Support for a Civil Society in Thailand

Katia Balassiano
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Katia Balassiano

Katia Balassiano is a graduate student at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. She can be reached at katiab@hawaii.edu.

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Katia Balassiano, AICP
PhD Student, UH Dept of Urban & Regional Planning
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The political environment and institutional structures of a country affect the degree to which a civil society can influence government. An environment that supports civil society can lead to a flourishing civil society which, in turn, can positively impact democratic processes. The intent of this paper is to explore the degree to which civil society can flourish in Thailand based on the country’s constitution and policies of devolution. In addition to the January 2008 vote that replaced the military junta, in place since October 2006, with a civilian government, there is other evidence to be optimistic about the future state Thailand’s civil society. The inclusion of an extensive list of civil liberties in the 1997 and latest 2007 Constitution, an ideological commitment to democracy, mass uprisings in response to undemocratic administrations, and the continuing devolution of government authority serve as some reasons for this optimism.

On the face of it, Thailand’s legal and political history is fraught with contestation and change; Thailand has had eighteen constitutions and charters in the past 76 years with governments ranging from military dictatorships to democratic. Although the 1997 Constitution was hailed procedurally and substantively as a document that furthered democratic rule, the 2006 military coup appeared to place the rights guaranteed by the 1997 Constitution in jeopardy. And yet, there is evidence that the country’s people are committed to the ideology of democracy. The national policy of devolution continues to exert positive influence on civil society at the municipal level. More specifically, the process of devolution may be forcing local governments to rely on civil society organizations, and thus be providing an environment that nurtures the growth of civil society. Ultimately, I believe that perceived obstacles to the continued growth and influence of Thai civil society – occasional domestic military intervention, certain traditional Thai values, and a mistrust of political parties - will give way to a democratic practices and an environment in which civil society can flourish.

Historical Overview

Apart from the Great Reforms of 1898, democracy first emerged in Thailand when the military imposed constitutional limits upon King Rama VII and forced him to relinquish control “to the people” in 1932 (Wyatt, 1982:249, as cited in Albritton and Bureekul, 2004). Initially, the government was run by elites in a one-party state. The first direct elections were held in November 1937, after which the country remained managed as a developmental state by an authoritarian Prime Minister. After World War I, the Prime Minister was ousted. New elections in 1946 coincided with the formation of political parties and a new constitution. In 1947, however, the military again took control of the government. After allowing the civilian regime to continue and witnessing elections that effectively condemned the military’s actions and rule, the military replaced the civilian regime with its own.
Although the military ruled Thailand for the majority of the years since 1932, dissatisfaction with the military and police grew. Discontent began in the rural regions then spread to the educated middle-income class. In 1973, a coalition of workers, farmers, students and the middle-class clashed violently with the police. The King’s intervention resulted in an end to the authoritarian regime. But in 1977, the military again reasserted its authority. Interestingly, over the years, the military’s various appointed prime ministers slowly began introducing democratic practices. In 1983, parliamentary elections were held, and 1988 saw the country’s first fully democratic elections. Support for democracy was strong until 1991 when another military coup was staged. In response to the public’s outrage, the junta promised new elections within a year. When the junta attempted to renege on its promise, it faced a mass uprising; at which point the King stepped in to restore democracy as demanded by the citizens. Between the election of 1992 and till 2006, Thailand had a civilian government and a series of prime ministers, some elected and some forced out by new civilian coalition governments. In 2006, in response to public protests against the prime minister, a military junta once again replaced the civilian government in a bloodless coup.

1997 Constitution

Prior to the 2006 coup, the Constitution originally approved in 1997 was in place. The 1997 Constitution had initially been hailed as a positive step toward democracy. Important provisions included:

