

International Graduate Student Conference Series

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No. 33, 2008

**“Shadows of Their Former  
Selves” and “A Place in the Sun”:  
The Legacy of War and Martial  
Law for Hawai‘i’s Japanese  
Leaders**

Kelli Nakamura



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## “Shadows of Their Former Selves” and “A Place in the Sun”: The Legacy of War and Martial Law for Hawai‘i’s Japanese Leaders

Kelli Nakamura

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***“Shadows of Their Former Selves” and “A Place in the Sun”: The Legacy of War and Martial Law for Hawai‘i’s Japanese Leaders***

*“The children suffered. Nobody would play with the children of the internees . . . My girl was returning home from the library. She was stopped and told, ‘This is not Japan. This is the United States. I want you to respect it.’ They stopped her with the intent to punish her. And then, my boy was up in an ohia tree. They didn’t bother the other boys, just my boy. They told him the same old stuff. They teased him . . . even me. We had a tough life.”<sup>1</sup>*

According to this account by Hisashi Fukuhara, a retired barber from the Kona coast of the Big Island, the impact of internment not only affected the internees themselves but also their family members who were treated with fear and suspicion by their community. Unlike the families of Japanese American veterans of the 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat Team, the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, and the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), a distinct minority of internees, *Issei*, and repatriates could not claim to be part of the triumphalist military discourse that has been employed to describe the fortunes of the Japanese community in the postwar period. During the war, while soldiers’ families desperately waited for news of the battlefield and the fate of their loved ones, many internee family members anxiously awaited news of the status of the prisoners and an indication of when normal government operations and civilian life would resume. On 25 October 1944, martial law ended with the proclamation of Presidential Order 9489. The Provost Courts were immediately abolished but other changes made were largely symbolic: the title of Military Governor became Military Commander, and the Office of

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<sup>1</sup> “Mr. Hisashi Fukuhara,” Japanese Internment and Relocation: The Hawaii Experience, University of Hawai‘i, Hamilton Library, Special Collections [henceforth JIRHE] Item 232, 6. (JIRHE was a research project, headed by Dennis M. Ogawa, that collected archival and oral history materials on the Japanese internment experience in Hawai‘i. JIRHE has amassed a valuable collection of documentary evidence for research purposes).

the Military Governor was designated the Office of Internal Security. The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) was still granted the authority to continue its investigative jurisdiction over all cases of espionage, but it now had to operate through more indirect channels. After 25 October, citizens were no longer placed in custodial detention but were immediately evacuated to the mainland. In addition, the Commanding General of the Territory of Hawaii Military Area still possessed the authority to exclude anyone from Hawai'i who was considered dangerous to security for sabotage or espionage reasons.<sup>2</sup> On 24 October 1944, sixty-seven Japanese and fifty aliens remained at the Honouliuli Internment Facility, but by 9 November, officials sent the sixty-seven Japanese-Americans to Tule Lake, while they released fifty aliens on parole. On the day that the war ended, authorities finally allowed the remaining twenty-two aliens to leave.

Upon returning to their homes and communities, many internees had to face the challenge of rebuilding their lives. Jukichi Inouye, a former Japanese language school principal, found his entire livelihood gone as the military had disposed of his school and given most of the proceeds to the Salvation Army. "So when I got back," Inouye recalled, "there wasn't anything I could do. Everything was sold or cleaned out. I could sit and do nothing. I couldn't eat then. With a daughter, I wondered what would happen next."<sup>3</sup> Fortunately, his wife had been making a living as a dressmaker while Inouye had been interned, and she was able to support the family until Inouye found a new job. This proved to be an enormous challenge as many internees carried a stigma from their experience and were shunned by the community as unpleasant reminders of the war. A former language schoolteacher, Kaetsu Furuya testified about his return by ship to

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<sup>2</sup> "History of the G-2 Section Part II," JIRHE Item 230, 26.

<sup>3</sup> "Mr. Jukichi Inouye TR-5," JIRHE Item 236, 1.

Honolulu: “there were people in Honolulu, other passengers . . . who didn’t like to hear about the internees . . . they looked down on us, and ignored us.”<sup>4</sup> Many like Furuya had lost all their money during the war and were in poor physical shape from the camps, which made even low-paying manual labor impossible for them. Numerous individuals suffered from physical ailments such as ulcers and had lost weight from the camps. However, none of this was reported during their internment due to military censorship. According to Furuya, “if we wanted to say we lost weight, we’d have to write ‘my pants is getting bigger and bigger’ or ‘my pants is loose’—anyway, we couldn’t say, ‘I’ve lost so much weight that my pants is falling down.’”<sup>5</sup> The military restricted their communication while in the camps and in the process essentially censored any full record of the physical and psychological effects of the camp experience.

The emotional and physical scars from the camps lasted long after internment was over. Many Hawai‘i internees were not only ignored by the white community when they returned home, but they were also shunned by the larger Japanese community as they represented the trauma of anti-Japanese sentiment. For these former leaders of the community, homecoming to Hawai‘i was often bittersweet as many had lost not only their physical possessions but also the respect and status they had once garnered in the community as prominent *Issei*. They were also confronted by pro-Japan nationalistic movements among a select portion of the alien population that not only seemed to validate their internment but also posed considerable obstacles to their acceptance and assimilation back into society. While many were outraged by the rise of pro-Japanese movements during and particularly after the war, this phenomenon must be understood

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<sup>4</sup> “Mr. Kaetsu Furuya TR-2,” JIRHE Item 233, 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

within the context of the social, political, and economic upheaval experienced by the Japanese community during this period that most drastically affected the *Issei* population in the islands, including especially those who had not been interned.

### **The *Issei* “Psychic Epidemic” and “Postwar Delusions”<sup>6</sup>**

For some who remained in Hawai‘i during the war, the alienation, discrimination, isolation, and upheaval they experienced proved to be too much and they became susceptible to rumors connected to a belief in Japan’s victory.<sup>7</sup> Following the announcement of Japan’s defeat, some *Issei* were “confused . . . utterly confused,” and many “could not eat nor sleep for days.”<sup>8</sup> Literally overnight they had lost the traditional leadership and status accorded to the older generation, and were forbidden from Japanese cultural practices that had provided continuity and stability within the ethnic population. As the government classified the *Issei* as enemy aliens, their children—the *Nisei* who were American citizens by birth—assumed a leadership role in families in what has been described as “a radical disruption of the traditional roles of the members of the family

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<sup>6</sup> “Some Older Japanese Here Said Grippled By ‘Psychic Epidemic,’” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 4 March 1946, 1; “Postwar Delusions of Old Japanese Here Studied By UH Research Unit,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 9 March 1946, 16.

