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Building an East Asian Regional Order: Testing of Propositions

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The topic of this research project is “Building an East Asian Regional Order.” The current paper will attempt to answer the questions of how the end of the Cold War and the on-going regional dynamics of rapid socio-economic changes --in this era of globalization and complex interdependence of the people and nations-- are shaping and affecting the foreign policy agenda and institution-building in Northeast Asia.

In answering this research question the paper will proceed in several steps: first, a statement of the research problems, a rationale and possible remedies, and formulation of testable propositions; second, a literature survey of the study of East Asian security and regionalism, with an analysis of selective inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) as a case study for comparative regionalism; third, a theoretical articulation of the logic for both institutional design and institution building for a workable regional order, that will promote “democratic peace” through a vibrant market economy; and fourth, a brief case study on Korea’s place in East Asian regionalism. The paper will conclude with a summary and conclusion.

As for the methodology and approach, the author makes a plea for going beyond “analytical eclecticism” in rethinking security in East Asia. The paper proposes an approach that may be characterized as “syncretistic,” as it aims to combine research traditions of field observation and participatory analysis, such as conducting interviews and documentary reviews, with a clear set of theoretical concerns about comparative regionalism and regionalization in Asia and the Pacific. The current paper attempts to apply that approach to a Korean case study. Future phases of this study will continue to apply that approach to examples of other countries in the region.

A. Introduction: Research Program

The passing of the Cold-War era security order, and the dawn of the new age of globalized world economy, necessitates a new perspective and approach to building a workable East Asian regional order. The puzzle of Northeast Asia today is answering the question of “how and why” does the region remain tension-ridden, thereby suffering from “stunted regionalism” (Rozman: 2004) with failed institution-building? This paradox requires careful scrutiny and analysis in the post-Cold War era. Two inter-related perspectives may be employed in this regard: the first is a “structural explanation” and the second involves a “national and cultural explanation.”

First, an “anarchic” structure of the regional security order prevails in Northeast Asia, that is, the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states imposed on post-colonial East Asia. Second, the region has undergone a rapidly changing economic transformation, associated with the market-oriented economic miracles in the post World War II era. The latter is driven, in turn, by globalization of the world economy in the post-Cold War years. The national companies of East Asian countries, for instance, are increasingly empowered to search for economic gains at home and abroad in each of the individual
countries of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. This is stimulated, in turn, by the
new Information Technology era of the twenty-first century (Friedman, 2005).

What Northeast Asia requires under these circumstances is a viable multilateral
institutional mechanism for order-maintenance and prosperity-enhancement, through
which to address the chronic disputes and the clash of national ambitions among the
regional powers. The future challenge lies, as the present study will argue, in promoting
“participatory governance” at home and a “regional peace building” abroad for each of
the East Asian countries encompassing Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China.

Methodological Approach: The leading research questions to unravel the East Asian
puzzle as proposed in this study will be as follows:

What “constitutive principles” should apply to guide the building of an East Asian
regional order? What institutional design is appropriate for the new age of a globalizing
political and economic complex with growing interdependence? Does history matter, like
the rise and fall of the Chinese world order in the bygone era, which was based on a
tribute system (Fairbank, 1968; Kim, 1980)? What lessons can we learn from the clash
between a Sino-centric tribute system and the treaty system as it was imposed by the
Western countries in the nineteenth century? Are the Westphalian system and the Sino-
centric tribute system compatible and reconcilable? If not, why not?

What institutional logic for peace-building is appropriate for the new age of
global interdependence and “stunted” regionalism in Northeast Asia? Is promoting
“democratic peace” theory among the regional actors, for instance, necessary and
sufficient for the building of an East Asian regional order in the new age? What critical
difference will the logic of market economy make, with business cycles (Olson, 1983),
for the smooth functioning of an envisioned East Asian regional order?

One central thesis to be explored is whether promoting “democratic peace,”
through a vibrant market economy, provides an alternative to and strategy for building of
an East Asian regional order. The proposed study will, in particular, rely on the
constructivist approach based on the trilogy of “ideas, interest, and institutions” (that is
three I’s), as well as the decision-making perspective of foreign policy that reflects the
trilogy of people’s “power, perception, and preference” (that is three P’s).ii The
conceptual framework of these “three I’s and three P’s” together will constitute the key
variables and factors for the political and economic analyses of each of the East Asian
countries and their dynamic interplay and interaction among themselves.

In the present study, the perspectives of social theory of international politics
(Wednt, 1999) and the decision-making approach to foreign policy (de Mesquita, 2003)
will be employed in the investigation of the proposed research topic.iii

Significance of the Proposed Project: Building an East Asian regional order, appropriate
for the twenty-first century requirements, will be an act of institutionalization at the
highest order. Twin ideas, like the “democratic peace” theory or promoting a vibrant
market economy, must become institutionalized if they are to be of enduring value.
Institutions allow people to believe that there is not going to be interstate conflict or that
there is a propensity toward regional peace. Institutions will lengthen the shadow of the
future and will reduce the acuteness of a security dilemma. Institutions will also stabilize
people’s expectations in four specific ways.
First, international institutions provide a sense of consistency; most people expect, for example, that the United Nations or the European Union will last for a while. Second, institutions provide an opportunity for reciprocity: there is less need to worry about each transaction (like what happened to post-Summit inter-Korean relations beyond 2000) because over time they will likely balance out. Third, institutions provide a flow of information regarding actions and assurances that both sides are obeying the rules jointly agreed on. Finally, institutions provide ways to resolve conflicts; they enable members to negotiate and bargain rather than to go to war and fight. Institutions, in short, create a climate in which expectations of stable peace will develop (Nye, 2000: 45).

Relevance to East Asian Area Studies: The “democratic peace” proposition, where liberal democracies do not fight against other liberal democracies, could be said to underlie the foreign policy posture and orientation of all democracies, including the major East Asian neighbors. One can argue, for instance, that if a future Korean or Chinese unification is based on a type of “democratic peace” characterized by an institutionalized framework that reflects the above-noted formula, these will further the causes of regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

This will require the future Korean or Chinese unification to be achieved by peaceful means and through genuine association, rather than by war and forceful assimilation of one side by the other (Grinker, 1998). This union could take initially the form of either federation or confederation. The temptation to continue a “hegemonic” unification policy, as pursued by authoritarian regimes in the past, would need to be replaced by genuine reconciliation and reciprocity between the two sides of a divided nation-state.

The formula of the “democratic peace” institution building in Korea and China, as elsewhere in the world in the days ahead, will require taking any one of the following three types, or reflect a combination of some or all, of the three models of “enmity, rivalry, and friendship” (Wendt, 1999: 246-312). As such the social relations between the two Korean or two Chinese states, as well as among the East Asian countries, can move from a Hobbesian condition of “a war of all against all,” to a Lockean culture of restraint, and finally, to a Kantian culture of friendship (Wendt, 1999; Russett and Oneal, 2001).

“Democratic peace” in the East Asian regional order countries is unlikely to materialize, however, unless institution-building is advanced with mutual trust and commitment. Speaking only for the Korean peninsula security, North Korea today is heavily armed and appears ready to strike against the South in pursuit of its own “hegemonic” unification policy that is based on the united front campaign strategy. So, until the security threat changes for better, the peaceful institution-building on the Korean peninsula will remain dormant (Axelrod, 1984; Kihl, 2005).

Interdisciplinary Dimension of the Proposed Research: The primary focus of this research is to mobilize the knowledge base of each of the key East Asian countries during a field study phase of the research. This will be followed by a conscious attempt to synthesize the nation-specific knowledge and findings into one region-wide focus.

The interdisciplinary character and orientation of the research is evident by virtue of the fact that the subject matter of research requires mobilization not only of political science and economics but also of sociology, social psychology, business administration,
and the globalization studies. Answers to some of the specific research questions require a multi-disciplinary investigation and analyses as well as the cross-border and transnational analysis and perspectives.

Potential for Generating Comparativist Knowledge: This research will hopefully advance the Asian studies and East-Asian area study by ways of launching a comparative and cross-country investigation and analysis of the dynamic process of regional integration and institution-building now under way. It may also enrich the intellectual heritage of the humanities and social sciences inquiry of history and Asian civilization (Pye, 1985).

The intent is also to enhance the scholarship on Asian values and regional integration, as contrasted with the study of West European institutions, thereby continuing the on-going research endeavors on Asian values (de Bary, 1998; Tu, 1996). Finally, the liberal arts and ecumenical perspectives, intended by this investigation, will generate the new knowledge basis for the role of diffusion of ideas, such as the democratic peace proposition and entrepreneurship for a vibrant market economy, in the East Asian region.