- **Election reform.** Voting was made compulsory in order to ensure a high-turn out and make vote buying so expensive as to be unfeasible. An independent Election Commission was established. A central site at which to count votes was also intended to discourage vote buying.
- **Strengthening the executive branch.** To increase the stability of the government, a process was put in place to replace the Prime Minister through representative and majority-rule voting in the House of Representatives.
- **Legislative reform and separation of powers.** Representatives of the House could no longer serve as Cabinet Ministers. Members of the Upper House of Parliament would be directly elected. To reduce the strength of political parties, Senators were prohibited from being party members.
- **Human rights.** In addition to freedom of speech, assembly, and association, property rights, freedom of religion, the right to due process of law, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and equality of rights between men and women, the Constitution specified many new human rights as well. Also included were the rights of children, the elderly, and the handicapped; the right to information; the right to public health and free education; consumers’ rights; the rights of traditional communities; the right to human dignity; and the right to peacefully protest extra-constitutional means of acquiring power.
- **Devolution of government.** Local, elected governments (Tambol Administrative Organizations, Provincial Administrative Organizations) were given new authority.
- **Increased checks and balances.** New independent government agencies were established, such as the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court, the Office of the Auditor-General, the National Counter-corruption Commission, and the National Human Rights Commission.
While the changes instituted were remarkably positive in comparison to the country’s previous constitutions, this Constitution also had its problems. Some of the problems may be attributed to the difficulty Thailand has historically had in sustaining a democratic government. Additionally, it appears that the 1997 Constitution could not correct abuses of power that had become practically systemic. For example, political corruption, or the perception of it, remained relatively high. Critics of the Constitution suggested that the Executive Branch was too strong. Also, by preventing Senators to be affiliated with political parties and limiting the information they can communicate to voters, Senate elections were reduced to popularity contests and ended up placing too much power in the hands of wealthy and influential business people. And although the intention of creating independent agencies to monitor government was sound, they too became tainted with corruption.

2007 Constitution

In early 2006, the public began expressing their discontent with Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s large-scale corruption and abuse of power for personal gain. Several months of mass protests focused on the joint demands of the Prime Minister’s replacement coupled with constitutional changes that would allow for more public participation in political decision-making. On September 19, 2006 a military coup, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, removed Prime Minister Thaksin from office. Shortly thereafter, the junta, calling itself the “Council for National Security” (CNS), put an Interim Constitution in place. The junta promised that a new, permanent constitution would be drafted by October 2007. Under the auspices of maintaining stability and limiting Thaksin’s political party from meeting/organizing, the junta banned political parties from conducting any activities, banned gatherings of more than five people, and placed restrictions on the public expressing political opinions in the media.

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) was skeptical of the junta’s long-term intentions. AHRC (2006) suggested that the junta does not represent the people’s interests, and accused the military of using the citizens’ dissatisfaction with Thaksin as a reason to gain control of the government. Additionally, the AHRC suggested that the process by which the new constitution was written and approved was questionable. The 35-member Constitutional Drafting Assembly consisted of 10 legal experts selected by the junta and 25 people appointed from a 2,000 member People's Assembly, an organization comprised of people selected by the military. It would appear that the military government did not trust democratic processes to generate quality leadership or decisions. The AHRC also criticized the junta’s proposal regarding the process for adopting the new constitution. A simple “yes” or “no” vote on the new constitution, as proposed, by the junta-selected National People's Assembly, without any public discussion or widespread input, would not be a true indication of the people’s desires. However, as promised, a new constitution was presented to the public in late 2007 and elections were held shortly thereafter. Evidenced by the lack of public protests, Thais appear to have accepted both the new constitution and outcomes of the December elections. And although a large contingent of the electorate distrusts the new Prime Minster Samak Sundaravej’s close relationship with the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, international observers found relatively few faults with the electoral process.
The Making of a Constitution

Beginning with Hannah Arendt’s efforts at identifying the various ways a constitution comes into being, Andrew Arato (2000) ultimately generates his own list. Thailand’s current 2007 Constitution falls in the category of having come into being as a result of a revolution. Beyond supplying a means by which a new constitution is drafted, the interim political power has also taken over all the government’s functions. Theoretically, a country’s own historical constitutional experience, reflexivity, and the incorporation of certain political principles should inform constitution-making and generate legitimacy. Arato suggests there are six principles that should ideally be present in the procedural design of constitutions. These include:

- **Publicity** – meaning an open public process and freedom for deliberation.
- **Consensus** – as opposed to majority rules which favor the victor.
- **Legal continuity** – which is especially important in defending the identity and security of individuals in the midst of large-scale political transformation, and which announces to the population that leaders and administrators are functioning under the rule of law and may not impose their arbitrary will.
- **Plurality of democracies** – modern democracies will usually have two democratic instances, i.e., the constitution drafting assembly and the popular referenda on the proposed constitution.
- **“Veil of Ignorance”** – borrowed from Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971, as cited in Clark, 1986), this term as used by Arato suggests that individuals drafting the constitution must remove their own personal motives and desires from the discussion. The drafters must also differentiate between the instance of constitution making and later legislation. New electoral rules could help create a veil of ignorance for political parties who might otherwise try to influence the process for their future political gain. And similarly, a better constitution will result when drafters are unsure of the current balance of power in society. Drafted during times of uncertainty, a constitution will likely have stronger checks and balances and better protect the rights of minorities.
- **Reflexivity** – constitution drafters, using their cognitive and not normative skills, must draw on the country’s historical processes of constitution design and the results of previous constitutions.

