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Democratic America in Northeast Asia: U.S. Strategy, Theater Missile Defense, and Allied Defense Relationships

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Having presented her findings at a Seminar at the East-West Center, this paper is the beginning of a larger project exploring the intersection of U.S. strategy, Theater Missile Defense, and security relations in Northeast Asia. She will present further findings at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in 2003.

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Democratic America in Northeast Asia:
US Strategy, Theater Missile Defense and Allied Relationships

"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes."

-Military Strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

With the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)¹, American political leaders have embarked on a long-term plan for deploying Theater Missile Defense (TMD) as a means to protect the United States, US forces abroad, and allies. Effective on 13 June 2002, the United States is no longer party to the 1972 ABM Treaty and missile defense is a priority with "prominence in policy, funding, and organization."² TMD essentially is a family of military weapon systems whose purpose is to intercept hostile missiles that have been launched, whether intentionally or unintentionally. However, the question remains whether Theater Missile Defense is, and will be, an integrated and effective tool in achieving overall US national security goals in Northeast Asia, namely enhancing regional security and reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction.³

Nowhere is this more critical than in Northeast Asia where, not only does the US maintain an active demilitarized zone in the last hot-spot remaining from the Cold War era, but also faces an irrational and non-transparent state who actively contributes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, many theorists and policymakers believe that Northeast Asia may become the next trouble spot for international relations, having pessimistic views regarding future stability and security in East Asia.⁴ Peter Katzenstein writes, "Asia is the site of the next great arms race, of potentially serious political instability and security threats."⁵ Also, President Bush included North Korea in his "Axis of Evil," stressing the continuing unpredictability and irrationality of the current

¹ Currently, 28 states have ballistic missile programs, 16 have chemical weapons, 13 have biological weapons, and 12 have nuclear programs. See briefing slides, "Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review," Department of Defense, 9 January 2002 at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/020109-D-6570C-001 df](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/020109-D-6570C-001%20df); Also, see Ballistic Missile Agency website on "Threat" at <http://www.aca.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/odfIBM2001.pdf>.

² Philip Coyle, "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush" *Arms Control Today*, Volume 32, Number 4 (May 2002), p. 3. www.armscontrol.org

³ For additional analysis of topics related to stability in Northeast Asia, including Theater Missile Defense, see The Northeast Asia Workshop Series, a collaborative effort among the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Arms Control Implementation and Compliance, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the Department of Energy to create a conceptual model of regional stability for Northeast Asia at <http://www.defenselink.mil/aca/acic/neasia/index.html>.

⁴ See Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, Volume 23, Number 4 (Spring 1999); Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Volume 18, Number 3 (Winter 93/94); Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East-Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Volume 18, Number 3; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival*, Volume 36, Number 2 (1994); Kokubun Ryosei ed., *Challenges for China-Japan-U.S. Cooperation* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998); Robert A. Manning, "Waiting for Godot? Northeast Asian Future Shock and the U.S.-Japan Alliance" in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin ed., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future* (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein. *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 208.

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regime. This comes after a period (albeit short) of potential advancements in the relationship between South Korea and the North, and hope for President Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine Policy.'

US strategy encompasses a range of means from political, economic, diplomatic, and social to military. Perhaps due to the nature of the threats posed by North Korea, not only to the region, but around the world, the Department of Defense seems to take the lead on formulating and crafting the (overall) strategy for Northeast Asia.⁶ Comprising the essence of US defense strategy, three interconnected and foundational tenets are the ability to 1) project American power, 2) strengthen alliances, and 3) maintain a favorable regional military balance. As a component of a new capabilities-based defense strategy, Theater Missile Defense is emerging as the backbone for US power projection and the principal military means to defend against weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons. However, with the increased prominence of TMD (both rhetorically and materially) coupled with an emerging American strategy that includes a moral authority and ability to conduct preemptive strikes against perceived threats, what are the implications for allied defense relationships in Northeast Asia and subsequently the regional balance of power? Does TMD bolster or diminish US ability to fulfill its tenets of defense strategy and thus to achieve its strategic goals of enhancing regional security and reducing Weapons of Mass Destruction?

The primary purpose of this paper is to identify how TMD might affect US bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea (considering both first and second order effects). To effectively address this, it is essential to begin with the broader understanding of US strategy because this provides the framework and context for the reasons why alliances are important in the first place. Both Theater Missile Defense and alliances are military means employed to achieve US national security. If TMD is a critical component of US defense capabilities, then it should support fundamental defense strategy tenets. According to the Department of Defense, these tenets are interconnected and vital in achieving national security goals. As the remaining superpower with the influence and capabilities to shape the post-Cold War, post-9/11 international order, it is imperative to identify the first and second order effects of TMD on its alliances in Northeast Asia. Additionally, the issue of transparency is central to this discussion for two reasons. First, transparency contributes to the strength and viability of US alliances. Secondly, US assessments of other states incorporate US interpretations of their relative transparency and intentions; therefore, it is equally important to identify the intentions and goals of the United States.

This paper begins with an anatomy of the general situation. First, it provides an overview of US strategy, including the national security strategy and national defense strategy. Included in this section is an outline of the fundamentals of Theater Missile Defense and how TMD supports the national defense strategy. Then the paper specifically addresses US interests and strategy in Northeast Asia by summarizing the North Korean proliferation of ballistic

⁶ In 2000, Victor Cha noted that although the US Defense Department used the North Korean ballistic missile threat as part of the rationale for Missile Defense, the State Department had not yet incorporated Missile Defense into its Korea policy. See Victor D. Cha, "Engaging North Korea Credibly," *Survival* Volume 42, Number 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 136-155.

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missile and weapons of mass destruction, and examining US Northeast Asia strategy. Integral to the successful promotion of US interests are the two bilateral defense alliances with Japan and South Korea, and an emerging democratic, cooperative relationship between the three states. After establishing the current situation in Northeast Asia, the paper then identifies potential effects of US TMD (and America's changing strategy) on its defense relationships.

Logic of the Situation (Arrows indicate presumed support):



Introduction: The Intent and Actions of Democratic America

"As the majority is the only power that it is important to court,
all its projects are taken up with the greatest ardor;
but no sooner is its attention distracted than all this ardor ceases"
-Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol I, Chapter XV

G. John Ikenberry describes a "hidden grand strategy" of American foreign policy: exporting democracy, reflecting a "very realistic view that the political character of other states has enormous impact on the ability of the United States to ensure its security and economic interests." While it is fashionable for some to deride this as idealistic (as opposed to realistic), it is feasible that Ikenberry's description will also apply to American foreign policy in this post-Cold War, post- 9/11 age. President Bush is developing a new security strategy (due in August 2002) addressing the threat of terrorism, rogue states, and the complexity of not knowing who America's foes may be in the future. In foreign policy speeches President Bush consistently refers to American values that underpin American actions and international relationships.⁸

⁷ G. John Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy? The 'Hidden Grand Strategy' of American Foreign Policy," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Volume 23, Number 2 (Spring 1999) at <http://wwics.si.edu/OUTREACH/W /W SELECT/IKENB.HTM>

⁸ In a recent speech, President Bush linked Palestinian democracy (actually the removal of Arafat from power during the next election) to US assistance for a Palestinian state. "Peace requires a new and different Palestinian

During his inaugural speech, President Bush described the status of the United States as "the story of a power that went into the world to protect but not possess, to defend but not to conquer."⁹ The United States believes it is -and can continue to be- a benign great power, capable of leading the world and assuming the world wants to go in the direction that America is leading. The 1999 National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of American involvement and leadership while acknowledging that "International cooperation will be vital for building security."¹⁰ The United States currently outpaces not only its potential adversaries, but also its allies when it comes to military and economic elements of power. Yet, in light of these relative measures of power, the United States continues vigorously to pursue higher technological prowess and domination. In so doing, American political leaders continue to stress to allies and adversaries alike that America's quest for more power should not be perceived as threatening, nor destabilizing to the international structure. Why not? Primarily because Americans see themselves as a democratic power that upholds and adheres to the rule of law, promoting good, not bad.

The US national strategy has long promoted the spread of democracy to increase the zone of peace envisioned by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in 1795.¹¹ Again in his inaugural address, President Bush offered "The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth."¹² Encouraging (perhaps even demanding) democratic values emphasizing individual freedom, tolerance, compromise, respect for the law and peaceful conflict resolution both within domestic politics and international relations, the US believes it has led other democracies toward a more secure future for the last fifty years.

American leaders and policies affirm the United States' commitment to supporting democratic values around the world. Relating open societies with increased security and prosperity, US policies continually link transparency in government with confidence-building measures designed to uphold democracies and the peaceful relations between democracies.¹³ Within the introduction of the 1998 US Security Strategy for the East-Asia Region, the text specifically argues "Transparency fosters understanding, and enhances trust and confidence among nations."¹⁴ The 1999 National Security Strategy also refers to "increasing

leadership so that a Palestinian state can be born. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty."

"President Bush calls for New Palestinian Leadership," 24 June 2002. See

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>.

⁹ President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 2001. See

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>

¹⁰ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. (The White House, December 1999), pp. 13-14. See

<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/natsec2k.htm>

¹¹ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972).

¹² President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address.

¹³ See US Department of State, International Information Programs, East Asia policy statement at

<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ealesec/homepage.htm>;

¹⁴ *US Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998). p.

6. See <http://www.defenselink.mil/oubs/easr98>

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transparency in the size, structure and operations of military forces and building confidence in the intentions of other countries"¹⁵ in order to build more cooperative relationships. While referring to other states, it is important the US itself, as a leading democratic power, illustrate and achieve transparency, reassure other states of American intentions, and build a more secure future.

What are the United States' long-term strategic goals and what are the stated means employed to achieve these goals? Do American actions reflect its stated national values? While many Americans, including political and military leaders, believe the strategic goals are clear-to protect the United States and promote freedom, the employed means may not always be integrated and consistent. Andrew Scobell writes "In the view of many Asian leaders, the U.S. is a mighty and unpredictable power. A strong dose of predictability would help ease the jitters for most Asian states."¹⁶ In his book *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security*, Roger Handberg argues many states question "American leadership and how that has been and will be exercised in the world. Many are critical, seeing U.S. policy as erratic, lurching from issue to issue with no general framework or strategic goal to guide decisions."¹⁷ Fluctuating American policies is also the basis for Victor Cha's analysis of the triangular relationship between the United States and its two democratic allies in Northeast Asia. Cha argues that the alignment patterns between Japan and South Korea alter according to their perceptions of American commitment and purpose.¹⁸

As the U.S. embarks on a long-term commitment to TMD, how will this affect the strategic goals and allied relationships in Northeast Asia in the near-term? Is TMD an effective means to propagate and reinforce existing security relationships with Japan and South Korea? If the US goal includes a zone of democratic states in the region cooperating with one another, what are the potential first and second order effects of TMD of which US and allied policymakers should be aware?

US National Security Strategy

US national goals include defending national security by promoting democracy. For national policymakers, strategy is a guideline between goals and available means. The word strategy comes from the Greek "strategos" meaning the "art of the general." Basically, strategies allow a state to prioritize, distribute, and apply political, economic, social, and military means to achieve national objectives and interests. Strategic objectives should be long-term providing consistency of purpose, and also broadly-defined allowing flexibility to subordinate agencies to define specific policies and tactics.

¹⁵ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, "Arms Control and Nonproliferation."

¹⁶ Andrew Scobell, "Crouching Korea, Hidden China: Bush Administration Policy toward Pyongyang and Beijing," *Asian Survey*, Volume XLII, Number 2 (Mar/Apr 02), p. 364.

¹⁷ Roger Handberg, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002), p. 2.

¹⁸ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

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Democratic peace theory highlights the significance of transparency in governmental decision-making and actions. Therefore, in order to analyze the effects of TMD on US strategic objectives in Northeast Asia, a key element is understanding how the US develops and implements its national security strategy. This is especially important because the US bases its credibility as a reliable, peaceful nation on its transparency, and criticizes other nations as unpredictable and irrational precisely because of the lack of transparency in government actions. Others may not agree with US intents and actions, but the US claims that no states may claim ignorance about them.