B. A Literature Survey on the Study of Asian Security and Regionalism

Soon after the Cold War ended the scholarly debates centered on the questions of whether the future of Asia would witness an emerging new regional order, or enduring disorder and chaos. One school insisted that the future of Asia will resemble the past of Europe, the centuries characterized by the warring states of mutual rivalry and conflict. One scholar contended that the region is “ripe for rivalry” and will emerge as the “cockpit of great power conflict” (Friedberg, 1993: 7).

Many in the late 1990s took the alternative position that, unlike Europe, Asia will herald the persisting regional stability and tranquility in their relations among the Asian countries. The latest controversy over heightened tensions, following North Korea’s test-firing of seven missiles including Taepodong-2 on July 5, 2006, does not augur well for promoting peace and stability in the region without first addressing the questions of unsettled political and security issues.iv

As for Asian regionalism a comparison was drawn between the experiences of Western Europe and those of East Asia by identifying the Asia specific features and factors for explaining regional integration. A typical example is the pioneering study by Peter Katzenstein in drawing a comparative regional role of Germany in Europe and that of Japan in Asia by calling them, respectively, a “tamed power” and a “network power” (Katzenstein, 1997; Katzenstein and Shiraishi, ed., 1997).v

a) Rethinking Security of Asia and the Pacific

Several benchmark studies are identified to address the subjects of rethinking Asian security and Asian regionalism. To begin with four recent projects on rethinking Asian security can be cited to illustrate the major themes and the state of arts on the scholarship of Asian security order. These are the collected volumes by Alagappa (1998, 2003), by Ikenberry and Mastanduno (2003), and by Suh, Katzenstein and Carlson (2004).
Muthiah Alagappa’s first edited volume (1998) is a pioneering and inclusive study that addresses *Asian Security Practice* in terms of its material and ideational influences. It mobilizes the talent and expertise of some eighteen sub-regional and country specialists of Asian studies.

His second volume (2003) continues to explore *Asian Security Order* in terms of its instrumental and normative features by mobilizing the talent of sixteen specialists on sub-regional and country experts of Asian studies. Unlike the former, the latter volume is more thematic and conceptual, exploring the pathways to order and discussing the management of specific issues of regional security.

Asian security practice, according to Alagappa, has been subject to influences by both material and ideational factors, and the need is there for conceptualizing security in a broad and comprehensive manner that also includes a hierarchic conceptualization (1998: Ch 20). The building of an Asian Security Order, on the other hand, was a deliberative act of construction and designing, that accounts for both instrumental and normative features of Asian security (2003).

Even if Asian security practice is not culturally unique (1998: 640-645), in the sense of its sharing of the basic features of security concerns with other regions (such as political legitimacy and internal conflicts), the Asia-specific security practice and dynamics must be subject to careful analysis and explanations based on in-depth case studies (1998: Ch. 19). Asian security practice, not surprisingly, is highly complex, contested, and dynamic.

In its institution-building of an Asian security order, one must account for not only its prevailing security practices, but also the historical context of how the vast region of Asia has come to play in international politics. It must consider the colonial origins and experiences of the Western modern state system (1998: Ch. 1 and 2). It also must make use of the symbol of national sovereignty of the Westphalian world order (2003: Ch. 3). The more specific set of pathways to security order consists of the following: “incomplete hegemony symbolized by the U.S. dominance (2003: Ch. 4); balance of power politics (Ch. 5); regional institutions building (Ch. 6); track 2 diplomacy (Ch. 7), economic interdependence and promoting cooperation (Ch. 8); and utilizing UN system (Ch. 9).

Also, on matters of managing a specific set of regional issues and issue-areas, the possibilities of regional conflicts are open to future challenges in the variety of functional domains. The following set of specific issues are identified and a case study was commissioned by country specialists in the 2003 edited volume: a set of acute conflicts in Asia, like the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan strait tension (Ch. 10); territorial disputes among the Asian countries (Ch. 11); maritime issues (Ch. 12); nuclear weapons, missile defense (Ch. 13); managing internal conflicts (Ch. 14); and human security as an intractable problem in Asia (Ch. 15) (Alagappa 2003).

Based on this comprehensive and carefully choreographed research project, Alagappa in his concluding chapter makes a set of five tenable propositions on Asian security order, as follows:

First, the security order exists in Asia that (contrary to the assertion that Asia is a dangerous place) is based on these findings:

- a widely shared normative framework;
• the growing salience of the principles and norms associated with this framework in ensuring state survival, easing the security dilemma, and sustaining normal political and diplomatic interaction among states that are part of the Asian security system; and
• the role of these principles and norms in facilitating coordination and cooperation in the pursuit of private and common security.

Second, the prevailing security order in Asia is largely instrumental in character but it also has important normative contractual features. In view of “virtually no commitment to a present or future collective political identity at the sub-regional or regional levels …” power and force still play a key role in the interaction of the major powers, although their function is primarily in the defense, deterrence, and reassurance roles.

Third, multiple pathways sustain the present security order. No single pathway is dominant in the management of Asian security affairs, although the preponderant power of the United States and the public goods it provides weigh heavily in the key security relationships and issues in the region. Nevertheless, the security order is not hegemonic … and Washington cannot manage security in Asia by itself. It needs the cooperation of the other Asian powers.

Fourth, security and stability in Asia rests on several pillars … (1) the U.S. security role and forward military presence, even if American role is not uncontroversial; (2) the continuing consolidation of Asian countries as modern nation-states; (3) the development of a normative structure that assures mutual survival and supports international cooperation; and (4) the rapid growth of the Asian economies and their growing integration into the global economy.

Fifth, the present security order is likely to persist for another decade or more. Change when it happens is likely to be gradual and occur both in the distribution of power and normative structure. The power and influence of Asian states especially China are likely to increase but these countries are unlikely to be in a position to challenge the predominance of the United States in the foreseeable future. The study also underscores the analytical value of the conceptualization of Asia as a single security region with several interconnected sub-regional clusters or complexes, and the purchase of analytical eclecticism in understanding and explaining Asian security behavior.

These two Alagappa’s edited books, pioneering as they are, also seem to suffer from the typical vice of anthology, as a collected volume of individual essays. The editor has attempted to fit too many explanatory variables under one cover, “without an overarching intellectual theme that ties the variables together,” as noted by one team of reviewers (Carlson and Suh, 2004). “Although some of these volumes argue for multivariate approaches, they tend to merely list explanatory variables or analytic frames that are deemed useful” and “stop short of considering how an interaction among variables is attributable to the political phenomena they try to explain” (231).

Finally, from the perspective of the above-noted trilogy, the Alagappa volumes will need to be reassessed as to their relevance and significance. The first volume clearly outlines the importance of developing a broad definition of security that forwards the argument that a key is to move beyond treating “ideational and material influences” as mutually exclusive explanations of security outcomes in the region. Alagappa not only
calls attention to the “interplay of ideas, interest and power” in producing particular security outcomes, but also argues that locating the relationship among them requires combining “the insights of related paradigms and theories, especially those of realism and constructivism” (Alagappa, 1998: 675).

In the second volume, Alagappa refers directly to the necessity of utilizing “eclectic theorizing in understanding and explaining Asian security behavior” (Alagappa, 2003: xii). Despite the value of his proposed approach, with foresight, Alagappa’s works have suffered from the limitation of what may be called “additive complementarity,” as one recent review puts it. Although the case studies in his volumes would present rich accounts of security phenomena in Asia, they tend to pay little attention to theory building and end up with greater realism, some liberalism and short on constructivism (Carlson and Suh: 232).

Turning next to the volume by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (2003), it constructs a broad framework for the study of Asian security. The study proceeds from the premise that “not instability but stability” is an appropriate metaphor that best depicts the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. Stability is defined broadly as “the absence of serious military, economic, and political conflict” among the nation-states in the region (Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003: 2).

This study outlines five distinct frames for analyzing the current security situation within the Asia-Pacific. These are said to be: (1) balance of power and stability, (2) styles of hegemony and stability, (3) history, memory, and stability, (4) institutions and stability, and (5) economic interdependence and stability. Yet, such frames are simply listed in the introduction, with little attention given to “how the causal factors emphasized within each one interact and converge to produce particular outcomes within the region” (Carlson and Suh, 2004: 231).

