Benthic Habitat Areas (2009) would subject new commercial fishing proposals in the Arctic to strict scientific assessments and initial small-scale exploratory licensing.

Two other images that can describe Canada’s Arctic policy are “policy perplexities” and “policy promises.”

One perplexing policy issue is the Northwest Passage. It is unclear where Canada sits on developing the Northwest Passage. The Passage is open to transits, but there is not a clear vision for infrastructure developments and vessel routings in relation to the Passage. Recent suggestions about a possible deep-water port in Iqaluit and a shipping corridor initiative are still being considered.

With respect to “policy promises,” Canada’s Arctic Strategy for the Coast Guard has not yet been released. Regulations to give effect to the Polar Shipping Code are being developed but have not been released for public comment. New initiatives are promised to deal with Indigenous Peoples issues, including health and climate change impacts. Canada says it is trying to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples but it is not clear how this will be done. In respect to the Paris Agreement, Canada has announced an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of a 30% reduction from 2005 levels by 2030, and Canada ratified the Agreement in October 2016, just prior to the COP22 meeting in Marrakesh. Prime Minister Trudeau is meeting with provinces and hopes to forge a Canadian position on climate change soon.

Notes

1. David L. VanderZwaag provided a Canadian perspective on Arctic policy. He noted that he was not speaking on behalf of the Government of Canada. He described Canada’s current approach as “policy pieces” and gave some examples of policy implementation.
China’s Arctic Policy
Yang Jian

I would like to provide a perspective on China’s Arctic policy, but note that it is not an official government position, but rather a “Shanghai Perspective.” I am hopeful that China will follow the lead of the Republic of Korea and Japan, and develop an Arctic policy. To some extent, China’s current policy is passive and reactive. China’s awareness of Arctic issues is based on discussions with diplomats from the Arctic nations. China’s Arctic policy has been formulated by consultations with international law scholars, global governance and international relations experts, and analyses of global economic trends. China is a neighbour of the Arctic and an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs. China tends to come at Arctic policy through issues such as claims to extended continental shelves, sustainable use of resources and sea routes, and other commercial and political considerations. More recently, climate change has also appeared on China’s radar. China’s economy is large, and anything that impacts its economy will involve cautious approaches that require substantial coordination with multiple governmental departments. Drafting an official Arctic policy will take time, but it is likely to happen fairly soon. China’s overall development policy affects issues of global governance. This developing policy will be guided by several key concepts: respect (for the Arctic Council, sovereign rights, indigenous rights, and international law); “win-win”; and sustainability. These words were reflected in a speech made by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the Arctic Circle forum. China also wants to make scientific contributions to Arctic knowledge through multilateral and bilateral cooperation.

China is a potential user of the Northern Sea Route and a customer for Arctic resources such as fish, oil and gas. China also wants to participate in global governance to deal with climate change and wants to see sustainable development that also promotes balance in social systems. China believes that peace and stability are key principles for Arctic governance and sustainable development. It believes that international security can be advanced by dialogue, in order to preserve peace in the Arctic.