Development and Implementation of Strategic Objectives: Organizational Structure

National Interests/Objective —————> National Strategy —————> Policies/Tactics

National strategy encompasses a wide-range of means from diplomatic, economic and social to military, although it is not readily apparent which means take priority or how the various means are coordinated. As the principal foreign policy advisor, the Secretary of State publishes the International Affairs Strategic Plan (IASP) providing a comprehensive vision of U.S. national interests. According to the most recent IASP, the primary national interest is national security, in other words to "protect vital interests, secure peace, deter aggression, prevent and defuse crises, halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and advance arms control and disarmament.,,19 The U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan then catalogs specific strategic goals supporting the primary national interest of security and identifies the lead agencies responsible for achieving those goals. Two goals specifically linked to promoting US national security are promoting regional stability and reducing the threat from weapons of mass destruction; the two primary agencies responsible for these goals are the State Department and the Department of Defense.²⁰

Within the State Department, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security leads interagency policy regarding regional security, defense relations, and nonproliferation (among others). However, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) is specifically responsible for developing defense strategy and policy, including the conduct of alliances, missile defenses and those policies designed to reduce and counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction.²¹ In order to integrate these different departments' strategy and policy, in February 2001, the Bush administration published the National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) outlining the organization of the National Security Council (NSC). The primary purpose of the NSC is integrating domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security. With regards to national security strategy and TMD in Northeast Asia, there are three National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) with possibly overlapping overview: East Asia PCC; Defense

¹⁹ *International Affairs Strategic Plan* (Washington D.C., Department of State, 1st revision, February 1999), p. 2. See http://www.state.gov/global/general_foreign_policy/9903_iasp_1.pdf

²⁰ *US Department of State Strategic Plan* (Washington D.C., Department of State, 2000), pp. 16-24. See http://www.state.gov/www/global/general_foreign_policy/2000_dos_stratplan_body.pdf

²¹ Department of Defense Directive 5111. 1 "Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)" 8 December 1999, pp.2-3. See http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d51111_120899/d51111.pdf

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Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning PCC; and Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense PCC.²² Within these inter-departmental committees, department officials coordinate strategy and policies.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 specifies that the President will submit an annual report on the National Security Strategy (NSS). Whereas the State Department's IASP provides the "grand strategy" for U.S. actions in international affairs, the National Security Strategy focuses on policies and tools to meet international *threats*, and principally is used by the DoD and intelligence agencies to derive their roles and missions.²³ Congress also uses (in theory) this document as a general baseline to discern priorities when appropriating funds and support.

From the National Security Strategy, the Defense Department develops the National Defense Strategy. Most recently published in September 2001, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) outlines this strategy.²⁴ The QDR identifies the military's strategy to support national objectives by describing the security environment and establishing defense priorities. Operationally, the Armed Forces' ten combatant Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) generally organized via geographic responsibilities (identified in the Unified Command Plan) report to the Secretary of Defense and thus use the QDR to develop their regional strategies, doctrine and tactics to accomplish their goals.²⁵ The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), commanded by Admiral Thomas A. Fargo, has mission and geographic responsibility for Northeast Asia. The PAC OM J5, or Strategic Planning and Policy staff, has the lead role in formulating the CINCs strategy and policy within Northeast Asia. The PACOM CINC also has an assigned political advisor from the State Department on his staff. It may be important to note that the CINC has authority over all assigned military personnel within the region; however, US Ambassadors, as Chief of Mission, have authority over all US government executive branch personnel in country.²⁶ Thus, while the armed forces have one unified command structure for the entire region, the diplomatic corps (State Department) has a separate chain of command for each nation in the region.

Strategy: From the Old to the New

"Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses."²⁷

-President George W. Bush

²² See www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html for all National Security Presidential Directives.

²³ *International Affairs Strategic Plan*, p. 3.

²⁴ *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense), 30 September 2001. The QDR is a product of senior civilian and military leadership within the Department of Defense in consultation with the President. This includes the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment (internal think tank) and its director since 1973, Andrew Marshall.

²⁵ For more information on Unified Command Plan see <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/> See Annex for Map of Unified Command Plan.

²⁶ *US Department of State Strategic Plan*, p. 4.

²⁷ President George W. Bush, Speech at the National Defense University, Washington D.C., 1 May 01. See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-2.html

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Having described how the US develops strategy, this section provides an overview of strategic changes in the last decade. During the Clinton administration, "Engagement" characterized the national security strategy. Acknowledging the positive and negative effects of globalization, the three core national security objectives were: 1) enhance America's security; 2) bolster America's economic prosperity; and 3) promote democracy and human rights abroad. Emphasizing the importance of America's democratic foundations as the source of both American strength and credibility, the National Security Strategy specifically recognizes "Our international leadership is ultimately founded upon the power of our democratic ideals and values."²⁸ This strategy highlights the importance of creating new frameworks, partnerships and international regimes and institutions based on the rule of law to guide and shape the international security environment toward a more democratic future.

In the late 1990s, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen requested a comprehensive review of US national security; thus Congress mandated the bi-partisan US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, otherwise known as the Hart-Rudman Commission.²⁹ Between 1998 and 2001, this commission released three phased reports. The first report describes the global security environment in terms of the positive and negative trends of globalization and fragmentation. Phase Two focuses on US interests, objectives and strategy and Phase Three outlines recommended structural and procedural changes of the US national security apparatus. Whereas previous National Security Strategies categorized US interests as 'vital, important, or humanitarian', the Hart-Rudman report recommends changing the categories to 'survival, critical, and significant.' Survival (vital) interests include safety from direct attack, especially from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the preservation of America's constitutional order. Critical (important) interests entail the security of key international systems on which America defends, including American ability to avert and check the proliferation of WMD. Significant (humanitarian) interests include the spread of democracy and market-based economies and increasing respect for human rights.

Overall the Hart-Rudman comprehensive report stresses the need for Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capabilities in order to deal with symmetric and asymmetric threats in the future. Fundamentally the US must maintain its ability to project power globally in order to promote its political interests and maintain security. The report stresses the importance of strengthening and promoting the effectiveness of international law and international institutions, but clearly asserts that counterproliferation measures should take priority over non-proliferation efforts. However, the commission warns "the problem is that unilateral

²⁸ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (December 1999), Conclusion, p.129.

²⁹ See www.nssg.gov. This was the most comprehensive review of the international security environment and national security processes and organizations involved in promoting US interests since the National Security Act of 1947. The 14-member commission, headed by former Senators Gary Hart (Democrat, Colorado) and Warren Rudman (Republican, New Hampshire), includes other former members of the legislative and executive branches, military leaders and representatives from business, news media, and academia: Anne Armstrong, Regent Texas A&M, CSIS; Norman R. Augustine, former Chair/CEO Lockheed Martin; John Dancy, former NBC Correspondent; John R. Galvin, Gen USA Retired and NATO Commander; Leslie H Gelb, President, CFR; Newt Gingrich, former Rep./Speaker of the House; Lee H. Hamilton, Rep./Director of Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Lionel H. Oliner, former Under Secretary of Commerce; Donald B. Rice, Pres/CEO UroGenesys, Inc.; James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Energy, Dir, CIA; Harry D. Train, Adm USN Ret, Supreme Allied Cdr, Atlantic; Andrew Young, former US Ambassador to UN.

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U.S. steps taken to assure military superiority in space may be seen by others as implying an ability to deny access to space and freedom of action there. Even if that ability is never used, it could complicate the ability of the United States to shape a benign international environment.”³⁰ Again, this document refers to the underlying assumption that American leaders have about American power. Americans believe in and promote the US as a democratic, benevolent power, only using its advanced capabilities when forced to respond and defend national interests. However, if this assumption is warranted, the emerging Bush doctrine may only solidify other states' perceptions of American unpredictability.

President Bush did not accept outright the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission,³¹ but in his budget report to Congress on 28 February 2001, he described the need to revitalize national defense priorities asserting that a "Cold War focus continues to define our Armed Forces in terms of doctrine, structure and strategy... [Now] threats come from rogue states bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and terrorism-threats as unconventional as they are unpredictable...³² Charging the Secretary of Defense to "conduct a strategy review to create a vision for the role of the nation's military in the 21st century... [that] will examine appropriate national security strategy, force structure and budget priorities", President Bush intended to redefine and clarify American priorities for the 21st century.³³ The defense budget would only be determined once this review was complete. In May 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld acknowledged that any changes to the National Security Strategy could have enormous impact, but also said, "When (President Bush) said he wanted a review he didn't say he wanted a new strategy. He said he wanted a review, and that's what's happening. We have been engaged with the military and civilian side in reviewing ...the nature of the world, our circumstance in that world and the kinds of capabilities that we're going to need. Whether that will result in a new strategy or not depends on what comes out of that process.”³⁴

³⁰Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), *RoadmapforNational Security: Imperativefor Change*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, February 2001), p. 79. See <http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf>. The first key objective of defending the US specifies the requirement for comprehensive TMD capabilities; the fourth objective is to promote the effectiveness of international institutions and law, such as non-proliferation regimes.

³¹ One journalist, Harold Evan believes because the report originated under a Democratic president and included an ousted Republican Speaker of the House that its political usefulness was null (www.cjr.org)

³² *A Blueprint for New Beginnings: A Responsible Budget for America's Priorities* (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, 2001). See www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/bud06.html

³³ Ibid. It is interesting to note that the President charged the Secretary of Defense to review the National Security Strategy as opposed to strictly the National Defense Strategy. The author has found no evidence that other Cabinet members participated in this specific review. Implications are that the resulting QDR will define national objectives, rather than vice-versa. According to Paul Glastris in his November 2001 "Who's Who" column in *The Washington Monthly*, "It would be hard to exaggerate how much Secretary of Defense **Donald Rumsfeld** and his top aide **Steven Cambone** [UnderSecretary for Policy] were hated within the Pentagon prior to September 11. Among other mistakes, Rumsfeld and Cambone foolishly excluded top civilian and military leaders when planning an overhaul of the military to meet new threats, thereby ensuring even greater bureaucratic resistance. According to The Washington Post, an Army general joked to a Hill staffer that "if he had one round left in his revolver, he would take out Steve Cambone." Cambone's reputation in the building hasn't improved much since September 11, but Rumsfeld's has been transformed." See <http://www.washingtonmonthlv.com/features/2001/0111.whoswho.html>

³⁴Jim Gramone, "Rumsfeld Review Takes Advantage of Unique Moment in History," American Forces Press Service, 31 May 2001.

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As previously mentioned, the National Security Strategy identifies international threats and focuses on the tools to meet and reduce threats. The Bush administration emphasizes the asymmetric threat of rogue states and other actors with weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.³⁵ Prevention and protection from these threats come through nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defensive means. Nonproliferation describes attempts to reduce the overall number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the number of actors with such weapons. The US actively promotes nonproliferation through various international regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Supplier Group activities and arms control measures.³⁶ Counterproliferation and defenses include means to detect, respond, and defend against weapons of mass destruction and specifically highlight Theater Missile Defense systems. The combined FY03 budget of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy for counterproliferation is over \$12.5 billion, a five percent increase from the previous year. The priority of funding is toward TMD.³⁷

Upon entering the Office of the U.S. Presidency, President Bush intended to reduce America's involvement in the global arena, or at least to re-examine American commitments around the world. After the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, some analysts see an emerging Bush doctrine redefining the purpose of the United States in light of the post-Cold War, post- 9/11 environment. A STRATFOR commentary argues "the Bush Doctrine is based on the notion that the defense of the homeland from attacks represents an interest so fundamental that all other foreign policy interests must be completely subordinated.,,38 Does this imply potential unilateralism in American foreign policy? Or does it imply a delicate balancing act between acting alone and maintaining existing alliances built on democratic ideals of transparency and cooperation?

³⁵ The author must also note that during the mid-to-late 1990s, there was consensus in the D.C. strategic community (Department of Defense) that the immediate threat to the US should be defined as asymmetric as no other state presently can match the conventional military strength of the US. In addressing long-term (future) threats there are two general means from which to choose: 1) shape the environment through current active engagement around the globe (high military operational tempo); or 2) reduce worldwide military engagement and focus efforts (fiscal, transformational) for future threats. Thank you to Colonel Andrew Twomey, Commander, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and former Branch Chief, Strategic Concepts, J-5, for providing an overview of the relationship between theoretical concepts and budget realities.