Each of the eleven chapters attempts to substantiate International Relations (IR) theory perspective of the Asia-Pacific, ranging from the focus on U.S.-Japan Alliance (Ch 1), China’s grand strategy (Ch 2), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and related security institutions (Ch 3 & 7) to that of the political economy and bilateral economic conflict issues (Ch 8, 9 & 10) as well as interpretations of select countries foreign policy purposes (Ch 11 & 12).

The sources of stability and instability in the Asia-Pacific are primarily found, according to the editors, not only in security relations, but also in economic relations, especially “in the intersection of the two” factors of security and economics (Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003: 3). Security conflicts, for instance, “have the potential to disrupt the economic interdependence upon which prosperity depends. For states in the region, then, economic and security relations interact to create vicious and virtuous cycles. The challenge for the statecraft is to achieve the latter and avoid the former” according to Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003: 4).

Chapter 4 of this anthology deserves particular attention here because its author attributes the regional stability to the cultural practice of a Sino-centric perspective on hierarchy. David Kang notes that some argue Asian international relations to have historically been “more peaceful and more stable” because it “emphasized formal hierarchy among nations, while allowing considerable informal equality.” This is in sharp contrast to the Western tradition of international relations, he continues, which is based
on “formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and almost constant interstate conflict” (Kang: 164; Kang, 2001: 3-33).

Based on this alternative perspective of a “hierarchic international system” the author draws an interesting set of behavioral implications for Asian international relations. These include the notion that “material power is at the base of the hierarchy, but other factors also matter” like the cultural practices and ideational factors. Another implication is that “bandwagoning by the lesser states is a central feature of hierarchy,” rather than “balancing of power,” which Kang illustrates with historical examples drawn from policy behavior of Korea and Vietnam vis-à-vis the central powers in coping with the regional tensions and conflicts (Kang: 167-168; Kang, 2001: 3-33).

Beyond this generalization, however, the editors merely hint that it is in turning to the U.S. role in the region that one may find the “crucial variable that will determine whether security conflicts are managed effectively and whether stability endures” (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003: 3). Then, the concluding chapter of the volume reiterates the theme of a pivotal role of the U.S. in the region, “only via a series of our stylized scenarios of the future of Asian-Pacific security order (will depend) on the prospects for shifts in the U.S. presence in the region, largely within the context of American domestic politics as a variable (Carlson and Suh: 232).

This explanation of externalities, however, is insufficient because it fails to identify the evolving Asia specific institutions and shifting identities as well as the changing distribution of power among the East Asian countries, which are making their own decisions regarding their perception of uncertain security future.

In regard to the fourth book by Suh, Katzenstein and Carlson (2003), it starts with the notion that the contemporary international relations research have revolved around a trilogy of constructivism, liberalism, and realism as a way to address some of the substantive and methodological issues and that a study of East Asian security must also reflect these concerns. Constructivism is based on the view that “ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct, and reproduce the institutional and material structures as well as their own roles and identities within them” (Suh, Katzenstein and Carlson, 2004; Katzenstein, 2004: 9).

Contemporary liberalism, in turn, focuses largely on “how rational state actors seek to maximize efficiency in an interdependent world and how, even under conditions of anarchy, this intentionality can produce cooperative arrangements and a rational aggression of social preferences” (Katzenstein, 2004: 10). This is an offshoot of neo-liberal institutionalism that provides a theory of explaining “how and why” international institutions are needed in world politics today (Keohane and Nye, 1989).

The realists diverge sharply from constructivism and liberalism by insisting that “states are inescapably operating in a self-help system, in which their cooperation is constrained by the objective of maximizing relative gains in the distribution of capabilities” and that, on security, “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability” (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 7, as cited by Katzenstein, 2004: 11). This anthology contains several theory-driven case studies, carefully designed, to substantiate each of the three IR theory perspectives of Constructivism, Liberalism, and Realism. This paper will assess these case studies, more in detail, in the next section of rethinking comparative regionalism in Asia and the Pacific.
b) Rethinking Comparative Regionalism of Asia and the Pacific

Asian regionalism, if it is to be viable, must be centered on a convergence of interests in the provision of some collective good. Bilateral political practices in Asia rather than multilateralism, however, had excluded collectively shared norms of Asian regionalism, as Katzenstein noted (1997: 23). In this regard four recent books on rethinking Asian regionalism can be cited to illustrate the scholarship of comparative regionalism. These are the studies by Katzenstein (1997), by Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson (2004) previously listed, by Pempel (2005), and by Kim (2004).

First, Asian regionalism according to Katzenstein (1997) is inclusive in character and network in style of integration. He starts from the premise that the scope, depth, and character of regional integration processes will vary across numerous dimensions and among world regions. Comparative analysis will thus highlight the inclusive character of Asia’s network-style integration, in contrast to the exclusive character of Europe’s emphasis on formal institutions. Four possible scenarios of Asia’s future are identified at the outset, by posing the following set of questions with implications for the type of institutions appropriate for Asian regionalism:

Will Asia be dominated by Japan, China, or the United States? Will it be divided by ethnically based coalitions that express Chinese and non-Chinese identities? Will it be transformed by globalization? Or will Asia be shaped by multiple centers of influence?

In Katzenstein’s view the future of Asian regionalism is open and to substantiate this optimism the author advances three varying theoretical approaches and perspectives. The first is a neo-mercantilist perspective, which emphasizes that the world is moving toward relatively closed regional blocs. In this view Japan is at the brink of reestablishing a new version of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The second is the opposing liberal view that global markets are creating convergent pressures across all national boundaries and regional divides. The third view is that distinctive world regions are shaping national polities and policies and that these regions are indelibly linked to both the larger international system of which they are a part and to the different national systems that constitute them.

Regionalism offers a stepping-stone for international cooperation between unsatisfactory national approaches on the one hand and unworkable universal schemes on the other. An analysis of Asian regionalism will “need to pay greater attention to the cultural basis of power,” according to Katzenstein (1997: 24). Regional integration in Asia will be more easily institutionalized if political actors subscribe to the notion of forming a distinctive community, as it was true in Western Europe, than if they do not.

In the past, as James Kurth has argued, the values embedded in the Atlantic and the Pacific basins were antithetical. The states of the Atlantic Basin endorsed international liberalism and welfare, while the states of the Pacific Basin endorsed national mercantilism and development (Kurth, 1989). Under this circumstance it was natural that only the values of the Atlantic Basin states had the chance to make political programs and government policies favoring institutionalized forms of regional integration.

Asian regionalism, according to Katzenstein, is characterized by dynamic developments in markets rather than by formal political institutions. This weak formal
institutionalization of Asian regionalism, in turn, is explained in terms of international power and norms and in terms of domestic state structures.

A theory of comparative regional integration has been advanced by Katzenstein (1997) with a thesis that, unlike in Europe, the Asia-Pacific regionalism is characterized by (1) the relative weaknesses of the formal political (or security) institutions and (2) the weak development of state structure and institutions. The latter point coincides with the slower development of the rule of law and norms of international behavior. Asian regionalism, in short, is characterized by dynamic developments in markets rather than by formal political institutions. The weak formal institutionalization of Asian regionalism can be explained in terms of international power and norms as well as domestic state structures (Katzenstein, 1997: 7).

Turning next to Katzenstein’s second book, the study of Asian regionalism has also been undertaken within one of the three research traditions of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, thereby resulting in partial and incomplete understanding of the status and process of regionalization (Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, 2004). The concluding chapter by Carlson and Suh (2004) makes a contribution that seems to be right on target.

A number of case studies of analytical and explanatory sketches are presented in this volume on *Rethinking Security in East Asia* (Suh, Katzenstein and Carlson, 2004). Several substantive essays in the book emphasize both material and structural conditions portray(ing) Asia as a series of power balancing states that are caught in security dilemmas (Ng-Quin, 1986). Four case studies deal with the specific Asian countries of “Beijing’s security behavior” (Ch 2), Tokyo’s security discourse on bilateralism and multilateralism (Ch 3), Seoul’s discourse on security alliance with the United States (Ch 4), and Southeast Asia’s strategy of coping with “strategic uncertainty” (Ch 5).

Some fail to understand, however, that security dilemmas between some states— for example, between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, and Japan and its neighbors—tend to stem from more fundamental competition for legitimate statehood” (Carlson and Suh, 233). Moreover, “those who worry about the absence of formal multilateral institutions (tend to) fail to recognize the ways in which competing states are engaged in institutionalized identity negotiations in public spheres.” “Other explanatory sketches in this volume would zero in on the absence or relative weakness of formal institutions that help Asian states manage their relationships, even if some of them acknowledge that Asian states are enmeshed in informal and personalized ‘networks’” (Ikenberry, 2001; Katzenstein, 1997).