Contrasting the 1997 Constitution and 2007 Constitution, the former was deliberated and finally drafted by the elites of Thai society, but it was also subject to extensive public debate and discussion; whereas, the later was drafted in private by a small, military junta-selected group. The 1997 document was based on the country’s historical experience and included specific, democratic means by which a Prime Minister and legislators could be removed from power. The 2007 Constitution certainly built upon Thailand’s past, but reduced certain democratic processes previously in place. For example, the 2007 Constitution requires that only half of the Senators will be elected, the other half will be appointed. Critics suggest that this is a backward move for democracy and that the administration and military will have too much influence on the Senate. Additionally, the 2007 Constitution absolved those involved in the coup. Thus, the members of junta were not subject to the rule of law and the “legal continuity” Arato calls for. Both Constitutions recognize the need for the plurality of democracies, and yet the drafters of the 1997 Constitution conducted the drafting in a far more open manner and over a period of several years. Regarding the empirical process governed by the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”, both
Constitutions contain many of the checks and balances and protection of minority rights that Arato envisioned coming out of such a process. Finally, the 2007 Constitution shows less reflexivity by its drafters than the 1997 Constitution in that its primary focus was to prevent another Thaksin-type politician from coming into power. The 2007 document is simply not as progressive as the 1997 document in terms of civil liberties and democratic processes.

**Ideology of Democracy and Civil Society**

From a Western perspective, the means by which the 2007 Constitution was drafted and adopted does not bode well for the maintenance of a civil society. However, a 2001 survey sponsored by the Asian Barometer Project Office suggests that Thais do embrace the ideology of democracy. The survey, taken of a probability sample of eligible voters, was designed to assess attitudes toward democracy. The results suggest that:

“the ideology of democracy has its roots in Thailand from the 1932 downfall of the absolute Thai monarchy. More recently, the period of democratic government 1973-76, reinforced democratic values in a way that has persisted since that time. It is possible, therefore, to hold highly democratic values even under authoritarian regimes and the commitment to democracy has been sustained in periods of both democratic and authoritarian rule.” (p. 10, 11)

Research conducted by Maratee Nalita (1999) supports this finding, i.e., that democratic values are not necessarily linked to a particular form of government. Going further back in history, Nalita found that Thailand’s civil society can be traced back to before the absolute monarchy. In fact, the Thai legal system, derived from ancient Hindu jurisprudence (developed between 1250 and 1767 AD), has always addressed both individual liberties and private rights associated with both civil and criminal matters. And while the number of civil society organizations continues to grow (Daniere and NaRanong, 2005), this growth, similar to Thailand’s ideology of democracy, has not always coincided with gains in democratic forms of government. Ketudat’s (1990:5) reasoning is less defensive. He suggests that while the behavior of Thailand’s military has not always appeared very democratic to the Western perspective, Thai freedom is best understood as having been preserved by the “tripartite cooperation” of the monarchy, military and civil administration. Ketudat describes the military as a key factor in achieving equilibrium whenever the balance of power leans too far in one direction or another. In terms of sequencing, Schmitter proposes that “the existence of civil society is not a prerequisite either for the demise of autocracy or for the transition to democracy....” (1997:242). Of course, there are also other reasons for an emerging interest in democracy. For example, Diamond linked demand for democratic change to the growth of the middle class and expansion of higher education (1993:419, as cited in Mahakanjana, 2004).

While some would argue that there is ultimately a direct, positive link between civil society and democracy, this may not be entirely true for Thailand. Although the 2001 survey found that Thais expressed very high levels of support for democratic processes and institutions, the survey results were not as consistent in the support of civil society. The surveyors used group membership and informal social activity as rough proxies for participation in civil society organizations. For social trust, the other measurable concept of social capital, they used questions pertaining to trusting others and trust of public institutions. Survey respondents had a
high degree of trust in government institutions, which the surveyors attributed in part to the social and cultural components of Thai society that show great deference to well-understood hierarchies (p. 27). In contrast, trust in fellow citizens was exceptionally low. Albritton and Bureekul, the authors of the survey report, attribute this to certain social institutions embedded in Thai culture. They cite Unger (1998) who argues that Thais have difficulty in associational relationships, which in turn negatively impacts the environment for civil society. Mahakanjana (2004:52) expands on this idea,

“General traditional Thai value orientation includes a hierarchical social structure, personalism, an emphasis on security, sanuk (fun), factionalism, and a tendency to diffuse responsibility when making decisions. These values are consistent with those associated with less civic society impelled by personalistic, patron-client networks, rather than by programmatic commitments on public issues”.