³⁶ NPT (1970) is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and has 187 members including five nuclear states, for overview see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/>; MTCR is an export control agreement between 33 states designed to prevent the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying WMD over a 300km range, for concise overview see George A. Hutchinson and Craig M. Brandt, "International Armament Cooperation and Theater Missile Defense: Why South Korea is Reluctant to Join the Club," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, Volume 23, Issue 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 22-25.

³⁷ Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, "Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism: Executive Summary," Annual Report to Congress, May 2002, p. 4. See <http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/cprc02xsm.pdf>.

³⁸ "Emerging Bush Doctrine Reshaping U.S. Strategy", 25 Feb 02, at www.STRATFOR.com

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Northeast Asia: Ballistic Missile Programs and Proliferation Threats

"We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."

-President George W. Bush³⁹

During the Gulf War, a single SCUD killed 28 American soldiers and injured ninety-nine. Since this event, policymakers and military practitioners have realized the growing threat from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Traditionally WMD has included nuclear/radiological, chemical, and biological agents; however, recently some government agencies have included conventional weapons causing mass casualties in the overall definition.⁴⁰ In July 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the Rumsfeld Commission, named after the Chair, Donald Rumsfeld) submitted a report to Congress focusing on the threat to the territory of the United States itself. Their inquiry concluded that rogue nations, including North Korea, with aggressive ballistic missile programs pose a substantial and ever-increasing threat. A major distinction from previous state efforts to build missile programs is that these rogue states do not follow the US/USSR pattern from the Cold War. Whereas the superpowers emphasized accuracy, reliability, and safety when developing ballistic missile programs, today many states simply emphasize acquiring basic capabilities. Rogue states see the political advantage in having ballistic missile programs because it gives them power relative to the superpower(s). Also, because of the increasing international commerce and foreign assistance between states with ballistic missile programs, states developing their missile programs have nearly continuous support and much of it is covert.⁴¹

A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report on Northeast Asia agrees on the North Korean menace, "For the United States, the security menu of threats includes nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and, at the core of the confrontation, conventional forces."⁴² The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) missile program includes not only indigenous testing, development, production and deployment, but also exportation. North Korean missile sales to other states contribute not only to increasing regional instability in other parts of the world, but also potential terrorist threats.⁴³ In 1993, the DPRK also refused access to nuclear sites by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and threatened to withdraw from the

³⁹ President George W. Bush, Commencement Speech, United States Military Academy, 1 June 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

⁴⁰ See www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/norfolk/wmd.htm

⁴¹ For the executive summary of the report, see <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm>. Commission and staff members include: Dr. Paul Wolfowitz (now Deputy Secretary of Defense) and Dr. Steven Cambone (now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy).

⁴² Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, co-chairs, "Task Force Report: Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy," (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), p. 32.

⁴³ The US Secretary of State first designated North Korea as a terrorist state on 20 January 1988. Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, co-chairs, "Task Force Report: Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula," (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 29.

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Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The immediate crisis was averted; however, despite the October 1994 Agreed Framework freezing North Korea's declared nuclear facilities, the DPRK may have more nuclear activities than it initially reported to the IAEA. The regime thus also remains a potential threat to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁴

In December 2001, the National Intelligence Council released its fourth annual report on "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015." According to the unclassified summary of this intelligence estimate, "The trend in ballistic missile development worldwide is toward a maturation process among existing ballistic missile programs rather than toward a large increase in the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles."⁴⁵ The ballistic missile arsenals of potential adversaries are becoming more technologically advanced with longer-range capabilities.⁴⁶ This poses a new threat to the continental United States from rogue states who previously had only short-to-medium range missile capabilities unable directly to reach the US. However, the technology required for developing longer-range missile capabilities can be challenging and most states with emerging weapons programs depend on foreign assistance to get over "humps" in research and development. A primary reason that the US cites North Korea as a major contributor to the proliferation of ballistic missiles is that "North Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source for many [missile] programs. North Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than otherwise would have been possible."⁴⁷

While North Korea also poses an immediate threat via its massive conventional forces facing the Republic of Korea and US forces stationed in the region, in the context of TMD, US policymakers focus predominantly on ballistic missile inventories and proliferation immediately posed by North Korea. Although unstated by most US policymakers, China may also be a future threat with a current inventory of 300 nuclear missiles that includes 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles with an effective range of 13,000 kilometers, 10-20 strategic missiles with an effective range of 4,750 kilometers, 100-150 strategic missiles with an effective range of 2,650 kilometers.⁴⁸ North Korea has nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons of mass destruction. Its missile inventory includes hundreds of No Dong missiles capable of reaching South Korea, Japan, and US military bases in Northeast Asia. On 30 August 1998, North Korea demonstrated its longer-range capabilities with a Taepo Dong I missile launch across the Sea of Japan and the island of Honshu. Although extending a moratorium on flight-testing its

⁴⁴ Task Force Report "Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy," p. 5-7,33-38.

⁴⁵ National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," Unclassified Summary of the National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001. See www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm

⁴⁶ One can deduce this intelligence is a primary reason for US priority on ground-based missile defenses (the old national missile defense system) stationed on American soil. By nature of geography and good neighbor relations, the threat facing the US itself is primarily from long-range missiles. However, allies in Northeast Asia may face immediate threats from short and medium range ballistic missiles.

⁴⁷ National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001.

⁴⁸ Matsumura, Masahiro, "Deploying Theater Missile Defense Flexibly: A U.S.-Japan Response to China," in Masashi Nishihara ed., *Old Issues, New Responses Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Options* (Tokyo: Center for International Exchange, 1998), p. 104.

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Taepo Dong II missile with ranges extending over parts of the continental United States, North Korea continues to develop this technology and its self-imposed ban on flight-testing is in place until only 2003.⁴⁹

Understanding the North Korean regime's motivations and intentions may be critical to efforts to address and relieve this threat. The regime of Kim Il Sung, and his son and successor Kim Jong Il, adheres to a blend of nationalistic and Marxist/Leninist ideology called *juche*. Guiding both domestic and foreign policies, *juche* demands independence, self-defense and self-reliance for North Korea as the one "true" Korea. Article Three of the North Korean Constitution reads, "the DPRK is against imperial aggressors, and it is a revolutionary regime which embodies the spirit of national independence.. ."⁵⁰ Begun in the 1950s, North Korea's missile program not only provides self-defense and economic self-sufficiency (via its export market), but also serves as a key political bargaining tool to "exert leverage" vis-a-vis the United States whom North Korea views as an imperialist power still occupying the Southern part of the Korean peninsula.⁵¹ The legitimacy of the North Korean regime is directly intertwined with this ideological solidarity of independence and resistance to bowing to US and its "puppet" of South Korea. Indeed, North Korean rhetoric continues this theme. In June 2000, on the first day of an inter-Korean summit, the Pyongyang news service published a statement that the "struggle against the U.S. strategy for world supremacy is the only way for ensuring global peace and security and building a free and prosperous new world."⁵²

The DPRK maintains a "military first" policy and remains committed to its goal to reunite the Korean peninsula under its leadership. However, since the end of the Cold War it has lost its primary patrons, namely Russia and China. It is noteworthy that while China generally continues to support North Korea, China has stated that it is not required to support North Korea with military forces if North Korea launches an attack despite its Mutual Cooperation Treaty with North Korea.⁵³ China now maintains a two-Korea policy and is developing a robust economic relationship with South Korea.

US policymakers believe they understand the intent of North Korea: to continue its domestic missile program and international exportation of its technology and products and to reunify the Korean peninsula under North Korean control, possibly through violent means. Although President Bush explicitly remarked that the US has no intentions of attacking North Korea, in light of the somewhat sweeping combined changes of US military policies (potential operations in Iraq, a doctrine of pre-emptive strikes, a flexible nuclear policy, and a

⁴⁹ See "Mass Destruction for Sale," *Financial Times* (London Edition), 9 July 2002, p. 14.

⁵⁰ Kyung-Ae Park, "North Korea's Defensive Power," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed., *Korean Security Dynamics in Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 93.

⁵¹ Stephen Bradner, "North Korea's Strategy," in Henry D. Sokolski ed. *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), pp. 39-41.

⁵² Quote within Chuck Downs, "Discerning North Korea's Intentions," in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings ed., *Korea's Future and the Great Powers* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), p. 103.

⁵³ See Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula," in Henry D. Sokolski ed., *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), p. 185.

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commitment to exporting American democratic values), many allies have become nervous about American intentions and potential actions.

Current US National Defense Strategy

"... we are committed to defending America and our allies against ballistic missile attacks, against weapons of mass destruction held by rogue leaders in rogue nations that hate America, hate our values and hate what we stand for."⁵⁴

-President George W. Bush

According to the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), "America's goals are to promote peace, sustain freedom and encourage prosperity... [and the] purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to *protect* and *advance* national interests."⁵⁵ A definitive change from previous defense strategies, this QDR focuses on a capabilities-based, rather than a threat-based strategy. In other words, rather than predicting where and against whom our armed forces may fight (threat-based), this strategy focuses on *how* a potential adversary may fight (capabilities-based). This acknowledges the unpredictable global environment and promotes flexibility for US armed forces while also affirming the key role of improving technologies.

A top-priority for the transformation initiatives associated with a "capabilities-based" strategy is the development of missile defenses. "The continued proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles poses a threat to U.S. territory, to U.S. forces abroad, at sea, and in space, and to U.S. allies and friends. To counter this threat, the United States is developing missile defenses as a matter of priority."⁵⁶ The QDR highlights a new "refocused and revitalized" missile program emphasizing broad-based research on various technologies and systems. Reflecting this administration's national priority on missile defense, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld elevated the previous Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to the Ballistic Missile Agency in January 2002.⁵⁷ The purpose of ballistic missile defense is to protect US forces/interests *and* devalue the utility of potential adversaries' strategic missiles thereby dissuading them from contemplating their use. Many argue the emphasis on missile defense reflects a strategic shift from Cold War deterrence (MAD) to dissuasion. During the Cold War, both superpowers were assured of their retaliatory mutual destruction because of the overwhelming arsenals on both sides; this provided deterrence. Today, no state matches the arsenals of the US; therefore, missile defense seeks "to convince potential adversaries that launching ballistic missile attacks against the United States, its allies, and friends would be

⁵⁴ President George W. Bush, Speech at the American Legion's 83rd Annual Convention, San Antonio, Texas, 29 August 2001. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010829.-2.html>

⁵⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), pp.I-2. Italics added by author for emphasis. See <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/O1100102.htm>; and for QDR see <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>

⁵⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 42. While military strategists have agreed on the ballistic missile threat since the 1990s, this Defense Review elevated the priority of Theater Missile Defense.

⁵⁷ DoD News release, "DoD establishes Missile Defense Agency", 4 Jan 2002. See http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/b01042002_bt008-02.html

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futile.”⁵⁸ Of course, a question remains whether it is possible to dissuade irrational, rogue states that pose the most immediate threat from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

The Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review also reflects the capabilities-based approach and military transformation outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Since 1992, a rationale for the maintenance of US nuclear forces has been deterring the development and use of weapons of mass destruction.⁵⁹ Missile defense is an integral component of the updated nuclear posture designed to provide flexibility in responding to asymmetric threats including those posed by actors with weapons of mass destruction. While deterrence remains a function of America's nuclear force, the current nuclear posture calls for a synergy between all defense assets, including nuclear forces, that will "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends."⁶⁰ This can be interpreted as potentially activist, especially in light of the additional nuclear posture requirement to update the US nuclear infrastructure allowing the US to develop "new capabilities." During a special briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review given in January 2002, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Mr. J.D. Crouch, highlighted that unilateral reductions in the number of deployed nuclear weapons goes hand-in-hand with the deployment of ballistic missile systems and this preserves the transparency of US government intentions.⁶¹ However, it may also be important to note while President Bush intends on reducing the levels of *deployed* nuclear weapons from around 6,000 to 1,700-2,200 within the next decade, the US still maintains an active and inactive reserve of nuclear weapons.