The study also illustrate the point that “a small but growing number of scholars who underline the importance of shared values and ideas claim that some sub-regions, if not all of Asia, are emerging as a security community (Acharya, 2001, 1998; Buss, 1999). Yet, they (seem to) neglect the extent to which the process of common identity production is impeded, or facilitated, by the distribution of material capability and by the presence of institutionalized fora of interaction. Thus, the trialectics of identity, power, and efficiency may possibly produce different “constitutional structures” in the Asia-Pacific as in other world regions.

A literature survey on Asian regionalism must also include *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (Pempel, ed., 2005). In its introductory essay, Pempel explores what he calls “emerging webs of regional connectedness.” There are three
drivers of East Asian Linkages, according to Pempel, in terms of governments, corporations, and what he calls ad hoc problem-oriented bodies or entities (or NGOs) and two directions of building cohesion which he calls regionalism and regionalization. Whereas regionalism involves primarily the process of institution building from the top, by the respective governments in the region, regionalization as a concept develops from the bottom up through the society driven process that is dynamic and fluid (Pempel: 19).

The result of the complex interplay of three diverse drivers, operating from two different directions, is that the composition of East Asia as geographic entity has become highly contested with different visions: Asia-Pacific, East Asia, Pacific Rim, Pacific Basin, Far East, and so on (Evans, 2005). Hence, the region known as East Asia has emerged with highly fluid outer boundaries, subject to redefinition and reconfiguration. Since “the boundaries vary constantly as problems and attempted solutions change,” the term “remapping” is suggested here not as changing the existing territorial boundaries but as “additional lines of cooperation that are constantly evolving across East Asia. “Outer boundaries are continually reshaping our perceptions of what we mean by East Asia,” so observes Pempel (p. 28).

Finally, a group of leading scholars were assembled to participate in a timely project on “Asia in World Politics” to produce an anthology of empirical country-specific studies, The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Kim, 2004). This book edited by Samuel S. Kim addresses the “major-power interaction” and “flashpoints in the divided nations.” It examines the political/security dimensions as well as economic dimensions of China and Japan, respectively, and each of the foreign policy of Russia, the U.S., South and North Korea, and Taiwan. The introductory chapter, entitled “The North East Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus” (S. Kim), and the conclusion on “Region Building,” called “the Emerging Northeast Asian Regional Order” (Lowell Dittmer), are both theory-driven and rich in conceptualization, as will be noted again in the final section, and in summary and conclusion, of this paper.

c) A Case Study of IGOs in the Asia-Pacific

In the making of the Asia-Pacific regional organizations, both positive and negative aspects of institution-building of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) are evident in the Asia Pacific Region. The focus here is primarily on IGOs activities rather than on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are very dynamic and prolific in their region-wide activities.

On the positive side one can mention (a) the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) as well as (b) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as a successful on-going IGO process in the region. The ARF is led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded on August 8, 1967 by foreign ministers of the five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). In the Manila Declaration of December 15, 1987, the heads of state of the six member countries (Brunei added) reaffirmed their common resolve to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) for the region.

The ARF, founded in 1994, is the only region-wide security organization in Asia and the Pacific. It was an attempt to expand the security role of ASEAN’s ten members to include other countries in the region like Northeast Asia, South Asia and Australia and
New Zealand, thereby excluding the United States as member state but extending an invitation to the U.S. to participate in the process. Proponents call ARF as an example of “soft regionalism,” but it was also called by some critics as nothing more than a “talk shop.”

The first meeting of the APT, including ten ASEAN members and three Northeastern countries of China, Japan and South Korea, was held in 1997 as an expanded forum of ASEAN summit. The growth of intra-regional economic ties and an Asian regional identity, as well as a gradual easing of the U.S. opposition, were responsible for the emergence of this grouping. The APT typically meets during or after an annual summit of the ASEAN heads of states. In this way the ASEAN’s concern of the matters of important developments in Northeast Asia, like the Korean Peninsula security and the North Korean nuclear standoff, were incorporated into the security dialogue and agenda of the ASEAN Plus Three. The idea of APT thus materialized to enhance the influence of China, Japan and South Korea as the rising economic power in the region, and their concern over the security and welfare of the region as a whole.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum was launched in 1989 by twelve countries at their founding meetings in Canberra, Australia. The APEC Leaders Summits are held annually in varying member country locations, like the 1993 Seattle Blake Island APEC Summit meeting, which was hosted by the then-US President Bill Clinton and the most recently held one of twenty-one member countries was the Busan APEC Summit meeting in November 2005.

The APEC Ministerial meetings and Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) are also held periodically to implement the Joint Statement adopted by the Leaders Summit. Three pillars of APEC are: (1) Liberalization (of trade and investment), (2) Facilitation (of business), and (3) Cooperation (both economic and technical) in world trade and its promotion. Some of its operative principles are “open regionalism,” meaning that any regional country government agreeing with the stated purposes of APEC is welcome to join as new member of the organization.

The APEC Leaders Summit has adopted two important goals called 2010 and 2020 vision statements, meaning that the politically advanced and economically developed member countries in the region would achieve the stated goal of liberalized economy by the year 2010, while the economically developing member countries would do so by the year 2020. The twenty-one member countries of APEC, in 2006, constitute close to half of the world total GDP holdings.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) which was launched in January 1995, after the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiation) in the preceding year, is the functional equivalent of the global trade body of a regionally based APEC. The WTO as a dispute settlement mechanism and as a free-trade norm setting body, however, seems to face significant challenges.

In recent years the so-called Doha Round of the MTN launched in 2001, in Qatar’s capital city of Doha, has not been successful in meeting its set-target date of April 30, 2006, “to agree on precise formula” for cutting the government subsidies and tariffs, especially on agriculture and service sector industries. The Doha Round of the MTN was declared a failure in late July 2006. This is why the FTA (Free Trade Agreement) negotiation, which is largely bilateral, has been launched by many of the APEC member
countries, including South Korea and the United States, in recent years. The FTA process is aimed at accomplishing bilaterally what the WTO could not do multilaterally, along the paths toward the free trade zone globally and regionally.

On the negative side two recent developments in institution building in the East Asian region: the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) can be noted.

First, during the 2005 APEC Summitry in Busan, the East Asia Summit desired by some countries like Japan failed to materialize. So long as the APT was meeting, some asked why the leaders of the three regional countries of China, Japan, and South Korea could not meet among themselves to begin with. Those sessions could be expanded later to include the summit meetings of the head of other regional powers. But the regional tensions in the preceding years, including the deterioration of the bilateral relations between China and Japan as well as between South Korea and Japan was a bad timing of such an idea to bear fruit.

Controversy was waged over the issues of China and South Korea criticizing the practices of Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro paying his annual tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, where some of Japan’s WWII convicted war criminals are entombed, as well as the Japanese government condoning of the pro-militaristic tone of textbook writings, which created ill feelings toward Japan’s near neighbors. This fueled nationalist sentiment and anti-Japanese fever both in China and South Korea.

Second, following the APEC Summit in Busan in November 2005, the meeting of the ASEAN Plus Six was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, on December 12, 2005, to announce the adoption of the so-called Kuala Lumpur Declaration of the ASEAN Plus Three. In addition to the ten ASEAN member countries, China, Japan, and South Korea have been added to constitute the so-called ASEAN Plus Three, as already noted, so as to address the sub-regional tensions of Northeast Asia. This time around, however, three additional countries of India, Australia, and New Zealand were also added, in order to constitute the so-called ASEAN Plus Six, but their presence was strictly in the capacity of observers rather than regular members. What is clear from this invitational diplomacy is the conspicuous absence of the United States and Canada were not invited by the host country government of Malaysia.

The main thrust of the 2005 Kuala Lumpur Declaration this time had to do with the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the so-called East Asian Community (EAC) down the road. This plan was previously floated by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia as an alternative to APEC but was not successful in attracting support from other key countries in the region. Whether and how this new regional institution of EAC will take hold next time, however, remains to be seen. What seems to be clear, however, is that the Malaysian government continues to harbor its ambition of playing host and playing a balancing role in regional politics vis-à-vis the United States and its allies within the context of the ASEAN process.