<sup>7</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “Rumor Among the Japanese” *Social Process in Hawaii* Vol. XI (May 1947): 84-92. A University of Hawaii Research Unit extensively studied this phenomenon among the *Issei* population in Hawai‘i after authorities charged Jisho Yamazaki, a thirty-three-year-old Japanese priest, with six counts of disloyalty for allegedly propagating messages where he expressed concern for people who “talk bad” about Japan. “Alien Priest Now Under Indictment Upset By ‘Bad Talk’ About Japan,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 6 March 1946, 11; “Japanese Indicted Under Disloyalty Law of 1918,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 5 March 1946, 7.

<sup>8</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “Interview with Mr. A. and Mr. B who are two of the officers of the Shosei-Kai (the original group of the Hawaii Doshi-Kai) at Mr. A’s hat store on Beretania Street on May 16, 1946.”

and in a complete change in status between the two generations.”<sup>9</sup> Respect and status traditionally accorded to the older generation further declined with the emergence of “victory groups” composed of a small number of *Issei* who became vulnerable to notions of Japan’s invincibility and refused to believe the news of Japan’s unconditional surrender following the dropping of the atomic bombs.<sup>10</sup> As early as 1942 and 1943, various *Issei* had formed underground *kachigumi* (victory groups) that disputed American “rumors” of Japanese defeats and strove to keep ethnic pride and confidence alive among Hawai‘i’s *Issei*.<sup>11</sup> Even after Japan’s official surrender, rumors persisted within the *Issei* population, such as those concerning the arrival of the Japanese fleet to take over Hawai‘i, the impending visit of Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu—the younger brother of Emperor Hirohito—to the islands, and the transfer of Hawai‘i to Japanese control.<sup>12</sup> This notion of Japan’s “invincibility” during and after the war was not only reflective of the extreme shock many experienced upon hearing the news of Japan’s defeat, but it was also a perception fostered in part by Japanese radio propaganda that revealed a curious inconsistency in American war regulations.<sup>13</sup> At the outbreak of war, all local Japanese

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<sup>9</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “Some Effects of the War Situation Upon the Alien Japanese in Hawaii” *Social Process in Hawaii* Vol. VIII (November 1943): 21.

<sup>10</sup> One scholar estimates that only three percent of the entire *Issei* population, which dwindled to 1 or 1.5 percent in the course of eight months, were unwilling to accept news of Japan’s defeat as a fact. Yukiko Kimura, “A Comparative Study of the Collective Adjustment of the *Issei*, the First Generation Japanese, in Hawaii and the Mainland United States Since Pearl Harbor” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago 1952), 351.

<sup>11</sup> John J. Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 172.

<sup>12</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “Rumor Among the Japanese,” *Social Process in Hawaii* Vol. XI (May 1947): 84-85.

<sup>13</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 29; Some individuals “suffered extreme shock” and were unable to “eat or sleep for days” when they learned that the war had ended. As events unfolded, detailing Japan’s defeat, some *Issei* women reportedly wept while the men appeared with “eyes downcast, in stony silence.” According to one account, “amid the celebrations and victory parades, many *issei* stayed indoors, mortified by shame and grief. Some felt awkwardness in facing their children.” Yukiko Kimura, “A Comparative Study of the Collective Adjustment of the *Issei*, the First Generation Japanese, in Hawaii and the Mainland United States Since Pearl Harbor” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago 1952), 330.

radio and newspapers were restricted, although authorities still permitted direct radio broadcasts from Japan that were filled with propaganda and news of Japanese victories until February 1942.<sup>14</sup> As many alien Japanese could not read or understand English well, they relied on the Japanese media for news of the war and subsequently many refused to accept the censored news of American war activities when the local Japanese press resumed publication on 8 January 1942. One scholar noted that during this critical period early in the war, the prohibitions regarding the use of Japanese in radio and print deprived the *Issei* of “a most effective means of news dissemination and of potential Americanizing influence.”<sup>15</sup> In essence, inconsistency in government policy as well as the upheaval experienced by the Japanese who were subject to harsh governmental policies and regulations designed to deter these nationalistic activities, inadvertently contributed to the rise of pro-Japanese sentiment.

In lieu of local Japanese newspapers such as the *Hawaii Hochi* and *Nippu Jiji* that had been traditional sources of news and events, but which officials had suspended as part of the new war restrictions, some individuals became subscribers to mainland Japanese newspapers such as the *Colorado Times*, *Utah Nippo*, and *Rocky Shimpo*. These papers propagated false reports of Japanese victories and celebrated Japan’s “invincible tactics” and “fighting spirit.”<sup>16</sup> To certain portions of the population, the existence of these papers, like the radio broadcasts from Tokyo that were permitted in an environment

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<sup>14</sup> Andrew W. Lind, *The Japanese in Hawaii Under Wartime Conditions* (Honolulu, New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), 19.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>16</sup> The editor of the *Colorado Times* estimated that there were approximately 1,000 subscribers in Hawai‘i. However, the total readership is estimated to be much larger as “the same copy was passed around among a number of friends and relatives.” One scholar notes that “the number of readers was several times larger than the number of subscribers and consequently the effects of those papers were “far reaching.” Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 51, 202, 207.

where officials restricted the local Japanese media and newspapers, seemed to confirm these stories and sanction pro-Japanese sentiment.<sup>17</sup>

Still another factor that contributed to nationalistic Japanese attitudes was the rise of a religious sect called Seichō-no-Ie (“House of Growth”), which likewise helped to promote notions of Japan’s invincibility and inevitable victory. Despite its obscure origins in Japan and its small number of converts before the war, this group was able to increase its membership dramatically since it was the only religious group authorized to operate in November 1944 due to its stated objectives of providing memorial services for Japanese-American servicemen killed on the battlefield.<sup>18</sup> With the closing of other Japanese religious organizations and the internment of traditional religious leaders, many in the community sought other avenues of religious support and guidance within this period of chaos and anxiety. This group attracted a large number of followers given the syncretic nature of Seichō-no Ie, which allowed adherents of different religions to belong to this sect while remaining devoted to their own faiths. The activities of Seichō-no Ie similarly increased in popularity among the anxious parents of *Nisei* soldiers as the organization’s leaders provided prayers for *Nisei* soldiers, along with claims that they could ensure their safety. According to government statistics, by March 1946 an estimated 400 members belonged to the Honolulu branch of Seichō-no Ie, with over 1,000 adherents in the territory; observers noted that number was steadily increasing.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 65. Masaharu Taniguchi founded Seichō-No Ie in 1930 as a nondenominational movement based on the belief that all religions emanate from one universal God. It was introduced to Hawai‘i around 1935, and its adherents disseminated its holy scripture, *Seimei-no Jisso* (The Reality of Life) and its monthly publication called *Seichō-no Ie*. Ibid., 62-64; *What People In Hawaii are Saying and Doing, War Research Laboratory, University of Hawaii, March 1, 1946 Report No. 8*. [Honolulu]: n.p., 1952.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 69.