Mathews and Mallikamaral (1995, as cited in Wales and Levinthal, 2002) identify similar “Thai ways” that they found impede best practices associated with environmental protection and enforcement – behavioral characteristics that are similar to those of flourishing civil societies. Specifically, these “Thai ways” include:

1. Thai culture avoids confrontation
2. Lawsuits are practically non-existent
3. Thais avoid openly questioning public officials
4. Fate is quickly blamed when damages or injury is incurred
5. Top-down authority is still relied upon, even as decentralization is expected

So, on one hand, Thais have demonstrated their interest in more democratic governments and are committed to personal liberties such as freedom of speech, and yet on the other hand, their culture may not be amenable to participation in, or trust of, civil society organizations. Civil society is thus somewhat uncoupled from democracy in Thailand. Although, just because civil society may not have been a critical component of democracy in Thailand’s socio-cultural experience to date, civil society organizations may be of use and rise in prominence now. The next section will explore how the national policy of devolution may strengthen this link between civil society and democracy.

**Impacts of Devolution on Municipal Government**

Civil rights are defined at the national level, but civil society is primarily operationalized at the municipal level. Certainly, there are civil society organizations of all sizes influencing various levels of government. However, I believe the impetus for the future growth in civil society will come from the municipal level of government. This section will discuss why the environment at the municipal level is becoming more conducive to the support and flourishing of civil society in Thailand.

In theory, municipal authorities in Thailand are self-governing, but in practice municipal governments are the administrative arms of central and provincial authorities. This is a classic case of deconcentrated government, which, in effect, serves to strengthen central government. The Ministry of the Interior controls municipal affairs through provincial administrations, which
have the authority to dissolve municipal assemblies and executive councils. Moreover, key municipal officials such as provincial governors, district administrators, and senior municipal administrative and professional staff are centrally appointed and serve as career officers of the Ministry. The Ministry has the power to set policy at the municipal level and controls and supervises municipal fiscal affairs. The responsibility of providing municipal services is divided between the local government and the province. Municipalities have tended to be responsible for services to property, while the central government and provinces provided services to people, i.e., education and social welfare.

Although the central government has great control over municipal affairs, it appears to understand the potential positive role of local public participation. In 1988, the Ministry of the Interior recognized the role of citizens in improving communities and specifically mandated that local governments “encourage, organize, recognize and support Cooperative Community Groups (CCGs) in municipal areas.” (Mahakanjana, 2004:127). Municipalities are now enjoying greater autonomy than they have had in the past, and the combined new policies of devolution and participation suggests this autonomy will increase in the future. The 1997 Constitution promoted popular participation, and encouraged a strong civil society and devolution as a means to stimulate local economies, strengthen local social fabrics and promote good governance (Mahakanjana, 2004). Towards this end, Chapter 9 of the 1997 Constitution included language that called for local autonomy, the direct election of local representatives, and featured prominently the need to devolve administrative and political power to local government bodies, which included increasing local government revenue and providing municipalities with fiscal autonomy. The 2007 Constitution contains similar, equally strong, language.

While the national policy of decentralization (initially in the form of deconcentration) and the delegation of more people-related responsibilities to local government began prior to the 1997 Constitution, significant progress was made in 1999 with the Decentralization Act and creation of the Office of National Decentralization Committee (TEI, 2004). [Note: The term “decentralization” is still common in the literature on the subject of Thailand, although after 1997, decentralization took the more specific form of “devolution”.] The Committee’s Decentralization Plan was designed to transfer responsibilities to local authorities within specific time periods, re-proportion revenue and budgetary authority from the state to municipalities, organize transfers of personnel, and adjust all laws and regulations in connection to decentralization.

The devolution process is seen as a positive opportunity to increase the “stock of social capital at the local level” (Mahakanjana, 2004). Pilot projects designed to test the devolution of certain natural environment-related activities confirmed that local needs and problems were better addressed, management was more efficient and local people became more aware of environmental issues (TEI, 2004). However, the transfer of responsibility is not without its problems. The pilot projects demonstrated that local governments lack long-term planning mechanisms (a problem that is exacerbated in areas with high political competition), leaders are not familiar with the issues at hand, there are not enough personnel, there is insufficient coordination with the provincial level of government, there are insufficient information and implementation systems in place to devise and carry out planning, and the transfer of national policy to the local level for implementation lacks clarity. In practice, as a coping mechanism,
municipal governments are turning to civil society organizations to assist with implementing tasks that were previously handled by the central government. Mahakanjana found that the burden of devolution is eased when local governments reach out to local communities to mobilize grassroots participation, strengthen local networks, and close the gap between local governments and communities.