Third is the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) in Shanghai on June 14-16, 2006. The original founding members of the SCO, launched in 2001, consisted of China and Russia, together with the four Central Asian countries including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Chung, 2005). What made the 2006 meeting interesting was that both Iran and Afghanistan were invited to attend as observers. The Russian President Vladimir Putin announcing, on June 15, the
visiting Iranian President Mahood Ahmadinejad after meeting with him the day before the opening of the SCO session; had said that Iran “is ready to enter negotiations” with the West (i.e., the EU member countries of UK, France, Germany and the United States) in response to the more flexible proposal announced by the UK foreign secretary in New York the week before, together with the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Both China and Russia oppose to U.S. pressures on Iran to forego its nuclear weapons development program including possible economic and diplomatic sanctions. Iran is China’s third largest supplier of the crude oil, and Russia reportedly wants to sell its nuclear reactor technology to Iran. The Uzbekistan President at the SCO meetings continued to insist upon the set deadline for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Central Asia, whereas the Afghanistan President Karzai was reported to say at the meeting that foreign soldiers are welcome until the mission of anti-terrorism is completed.

In conclusion, it is clear that the Asia-Pacific region is not as stable nor has it progressed so far along the path of regional community-building as compared, for instance, to Europe and the European Union. But it seems that the ASEAN and APEC processes of regional institution building seem to be on the right track and that the Pacific Basin countries are determined to prepare themselves for the better future of “peace and security” in the 21st century.

In this process of institution-building in East Asia, we need to be more realistic in expectation and be aware of the limits of functional approach to regional integration.x According to one observer (Katzenstein, 1997),

Theories based on Western, and especially West European experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism. Functionalist integration theories, for example, underline the importance of institutional learning on the changing attitudes and behavior of political elites. A core proposition of functionalist theory stipulates a spillover effect that ineluctably transforms economic unions to political ones. The history of Asian regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s appears to contradict that expectation (5).

Nonetheless, in this age of globalization and information technology, the Pacific Ocean no longer seems to pose a barrier for travel and communication. Instead, the Pacific Ocean acts as the common lake and a common resource to be shared jointly by all global citizens. Under the circumstance of an emerging challenge in the new age, a new set of perspectives and testable propositions will need to be explored.

C. “Democratic Peace” and Building an East Asian Regional Order

Based on the above-noted literature survey of the study of Asia-Pacific security and regionalism, this study makes a plea for going beyond “analytical eclecticism” of rethinking security in East Asia.xi We will need to formulate new propositions that will give a fresh look at current conflict issues that impact future efforts to develop a regional order. This will require moving toward a methodology that may be characterized as “syncretistic,” as it aims to combine field observation and participation analysis, such as interviews and documentary reviews, with theoretical concerns. This last point, to be elaborated in the present section, will be called a “Democratic Peace” theory approach to
be followed by a case analysis of the current security issues in Northeast Asia that hinder the building an East Asian regional order.

"Democratic Peace" Theory and Practice

"Democratic Peace" theory starts from the premise that “peace can be seen as essential, for without some degree of peace, neither development nor democracy is possible” and that “yet both development and democracy are essential if peace is to endure” (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1996: 53).

This notion of why peace is essential for both development and democracy and, therefore, “democratic peace” will be conducive to both peace and prosperity is widely adhered to by both scholars and practitioners who advocate “democratic peace” proposition, as the basis for public policymaking in the Western countries. Former U.S. President William J. Clinton spoke, for instance, during his address to the United Nations General Assembly, on September 26, 1994, that “Democracies after all, are more likely to be stable, less likely to wage war (and) (T)hey strengthen their civil society.” Democracies can provide people “with the economic opportunities to build their own homes, not to flee their borders” (UNGA, 49th Session, 1994).

Institutionalization is a key to democratic peace in foreign policy. Ideas must become institutionalized if they are to be of enduring value. Interests and identities become efficient and economic through the process of institutionalization of ideas. One such profound idea is building a community of democratic peace (Russett, 1993).

Institutional Logic for Peace Building:

The statement that “democracies very rarely, if ever, make war on each other” is commonly known as the democratic peace proposition. Although this statement must be considered a strong probabilistic observation (democracies rarely fight each other), rather than an absolute “law” (democracies never fight each other), there exists sufficient statistical evidence to show that “there is a separate peace among democracies” and that this hypothesis (that democracies rarely fight each other) is now generally, if not universally, accepted (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 43).

For the “democratic peace” theory to work and function smoothly, however, one needs to recognize the reality that not all countries in the region of Asia and the world at large are necessarily so-called “democratic” states to begin with and that there exists a variation and differential degree of democratization among the member countries of the region of Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, among the ASEAN countries, the variation is even more pronounced. Most countries are aspiring democracies, with variation between the Philippines as an established democracy, while Thailand is a constitutional monarchy and Indonesia is a struggling electoral democracy. Whether Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are open to liberal democracy are disputable at best, whereas Myanmar clearly has an authoritarian military regime. The countries in outer region of Australia, New Zealand and India are, for all practical purposes, established democracies.

In Northeast Asia, Japan is an established liberal and parliamentary democracy, a government imposed on them after WWII by the U.S. occupation forces in 1945, while China is the communist and socialist country since its founding of the People’s Republic
China has pursued the policy of market reform, instituted by the late Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy in 1979. South Korea’s Sixth Republic, since 1987, has undergone successful democratic transition and struggled to attain democratic consolidation. The Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan since 2000 and Mongolia since 1991 are generally recognized as thriving “new democracies” in Northeast Asia. North Korea, under the Kim Jong Il reign, continues to remain a non-democratic “dictatorship” despite its official name of the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).

This practice of political economy in the region raises the question, as regards “democratic peace” proposition, as to what is meant by the term “democracy” to begin with. Democracy, simply put, is “rule by the demos” or government by the people. In explaining democracy, differentiation is usually made between its substantive and procedural aspects. Substantively, democracy is a form of government based on the consent of the people and it serves the general interest of the governed. Procedurally, democracy is a form of government where the people through elections, which are “fair, open and periodic,” select the leaders. Candidates are expected to compete for votes (Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Pae, 1986: 1–14).

The differentiation between the substantive and procedural aspects of democracy reflects the values underlying the conception of democracy. Substantive democracy gives an emphasis to such values as justice and equality. Procedural democracy, on the other hand, promotes such values as fairness, due process, transparency, and the rule of law. Recent empirical research on democratization tends to favor a procedural or minimalist conception of democracy over a substantive or maximalist conception that embraces political equality and social justice (Shin, 1994: 142). The procedural conception of liberal democracy, according to many, is said to have gained greater acceptance today, not only by the elites, but also by the mass public (Huntington, 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).

The social science literature is full of studies on democracy as a theory and practice (Dahl, 1989; Held, 1987; Sartori, 1987). Democracy, as a political science concept, means a political regime that permits free and competitive elections, where the adult population enjoys not only universal suffrage, that is, franchise, but also the protection of basic human rights by the government. A democratic regime must provide an institutional mechanism for its citizens to enjoy the basic freedoms of speech and the press, as well as the rights of political association and political competition (Share and Mainwaring, 1986: 177). A democratic regime must also enable an alternation in political power through periodic general elections.

Two observable and empirical indicators of democracy, as Robert A. Dahl observes, are the presence in the political system of political contestation and popular participation in the political process (1971, 1989). A political system is democratic, as Samuel P. Huntington notes, “to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (1984: 194). An operational definition of the term “democracy,” therefore, will require the presence of both the regime and political opposition forces in society, a society governed by the institutional rules and arrangements for peaceful and orderly political change via election and the electoral process (Dahl, 1989; Di Palma, 1990; Huntington, 1989; Lawson, 1993; Mainwaring, 1993; Sartori, 1987; Schmitter and Karl, 1991).
Democracy, as such, reflects primarily Western values that have acquired universality or universal appeal in the late twentieth century. Democratic values are somewhat alien to an East Asian traditional culture that draws on the beliefs and norms of Confucianism (Kihl, 2005: 39-43). Although East Asian civilization had some notions of democratic values and value-orientation, the dominant paradigm of the traditional culture of East Asia was family centered and hierarchical in human relations and value orientation (Kihl, 2005: 319-324).