At Seichō-no Ie meetings, where between 200 and 500 participants gathered, pro-Japanese sentiments were inserted into speeches such as “Demonstrate your Yamato spirit,” “We Japanese race,” “By the grace of our Emperor,” and “Remember our fatherland.”<sup>20</sup> Terms and descriptions such as “barbarian” and “inferior” were used to refer to non-Japanese, particularly Americans, and the leaders only acknowledged Japanese-American war contributions in describing how many had been saved due to prayers by Seichō-no Ie priests.<sup>21</sup> Although it is uncertain if audience members embraced these phrases and ideas, the larger Japanese community considered Seichō-no Ie a pernicious organization that propagated anti-American sentiment.

In this atmosphere of heightened anxiety and pro-Japanese sentiment among the *Issei* population, various victory organizations emerged and encompassed membership from various locations in the island. They included Tōbu Dōshi-Kai (東部同志会 “Eastern Association of Kindred Spirits”) in Waialae, Kōsei-Kai (更生会 “Association for Rehabilitation”) in Palama, and Hakkō-Kai (八紘会 “Association of Brotherhood”) in Kalihi.<sup>22</sup> As one member of Tōbu Dōshi-Kai testified, “We are a group of people who retain the Japanese spirit and believe that our fatherland did not lose the war.”<sup>23</sup> While

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 66; Yukiko Kimura, “A Comparative Study of the Collective Adjustment of the Issei, the First Generation Japanese, in Hawaii and the Mainland United States Since Pearl Harbor” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago 1952), 356.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 356-357.

<sup>22</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “Mr. Y., Waialae Ave., April 11, 1947,” 3. According to a member of Tōbu Dōshi-Kai, his organization had about 300 members while Kōsei-Kai had about 200 and Hakkō-Kai 100 members. The translation for Hakkō-Kai could possibly have a more nationalistic orientation. According to one scholar, the word 八紘 (Hakkō) comes from the saying 八紘一宇 (Hakkō-ichiu), which has two meanings: “universal brotherhood” or “all eight corners of the world under one roof,” meaning under the control of Japan. Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 136.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 1.

disputing claims of Japan's defeat, the main purpose of this organization was to provide Japanese lunch for prisoners of war everyday for nearly two years. "For this we spent almost \$10,000," one member claimed, as "we sent our members to all 6 places on the island where they worked everyday."<sup>24</sup> Women played a significant role in this endeavor as they "cooked rice and fish and other things and prepared a very palatable lunch."<sup>25</sup> Men who were unable to cook or who did not have wives to assist in the preparation of food contributed money and materials for this purpose. Many of these members had split from Hawaii Dōshi-Kai (ハワイ同志会 "Hawaii Association of Kindred Spirits") and Shosei-Kai (処世会 "Holy Righteous Association"), which were originally organized to help "bewildered" Japanese during the period of "mental and emotional confusion" following the war, and to help them "pursue the proper course as Japanese and to educate other Japanese following erroneous paths."<sup>26</sup> One of the activities embraced by these organizations was the entertainment of Japanese prisoners of war incarcerated in Hawai'i.<sup>27</sup> As Mr. Inokuchi, an original member of Hawaii Dōshi-kai, recalled:

Our group helped the Japanese prisoners of war in Kalihi camp. There were about 1000 Japanese men and officers. We took with us actors and actress, musicians, etc., sometimes 70 or more of them at a time. We went there early and stayed there till nearly 11 P.M. We were not supposed to stay there too long but in the pretense of making preparations for the stage, etc., we often stayed

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<sup>24</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, "Mr. Y., Waialae Ave., April 11, 1947," 3.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, "A Former Hissho-Kai Leader Aiding Relief Projects for Japan: Exposes Inner Activities of 'Katta-To,'" 22 July 1948, 1. This split between various organizations is detailed in Yukiko Kimura, "A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War" (master's thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 134.

<sup>27</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, "Mr. Inokuchi, Hawaii Doshi-kai, April 8, 1947," 1.

there quite late.<sup>28</sup>

Although Inokuchi disputed the nationalistic orientation of his organization, he did acknowledge that there were individual members who believed in Japan's victory. The most aggressive group in propagating pro-Japanese notions was Hisshō-Kai (必勝会 "Absolute Victory Group"), which was known as a "*kattagumi*," an organization which believed victory had been achieved. According to Tokuzo Shibayama, an advisor to Hisshō-Kai, the purpose of the organization was "to give comfort and encouragement to the Japanese by telling them the truth."<sup>29</sup> After the end of the war, Shibayama noticed that "there were some who committed suicide, some who went insane and there was a lot of violence."<sup>30</sup> Dismissing these actions as "foolish" as Japan had not lost the war, he and a few others who "knew the true situation decided to form a group and tell others the facts."<sup>31</sup> Shibayama not only dismissed newspaper reports and radio broadcasts as "all false," but argued that San Francisco and San Diego were also under the jurisdiction of Japan while "Pearl Harbor is under the control of the Japanese navy" due to the invasion of Japanese forces in the islands.<sup>32</sup> Despite widespread criticism of his beliefs, Shibayama remained unshaken in his views:

The society is topsy-turvy now. We are the only sane ones. Others are crazy and belong at Kaneohe. That picture on the wall was given to me on the 77<sup>th</sup> birthday by the first battalion of the Japanese army stationed at Schofield. There are three battalions on this island at present. Thousands of Japanese troops are camped at Mokapu. I don't know if you've heard this but MacArthur recently passed away at the Queen's hospital. He sustained serious battle wounds and was convalescing