The earliest significant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Thailand were the Buddhist and Christian groups serving the poor in the early 20th century. NGOs primarily provided social services when the government’s attempts to meet the needs of the citizens failed. In the 1960s certain civic association decided to become more proactive and address problems at their source. Currently, the primary role of civil society organizations in Thailand is still quite tentative, i.e., they mainly engage in activities associated with the distribution of information and resources (Quigley, 1995). But on a more positive note, Quigley found such organizations extended participation and promoted pluralism in ways that affect state-citizen relations and encourage government to be more responsive to citizens' concerns. Provisions for NGO involvement in planning processes are specifically included in the country’s Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan. Quigley goes on to report that the civil society organizations he studied did not have a great effect on the more explicitly political process, nor did they contributed noticeably to the development of political parties. Interestingly, this finding corroborates the 2001 survey findings, i.e., Thais respect government organizations and are committed to democratic processes, but do not have a strong appreciation for political parties. So, in Thailand, it appears necessary to distinguish between political parties and other civil society organizations. Schmitter’s analysis (1997) pertaining to the influence of political parties accurately portrays the nominal role they play in Thailand’s developing democracy. Schmitter suggests that not only are political parties insufficient evidence of a civil society, but “today’s citizens” have different organizational skills and needs. One could therefore conclude that Thai political parties are faced with competition from other organizations that are better able to respond to the varied interests of the public and which provide more useful models of successful collective action. The fact that many Thai political parties have reputations for engaging in corruption does not help.

**Conclusion**

While seemingly erratic, Thailand’s political history appears to point toward the continuing implementation of practices that are democratic in nature. The 2006 junta relinquished control to a civilian government in 2008. The civilian government’s current prime minister and leadership, interestingly, are comprised of those people loyal to the ex-prime minister. Although there is some discussion in Thailand whether this new government is simply a continuation of Thaksin Shinawatra’s previous administration, the election results serve as evidence of a relatively democratic electoral process.

Some suggest that one of Thailand’s recurring obstacles to democracy is its military regime. Others have faith that power struggles between the military and civilian administration can be resolved, as it often has in the past, with the monarchy’s intervention. A difficult juncture will come when the King passes away. According to various newspaper editorials, this is a matter of great concern in Thailand. The King has historically intervened on the people’s behalf to reestablish democratic rule. More importantly, although the monarchy is primarily a symbolic
institution, the King has been elevated in people's minds to the status of a national savior (Head, 2007). The King’s age and questionable health were reasons that led to the development of the 1997 Constitution in the first place. The Crown Prince is not as well-liked as his father. Head reported that many Thais feel the Prince cannot fill his father's shoes and will not be strong enough to represent their interests when faced with future military pressure.

The other point which deserves greater exploration is the degree to which civil society is important in Thailand’s democratic future. Many philosophers and political theorists suggest that there is a direct relationship between civil society and democracy. And, that the degree to which civil society can flourish is dependent upon certain conditions such as freedoms of speech and assembly, a free press, and the right to freely participate in political debate and decision-making. Evidence of Thailand’s commitment to the conditions necessary for a civil society can be found in Chapter 3, Sections 26 through 65, of the 1997 Constitution, which included a full litany of liberties. The 2007 Constitution includes, and in certain instances, expands upon these liberties. Civil society was also clearly evident in the mass citizen uprisings of 1973, 1992 and most recently in 2006. The Asian Barometer Project’s 2001 survey confirmed people’s support of the freedom of speech. And yet, there appears to be mistrust of organizations interested in influencing politics. The survey results suggest that Thais have sociological reasons for mistrusting each other, as well as negative associations with political parties. And while it appears to be necessary to separate political parties from the general category of civil society organizations, these sociological reasons and distrust of political parties likely affect civil society organizations as a whole.

While the 2006 military government threatened the gains made since 1992, I would suggest that the strength of civil society will ultimately be determined by the country’s commitment to a combination of local citizen participation and devolution. Although many voluntary groups are encouraged and were even founded by local governments to promote citizens’ participation in local activities, the impact of devolution on local governments in Thailand is forcing governments to rely on civil society organizations in order to cope with their new responsibilities. And, in turn, I suspect this reliance on civil society is leading to more public participation in local democratic practices and the creation of more civil society organizations. Contrary to Huntington’s proposal (1991), I suggest that it will not be the skills of political elites and leaders that propel countries like Thailand toward democracy. Certainly, Thai political elites were prominent in drafting the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions, but it appears that it is the combination of civil liberties articulated in the Constitution plus implementing a policy of devolution that will result in a flourishing civil society.
References