Peace as a concept also has multiple meanings and definitions. Minimally, peace is an absence of war and conflict. Maximally, peace requires an active cooperation and friendship. A narrow definition of peace entails: (1) ending of specific hostilities, (2) absence of armed hostilities, (3) active friendship/promoting cooperation, and (4) a set of certain institutions (e.g., Pax Britannica). A broader definition of peace, on the other hands, entails: (5) law and order with justice, (6) “harmony, concord, and amity,” (7) a state of mind or personality free from agitation, and (8) an absence of noise – silence.xiv

Armed with conceptual clarification on “democracy and peace” we are now ready to turn to examine the reality of the practice of peace-building in the Northeast Asia region in the post-Cold War era.

**Practice of Peace Building in Northeast Asia:**

The democratic peace theory, where liberal democracies do not fight against other liberal democracies, could be said to underlie the foreign policy posture and orientation of all democracies, including South Korea and Japan and their respective actions of future administrations toward their neighbors. The notion of “Democratic Peace” (that democracies rarely go to war against one another) is now widely accepted in the study of world politics. The question of how and why this is the case is still debated and unresolved, however. Institutional factors, like norms and culture, as well as structural elements like economic growth, have been mentioned. Regime types and political system have also been suggested as explanatory factors and the causes for sustaining democratic peace (Russett, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001).

Why do institutions matter in inter-national relations? The answer is that institutions provide a framework that shapes expectations (Nye, 2000: 43). Institutions allow people to believe that there is not going to be a conflict or that there is a propensity toward peace. Institutions lengthen the shadow of the future and reduce the acuteness of a security dilemma.

Institutions stabilize expectations in four specific ways. First, institutions provide a sense of continuity; most people expect the United Nations will last for a while. Second, institutions provide an opportunity for reciprocity; there is less need to worry about each transaction. The Chinese leader avoided confronting Japanese Prime Minister at the 2005 ASEAN Plus Three or the 2005 APEC Summity) because over time issues will likely balance out. Third, institutions provide a flow of information regarding actions and assurances that both sides are obeying the rules jointly agreed on. Finally, institutions provide ways to resolve conflicts; they enable members to negotiate and bargain rather than to go to war and fight. Institutions, in short, create a climate in which expectations of stable peace will develop (Nye, 2000: 43).
This idea may also be applied to future security and regionalism in Northeast Asia. The fact that anticipated summit meetings among the three East Asian leaders failed to institutionalize in 2005-06, among the three leaders of China’s President Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, either during the ASEAN Plus Three meetings in the fall of 2005 or during the APEC Summit meetings in Busan in November 2005, does not augur well for Asia’s future diplomacy and dealings on peace and security. Nevertheless, in the long run, instituting a democratic peace among the three and their neighbors near and afar will be the only viable way of promoting peace and security in Northeast Asia.

An East Asian regional integration, based on a type of democratic peace, with an institutionalized framework that reflects this formula, could emerge as a union of democratic and peace-loving states, similar to the European Union. If so, the future regional security and peace could be achieved by peaceful and genuine association, rather than by war and forceful assimilation of one side by the other. This union could take the form of a custom’s union or Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The temptation to continue a hegemonic trade or investment policy, as pursued by authoritarian regimes in the past, would need to be replaced by genuine association based on a reciprocity rule between the two sides. The non-democratic approach to regional peace and prosperity, which perpetuates the self-righteous policy stance of each side based on the Mercantilist practices in the past, has been allowed to persist for too long.

Institutions that promote democratic peace between China and Japan could at least in theory bring peace to the region. The political formula of the democratic peace institutions in Asia in the days ahead can be made flexible. It could resemble any one of the following three types or reflect a combination of some or all of the three models of “enmity, rivalry, and friendship” (Wendt, 1999: 246–312). As such, the social relations between the neighboring states can move from a Hobbesian condition of a war of all against all, to a Lockean culture of restraint, and finally, to a Kantian culture of friendship (1999; Russett and Oneal, 2001).

Democratic peace in intra-regional relations is, however, unlikely to materialize as long as some countries (like the DPRK) continue to remain unyielding as a communist and dictatorial state. North Korea today is heavily armed and appears ready to strike against the South in pursuit of its own “hegemonic” unification policy that is based on the united front campaign strategy. So, until the security threat changes for the better, the peaceful institution building on the Korea Peninsula will remain dormant rather than active.

Under this circumstance of security threat posed by certain neighboring countries (like the communist North Korea), South Korea and Japan as a liberal democracy must be prepared to defend themselves from a possible attack and invasion by the North and to wage a war, if necessary, to prevail over the non-democratic state. A more viable and realistic alternative path toward democratic peace on the Korea Peninsula, for instance, may be to promote a region-wide mechanism of security cooperation and institution among like-minded countries in Northeast Asia. This multilateral arrangement of security institutions could ultimately result in trapping a non-democratic country (like North Korea) as an island in an open porous sea created by regional collective security.

An East Asian regional security community of like-minded states that pursue democratic peace may also be fostered as cross-border exchanges promoted among
regional actors through expanded trade and communication. The underlying logic is that a growing interdependence among the peace-loving participating countries will lead to a greater degree of regional integration and cohesion, in which all share a common sense of vulnerability.

**Regime Change and Democratic Peace: Three Explanations**

In the context of successful democratic transition in East Asian countries, like South Korea and Taiwan, one can validate a set of theoretical propositions on regime change and democratic peace to see what relationships, if any, prevail among overriding concepts of democratization, economic growth, and foreign policy. The three explanations for foreign policy behavior by democratizing regime are offered here as hypotheses, rather than as a proven theory. Two of the three theories regarding economic growth and democratization have proven to be valid up to a point, whereas the third theory on regime type and foreign policy has not been fully validated. The reason for this assessment needs to be explored.\textsuperscript{xv}

The first theory asserts that East Asian countries’ democratization and economic growth are not always compatible as policy goals.\textsuperscript{xvi} This is somewhat exaggerated because South Korea’s Roh Tae-Woo government attained reasonable economic growth during its five-year tenure in office, by more than doubling the gross national product (GNP) per capita from $3,110 in 1987 to $6,498 in 1991. The same pattern can also be seen for Taiwanese authoritarian regime of Lee Teng-hui prior to its democratic transition to the newly elected Chen Shu-bian government in 2000, under the Democratic Progressive Party, to be reelected in 2004. Although not as high as in the preceding administrations, an average of 7 to 8 percent of the annual GNP growth for South Korea as for Taiwan was certainly high and a respectable economic performance when measured against the world standard.

The reasons why some claim that democratization and economic growth are incompatible are linked to the changing nature of state-society relations and the dynamics of regime change. With democratization, the state, in the sense of office holding by ruling elites, changes its character and its role in society. State autonomy has now been constrained as civil society has become activated. State intervention in the market process in a democratizing country like South Korea’s Sixth Republic and Taiwan’s new democracy has been reduced. Democratization means a “continuous regime change in an autonomous state,” whereby state autonomy, or state capacity for autonomous action, has become constrained by domestic interests and external pressures.

The second theory states that the relationship between democratization and economic growth is not always positive. This claim is also somewhat exaggerated and proven to be only partially valid. It is assumed that the role of the state in the capitalist market system is different from the authoritarian developmental state and in the democratizing state. Successful industrialization during the authoritarian era led to the rise of new social classes and a new set of interests, in addition to the emergence of new elements of civil society occasioned by the democratization of politics. The new democratic state must tailor its policy to suit the interest and demands advanced by newly activated groups and classes in civil society.
The new state intervenes in the process of democratization and economic growth via the middle-class citizenry and helps the regime to broaden its basis of political support. In the transition process, the middle-class support is the key determinant in democratization. Yet, in the post-democratization phase, middle class desires political stability and a conservative regime that is able to sustain law and order. The role of the state has become more diversified and its policies made multidimensional, so that the policy of economic growth is sometimes put onto a back burner by a regime that is preoccupied with maintaining continuous political stability and support of the middle class.

The third theory asserts that political regime type and economic performance will have no bearing on the success or failure of a country’s foreign policy. This statement is proven false in the case of both South Korea’s and Taiwanese experiments in democratic transition. In fact, the causation is the other way around, for example, the regime type (whether authoritarian or democratic) and the economic performance (either high or low growth) will affect the success or failure of the regime’s foreign policy. Because South Korea and Taiwan initiated democratization and had a proven record of high economic performance in the past, both the Roh Tae-Woo and Lee Teng-hui regimes were able to launch and succeed in the foreign policy initiatives of positive diplomacy vis-à-vis former Socialist countries soon after the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, with the gain toward democratic consolidation, middle-class voters are now more interested in the policy issues of economic growth and social welfare. This is the reason why during the 1992 presidential election campaigns in South Korea and during the 1999-2000 presidential election campaigns in Taiwan neither foreign policy nor unification policy captured the attention of the electorate. The public was interested more in the economy and leadership and less in foreign policy and unification policy issues. Although all leading candidates had their own visions and strategies regarding the kind of reunification they hoped to bring about, they were not questioned extensively on these issues during their presidential campaigns. In fact, the initial enthusiasm for inter-Korean and cross-strait agreements and accords on reconciliation and nonaggression, as well as exchanges and cooperation, died down during the campaigns.