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, "Interview with Mr. Tokuzo Shibayama—advisor of Hissho Kai," 9 July 1948, 1.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

for a while at the Pearl Harbor naval hospital.<sup>33</sup>

In spite of these outrageous claims, some *Issei* did pay membership dues and belonged to this group. Although exact figures are unavailable, the president of Hisshō-Kai claimed that there were between 3,500 and 4,000 members in the organization.<sup>34</sup> Others have provided more conservative figures of 1,000 total participants, with many holding membership in other organizations.<sup>35</sup> While only formally disbanded in 1977—thirty-two years after Japan’s official surrender—many of Hisshō-Kai’s members became discouraged much earlier by the evident lack of truth in the claims espoused by its leaders and given the exposés by former members and scathing articles and editorials published by the *Hawaii Times* that led to a dramatic drop in membership.<sup>36</sup>

A decline in participation also stemmed from the disorganization and disagreements among the various groups and leaders that resulted in numerous split factions, many of which were left without a purpose after the departure of Japanese prisoners of war.<sup>37</sup> The growth in the number of these organizations was not necessarily

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “MEMBERSHIP FEE OF HISSHO-KAI IS \$10.00—4,000 PAID-UP MEMBERS,” 26 July 1948.

<sup>35</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 126.

<sup>36</sup> On 17 November 1977, Hisshō-Kai secretary Seiichi Masuda announced the formal disbanding of the organization in an announcement published in the *Hawaii Hochi*. “□□□□□□□□□□,” *Hawaii Hochi*, 17 November 1977, 4. The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “KAHALUU MEMBER OF HISSHO-KAI EVICTED FROM FARM: Refused to Re-new Lease Because He Believed Rumours,” 9 July 1948; The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “HISSHO-KAI SHOULD DISBAND—PAU: We Should All Try to Get Along Happily,” 30 June 1948; The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, A FORMER HISSHO-KAI LEADER AIDING RELIEF PROJECTS FOR JAPAN: Exposes Inner Activities of ‘Katta-to,’” 22 July 1948. Many members of Hisshō-Kai eventually left because of its radical nature and created their own groups. Nearly seventy individuals formed a faction organization known as Sekisei-Kai (Association of the Faithful) whose objective was “not to assert to the outsiders our belief in Japanese victory but it is primarily to keep our Japanese spirit unwavered” in the turmoil of the postwar period. The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “Mr. K. H[igashi], Waipio, April 6, 1947.”

<sup>37</sup> By April 1947 there were at least eight known groups on Oahu alone that were very similar in nature: Hawaii Dōshi-kai, Shosei-kai, Hisshō-Kai, Tōbu Dōshi-kai, Kōsei-kai, Hakkō-kai, Sekisei-kai, and the

reflective of increasing support from the wider Japanese community, but rather suggested a growing disillusionment and schisms among the members and leaders. The subsequent arrival in March 1946 of Earl M. Finch, the “patron saint” of Japanese-American soldiers, whose generosity and kindness to the *Nisei* from Hawai‘i in training at Mississippi was extensively publicized by all the major newspapers in the territory—both the English language and Japanese presses—also contributed to the decline of these organizations.<sup>38</sup> Acting Governor Gerald R. Corbett and Honolulu Mayor Lester Petrie officially welcomed Finch to Iolani Palace and City Hall and nearly 1,500 veterans and their families feted him at a luau held in his benefit. This made it impossible for many individuals—some of whom were parents of veterans or knew families of veterans—to express their gratitude and appreciation while maintaining a pro-Japan stance.<sup>39</sup> Further, the publicity surrounding Finch’s visit in both the English and Japanese language presses included the first mention among nationalist groups of the merits of *Nisei* soldiers as opposed to Japanese soldiers fighting for the emperor.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, the arrival of returning internees and veterans further eroded support for nationalistic movements among the *Issei* as these groups expected public criticism of these activities.<sup>41</sup> Some of the interned Buddhist priests found their temples utilized by nationalists leaders who had described them as “Communists,” “pro-American,” and “Having forgotten the ‘On’ [obligation] or the grace of their ancestral land and the

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short lived Bansa Club. Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 136.

<sup>38</sup> “Earl Finch Given Rousing Reception,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 5 March 1946, 1.

<sup>39</sup> Elizabeth Jones, “AJAs Fete Finch At Luau In Palama Auditorium,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 7 March 1946, 1; “Earl Finch Given Honorary Life Membership in C of C,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 26 March 1946, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 139.

<sup>41</sup> “Nisei Officer Shocked At Local Skepticism On Japan Defeat,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 6 December 1946, 6.

emperor” to justify their authority over the congregation. Many internees, such as Hisashi Fukuhara and Kaetsu Furuya, whose families experienced discrimination and alienation from the larger Japanese community, wondered why authorities had not arrested these fanatical leaders while they themselves were interned without any explanation save that they were considered potentially dangerous because of their prominent positions in the prewar Japanese community. Most prewar leaders, including businessmen, newspaper editors, language school teachers, and priests, joined in the criticism of these nationalistic groups. They were seen as damaging to the reputation of the Japanese community, to the reintegration of Japanese back into society, and to the hard-fought gains made by the *Nisei* who were also returning to the islands.<sup>42</sup> Some, who had fought in the Pacific theater of the war and who were active during the occupation of Japan—such as the *Nisei* in the MIS—also brought back newspapers, letters, and magazines from Japan which revealed the “destruction and misery in Japan,” clearly contradicting stories of Japan’s success.<sup>43</sup>

While most of the *Nisei* veterans from the European theater returned in small groups, the formal reception for the 442<sup>nd</sup> and the 100<sup>th</sup> was held on 9 August 1946, when the last 241 members of those units arrived and were transported in a sixty-car motorcade from the dock to ceremonies at Iolani Palace.<sup>44</sup> The return of *Nisei* veterans marked a fundamental shift in traditional dynamics, as they, not their parents, assumed the leadership roles once the exclusive domain of the older generation. This was due in part

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<sup>42</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “A Comparative Study of the Collective Adjustment of the Issei, the First Generation Japanese, in Hawaii and the Mainland United States Since Pearl Harbor” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago 1952), 367-369.

<sup>43</sup> Yukiko Kimura, “A Sociological Analysis of Types of Social Readjustment of Alien Japanese in Hawaii Since the War” (master’s thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1947), 142-143.