According to the DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), projecting US power, strengthening alliances and maintaining favorable regional balances of military power are also fundamental tenets of the overall military strategy. Power projection is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy US forces, a capability that reassures allies, specifically those with whom the US has mutual defense treaties. Power projection also provides the United States with expanded flexibility to respond to situations around the globe affecting national interests. Alliances and partnerships ensure access and assistance in promoting American goals of peace, freedom and prosperity. The QDR "requires that U.S. forces train and

⁵⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen, "Conference Brief: Missile Defense" (Carlisle, P A: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001). Summary sheet for a conference hosted by the US Army War College SSI and the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology on "Modern Missile Defense Systems: Examining the Impact of NMD/TMD on the International Security System" November 9-10, 2001. Also, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/thaadtes.pdf>. MAD stands for Mutually Assured Destruction.

⁵⁹ Stanley B. Weeks and Charles A. Meconis, *The Armed Forces of the USA in the Asia-Pacific Region* (London: I.B. Tauris and Co., 1999), p. 104. The 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment Report, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, and the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review all refer to counterproliferation against weapons of mass destruction.

⁶⁰ *Nuclear Posture Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 31 December 2001), p. 9.

⁶¹ J.D. Crouch, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, DoD News Transcript, 9 January 2002. See www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html. It is interesting to note that the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland both charge, "Some of the proposals of the U.S. nuclear posture review would contradict U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." See Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja, "Slaying the Hydra Together: Weapons of Mass Destruction," *International Herald Tribune*, 3 July 2002.

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operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as increased allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and experimentation.”⁶²

During his commencement speech to the Class of 2002 at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Bush told the new military officers to be prepared. More significantly, he then presented a significant change in American strategy from one of containment and deterrence to one that incorporates pre-emptive action against future threats involving ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.⁶³ Again, critical in determining potential US pre-emptive action is the knowledge of foreign actors' *intent* --linking the issues of transparency and the types of values for which nations stand. The Quadrennial Defense Review is clear that the purpose of US Armed Forces is not only to protect, but also to advance US interests. Although the US has not fallen victim to any terrorist missile attacks, the 9/11 horror and numerous subsequent threats, some involving weapons of mass destruction, have given added impetus to the Bush administration's insistence on TMD as a major component supporting US strategy and freedom of action.

Theater Missile Defense

" We're trying to develop the best capability to defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges, and including our deployed forces, by the way. I mean, and once you're protecting your deployed forces, you're almost by definition protecting allies."

-Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz⁶⁴

Missile Defense itself is the ability to intercept incoming missiles, whether to destroy the missiles in flight, or damage and thus divert them from their intended target. In a global environment of rapid technological innovations and the diffusion and proliferation of these technologies among allies and potential adversaries alike, the United States is basing its national military strategy on "full spectrum dominance," in other words, overwhelming military superiority in all facets of operations.⁶⁵ Fundamental to the US preserving its status

⁶² Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 15.

⁶³ President George W. Bush, Commencement Speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1 June 2002. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>; also David E. Sanger, "Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First" *New York Times*, 17 June 2002 and Mark Matthews, "Bush to Issue 'Strike First' Strategy; Doctrine of Attacking Enemies Pre-emptively marks Major Policy Shift," *Baltimore Sun*, 30 June 2002.

⁶⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Ballistic Missile Defense, 19 July 2001. See <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010719-depsecdef2.html>

⁶⁵ The Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review highlights the need for "Creating substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of military competition (e.g. power projection, space, and information)" p. 15; *Joint Vision 2020: America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's guidance to the Armed Forces, specifically uses the term "full spectrum dominance" See <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2.htm>; a Transformation Study Report on Transforming Military Operational Capabilities submitted to the Secretary of Defense in April 2001 was more blunt: The "fundamental purpose of transformation [is to] move from marginal superiority over [a] Cold War opponent to dominance across the full

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is its ability to project power and defend American interests. A vital component of power projection, theater missile defense provides protection from hostile missiles to deployed forces around the globe.

In order to shoot down incoming missiles (or aircraft for that matter), one must first be able to see them. Missile Defense weapon systems usually consist of sensors (radars) to detect, track and identify targets and weapons (missiles or lasers) to intercept the hostile targets. Currently US armed forces have some air defense weapon systems capable of performing these tasks, most notably the PATRIOT weapon system which was tested during the Gulf War. Basic debates involving theater missile defense are both political involving intentions, and technological involving capabilities. I will briefly cover some basic technological aspects and then later focus on political implications of TMD relevant to US national strategy and alliances in Northeast Asia.

Theater missile defense systems defend against incoming hostile missiles at two different altitudes, or 'tiers'-lower tier (within the atmosphere or endo-atmospheric) and upper tier (outside the atmosphere or exo-atmospheric). One obvious advantage of upper-tiered systems is the ability to shoot-down hostile missiles earlier, rather than waiting until the missiles reenter the earth's atmosphere and are thus closer to their targets. The US currently has no upper-tier operational systems; however, the Army's THAAD system (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) and the Navy's Sea-based Midcourse66 system have both had successful missile intercepts during testing. Advanced theater missile defense R&D also focuses on developing the ability to intercept hostile missiles soon after their launch, requiring exceptionally precise sensor capabilities (to immediately detect missile launches) and extremely high-speed missiles (to intercept hostile missiles at the beginning of their flight paths). Differing sensors and weapons capabilities are required to intercept hostile missiles at each stage of a missile's flight path (whether immediately after launch in the boost phase, outside the atmosphere in the mid-course phase, or inside the atmosphere closer to the intended target during the terminal phase). Different systems also focus on the various ranges of hostile ballistic missiles. The heart of much of the technological and political debate over missile defense centers on where to place R&D priorities-which capabilities are most important and when.

Until recently US policymakers emphasized the distinction between National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Whereas National Missile Defense essentially describes the concept of a stationary system designated to protect the US homeland, the name Theater Missile Defense reflects this defense system's purpose to protect armed forces in combat theaters of operations. TMD by design must be transportable

spectrum of 21 st century military operations-full spectrum with Joint Response Forces." See <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/d20010621transrep.pdf> page 5.

⁶⁶ For specific information on THAAD, see <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/thaad.htm> and <http://lmms.external.1mco.com/thaad/home.htm>; For specific information on Sea-based Midcourse system, see <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/seabased.pdf> and <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/fm3.html>; Subsequent flight testing will be incrementally more stressful with further realistic operational situations, thus testing the true operational capabilities of this system. Initial tests have shown the hit-to-kill missile technology is sound under given conditions. Now the tests must coordinate the sensor (detection) and weapon (intercept) functions in combat environments.

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(to be deployed into various theaters of operation), mobile (to respond to a fighting/advancing force), flexible (to operate under diverse environmental conditions), and robust (to defeat various enemy missile capabilities). The Bush administration's rhetoric and policy changes have tried to eliminate the distinction between National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense.

In Congressional hearings in 2001, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Agency Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish testified, "The definition between theater and national [missile defense] is a geographical one. And in the missile defense business, it's where you place your sensors and weapons that have an impact on geography. So all aspects of the program can be viewed as protecting our allies or necessary to protect our allies as well as the U.S. and deployed forces." Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued the testimony summarizing "Secretary Rumsfeld's strong view that it was very artificial both technologically and politically to make an arbitrary distinction between different ranges or different categories of people that you're trying to protect.,⁶⁷ However, at this stage of America's technological capabilities, this statement glosses over the current realities of American missile defense capabilities and perhaps oversimplifies American short-term political intent.

The "refocused and revitalized" missile programs of the Ballistic Missile Agency now attempt to integrate land-, sea-, air- and space-based systems for a comprehensive, "layered" defense against hostile missiles. Programs are now deemed flexible, responding to the advances in research, development and testing across a myriad of systems. In other words, the progress of the research will drive which systems come to fruition, as opposed to focusing on making a specific system develop. However, a Naval Studies Board raised concerns during a recent evaluation of US TMD Research and Development programs and priorities. Concluding its review in 2000, the Board writes, "Since the Gulf War, BMDO [Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, now the Ballistic Missile Agency] programs have emphasized the acquisition of theater missile defense (TMD) systems and National missile defense rather than R&D.,⁶⁸ This reflects a concern held by many, including allies, that US leaders are committed to deploying a system before it is truly operational in combat.

Indeed, according to the Fiscal Year 2003 Missile Defense budget statement, more emphasis and dollars are placed on acquisition of ground-based systems (the generic name given to the outdated concept of "National Missile Defense") because the "initial goal is to provide limited protection against long-range threats for the United States and potentially our allies within the 2004-2008 timeframe."⁶⁹ Thus, despite US public statements about artificial

⁶⁷ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Ballistic Missile Defense, 19 July 2001. See <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010719-depsecdef2.html>

⁶⁸ Naval Studies Board and National Research Council, *Naval Forces' Capability for Theater Missile Defense* (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001), p. 19.

⁶⁹ Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, "Fiscal Year 2003 Missile Defense Budget," Unclassified Statement to the Defense Subcommittee to the Senate Appropriations Committee, 17 April 02, p. 6. See <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/kadish17apr02.pdf>. In July 02, LTG Kadish and Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated that although there is no definitive timetable, the US would deploy missile defense systems as soon as possible, "in the four-to-six-to-eight-year time frame of this decade." Bill Gertz, "Missile Defense System has No Target Date," *The Washington Times*, 2 July 2002.

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distinctions between assets protected by missile defense systems, and the importance of consulting with allies, US policy remains focused on deploying a ground-based missile defense system on US soil (ground-breaking just occurred at Fort Greely, Alaska). On 11 June 2002, Philip Coyle testified before a House Committee on the unrealistic and potentially damaging accelerated development and deployment of theater missile defense. He writes, "Perhaps most important, the proposed residual capability [of the successor system to national missile defense] would not prevent or deter an enemy from threatening our friends and allies. This is a central tenet of the Administration's approach to missile defense, but it would not be achieved with this [ground-based missile defense system]."⁷⁰

Why are these distinctions significant? Theater missile defense, the layered, comprehensive system described by American political leaders, one-day will be a family of weapon systems providing overlapping defense from hostile missiles to the US and its allies. Yet according to many analysts the ability to provide a layered-approach will not be feasible for nearly another decade. Philip Coyle warns that "It would make little sense to predicate strategic decisions on a defense that does not exist... the Bush administration should not base its foreign policy on the assumption that during its tenure it will be able to deploy defenses to protect the United States from strategic missiles."⁷¹ Driven partly by the requirements identified in the Nuclear Posture Review, the US Ballistic Missile Agency is focusing on acquiring rudimentary missile defense systems in the near-term, with less emphasis and money spent on both realistic, operational testing and advanced technology development prior to actual deployment of such systems.⁷²

Therefore, a logical conclusion one can draw is that currently theater missile defense systems play a predominantly *political and strategic* role, rather than a strictly operationally defensive role. Accurate defenses should be tested thoroughly in realistic combat situations in order to provide reliable protection from hostile missiles. For political purposes, the acquisition of a rudimentary system may suffice. Many potential adversaries with emerging missile programs employ the same logic, seeing the immediate political effectiveness of simply having ballistic missiles. Describing the effects of Iraq's use of SCUD missiles during the Gulf War, Roger Handberg writes, "For weaker states, the message was clear—mere possession of such weapons made a more substantial threat than their objective military value merited."⁷³

⁷⁰ Philip E. Coyle, "Missile Defense Testing," Prepared Statement for the National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, 11 June 2002. See <http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/Coyle-testimony-061102-pr.cfm>

⁷¹ Philip Coyle, "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense under Bush," *Arms Control Today*, Volume 32, Number 4 (May 2002), p. 9, 3. See www.armscontrol.org. Philip Coyle was as Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon's Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation from 1994-2001.

⁷² Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, "Fiscal Year 2003 Missile Defense Budget," pp. 10, 18,27.

⁷³ Roger Handberg, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agenda, Perceptions, Technology and Policy* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 65.