Peace and reunification were effectively non-issues during the subsequent presidential election campaigns of Korea in 1997 and 2002. In the end, what matters for the future of South Korean and Taiwanese democracy is far more predicated on domestic politics than on how foreign policy is conducted. So long as both South Korea and Taiwan continue along the path of liberal democracy. These foreign policies will be inspired by the idea of democratic peace. Under these circumstances, the prospect of a Korea Peninsula and a Taiwan Strait free of war and conflict will be greater. This can be the case despite the momentary rise and fall in foreign policy initiatives and the popularity of the incumbent administration, or its reunification strategy toward the failing communist regimes in North Korea as well as the People’s Republic of China.

D. Korea’s Role in East Asian Regionalism: An Exposition

Promoting regime change for democracy in each of the East Asian countries has become not only the purpose of the United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War era but also the strategic doctrines of the George W. Bush Administration, in the post-9.11 era of
combating global terrorism in the twenty-first century (Walt, 2005). The “Democratic Peace” proposition (that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against each other) is, therefore, not only an ideology of foreign policy but also a strategic doctrine for building a workable regional order in Northeast Asia. This is the case because realism dictates that the regime type per se does not matter as much as the performance of the regime in living up to democratic promise and expectations.xvii

However, not only does “power matter” in international politics and diplomacy, but people’s “preference” and “perception” also matter greatly in the world of practical politics, in enabling “democratic peace” to come true and to take roots as an institution. The liberal premise is that “all democracies in the modern era are, by necessity, representative governments, where political leaders are chosen by the people as an electorate.” Not only are leaders elected to make policies and choose policy alternatives based on their interpretation of the people’s “preference” on the policy issues, but they are always sensitive to the public interest and people’s “perception” as to how and why certain policies in democracies are adopted for implementation.xviii

Building a workable institution of East Asian regional order is also necessary, even if it may not be sufficient, for promoting regional peace in this age of globalization. This is so because of the on-going dynamics of regionalism and regionalization in East Asia, and the constantly evolving and changing role for regional integration in this age of nationalism and globalization. This perspective reflects both constructivism and constitutive point of views.

A “region” may be defined in various ways, but for our purposes a region represents an area of the world, or a geographic area, that is broad but homogenous in sharing a set of common characteristics. The Asia-Pacific during the Cold War years was not as open and porous as it is today. In the post-Cold War years, East Asia is a mosaic of divergent cultures and regime types politically. Spurred partly by United States post-WWII --and post-Cold War-- policies, East Asia has become a region that reflects the potential for free trade and liberalism facilitated by the process of globalization and internationalization. Hence, East Asia has become porous as a region of territorial states in the Asia-Pacific (Katzenstein, 1997: 24).

East Asia also has a defined geographic space that has constituent regimes with a set of discernible characteristics. These include, according to one scholar, “a shared socio-cultural heritage, shared political attitudes or external behavior, geographic proximity, economic complementarity, and/or some form of institutional cooperative arrangements” (Lowell, 2004: 331). Here the focus will be primarily on Northeast Asia: Japan, Korea (North and South), and China. The focus also includes the United States with its strong military and economic presence in the region. That reflects the nexus of the three largest world economies.

**Regionalism, Regionalization and Regional Order**

Regionalism and regionalization are interrelated, but they are analytically distinct processes through which Northeast Asia can be conceived as moving forward in the age of globalization (Hurrell, 1995; Pempel, 2005: 19; Pempel, 2004). Regionalism involves primarily the process of institutional design and creation by nation-states to cope with transnational problems that arise from the growing and increasing interdependence of the
people and nations across the national boundaries. Regionalism, as the government-led process and institutions of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), has at least three key elements: it is top down; it is biased toward formal (usually inter-governmental) agreements; and it involves semi-permanent structures, in which governments or their representatives are the main participants.

Regionalization, in contrast, is a society driven process that is bottom up in its origins and developments. Regionalization, as such, is pioneered by the market-driven forces of business activities that are now increasingly identified with civil-society activities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The impetus toward regional integration in Asia comes today more from economic links driven primarily by private corporate actions. This bottom-up process is less appreciated by such formal IGOs as ASEAN, ARF, or APEC. Asian regionalism, in this sense, is deepened more by the dynamic development in market (i.e., through regionalization) and less by an official act of formal political institutions (i.e., inter-government agreement on regionalism) (Katzenstein, 1997: 7).

A “Regional Order” is an idea, a set of activities, which is often lost in the preoccupation with Nationalism and with Globalization, but may be taken seriously in this age of complex interdependence of the people and the nations across the globe and in Asia and the Pacific, in particular. Regional order offers a stepping-stone for international cooperation between national and universal approaches to problem-solving in this age of global interdependence.

**Dynamics of Regionalism 1**

We live in an age of nationalism. Yet, a new force of globalism or globalization has emerged to become a dominant factor and force to be reckoned with in the twenty-first century. Between the national and the global one can identify something in-between called the regional. Regionalism is connected to both nationalism and globalization but, is distinctive and different from either one. A “Regional Order” thus does not preclude nationalism or globalization, but it encompasses both in a search for peace and prosperity for the people and nations around the world.

In Asia, as elsewhere, national and international developments are increasingly shaped by regional dynamics. Asia’s future will be dominated less by Japan, as an economic superpower, or by the rising China, but more by the United States coalition building with its key allies in Asia working toward a global reach. Also, Asia’s future is likely to be shaped less by traditional forces, like ethnicity, culture, religion, and civilization, and more by a cohesive Asian identity, which does not yet exist.

An emerging Northeast Asian regional order today is full of “puzzles and paradoxes.” Four specific clusters of problems will illustrate this point: (1) Sino-Russian “Strategic Partnership,” (2) a landscape without strategic architecture, (3) cooperation without an overall institutional integration, and (4) integration and its exceptions, like the ones between the two halves of divided Korea and China (Dittmer, 2004: 331-360).

**Dynamics of Regionalism 2**
In decades after the end of the Cold War in 1989-91, East Asia was supposed to be ripe for regional peace and stability rather than rivalry and instability, punctuated by frequent summits of political leaders who promised to improve mutual ties and trust. Fifteen years after the Cold War’s ending globally, this is not exactly what transpired in the region and there has been no breakthrough in the momentum of building an East Asian regional order. The question is “why?” “The prime culprit in aborted efforts to achieve regionalism” in Northeast Asia, according to Gilbert Rozman, “is modernization with insufficient globalization” (Rozman, 2004: 3). This suggests that “unbalanced development dating back many decades” in each of the major East Asian countries of Japan, South Korea and China, “has left domestic interests in each country unusually resistant to important manifestations of openness and trust of the outside” world.

Rozman argues that Korea’s return to the center stage is essential to the success in promoting regionalism in Northeast Asia (Rozman, 2006: 151-166). South Korea’s place in regionalism at the end of the Cold War was crucial, as he argues, because the United States provided key support to South Korea by “combining cold war protection by troops,” and by “open-market modernization that tolerated the most protectionism of any U.S. trade partner, and, finally, by democratization that established the most glaring contrast with a communist rival” (p. 151).

Japan is said to be eager in its anticipation of signing a free trade area (FTA) within the next few years, while the Koreans are looking to the United States and China for a follow-up FTA “that would signify a regional balance rather than one-sided dependency.” “Over the horizon, multilateral support for North Korean economic openness (if it comes) would add further impetus to regional integration” in Northeast Asia.

The paper will turn next to address the questions of “how and why” (a) an interdisciplinary social science orientation and (b) the comparative history perspectives are both deemed essential for an analysis of the regional dynamics and the structure and process of regionalism in Northeast Asia that will help in charting the future options for the study of Asia-Pacific regionalism. The focus on Korea and its role in Northeast Asian regionalism represents a first step in a broader study that will apply the syncretistic approach to an assessment of regionalism in East Asia.