<sup>44</sup> “241 Officers, Men of 442<sup>nd</sup> Regiment Land,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 9 August 1946, 8; “241 Officers And Men To Be Given Iolani Reception,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 9 August 1946, 1.

to efforts made by the veterans themselves, who successfully organized themselves into the Club 100 and the 442<sup>nd</sup> Veterans Club, which became mobilized centers of support for returning veterans. These *Nisei*, having risked their lives and having been exposed to the larger world, were unwilling to return to their second-class status in society. Their rise in public and political life was ironically facilitated by the same government agencies responsible for the relocation and internment of Japanese during the war. In the postwar period, they now publicized the accomplishments of *Nisei* soldiers to ease the transition of returning internees on the mainland.

***Nisei* Veterans: “We Wanted Our Place in the Sun”<sup>45</sup>**

When the War Department announced in January 1944 that Americans of Japanese ancestry would be called into military service by normal selective service procedures, it listed as the major factors in this decision the “excellent showing” which the 442<sup>nd</sup> had made in training and the “outstanding record” that the 100<sup>th</sup> had made in battle.<sup>46</sup> During the summer of 1944, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) began a campaign to counteract charges circulated about the Japanese-American population to enable the peaceful resettlement of internees in previously restricted areas.<sup>47</sup> To this end, the agency attempted to focus public attention on the essential issues of the program and “bring the full spotlight of publicity on the *Nisei* units.”<sup>48</sup> This campaign was so effective that the WRA later reported that by the early fall of 1944, “it was no longer fashionable over most areas of the country to fling irresponsible accusations at the Japanese

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<sup>45</sup> *From Bullets to Ballots*. Produced by the Japanese American National Museum. 24 min. 1997. Videocassette.

<sup>46</sup> Radford Mobley, “Plans Made to Call Japanese American Troops,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 21 January 1944, 6.

<sup>47</sup> *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), 121.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

American people and to demand further restrictions of their liberties.”<sup>49</sup> According to one author:

The 100<sup>th</sup>'s name had become a rallying cry for those who asked for justice for the Mainland AJAs. Even though at Cassino and afterwards, the replacements who were Mainlanders were always a minority of the 100<sup>th</sup>'s membership, in the public mind the important fact was that this fighting outfit was composed of men of Japanese ancestry.<sup>50</sup>

The WRA began emphasizing the military achievements of *Nisei* soldiers to secure acceptance for the west coast evacuees trying to return home. In the fall of 1944, at WRA request, the Army assigned Hawai'i-born Lieutenant Spark M. Matsunaga, one of the original members of the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, to that agency, which then scheduled him for a series of speaking engagements before civic and professional clubs and religious groups in cities where the WRA was trying to find employment, housing, and acceptance for Japanese internees. Matsunaga, who had been twice wounded and who Army doctors had declared physically unfit for further combat, regaled audiences with stories of the bravery of *Nisei* soldiers and asked that their relatives in relocation centers be allowed to return to their homes. Matsunaga's stories had a deep impact on his listeners, and one auditor commented that “the lieutenant's talk had inspired more tolerance in thirty minutes than other methods could in thirty years.” Another remarked that “in the audience of which he had been a part many persons had been unable to hold back their tears.”<sup>51</sup> A clergyman reported that “after Matsunaga's speech men of his congregation had come to him to express shame for their previous attitudes toward AJAs.”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>50</sup> Thomas D. Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955), 275.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

Five other white officers—one from the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, three from the 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat Team, and one who had supervised the activities of *Nisei* interpreters in the Pacific theater of operations—were subsequently given similar assignments during the fall of 1944 and the spring of 1945 as increasing numbers of Japanese returned to their home communities on the Pacific coast, sparking widespread protests. The WRA reported that “the anti-evacuee elements of the west coast population employed practically every weapon short of lynching and murder to keep the people of Japanese ancestry from returning to the area.”<sup>53</sup> In response to anti-Japanese sentiment, on 15 June 1945, Captain George H. Grandstaff, then on furlough from the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, wrote to the War Department from his home in Azusa, California to ask that he be given a chance to speak against these outrages to public audiences throughout his home state. He explained the reason for his request:

As one of the few white officers who have served with the Japanese American 100<sup>th</sup> Battalion for some two and a half years, my main interest is to see that the splendid work they have done in combat is called to the attention of the people of the Pacific Coast in order that Japanese Americans who desire to return here may receive fair treatment. The thought in . . . [my] mind . . . was that a white officer who had lived in California most of his life could emphasize their splendid combat record as no Japanese American could. Racial prejudice would not enter the minds of the audience where I am concerned.<sup>54</sup>

The WRA reported that these speakers were some of the most effective tools in its campaign to rebuild the status of the interned Japanese. They spoke in school auditoriums, before service club luncheons, and at a few community-wide gatherings. They also talked individually with respected and influential members of the community, such as chiefs of

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<sup>53</sup> WRA, 129-130.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

police, sheriffs, and local newspaper editors.<sup>55</sup> Government officials reported on the success of this endeavor, explaining that, “although they certainly did not succeed in entirely eliminating anti-Nisei prejudice from the west coast region, they unquestionably dealt it one of the heaviest and most crippling blows which it has suffered since its birth in the early 1900s.”<sup>56</sup> Commenting on this transformation, WRA officials only noted that it “seems a little regrettable that this attitude could not have been expressed in the spring of 1942 and that so much Nisei blood had to be shed on the battlefields of Italy before it could gain widespread acceptance.”<sup>57</sup>

White soldiers in outfits who had fought alongside *Nisei* soldiers contributed to the growing positive sentiment toward returning Japanese internees as they responded vigorously when news of outbreaks of racial discrimination towards evacuees reached them. In August 1945, every man in Company D, 168<sup>th</sup> Infantry, who had fought alongside the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion from Salerno to the Arno River, signed the following statement:

From Company D, 168<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 34<sup>th</sup> Division to the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment in appreciation of the heroic and meritorious achievements of our fellow Americans in the 100<sup>th</sup> Battalion and the 442<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment, do hereby assert that our help can be counted on to convince the folks back home that you are fully deserving of all the privileges with which we are ourselves bestowed.

It is a privilege and honor to acknowledge the members of the 100<sup>th</sup> Battalion and the 442<sup>nd</sup> Regiment as fellow Americans. We are duly proud to say “Well done” to you and yours.<sup>58</sup>

While many *Nisei* veterans from Hawai‘i undoubtedly appreciated such sentiments, for most their primary concern was their own return to the islands and their reentry into

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 124.