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Northeast Asia Strategy

"Today the great powers are also increasingly united by common values... The United States, Japan and our Pacific friends... share a deep commitment to human freedom, embodied in strong alliances... America needs partners to preserve the peace, and we will work with every nation that shares this noble goal... The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance. America cannot impose this vision --yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people." ⁷⁴ -President George W. Bush

Since 1945, US strategic objectives in Northeast Asia have included preventing the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon, fostering an environment conducive to US values and interests, and ensuring American access to regional markets and resources. While Ikenberry describes the American strategy of promoting democracy as "hidden," in Northeast Asia it has been both obvious and successful. The United States has been a proponent and an integral component (via its bilateral security alliances) to the establishment of democratic governance within its two chief allies of Japan and South Korea. Secretary of State Colin Powell affirmed the continuation of this general strategy in his remarks at the Asia Society's Annual Dinner in June 2002. "Therefore, our first goal and highest priority for Asia must be to help create the secure conditions under which freedom can flourish --economic freedom and political freedom."⁷⁵

The military objectives of the US armed forces in the region, PACOM, are to deter war, respond to crises, and defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. US military presence assists in shaping the regional security environment by "mitigat[ing] the impact of historical regional tensions and allow[ing] the United States to anticipate problems, manage potential threats and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes."⁷⁶ Again, central to protecting and advancing US interests are the tenets of US power projection, affirmation of existing alliances, and maintenance of a favorable balance of power in the region. Eberstadt and Ellings write "Forward-looking strategic analysis requires not only a solid grounding in historical realities... but also up-to-date knowledge about the expectations and intentions of the major actors who stand to shape the international strategic environment."⁷⁷ Therefore, I will review the two bilateral security alliances and comment on the bilateral and trilateral relationships as they stand today.

⁷⁴ President Bush, Commencement Speech, United States Military Academy, 1 June 2002.

⁷⁵ Colin L. Powell, Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner, 10 June 2002. See <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10983.htm>

⁷⁶ *US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, p. 9.

⁷⁷ Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings ed., *Korea's Future and the Great Powers* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), p. 4.

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US-Japan Security Alliance: Reasons, Roles, and Responsibilities

Established in 1951, US leaders view the US-Japan security alliance as a cornerstone to promoting US interests and regional stability. From the beginning, the purpose of the US-Japan alliance was to stem the influence and perceived expansion of the Soviet Union. Believing the world's five key industrial power states included the US, UK, Germany, Japan and the USSR, George Kennan described America's vital task as keeping the remaining nations "out of hostile hands."⁷⁸ Although based on the communist threat, the initial structure of the alliance also revealed an American desire to rein-in the previously militaristic tendencies of Japan. The alliance also fulfilled Japanese leaders' desire to "restore Japan's position of honor and respectability in international society."⁷⁹ Even though Japan proposed a military alliance with the US as early as 1947,⁸⁰ it was not until American policymakers became convinced of an active communist military threat that the relationship solidified into a bilateral military alliance.

Having constitutionally limited the Japanese military to self-defense, reneged its sovereign right to wage war and committed itself to be a non-nuclear power, Japan's primary contributions to its defense and regional security are two-fold: 1) providing access to and financial assistance for bases in Japan for American armed forces; and 2) promoting democracy and stability through economic development. With the end of the Cold War, the US and Japan reaffirmed and strengthened the alliance, now focusing on regional security and the potential threats from North Korea and China (without specifically naming China). Since 1996, the US and Japan have concluded a number of agreements facilitating closer peacetime cooperation between the two nations.⁸¹ Included in this alliance cooperation is an expanding peacetime and regional conflict role for the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). Formalized in 1999, the most recent agreements make "it easier for Japan's military to cooperate with the United States in any security crisis in East Asia."⁸² While increasing its defense diplomacy with regional armed forces and the United States, the Japanese may now provide logistical support for US forces conducting training and peacekeeping operations, and perform search and rescue operations in the 'areas surrounding Japan.' Peter Katzenstein describes the security treaty as having "acquired a global scope"⁸³ going beyond its initial purpose of defending Japan from a direct attack.

Following the September 11 th terrorist attacks in the US, the Government of Japan rapidly passed a series of legislation profoundly changing Japan's defense and security policy. Each of the Self Defense Force (SDF) components (Ground, Sea, and Air) is increasing their

⁷⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, "The Strategy of Containment," in Thomas H. Etzold and Gaddis ed., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 31.

⁷⁹ Bert Edstrom, "The US-Japan Security Treaty Revisited: The Yoshida Legacy and the Changing World," in Bert Edstrom ed., *Japan's Foreign and Security Policies in Transition* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute for International Affairs and the Center for Pacific Asian Studies, 1996), p. 61.

⁸⁰ See Martin Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 26, and Akira Iriye, *The Cold War in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 175.

⁸¹ Agreements include: Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21 st Century-1996, Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement-1996, Guidelines for Defense Cooperation-1997.

⁸² New York Times, "Tokyo Lawmakers Pass Bill to Improve Military Ties with U.S.", 28 April 1999.

⁸³ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 147.

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operational tempo and responsibilities in the wake of these new threats. In October, a new Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorized the SDF to provide rear area logistics support for US military operations in Afghanistan for a period of two years. This marks the first time since WWII that SDF forces will conduct operations overseas during an armed conflict, although SDF missions remain restricted from operating in active combat zones. The same Diet session also revised Japan's Self-Defense Force Law allowing Japanese forces to help guard US facilities in Japan while previously the civilian police performed this duty.⁸⁴ Additionally, in December 2001, the Diet revised the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law (PKO) expanding the number of acceptable SDF missions and easing restrictions on the use of weapons; SDF troops may now use weapons to protect others under their operational control during peacekeeping operations. Changes in Japan's defense and security policies reflect the Japanese emphasis on both maintaining and advancing active peacetime operations with US forces within the alliance structure and promoting international cooperative security efforts through non-combative means (although the US interestingly defines itself in a state of war against terrorism).

In the immediate post-Cold War years and the changing international environment, Japan seemingly struggled with its strategic purpose. Accustomed to relying on US defense for protection from the known communist threat, Japan had focused nearly exclusively on its economy. However, Japan has incrementally increased its integration into active military operations with the US and many Japanese leaders now openly discuss eventual possibilities of revising the Japanese constitution and even its non-nuclear principles.⁸⁵ While the current Prime Minister Koizumi affirms these changes will not take place, the ability to debate openly Japan's purpose and means is a valuable sign of the strength of Japan's stable democracy. Japanese leaders also highlight transparency as an important element of democratic government policies and actions. The Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency introduces Japan's defense guidebook *2001 Defense of Japan* with "[t]his is the evidence of transparency in Japan's defense policy, and is also of great significance in that it further promotes, among other countries, understanding of and confidence in our country."⁸⁶

Stressing international cooperation as a primary means to peace (and reducing threats from weapons of mass destruction), Japan emphasizes its membership in international regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and the Missile Technology Control

⁸⁴ Jennifer H. Svan, "U.S., Japanese Troops Rehearse Force Protection Procedures," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 9 December 2001. U.S. Armed Forces routinely train on Force Protection, enhancing basic soldier combat skills. Until now, Japanese troops did not participate in these types of missions with their Alliance partner. In December 2001, an "operational study" occurred at the American Camp Zama base in Japan in which SDF forces trained side-by-side with American troops. Long-term implications include a "modernization" of the SDF by training and improving the basic combat skills of Japanese troops to levels performed by other professional Armed Forces. For example, the Japanese SDF have no official Rules of Engagement (ROE) governing the use of force in various situations because until now, SDF troops have never been in situations with potential conflict.

⁸⁵ See Howard W. French, "Nuclear Arms Taboo is Challenged in Japan," *The New York Times*, 9 June 2002.

⁸⁶ Japan Defense Agency, *2001 Defense of Japan: Toward a More Vigorous and Professional Self Defense Force in the 21st Century* (Japan: Urban Connections, 2001), p. iii.

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Regime. In September 1998 (following the North Korean Taepo Dong I missile launch), Japan also committed to joint ballistic missile defense research with the United States after consistently rejecting such efforts in the early 1990s. However, within the *2001 Defense of Japan*, Japan outlines its expectations for future missile defenses and explicitly (and politely) points out that the US should not act unilaterally on the subject of missile defense. "Japan hopes that the issue of missile defense be dealt with in a manner to contribute to the improvement of an international security environment including efforts for arms control and disarmament, and welcomes the expressed intention of the United States to fully consult with its allies, Russia, and other countries."⁸⁷ Thus, Japanese strategy also combines nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses, but places a higher priority on cooperative nonproliferation efforts.

Joint technical Theater Missile Defense research with the US began in 1999 and focused specifically on missile technology for the (former) Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Defense System. Allocating more than \$8 million in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 budget to begin TMD research, the "Defense Agency appropriated 2.048 billion yen in FY2000 and 3.708 billion yen in FY200 1 as expenses necessary for the design and trial manufacture of the four main components of the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD).",⁸⁸ This sea-based system would deploy on Aegis destroyers, assets the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces already possess.

Japan's Fiscal Year 2002 TMD budget included 6.6 billion yen (\$49.2 million), twice the level of last year's budget. Although the "refocused and revitalized" US missile defense priorities have re-designated NTW as the Sea-Based Midcourse Defense and relegated it to a distant-second compared to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (formerly the national missile defense system),⁸⁹ the US Ballistic Missile Agency has allocated \$3.3 billion over the next five years for sea-based missile defense systems 0 and of this, the FY 2003 budget allots \$79 million annually for five years toward the cooperative research with Japan.⁹¹ Yet, recent changes in Pentagon missile defense priorities may affect the fundamental Theater Missile Defense cooperation between the alliance partners.⁹² US emphasis on near-term (2004-2008) deployment of both ground and sea-based missile defense systems does not coincide with Japan's decision to participate in "research and study," but delay any "deployment" or "mass production and deployment."⁹³

Focusing specifically on the missile threat from North Korea, Michael Green asserts Japan requires both lower- and upper-tier levels "based on a combination of Aegis cruisers at sea, AWACS in the air, and surface-to-air missiles such as Patriot and THAAD (theater high-

⁸⁷ *2001 Defense of Japan*, p. 12.

⁸⁸ *2001 Defense of Japan*, p. 184.

⁸⁹ "FY03 Missile Defense Budget," p. 18. See www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/kadish17a_r02.pdf

⁹⁰ "U.S. Plans: Sea-Based System Sought by 2004, MDA Director Says," National Journal Group: Global Security Newswire, 19 June 2002. See http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/6/19/8p.html

⁹¹ Sherman, p. 3.

⁹² See Jason Sherman, "Japanese Reconsider Joint Effort with U.S. on Missile Defense," *Defense News*, February 25-March 3, 2002, p. 3.

⁹³ *2001 Defense of Japan*, p. 184.

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altitude air defense) on land.”⁹⁴ While Japan is cooperating on future TMD technologies, Japan already has a maturing capability to provide for its own air and missile defense. Japan currently has 24 operational PATRIOT fire units deployed in fixed sites predominantly near geopolitical centers and airbases in Japan. Over the next four-five years, these units will continue to upgrade their capabilities to "PDB-4 Configuration TWO.”⁹⁵ A unique feature of Japan's weapon industry is the fact that, unlike all other countries owning PATRIOT, a Japanese firm (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) produces its own missiles via a Technical Assistance Agreement with the Raytheon Corporation. Also, while most allies owning PATRIOT train their forces at the US Army Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, Japan conducts its own PATRIOT training in Japan.

US-ROK Security Alliance: Reasons, Roles, and Responsibilities

The US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 following the ceasefire in the Korean War. Article Three specifies "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties... would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Specifically the treaty addresses the communist threat from North Korea and its former patrons in the Soviet Union and China. Although Russia and China both established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in 1990 and 1992, respectively, North Korea remains a hostile adversary with the world's fifth largest military and the largest special operations force, most of whom are deployed within miles of the demilitarized zone located less than 50 kilometers from the capital of South Korea.⁹⁶ Therefore, although the Cold War is over and the US-Japan alliance has adjusted to a new strategic goal of promoting general regional security, due to the immediate threat posed by North Korea, the US-ROK alliance has not fundamentally altered its focus and the centerpiece of Korean security efforts remains deterrence of hostilities from the North.