<sup>58</sup> “Gis in Italy Promise Full Aid to Nisei American Veterans Upon Return to Civilian Life,” *Pacific Citizen*, 25 August 1945, 1.

civilian life. However, their experiences during the war had fundamentally changed these soldiers, and they were unwilling to accept their second-class status within society, particularly in light of the lives that had been lost in order to prove the loyalty of the Japanese community. The 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion and 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat Team accounted for sixty percent of Hawai‘i’s fighting forces and eighty percent of total Hawai‘i casualties. Of the 7,500 men who joined either of these units, 5,000 were awarded medals, approximately 3,600 of which were for battle wounds. 700 hundred died, 700 were maimed, and another 1,000 were seriously wounded.<sup>59</sup>

The *Nisei* who fought and died on the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific to defend the honor and loyalty of their people learned a great deal about Hawai‘i and America in their experiences. Coming from an insolated island chain in the middle of the Pacific, they witnessed firsthand the racial segregation of southern towns while training in areas such as Camp Shelby, Mississippi. They observed the inferior position of poor whites who performed menial labor reserved for non-whites in the islands, and saw the widespread discrimination experienced by African-Americans.<sup>60</sup> They also met the better-educated “kotonks,” their fellow *Nisei* from the mainland who were also in the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Batallion and 442<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, heard them describe the opportunities available on the mainland, and accompanied them when they visited their interned families. “Most of all,” according to one author, “they wondered quietly to themselves if they were fighting for mere acceptance or if, as warriors returning to Hawaii, they could

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<sup>59</sup> Lawrence H. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono: A Social History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1961), 306.

<sup>60</sup> Andrew W. Lind, “Some Problems of Veteran Adjustment in Hawaii,” *Social Process in Hawaii* vol. XII (August 1948): 67.

assert their ambitions in politics and business.”<sup>61</sup> By fighting and dying on behalf of the United States to prove their loyalty—something no other ethnic group had been asked to do—Japanese American soldiers believed they had earned their rightful place as equals within society. As 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat veteran and future Hawai‘i senator Daniel Inouye explained:

Well obviously after going through an experience of that nature where you saw your friends die every day, get wounded every day, keep in mind that we had more purple hearts per capita than any other regiment in the United States Army . . . we received more decorations for valor than any other comparable unit in the United States Army . . . it showed that we were involved in a lot of action . . . and whenever you do involve yourself in action, there is a lot of blood and having spilled that blood . . . we weren’t ready to go back to the plantations.<sup>62</sup>

According to Inouye, after having experienced the horrors of war, and having sacrificed countless lives in an effort to prove their loyalty, many *Nisei* veterans returned to the islands with a new perspective and desire for change. “So we knew we were expendable,” explained Inouye, “but we knew that we had to pay that price . . . and we were willing to pay that price . . . but once we paid that price we wanted our place in the sun.”<sup>63</sup> This desire for political, social, and economic change led many veterans to support the Democratic Party and align themselves with other prominent *Nisei* who had emerged as leaders within the Japanese community during World War II. Because of the absence of traditional *Issei* leaders who had been interned, and because of the war-spawned role reversal of traditional Japanese social patterns, prominent *Nisei* assumed the leadership roles within the Japanese community. They spearheaded organizations during the war such as the Council for Inter-Racial Unity, Morale Committees, and Emergency Service

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 306-307.

<sup>62</sup> *From Bullets to Ballots*.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

Committee.<sup>64</sup> The latter organization led the way in demonstrations of loyalty and Americanization by in part encouraging *Nisei* with dual citizenship to renounce their Japanese citizenship.<sup>65</sup> This group was mainly led by *Nisei*, including such prominent individuals as Supreme Court Justice Wilfred C. Tsukiyama, University of Hawai‘i historian Shunzō Sakamaki, attorney Katsuro Miho, engineer Arthur Y. Akinaka, attorney Masaji Marumoto, and his one-time law partner Robert K. Murakami.<sup>66</sup> During the war they had encouraged donations to blood banks and “Speak-American” campaigns, collected flowers from Japanese farmers for the graves of those killed on 7 December

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<sup>64</sup> The roots of the Emergency Service Committee can be traced to the Hawaiian Japanese Civic Association in 1927. The purpose of the Hawaiian Japanese Civic Association was to promote educational, cultural, and political efforts. In 1938, it campaigned to persuade dual citizens to expatriate. During a two-week drive, a thousand *Nisei* took the first steps to make themselves full American citizens. The same organization made similar efforts in 1939, 1940, and 1941. In November 1940, the leaders of the association drew up a petition to present to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which described the existing expatriation process as “complicated and cumbersome, entailing involved correspondence and long waiting.” It many cases, it stated, “the technical difficulties are appalling, and in numerous instances more than a year elapses before the action is at long last completed.” Some citizens had deferred taking the necessary steps, not only for these reasons, but also because they were unwilling to recognize a claim upon them by any other government than the United States. The whole situation brought much “undeserved and unwarranted” suspicion of Americans of Japanese ancestry by other citizens. In addition to an expatriation drive, the *Honolulu Star Bulletin* reported that the association also sponsored discussions of “civil and economic problems facing American citizens of Japanese ancestry.” “Service Group, Civic Club Merge,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, 24 July 1942, 7; “Campaign for Simpler Form of Expatriation Opens Here,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 8 November 1940, 3; “Civic Club Is Planning Active Year,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 8 August 1939, 9.

<sup>65</sup> According to one prominent *Nisei* official, of the approximately 113,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry in Hawai‘i, 60,000 had been born after 1 December 1924. By an imperial ordinance that became effective 1 December 1924, the government of Japan declared that in the future it would claim no American-born child of Japanese parents as a citizen unless the parents registered the infant’s name with a Japanese consulate within fourteen days of its birth. Dual citizenship would result only when the parents strongly desired that their children share the same citizenship. Procedures for formal renunciation of Japanese citizenship through registration with imperial government agencies were also made somewhat less complicated. They could be used by those born before 1 December 1924, as well as by any born after that date who might as they grew older wish to deny the Japanese citizenship registered for them by their parents. Kiyosue Inui, *The Unsolved Problem of the Pacific: A Survey of International Contacts, Especially in Frontier Communities, with Special Emphasis upon California and An Analytic Study of the Johnson Report to the House of Representatives* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1925), 258-261, 313, 320.

<sup>66</sup> “Katagiri Due for Presidency of Civic Group,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 27 June 1940, 2; “New Citizen Conference Concluded,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 21 July 1941, 3; “Civic Group Will Install New Officers,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 11 July 1942, 9. Shunzō Sakamaki was the son of Jūzaburō Sakamaki, bombing victim during the 1920s strike. He was also Chairman of the University of Hawaii History Department and served as Dean of the University Summer Session for sixteen years. Robert Murakami was the defense attorney for Myles Fukunaga who was charged, sentenced, and executed for the brutal murder of Gill Jamieson.

1941, and removed Japanese signage. Their efforts were designed to focus the energies of the Japanese community on deflecting accusations of disloyalty.

Similar in aims to the Emergency and the Morale Committees was the Police Contact Group active on Oahu during the early months of the war.<sup>67</sup> It had evolved from a rally at McKinley High School in June 1941, which 2,000 people had attended.<sup>68</sup> Following that event, a group of *Nisei* had gone to the Honolulu Police Department to volunteer their services. They were directed to a young police officer, John Burns, who organized them into a network of young Japanese Americans who would to serve as contacts in Japanese neighborhoods. These *Nisei* were charged with the responsibility of “checking out scare rumors, quieting the sense of fear, outlining the harsh realities of martial law and translating information to those of the immigration generation who spoke no English.”<sup>69</sup> As a result of his work with the Police Contact Group, Burns grew increasingly involved within the Japanese community and efforts to publicize the military contributions of Japanese Americans who had served in the Varsity Victory Volunteers, the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, and the 442<sup>nd</sup> Regimental Combat Team. In the process, Burns established key political alliances and critical community support within the ethnic population. One author commented:

Bit by bit, the young police captain was backing into politics. His personal contacts were multiplying to the hundreds and thousands, ranging from his organizing campaigns to managing a Japanese baseball team, the Asahis (Morning Sun), who for wartimes’ sake changed their name to the Athletics.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Gwenfread Allen, *Hawaii’s War Years: 1941-1945* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1950), 144.

<sup>68</sup> Tom Coffman, *Catch a Wave: Hawaii’s New Politics* (Honolulu: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1972), 17-19.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

Through his efforts within the Japanese community, Burns became acquainted with prominent *Nisei* who became instrumental in his political aspirations, which came to fruition during the “Revolution of 1954” when Democrats seized control of the Territorial Legislature and ushered in a new era of social and racial equality in Hawai‘i. The executive secretary of the Emergency Service Committee was Mitsuyuki “Mits” Kido, who in 1959 ran with Burns as a candidate for lieutenant governor. Kido first met Burns in the early days of the war and, by 1944, Burns, Kido, Edward Murai, Jack Kawano, and politician Chuck Mau met almost weekly to discuss plans for the postwar period.<sup>71</sup> At that time, Kido recalled, “we asked each other, ‘What the hell are we going to do when these kids come home’ . . . . We said we would stand for equality of opportunity, regardless of race. We wanted acceptance as first-class citizens. Our second goal was to raise the standard of living and the standard of education.”<sup>72</sup> They settled on the Democratic Party as the vehicle for challenging white oligarchy that had maintained its political dominance in Hawai‘i through the Republican Party.

After the war ended, Burns resigned from the Police Department, intent on reorganizing a party that had never controlled an elective body in the history of Hawai‘i. Key to his success was the alliance Burns formed with a young *Nisei* veteran, Daniel Inouye, who convinced Dan Aoki, president of the 442<sup>nd</sup> Veterans Club, that the energies of its members could be used to improve the social and political status of Japanese in Hawai‘i.<sup>73</sup> By 1948, after serving six years as Oahu’s Civil Defense director, Burns had

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<sup>71</sup> Edward Murai had helped Burns organize the Police Contact Group and Jack Kawano was an International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) organizer who provided critical labor support when Burns and other *Nisei* ran for political office. *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Dennis M. Ogawa, *Kodomo no tame ni: For the Sake of the Children* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1985), 381.

gathered enough support to become the Oahu Chairman of the Democratic Party. In the fall, he entered the nearly impossible race for Delegate to Congress against the popular Republican incumbent, Joseph Farrington. Burns lost, but he had established a core group of supporters: Matsuo Takabuki and Mike Tokunaga, *Nisei* veterans who had been raised on the plantations and became key party leaders; William Richardson, a part-Hawaiian who envisioned a Japanese-Hawaiian voting bloc to weaken white political control; and Sakae Takahashi, who was a veteran of the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion and who in 1950 won a seat on the Honolulu Board of Supervisors and became the first Japanese American treasurer of the Territory.<sup>74</sup>

As Burns rose from Oahu chairman to Territorial Chairman of the Democratic Party, his supporters similarly gained in numbers and political positions as they “indefatigably exploited the accumulated resentments of Japanese, Chinese, Hawaiians, and Filipinos against the injustices, real and imagined, of the past.”<sup>75</sup> In 1954, thirteen years after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the now vital Democratic Party achieved victory, securing solid majorities in both houses of the legislature. That same year, Burns ran as a candidate for Delegate to Congress against Joseph Farrington’s widow, Elizabeth Farrington, and lost by less than a thousand votes. Two years later, Burns beat Farrington in a landslide to win the most prestigious elective office then available in Hawai‘i. As a Democratic delegate in a Democrat-controlled congress, Burns cultivated the support of southern congressmen, who were the leading opponents to Hawaiian statehood, by working with two powerful Texans—House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority

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<sup>74</sup> Coffman, 24. For more information on Matsuo Takabuki consult, Matsuo Takabuki, *An Unlikely Revolutionary: Matsuo Takabuki and the Making of Modern Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998).

<sup>75</sup> Fuchs, 318.

Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. At the risk of his own political future, Burns supported the so-called “Alaska Strategy,” separating the question of statehood for Alaska and Hawai‘i and allowing Alaska to go up for a vote first.

In April 1958, both houses of Congress passed a resolution of statehood for Alaska, and on 3 January 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the bill into law. That same year, the Hawaii bill came out of committee, passing in the House by a 323 to 89 vote and in the Senate by a 76 to 15 margin. At last, eighteen years after Pearl Harbor, Hawai‘i’s people were official American citizens. In the referendum, Hawai‘i voters ratified statehood by an overwhelming margin of 17 to 1. But Burns, who had returned home to run for governor, lost to the incumbent Republican William Quinn by 4,000 votes.