Whereas from the beginning of the bilateral alliance system in the early 1950s Japanese leaders enjoyed the flexibility to focus on political (democratic) and economic (free-market) development because of the US security umbrella and the lack of an immediate threat to Japan's survival, the circumstances on the Korean peninsula did not allow the new ROK the same opportunities. Korean political leaders maintained (as many do today) a zero-sum mentality with regard to the North. The immediate focus for South Korea was state survival. Authoritarian governments dominated until the late 1980s with the election of former general

⁹⁴ Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 137. For a general overview of U.S. Missile Defense Systems, see also Michael J. Green and Toby F. Dalton, "Asian Reactions to U.S. Missile Defense," The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Analysis: Vol 11, No.3 at <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol11no3/Essay.html>, p. 3-5. AWACS stands for Airborne Warning And Control System.

⁹⁵ PDB refers to the Patriot Data Base, or software capabilities. Configuration Two improves both the software and hardware capabilities of the Patriot System, specifically focusing improvements in: radar multi-function capability, target identification, unit survivability against ARMs (Anti-Radiation Missiles), and communications. Japan has its own unique communications link.

⁹⁶ General Thomas A. Schwartz, "U.S. Forces, Korea and UN Command/ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command: Strength through Friendship" *Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM* (Summer 2001), p. 48.

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Roh Tae Woo. Therefore, democratization remains an emerging and perhaps fragile system in South Korea. Indeed, the ROK still maintains a National Security Law banning any activity deemed subversive, including communism.⁹⁷

US Forces Korea (USFK) maintains 37,000 troops in South Korea and South Korean forces, numbering 650,000, perform an active, integrated role in the defense of the ROK. There are technically three military chains of command operating in South Korea. Established in 1950, the United Nations Command continues to maintain the Korean armistice agreement; in 1978, the Combined Forces Command was created to coordinate operations between the US and Korean forces. Former Commander of US Forces Korea, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (a triple-hatted job), General Thomas A. Schwartz describes the alliance as "fully inter-operable in all aspects of joint and combined warfighting... Our powerful alliance is built on values of trust, mutual respect, and transparency."⁹⁸ Indeed, unlike the US relationship with Japan that traditionally has restrained Japanese defense capabilities, the US-ROK military relationship is more robust and combat-tested. During the Vietnam War, South Korea sent two Infantry Divisions, soldiers who fought according to US doctrine and tactics and with advanced US weaponry.⁹⁹

Already facing a constant artillery threat from North Korea to the majority of its population located in the capital of Seoul, South Korea has not been particularly troubled by North Korean missile proliferation. Yet, in April 1994 during the nuclear crisis with North Korea, the US deployed a PATRIOT battalion (1st Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery) from Fort Bliss, Texas, permanently re-stationing the unit in the ROK. Dr. David Finkelstein argues this move reflects American political resolve and positioning because the significant military threat remains conventional artillery and not hostile missiles with weapons of mass destruction. ¹⁰⁰ Thus, this represents a precedent for deploying Theater Missile Defense systems in the region for political, rather than strictly operational purposes.

However, ROK defense leaders themselves have emphasized offensive capabilities over defensive capabilities in deterring the missile threat from North Korea.¹⁰¹ Hemmed by a 1979 agreement with the US limiting the allowable range of South Korea's missiles to only 180km (112miles), South Korea negotiated for years with the United States and finally joined

⁹⁷ Robert A. Scalapino, "The Challenges Ahead," in Tong Whan Park ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 31.

⁹⁸ Thomas A. Schwartz, "U.S. Forces, Korea and UN Command/ROK-US Combined Forces Command: Strength through Friendship," *Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM* (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: USCINCP AC), Summer 2001, p. 47. See <http://forum.apan-info.net>

⁹⁹ Tae-Hwan Kwak and Wayne Patterson, "The Security Relationship between Korea and the United States, 1960-1982," in Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson, ed., *Korean-American Relations 1866-1997* (New York: State University of NY Press, 1999), p. 84.

¹⁰⁰ David M. Finkelstein, "TMD in Asia," at www.nautilus.org.nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/finkelsteinpaper.html

¹⁰¹ George A. Hutchinson and Craig M. Brandt, "International Armament Cooperation and Theater Missile Defense: Why South Korea is Reluctant to Join the Club," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, Volume 23, Issue 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 22-25. The authors discuss that an economical way for America to develop weapons is to conduct cooperative R&D with allies. This also enhances modernization and interoperability of allied weapon systems.

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the Missile Technology Control Regime in January 2001. By joining this regime designed to *prevent* the proliferation of longer-range missiles, South Korea now may *expand* its missile inventory to include missiles with a range up to 300km (190miles). Edward Olsen explains that South Korea wanted "enough latitude to be more self-reliant and the ability to maintain its own form of missile deterrence against North Korea."¹⁰² Indeed the longer-range missile capabilities now provide South Korea with the ability to target critical North Korean assets. Despite heavy lobbying throughout the 1990s from the US emphasizing the importance of alliance interoperability and the advancing North Korean threat, South Korea has resisted buying US TMD weapon systems. Instead, in the last decade Korea has developed its own indigenous short-range missile defense system (a surface-to-air missile named Chorima), has purchased missile defense systems from France, and has focused efforts on autonomous offensive capabilities to deter the North.

One additional note about the types of forces employed by the US-ROK alliance is the absence of nuclear weapons. In September 1991, President Bush announced the unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons; South Korean President Roh then called for a nuclear free zone. These actions led to a North Korean-South Korean Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992 and the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Agreement in 1992. However, it is interesting to note that in the 1970s when US commitment seemed to wane, South Korean President Park declared South Korea would and could develop nuclear weapons if the US withdrew its nuclear umbrella.¹⁰³

US-Japan-ROK: Relations and Cooperation

"The three delegations reiterated that continued close consultations and trilateral coordination remain vital to the success of their individual efforts [and] they reconfirmed the importance of engaging North Korea in the international community through constructive dialogue, which would greatly enhance prospects for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia."

-Joint Statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group¹⁰⁴

In 1965, at the urging of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea normalized relations, but through nearly forty years of starts and stops in this developing relationship, Japan and South Korea have yet to thoroughly dispel old perceptions and historical memories of each other and solidify their relationship. The Koreans continue to admonish Japan about its inability to honestly acknowledge its past (lack of Japanese accountability) and even define Korean nationalism in part as anti-Japanese.¹⁰⁵ In this regard, the maintenance of the

¹⁰² Edward A. Olsen, "US-Korean Relations: The Evolving Missile Context," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Volume XV, Number Two (Fall/Winter 2001), p. 280.

¹⁰³ Robert T. Oliver, "Transition and Continuity in Korean-American Relations in the Postwar Period," in Yur Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson, ed., *Korean American Relations 1866-1997* (New York: State University of NY Press, 1999), p. 87. Two years later, ROK President Park rescinded his pledge.

¹⁰⁴ Joint Statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, US State Department, 18 June 02, at <http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/ps/2002/11244.htm>

¹⁰⁵ See Victor Cha, "Japan's Grand Strategy on the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism," in Henry D. Sokolski ed., *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, P A: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,

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US-Japan alliance is critical because "regional stability depends upon the perceived limits of Japan's security role. That is especially important to Beijing and Seoul, but is also a factor in capitals throughout the region."¹⁰⁶ Gerald Curtis also explains "Attitudes toward Japan vary widely within the region. China and the two Korean states, the countries closest to Japan and the ones to suffer the most during Japan's militarist era, are the most suspicious and fearful that Japan will seek to flex its political muscles in the region and once again become a major military power."¹⁰⁷ Even as recently as December 2001, a public opinion poll in *The Asahi Shimbun* revealed that nearly 30% of South Koreans polled viewed Japan as a primary threat.¹⁰⁸ Yet a Japanese official stated in 1992, that the military alliance with the United States "gives us the credibility that as long as U.S. forces are stationed in Japan, we won't act independently."¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, the Japanese continue to uphold their assumed superiority over Koreans, partly due to the disdain of the authoritarian regimes in Korea from the 1950s through the 1980s. Yet the North Korean threat seems to bring the US, Japan, and South Korea together, at least to formally consult and coordinate their respective policies towards the DPRK. All three states are principal supporters of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established following the 1994 Agreed Framework freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. KEDO's purpose is to build light-water reactors, with low-proliferation risk, in North Korea. Since 2000, officials from all three allies also have met under the auspices of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, the most recent meeting occurring 17-18 June 2002 in San Francisco. Victor Cha also adds that democracy itself is a "trend that weighs strongly in favor of a positive reconstruction of the Japan-Korea relations."¹¹⁰

All three governments continue to promote cooperation and greater understanding of each other's intentions. On the surface, the three states are maintaining a positive, cooperative image and the above statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group reflects a belief that unilateral actions without consultation will not lead to success for any of the democratic allies.¹¹¹ Indeed, all three states participate in not only diplomatic meetings but

2001), p. 230. Cha describes Korean national holidays that resurrect anti-Japanese images and celebrate South Korean liberation from the Japanese occupation.

¹⁰⁶ Institute for National Strategic Studies. 1997 *Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force Structure*. National Defense University, www.ndu.edu/inss/sa97, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Gerald L. Curtis, "Meeting the Challenge of Japan in Asia" in Gerald L. Curtis ed., *The United States, Japan, and Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 219. See also Yoichi Funabashi, ed. *Japan's International Agenda* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 20.

¹⁰⁸ *The Asahi Shimbun*, December 25, 2001, p.8.

¹⁰⁹ Richard D. Leitch Jr., Akira Kato, and Martin E. Weinstein. *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*. (London: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 182.

¹¹⁰ Victor Cha, "Japan's Grand Strategy on the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism," in Henry Sokolski ed., *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, P A: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), p. 248.

¹¹¹ In truth, a two-day conference attended by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Korean Division-General of Asian and Oceanic Affairs, and the American Assistant Secretary of State For East-Asia and Pacific Affairs probably does not address the fundamental defense strategies and policies that are driving relations. One must only review the various entities responsible for developing and implementing national strategy and policies to wonder what a two-day meeting accomplishes in practical terms. Recent events illustrate this observation. Two weeks after the latest Trilateral Group meeting there was a deadly naval clash between North and South Korea.

A senior Japanese diplomat then returned to Washington D.C. to "coordinate the policies of Japan and the

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also military exercises such as the biennial, multinational RIMP AC exercise (Rim of the Pacific).¹¹² However, it is important to look beyond the public statements because "[n]ational leaders are prone to describe their allies in overly flattering terms, and to overstate the level of compatibility and identification between them, both to convince adversaries that the alliance is firm and to sustain domestic support for potentially costly commitments."¹¹³ Despite American leaders' continued public emphasis on coordination and close consultation with allies, this has not been consistent policy. For example, in 1997, Bates Gill described sources of tension within KEDO: while South Korea is a primary financier, the US often dictates the direction of the program.¹¹⁴ In 2000, the US made decisions affecting the direction of the Theater Missile Defense program, including the US-Japanese cooperative research, without consulting Japan. Also, in 2002, the US also informed both Japan and Korea after-the-fact that the US would not certify North Korea as having adhered to the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The US defense strategy insists that the maintenance of alliances is fundamental to its success and an integral component of maintaining regional security in Northeast Asia. On the surface, there is growing cooperation between the United States, Japan and Korea; however, it is imperative that the US coordinate and integrate its own policies and assess the effects of US decisions on its regional relationships in order to promote the viability of these alliances.

Impact of Theater Missile Defense

"O, it is excellent
To have a giant's strength;
but it is tyrannous
To use it like a giant."
-William Shakespeare, "Measure for Measure" Act II, Scene 2

America's identity as a liberal democracy has affected not only US policies, but other nations' attitudes towards the United States. John Ruggie suggests, "*American hegemony* was every bit as important as the fact of *American hegemony* in shaping the post-World War II international order."¹¹⁵ Now the Bush administration is attempting to shape a new post-Cold War, post-9/11 international order-again with a "moral clarity" of promoting

United States." Hiroshi Hiyama, "Japan sends Senior Diplomat to US for Talks on North Korea," *Agence France Presse*, 8 July 2002.