For the next four years, Burns bided his time while maintaining his public profile. In his last act as delegate, he introduced the newly elected congressman, Daniel Inouye, to the House, where Inouye was immediately taken under the wing of House Speaker Sam Rayburn. As a Texan, he was “aware that a segregated all-Japanese unit,” in which Inouye had served, had “rescued the Lost Battalion of Texans.”<sup>76</sup> Rayburn not only extended political support to Inouye, offering to be Inouye’s mentor, but, as Inouye recalled “early in my House career, he told me that I would always have a place at ‘The Texas Table’ in the House Dining Room.”<sup>77</sup> While Inouye began to establish his political career, Burns continued to work out of Washington, trying to round up state delegations to support Lyndon Johnson’s bid for the Democratic presidential nomination.

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<sup>76</sup> Daniel K. Inouye, “Correspondence, 8 May 2007,” Private Collection of Author.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

Two years later, Burns challenged Quinn in a rematch. He was in part helped by James Kealoha, Quinn's lieutenant governor, who had turned on Quinn and challenged him in the Republican primary, dividing the already dwindling resources of the Republican Party. This time, Burns won by a landslide. The vote was 114,000 for Burns and 82,000 for Quinn. Burns' victory proved emblematic of the growing political domination in Hawai'i of the Democratic party, and of the rise of Japanese American veterans such as Daniel Inouye, Spark Matsunaga, and George Ariyoshi. For many, the 1950s marked a new era dominated by *Nisei* who had capitalized on the educational opportunities provided by the GI Bill and who had taken advantage of political and economic opportunities. In the postwar period many *Nisei* entered professional occupations and became teachers, doctors, and lawyers, while others took advantage of the tourism boom in the 1950s to enjoy unprecedented profits from businesses catering to the burgeoning tourist industry.<sup>78</sup>

The financial, political, and social mobility of the *Nisei* during the postwar period, and the subsequent rise of the third, fourth, and even fifth generations of Japanese Americans, stands in sharp contrast to the history of struggle, conflict, resistance, and negotiation that characterized the first century of the history of the Japanese in the islands. Contrary to the dominant historical narrative that often focuses solely on the military accomplishments of the *Nisei* that marked their entry into middle-class respectability, the early history of the Japanese in Hawai'i was far more contentious and complicated than many accounts portray. The Japanese community itself never coalesced into a homogenous entity and instead was fraught with class, citizenship, and generational

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<sup>78</sup> For more information on the postwar rise of the *Nisei*, consult Dorothy Ochiai Hazama and Jane Okamoto Komeiji, *Okage Sama De: The Japanese in Hawaii 1885-1985* (Honolulu: Bess Press, 1986), 177-218.

differences that often divided Japanese over issues of media representation in the newspapers, labor and legal rights, cultural practices, and community authority. The postwar rise of the *Nisei* and the rights and respect accorded to the second generation came as a result of their heroic efforts and sacrifices made on the home front and battlefield, but they also came at the expense of the rights and respect traditionally accorded to the older generation—their *Issei* parents. Their history, however, should not be seen as one of acquiescence and acceptance but rather as one of struggle and resistance. The various strikes and crimes that marked nearly each decade of the history of Japanese migrants in Hawai‘i offer insights not only into local affairs between whites and Japanese but also into the Japanese population itself. The very hybridity of the Japanese community was due to the ever-changing state of relations between Hawai‘i, Japan, and the United States, which gave birth to different laws, different definitions of citizenship rights that both white officials—in Hawai‘i and the United States—and Japanese officials implemented in an effort to control the migrant labor community. The post-war period gave birth to not only nationalistic movements among a select portion of the *Issei* population, but also the “Revolution of 1954” and the rise of Americanized *Nisei* leaders, once again reaffirming the widespread complexity of ethnic loyalties and identities within Hawai‘i’s Japanese community.

Within this nebulous, ever-changing context, it is important to recognize that the Japanese were not simply victims—as the Gotō murder, the 1909 and 1920 strike trials, the Fukunaga murder trial, the Massie trial, and internment and repatriation attest. They were also active agents exploring and defining their own often dual identities, in a fashion akin to the exploits of *Nisei* soldiers in Europe, the Pacific, and during the

occupation of Japan. Some Japanese, like Myles Fukunaga who brutally murdered the young son of a wealthy white family, perpetrated crimes as they resisted their political, social, and economic oppression and were swiftly punished for their challenges to white authority within the dual system of justice in Hawai‘i. Within this system authorities often prosecuted Japanese to the fullest extent of the law, whether they had committed the alleged crime or not, while whites charged with similar offenses were often never arrested or avoided punishment for their crimes. Yet within this biased legal system there were many whites and Japanese who were outraged by the often blatant miscarriages of justice and fought with considerable effort and dedication on behalf of Japanese defendants. In the process, they risked their own political, economic, and social standing. Not all whites sanctioned racial privilege in the law, and some Japanese became complicit in perpetuating this legal imbalance by testifying against Japanese defendants in exchange for payment and rewards.

These complicated events must also be understood not just as localized events between white and ethnic populations in an isolated island chain but as part of a national and international history affecting Japan, the United States, and Hawai‘i. Japanese migrants occupied a liminal status that often defied geographic boundaries and singular national allegiances. The ambiguity surrounding the citizenship, loyalty, and allegiance of the Japanese grew in global importance as tensions between Japan and the United States increased and culminated in war. The isolation, marginalization, and alienation experienced by migrants in the pre-war period fanned long-standing anxieties about the largest ethnic population that, like Hawai‘i itself, was situated at a critical juncture between east and west. Despite the *Nisei* proving the allegiance of the Japanese

population in Hawai‘i to America through heroic self-sacrifice and effort, the Japanese community did not emerge unscathed as repatriates, internees, and disillusioned *Issei* challenge this triumphalist narrative. While many did enjoy their “place in the sun” in the postwar period, there were also those who became “shadows of their former selves,” haunted by memories of being “frozen to death in the cold, windy, and barren field” of the Sand Island internment center.<sup>79</sup> They represent a history fraught with challenges, strife, and struggle, providing a counter narrative to *Nisei* triumph that rightly complicates the history of the Japanese in Hawai‘i and the United States. While Hawai‘i was not a racial paradise, it was at least a place where ethnic identity could be contested and negotiated, and a place where interethnic alliances finally proved possible—if only after decades of subjugation and resistance to a dual system of justice that exploited sporadic Japanese labor activism and criminal activity in a calculated attempt to frame all Japanese as subversive risks to the security of whites in Hawai‘i and the United States.

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<sup>79</sup> *From Bullets to Ballots*; “Soga, Translations of My Life behind Barbed Wire (Fukuhara),” JIRHE Item 263, 6.

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