¹¹² Taking place in the waters near Hawaii, RIMPAC is the largest multinational maritime exercise in the Pacific. The 2002 RIMPAC exercise is the 18th. During this year's event, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces will command US ships during an anti-terrorism drill. According to news reports, the Japanese Defense Agency believes "Japan's commanding role in the drill shows that defence cooperation between Japan and the US has entered a new stage." See "Japan to Command US Warships in Naval Exercise," *Klodo News Service*, Tokyo (in English), 7 July 2002.

¹¹³ Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival*, Volume 39, Number 1 (Spring 1997), p. 169.

¹¹⁴ Bates Gill, "Proliferation and the U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia," *Columbia International Affairs Online Working Papers*, September 1997, pp. 3-5. See <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gib01>

¹¹⁵ John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 14.

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democracy,¹¹⁶ including its elements of transparency. In a world with only one superpower, and a superpower that sees itself as a force for good through its efforts 1) to promote democracy, cooperation, transparency, and 2) to fight for peace, the US still maintains considerable influence over its allies. These relationships benefit both the US and the Pacific allies; however, with the increased prominence of Theater Missile Defense (both rhetorically and materially) coupled with an emerging American strategy that includes a feeling of moral authority and ability to conduct preemptive strikes against perceived threats, what are potential first and second order effects of TMD on allied defense relationships? Does TMD bolster or diminish US ability to fulfill its tenets of defense strategy and thus achieve its strategic goals of enhancing regional security and reducing weapons of mass destruction?

In an age where alliance management is increasingly important, it is critical for the United States to be transparent about American capabilities and intentions with its alliance partners to mitigate budding conflicts. Increasing American unilateralism (or the perception of this) complicates the Theater Missile Defense issue. TMD has the potential to directly and indirectly affect the US-Japan alliance and the US-ROK alliance. The US and its allies have repeatedly stated the importance of continuing these bilateral alliances to promote cooperation and maintain regional stability. The bilateral alliances themselves also should promote transparency in individual state decision-making because of the coordination required for a functioning alliance, yet alliance maintenance is not a given. On one side of the bilateral alliances is the United States, a superpower seeking even more capabilities and dominance in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 international setting. On the opposite side of the bilateral alliances are two regional powers seeking more transparency and decision-making within the alliances. All bilateral partners are focused on the same general threat from North Korea, but from different perspectives and with different concerns related to their state survival.

Theater Missile Defense: Buttress of American Unilateralism?

As the one remaining superpower, the United States now finds itself facing asymmetrical threats from rogue states and terrorists around the world. Although an overwhelming preponderance of power does not necessarily deter these potential adversaries (unlike during the Cold War), the US remains focused on "full spectrum dominance" for any future conflicts. Stephen Walt warns, "states whose power is increasing often adopt more ambitious international objectives, thereby alarming both their traditional adversaries and their current allies."¹¹⁷ The United States presents itself as determined to deploy Theater Missile Defenses (with a leaning towards ground-based capabilities over sea-based in the near-term), dominate militarily, and "take the battle to the enemy."¹¹⁸ This ambitious zeal combined with a comprehensive offense and defense reflects a growing potential for American unilateralism.¹¹⁹ This may negatively affect the bilateral alliances in Northeast

¹¹⁶ President George W. Bush, Commencement Speech, United States Military Academy, 1 June 2002.

¹¹⁷ Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival*, Volume 39, Number 1 (Spring 1997), p. 159.

¹¹⁸ President George W. Bush, Commencement Speech, United States Military Academy, 1 June 2002.

¹¹⁹ Bush administration officials say "Preemption doesn't imply military action alone, but also diplomatic and law enforcement strategies that require cooperation from other countries." Mark Matthews, "Bush to Issue 'Strike First' Strategy; Doctrine of Attacking Enemies Preemptively Marks Major Policy Shift," *The Baltimore*

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Asia, which according to the National Defense Strategy is a fundamental component of American success.

Theater Missile Defense is considered an integral component of America's ability to protect and promote US interests worldwide. Joseph Cirincione believes TMD erroneously supports the myth held by some American leaders that the US can pick and chose when to consult and rely on its allies. "The myth that missile defense can work allows conservatives to comfortably believe that the United States can go it alone in the world, rallying allies where and when necessary, but relying fundamentally on the nation's own resources for defense."¹²⁰ Combining such an attitude with the upcoming strategic revision that incorporates an authority to conduct pre-emptive strikes against those who threaten American interests and values, the Bush administration's emphasis on TMD, in hindsight, may have simply set the stage for a new American independent activism.

During the last major nuclear crisis (representing a threat to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) with North Korea in 1994, the US became involved because "for the United States, this was a global, not merely an inter-Korean, issue since it [the US] viewed the DPRK as posing a threat to all nonproliferation efforts."¹²¹ After the US defused the crisis with the 1994 Agreed Framework and the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the US gave a Negative Security Assurance to North Korea- effectively pledging not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea as a non-nuclear power.¹²² Although US intelligence estimates since the mid-1990s have suggested the possibility that North Korea possesses a few nuclear weapons (number unknown), US officials now stress both this likelihood and North Korean intentions to remain committed to developing longer-range ballistic missiles to deliver the nuclear bombs. This is one of the foremost justifications for the forthcoming pre-emptive strike strategy and Theater Missile Defense.

The forcefulness and immediacy placed on the deployment of Theater Missile Defenses combined with President Bush's emerging strategy of preemptive strikes to protect American interests may lead allies to wonder about the scope of America's intentions.¹²³ This is especially the case in Northeast Asia. While President Bush has made earlier statements asserting that the US has no intentions of attacking North Korea, during his commencement

Sun, 30 June 2002, p. 1A. However, when taking the last 18 months of the Bush administration's policies and actions into account, rhetorically US officials have called for close consultation and cooperation, yet have taken independent defense-related steps (e.g. ABM Treaty).

¹²⁰ Joseph Cirincione, "No ABM Treaty, No Missile Defense" web article, Carnegie Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 June 02; He writes about the power of a political myth; See <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.as?NewsID=3123>

¹²¹ Robert A. Scalapino, "The Challenges Ahead," Tong Whan Park ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 25.

¹²² Tong Whan Park, "South Korea's Nuclear Option," in Tong Whan Park ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 104-105.

¹²³ Interesting to note that the International Criminal Court came into existence on 1 July 2002, as 60 states ratified the Rome Treaty. The US is adamantly opposed to this court and has threatened to withdraw support for peacekeeping operations because of the potential for American political leaders and military servicemembers to be indicted for warcrimes for actions occurring while defending/promoting American interests and values.

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speech at West Point he referred to North Korea (and other states threatening proliferation) when saying "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." It is both the lack of consistency and lack of understanding of US intentions that concern US allies.

These issues are critical for Japan because Japan's security strategy centers firmly on the US-Japan Security Alliance; therefore, any changes in both US military means and strategy directly affect Japan's security calculations. A Japanese scholar, Tsuneo Akana, points out that some Japanese analysts see "U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific, as elsewhere in the world, [as] increasingly self-centered" and that "U.S. strategic policy has become a moving target toward which Japan has to adjust its own policy."¹²⁴ Japan now find itself dependent upon an increasingly assertive United States dedicated to deploying Theater Missile Defense in the near-term.

Both the US and Japan have relied upon their bilateral alliance in part to insulate Japan and develop cooperative regional relationships. Concerned about regional perceptions of Japan, the Japanese defense system itself is designed to prevent an 'active' military and Japanese Self Defense Forces are limited to just that-self defense actions. Even with the increasingly cooperative military role in the 'war on terrorism,' Japanese leaders are sensitive to the scope and range of allowable activities for Japanese forces.¹²⁵ It was only after years of intense US lobbying,¹²⁶ combined with the North Korean Taepo-Dong I launch over Japan in 1998, that Japan committed to joint TMD R&D with the US. Even in this decision, Japanese officials emphasize their perspective of Ballistic Missile Defense, rather than Theater Missile Defense because of the regional sensitivities about Japan's potential military involvement in the region.¹²⁷ Japan still has not committed to TMD deployment and the US insistence on an accelerated deployment schedule for US TMD may place Japan in an awkward position while it attempts to cultivate more cooperative regional relationships. In the words of Victor Cha, Japan may feel "entrapped" in supporting its defense patron, the increasingly unilateralist United States who thus far rhetorically has targeted North Korea.

Referring to domestic pressures, Brad Glosserman writes, "U.S. failure to act like a good ally could [also] undermine popular support within Japan.,,128 Unlike the United States whose

¹²⁴ Tsuneo Akana, "Japan's Response to Changing U.S.-Korea Relations," in Tong Whan Park ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp. 235-236.

¹²⁵ For example, Japan cannot participate in collective defense measures. Japanese officials publicize their active participation in combined operations after being 'scolded' for their checkbook support of the Gulf War, but also emphasize their ability to remain within their self-imposed limitations.

¹²⁶ For a brief overview of US lobbying efforts see Stephen A. Cambone, "The United States and Theater Missile Defence in North-east Asia," *Survival*, Volume 39, Number 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 66-84.

¹²⁷ Although nearly all Western writers (academic and professional) use the term TMD to describe the American and Japanese policy efforts, Japanese officials emphasize the term BMD-Ballistic Missile Defense.

On 25 May 1999, Japanese Press Secretary Sudaaki Numata stressed that Japanese officials "talk about it in terms of the Ballistic Missile Defense System because we are not interested in a theater-wide defense system, we are interested in providing the defense for possible ballistic missile attacks against Japan, and that is purely for the defense of Japan." See "Press Conference by the Press Secretary", p. 4 of 7, at

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/5/525.html>.

¹²⁸ Brad Glosserman, "Setting New Standards," *Comparative Connections* (E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations) Volume 4, Number 1 (April 1st Quarter 2002), www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal.html

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"policies toward North Korea are essentially aimed at preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and from producing weapons of mass destruction and selling them to someone else.. Japan's primary policy is to normalise diplomatic ties with North Korea."¹²⁹ Whereas the US has a global defensive perspective, Japan's focus is regional. The North Korean missile program poses a direct threat to Japan's security; however, Japan's primary strategy involves cooperative efforts to reduce proliferation and enhance Japan's regional reputation.

The preponderance of attention the US places on TMD seems to downplay cooperative nonproliferation and arms control regimes which are the mainstay of Japanese policy efforts to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Stephen Cambone, currently the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), writes that while these international regimes may limit proliferation (if states abide by their agreements), the regimes do not stop the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. He also adds that offensive capabilities do not stop the first use of ballistic missiles; therefore, the US must deploy a Theater Missile Defense system in Northeast Asia capable of negating the utility of North Korean weapons.¹³⁰ However, the fact still remains that the US may undermine nonproliferation efforts through its defense-related decisions,¹³¹ and thus undermine its ally's attempts not only to cooperatively reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but also to develop its regional reputation and relationships.

In targeting North Korea as a prospective target for short-term US actions, the US also affects South Korean security calculations because of the potential military ramifications on the peninsula. According to Edward Olsen, "The degree to which the United States is prepared to utilize North Korea's threat potentials for the United States and its own purpose causes problems for both Koreas in terms of U.S. manipulation of the issue and in terms of spill-over effects on each Korea's foreign and defense policies."¹³² However, it is precisely due to North Korea's formidable inventory of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction that even a rhetorical American threat against North Korea, buttressed by TMD, poses potentially serious consequences for the Korean peninsula.

The purpose of US TMD is to defend against and devalue the utility of strategic missiles, thereby dissuading potential adversaries from contemplating their use. According to Philip Coyle in his prepared statements for a House subcommittee, Theater Missile Defenses providing overlapping defense from incoming hostile missiles most likely will not be

¹²⁹ Quote from Naoki Mizuno, professor of modern Korean history at Kyoto University in Hiroshi Hiyama, "Japan sends Senior Diplomat to US for Talks on North Korea," *Agence France Presse*, 8 July 2002.

¹³⁰ Stephen A Cambone, "The United States and Theater Missile Defence in North-east Asia," *Survival*, Volume 39, Number 3 (Autumn 1997), p. 72-73.

¹³¹ In addition to highlighting TMD, the US refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and according to the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, "Some of the proposals of the U.S. nuclear posture review would contradict U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." See Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja, "Slaying the Hydra Together: Weapons of Mass Destruction," *International Herald Tribune*, 3 July 2002.

¹³² Edward A. Olsen, "US-Korean Relations: The Evolving Missile Context," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Volume XV, Number 2 (Fall/Winter 2001), p. 298.

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operationally deployable for nearly a decade.¹³³ With the current hard-line stance toward North Korea and the promise of *future* TMD, the US may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in North Korea in the near-term. US officials themselves categorize North Korea as "irrational" and according to Tong Whan Park, "the balance of terror against the South could be a no-loss proposition for North Korea. Its only concern may be a preemptive strike by the United States against its nuclear facilities."¹³⁴ While North Korea does not have enough ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to effectively challenge the US directly, North Korean capabilities (including conventional artillery) can be fatal for the Republic of Korea.

While TMD may fortify US ability to strike first in the future, South Korea may be capitalizing on America's example today. Following the latest round of fatal hostilities with North Korea on 29 June 2002, South Korean defense officials called for a revision of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) allowing South Korean forces to strike first.¹³⁵ There have been numerous military confrontations between the North and South over the years; however, the recent South Korean request seems to follow the lead of the forthcoming US preemptive strategy. One must remember that South Korea's defense against hostile missiles from the North increasingly emphasizes offensive capabilities because of the overwhelming and immediate threat posed by the North. As the United States seems to take a hard-line buttressed by its (potential) TMD, and highlights defenses over arms control and nonproliferation, this may encourage the same decision-making in Korea. The result could be more proliferation and potential for hostilities on the Korean peninsula, complicating the US goal of regional stability.

If hostilities occur within the next decade, it is currently a fallacy that while protecting US forces with Theater Missile Defenses, "you're almost by definition protecting allies."¹³⁶ Now that the US has eliminated the constraints of the ABM Treaty, the initial goal of US TMD is "to provide limited protection against long-range threats for the United States and *potentially* our allies within the 2004-2008 timeframe."¹³⁷ However, the capabilities of the initial rudimentary TMD system will not necessarily guarantee defense against hostile ballistic missiles for the US or US forces in the near-term. This fact actually may constrain US policy in the short-term and thus allow time for consultation with allies. If this is the case, then Theater Missile Defenses also may be useful for dissuading potential adversaries from pursuing more developed ballistic missile programs. However, there is an inherent catch-22 because the United States insists that North Korea is an irrational regime; therefore,

¹³³ The US currently has limited theater missile defense systems in the Pacific theater (Aegis systems on sea and Patriot on land); however, these systems predominantly defend US sites (e.g. Patriot is located near US air bases).

¹³⁴ Tong Whan Park, "South Korea's Nuclear Option," in Tong Whan Park, ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 102.

¹³⁵ See Don Kirk, "Seoul Seeks Right to Strike First," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 July 2002, <http://www.iht.com/articles/63170.htm> and "The Dead are not the Only Casualties," *The Economist*, 6 July 2002.

¹³⁶ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Ballistic Missile Defense, 19 July 2001.

¹³⁷ Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, "Fiscal year 2003 Missile Defense Budget," 17 April 2002. Italics added for emphasis.

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one not likely to be dissuaded by US actions. Philip Coyle concurs that diplomacy, not technology, may be the "most straight forward route to missile defense against North Korea."¹³⁸

Theater Missile Defense and Allied Partnerships

Theater Missile Defense may also accentuate existing tensions within the alliance relationships. Although both bilateral alliances began with a definitive patron-client relationship, over the years, the US has encouraged and required both Japan and Korea to take more responsibility for their own defense.¹³⁹ President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" expected allies to be primarily responsible for providing manpower for their own defense with the US supporting with air and sea power. President Carter once proposed removing US troops from Korea and allowing South Korean forces to deter the North (until intelligence reports indicated the DPRK's forces were much larger than originally thought). Even during times of solid commitments by American leaders to the bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia, debates over alliance burden-sharing persist. However, while the US stresses cost and risk-sharing, both Korea and Japan emphasize greater authority and decision-making. Robert A. Scalapino writes, "Patron-client relations are increasingly passé. Demands for partnership, including involvement in critical decision-making, are evidenced by those once clients."¹⁴⁰

The US has taken structural steps alleviating some of the patron-client structures and promoting integrated partnerships. The 1997 Revised Guidelines with Japan provides for a more coordinated and integrated working military relationship between US and Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Yet, within the *2001 Defense of Japan*, Japanese defense leaders specifically (and politely) highlight the need for consultation and coordination between the US and Japan, especially on issues related to Theater Missile Defense. Indeed, as the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) on 13 June 2002, President Bush stated that the "United States will deepen our dialogue and cooperation with other nations on missile defenses."¹⁴¹ Yet "dialogue" does not necessarily imply a deepening of cooperative decision-making.

In Fiscal Year 2002, Japan doubled its investment in TMD research with the United States. This is significant because of the self-imposed ceiling on military expenditures to one percent of GNP. However, US decisions on emerging technologies and deployment in other cooperative R&D relationships do not reflect a trend toward equal partnership and decision-

¹³⁸ Philip Coyle, "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense under Bush," *Arms Control Today*, Volume 32, Number 4 (May 2002), p. 9.

¹³⁹ For an overview of US actions affecting Korean military development, see Choong Nam Kim, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Korean Military," *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Volume 5, Number 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 159-182. Also, Nathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century* (National Defense Research Institute: RAND, 1995).

¹⁴⁰ Robert A. Scalapino, "The Challenges Ahead," Tong Whan Park ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 16.

¹⁴¹ President George W. Bush, Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary, 13 June 2002. Access through <http://usinfo.state.gov>

¹⁴² Prime Minister Miki Takeo instituted the 1 % GNP limit on the Japan Defense Agency in 1976; Prime Minister Nakasone removed this as formal policy in 1987; however, since the late 1980s, Japan has maintained this self-imposed limit despite the lack of any legislative requirement to do so.

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making. In Europe, the United States, Italy, and Germany are cooperating on a Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS); however, "Germany has objected to U.S. requirements that certain PAC-3 technologies be 'black boxed,' meaning not accessible to German scrutiny."¹⁴³ The "refocused and revitalized" US Theater Missile Defense Program has already changed some of the initial parameters of the cooperative relationship with Japan as the Navy Theater Wide program has been redesignated as the Sea-based Midcourse system.

Japan also relies on US defense monitoring and intelligence for notification of hostile missile launches in Northeast Asia. Although erroneous information is inherent in gathering intelligence, some Japanese officials are becoming wary of US insistence on deploying a "technologically premature," rudimentary Theater Missile Defense system in the near-term. Having been falsely notified twice in the last year of potentially hostile ballistic missile firings, many Japanese question the "reliability of the US system used to detect incoming missiles."¹⁴⁴ An over-reliance on the initial TMD systems by the United States could degrade Japan's security.

In South Korea, the US relinquished peacetime command and control of Korean forces to Korean Commanders in 1994 and Korea continues to pursue developing more capabilities to provide for its own defense. However, Bates Gill characterizes South Korea's reluctance to buy US Theater Missile Defense systems, namely Patriot, as South Korea "mak[ing] an important political statement to the United States about what is often perceived as a somewhat patronizing attitude of Washington towards South Korea and its alliance relationship."¹⁴⁵ Therefore, TMD may become a symbolic measure of Korea's independence from US dominance in decision-making regarding the Korean peninsula. US lobbying efforts for Patriot stress the importance of alliance interoperability; however, according to a joint study by RAND and the Korean Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA), a primary interest of South Korea is "enhancing the Republic of Korea's technological independence [and] military self-sufficiency," which is not necessarily compatible with US interests regarding the alliance and the peninsula.¹⁴⁶

According to Norman Levin, the "bilateral relationship is relatively healthy in terms of dealing with possible large-scale North Korean aggression or adventurism on the peninsula. However, there is little shared understanding on broader policies towards Pyongyang."¹⁴⁷ For South Korea, military deterrence provides the security for engagement with North Korea

¹⁴³ Roger Handberg, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 138. MEADS is a modified Patriot PAC-3 missile used for the Army-Corps level defense. PAC-3 describes the latest generation of Patriot missile capabilities. It has a greater capacity to respond to tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hostile aircraft.

¹⁴⁴ "US Miscalculation blamed for 30 June Missile Scare in Japan," Kyodo News Agency, 2 July 2002 (reprinted by the BBC). In November 2001 and June 2002, the US mistakenly warned Japan that a potentially hostile missile would land in Japanese waters. The trajectory calculations were wrong.

¹⁴⁵ Bates Gill, "Proliferation and the U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia," Columbia International Affairs Online Working Papers, September 1997, p. 6. See <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gib01>

¹⁴⁶ Nathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of u.s. -Korean Security Cooperation* (National Defense Research Institute: RAND, 1995), p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ Norman D. Levin, "What if North Korea Survives?" *Survival*, Volume 39, Number 4 (Winter 1997/1998), p. 170.

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(President Kim's Sunshine Policy). Even though many Koreans are questioning Kim's Sunshine policy,¹⁴⁸ the fact remains that South Korean long-term goals include reconciliation and reunification with the North. In order for this to occur, South and North Korea must engage each other as equals on the peninsula. US efforts to identify North Korea as a fundamental international threat may undermine South Korea's peninsular strategy.¹⁴⁹ Whereas previously the US recognized North Korea as simply one element of its overall nonproliferation effort, now the US is elevating North Korea's status as an international player. Being part of the "axis of evil" places North Korea's strategic significance well beyond peninsular concerns.

This situation may place pressure on South Korea's emerging democratic processes. Whereas Korea's authoritarian regimes through the 1980s relied heavily on the US for their authority and legitimacy, democratically elected leaders in Korea now must respond to the Korean populace. As the US makes Theater Missile Defense decisions, policymakers should understand that domestic Korean politics now plays a role in Korean security decisions and that the US may no longer have as much influence over the direction of Korean policies as it once did.

Conclusion

The US sees itself as a democratic leader promoting democracy and its fundamental components of transparency that foster understanding, trust and confidence between nations. In the spirit of transparency, the goal of this paper is to identify potential implications of US strategy and Theater Missile Defense on allied relationships in Northeast Asia. Theater Missile Defense is a military weapon system designed to promote US security interests. It is *one* component of the national defense strategy whose goals in Northeast Asia include maintaining regional security and reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

Although Theater Missile Defense is a major policy initiative, US policymakers have not necessarily integrated TMD into the overall national defense strategy so that it complements other available means, nor identified the potential impacts of TMD on allied defensive relationships with Japan and South Korea. In short, Theater Missile Defense has the potential to undermine two of the US defense strategic tenets of strengthening alliances and maintaining favorable regional balances of power. In the near-term as the United States prepares to deploy a rudimentary Theater Missile Defense system, rhetorical comments and technological developments concerning TMD may affect both the domestic and international

¹⁴⁸ A recent newspaper article highlights South Korean public opinion and possible US influence on the opinion. Although the US officially supports President Kim's Sunshine Policy with the North, since January 2000, the US has had no diplomatic engagement with North Korea. "According to a recent survey by the newspaper *Munhwa Ilbo* showed that 55.6 percent of South Korean respondents called for the revision of "sunshine policy" and supported a strong response to the further North Korean provocation." The article also quotes a retired soldier as saying "The deliberate provocation is clear evidence that North Korea is an axis of evil." See Jong-Heon Lee, "Analysis: Korean peace --a long way to go," *United Press International*, 10 July 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Following this logic, US actions could actually assist North Korea's strategy to refute South Korean legitimacy. North Korea continuously attempts to deal directly with the United States, not South Korea, maintaining its position that North Korea is the one "true" Korea with South Korea as a puppet state of the United States.

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security calculations of Japan and South Korea, as well as North Korea. This paper purposely did not address China, although this is an area well explored in the literature. The United States has two successful, democratic allies in Northeast Asia with whom it maintains bilateral defensive alliances. This paper identified potential pitfalls of which both US and allied policymakers should be aware in order to mitigate any budding conflicts that may undermine these defense relationships.

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