*History Matters 1*

Historically, the case of Korea and its role in East Asia help to illustrate the role of regional balance. A common image of Korea, once known historically as the “hermit kingdom” in the late nineteenth century, has gone through a number of changes and transformation over the years. Geographically, the Korean Peninsula is the crossroad of civilizations providing a land bridge between the continental and the oceanic forces in Northeast Asia. It is surrounded by the major powers of China, Japan, Russia and the United States, with its presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific as the world’s dominant power. Today, Korea is in the midst of the dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Korea’s centrality role in the East Asian Regional Order has taken many different forms over the years.

Historically, Korea served as the transmitter of high Chinese culture and practices to Japan. Buddhism, for instance, first originated in India but later traveled to China. The
Koreans transmitted Buddhism from China to Japan.²² Even if this function has declined over the centuries, this practice has left Korea well positioned as an intermediary. In the first half of the twentieth century, when Korea became a colony of Japan, the Japanese attempted to reverse the flow, making Korea the conduit to China, as was once tried but failed in the late sixteenth century, when Japan invaded and ransacked the Choson kingdom by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his army en route to China for conquest.

History Matters 2

In the modern era, since 1945, historic ties were disrupted in various directions, although some of the former linkages between Japan and China through Korea can be restored and reconnected. In the Cold War era, South Korea drew Japan’s attention as the latter began to regain a footing on the Asian mainland as an economic power. North Korea as a socialist country took advantage of a balancing role in the decades of the Sino-Soviet disputes and rivalry. The opportunities for casting Korea’s centrality in the region were rather limited during this time, because each half of divided Korea across the 38th parallel could not make significant inroads.

The Korean Peninsula has moved to the hub of Northeast Asia once again, with the advent of Japan as an economic miracle-making and the future rise of China as an economic power. South Korea as the successful economic power also makes its future role as linking Japan and China in the East Asian regional order both promising and hopeful. “Economically, South Koreans now have grown hopeful about occupying the middle post in a high-tech urban belt linking Beijing and Tokyo,” as one observer wrote (Rozman, in Armstrong et. al., 2006: x). The ways to do so would be “via energy pipelines, which would pump oil and perhaps gas from Asiatic Russia to China and Japan.” It can also be done “via a Eurasian railroad corridor reducing the transit time for goods shipped across more than 6,000 miles.” Finally, “in a giant free trade area that China and Japan lack sufficient trust to develop without a third party present,” Korea can easily fill this gap.

Rozman’s Four Plus Five Formula

Four building blocks of Northeast Asian regionalism, according to Rozman, contribute to the cause of building a regional order: 1) globalization and the United States maintaining ties with each of the major countries; 2) domestic development tied to regionalism, including national identities, development strategies, and the balance of centralization and decentralization for the main regional actors; 3) bilateral relations in the region, most importantly Sino-Japanese, Sino-Russian, and Russo-Japanese relations; and 4) a general overview of strategies for regionalism (Rozman, 2004: 5).

Five additional conditions are said to be needed for Northeast Asia to achieve regionalism, according to Rozman: First is the national strategies of modernization, that will give importance to the neighboring countries, recognizing the growing need for a far-reaching division of labor. Second is the presence of national identities that accept neighboring countries as partners rather than threats and orient one’s own country build trusting relationships across civilization boundaries. Third is recognition that the dominant place of the United States does not preclude an evolving balance of powers on
a regional level, including the role of other powers in resolving hot spots and allowing for confidence in long-term relations without fear of deepening insecurity.

Fourth is incremental progress in bilateral relations sufficient to put territorial disputes and other problems aside while expanding ties. Fifth, finally, is a vision of regionalism, persuasive to elites and public alike that shows the way to substantial advantage without posing serious concerns in each country (Rozman, 2004: 16). Whether these conditions for a successful regionalism in Northeast Asia are present and available, however, is not obvious and must be subject to empirical testing and validation.

In another context Rozman continues to examine Korea’s return to center stage in promoting regionalism in Northeast Asia (Rozman, 2006: 151-166). South Korea’s place in regionalism at the end of the Cold War is crucial, because the U.S. provided key support to South Korea by “combining cold war protection by troops,” “open-market modernization that tolerated the most protectionism of any U.S. trade partner, and, finally, democratization that set the most glaring contrast with a communist rival (p. 151).

In taking a developmental perspective of Korea’s role and place in regional dynamics, one needs to recognize the twin factors of (1) “multiple paths” to promoting regional peace and prosperity and (2) “path dependency” nature of the future policy alternatives and options open to Korea. By “multiple paths” the intent is to underscore that there is more than “one way or the royal way” to achieve the stated goal of “building an East Asian Regional order.” “Path dependency” will also dictate and constrain the subsequent “a posteriori” historical path to be chosen by the future leadership and to be pursued by its generation.

**National Conflict in Regional Context: A Case Study on North Korea Missile Launch and the Six Party Talks**

The controversy over the Korean Peninsula security dynamics, unleashed by the provocation of the North Korean test-firing of seven missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 5, 2006, needs to be addressed. This controversy is a timely and apt “analytical episode” in the contemporary Korean politics and history, and provides an opportunity to demonstrate the value of the syncretistic method.

What is the proper role of the Six Party Talks, which is set up by China to help defuse the U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff, as a multilateral diplomatic forum? Is the Six Party Talks formula, to be hosted and mediated by China in Beijing, but also attended by North Korea and other interested countries consisting of South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States, effective as a means to address the nuclear crisis and also to seek for final settlement of the issue? The author had an opportunity to visit South and North Korea during the period of the crisis stimulated by the North Korean missile test-firing on July 5, 2006. He interviewed key government officials, academic scholars, and business leaders in South Korea, as well as exchanging views with the North Korean officials at the Kaesong Industrial Complex Liaison Office.

Pyongyang continuously boycotted and sabotaged the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, until September 2005 before agreeing to the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks in Beijing on September 19, 2005. The six-point statement was based on the draft prepared by China’s chief negotiator and Vice Foreign Minister.
Wu Dawei. In view of its importance, the content of this 6-point agreement will need to be spelled out.

The Six Parties agreed to (1) re-affirm the goal of attaining the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner; (2) undertake, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations; (3) to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally; (4) commit to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia; (5) take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action;" and (6) hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

It is one thing to come to agree on a set of principles. However, unless it is put into effect as a set of meaningful actions, the agreement will remain as an empty talk, and the Six Party Talks will have failed, to stimulate the subsequent rounds of talks focused on setting up an implementation plan. Except for a brief meeting of the Fifth Round, on November 9-10, 2005, Pyongyang has consistently set the prior conditions for the U.S. Bush Administration. The Bush Administration has, in turn, chosen to impose financial sanctions against North Korea on the charge of an alleged counterfeiting of U.S. dollars (i.e., super notes) and money laundering by the Kim Jong Il regime.xxiv

The firing of the Taepodong-2 long-range missile was much anticipated since the first launching over Japan of the Taepodong-1 missile on August 31, 1998. The only surprise was associated with the timing. North Korea, in fact, has test-fired a number of short-range Ro-dong missiles as well as anti-ship missiles along with the most recent one tested in March 2006. Moreover, there was no prior agreement on North Korea’s long-range missile firing. The U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks were held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2000, following the then-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in September/October 2000, so as to explore possibilities of state visit by then-U.S. President Bill Clinton. In 2001 North Korea announced a self-imposed moratorium, which is now broken, on the Taepodong-2 test firing, and the DPRK never joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that the U.S. maintained together with other interested parties.

Nevertheless, North Korea’s missile firing generated immediate reaction from Japan. The Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo announced, on behalf of Prime Minister Koizumi Jinichiro, plans to put Japan’s Self-Defense Forces on alert and Japan might have to resort to force, if necessary, to respond to Pyongyang’s provocative act. The South Korea’s response was much more deliberate and low keyed. Official response was delayed for several days. Even the public response in Seoul was muted with defused protests on several national issues, including a mass demonstration against the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement negotiations under way in Seoul.

The 19th Inter-Korean cabinet level talks to discuss the North Korean request for South Korean delivery of rice and fertilizer to the North went ahead as scheduled in Busan on July 12-14, more than a week after the missile launching. However, the South Korean chief delegate Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok asked for clarification on the North Korea’s missile test-firing and used Pyongyang’s promise to return to the Six-Party Talks as the condition for its delivery of the promised rice and fertilizer. The North
Korean chief delegate insisted that these were the separate matters and that Seoul was expected to deliver a humanitarian relief to the North. Out of anger the North Korean delegation left the conference one day earlier than expected.

The Kim Jong Il regime of North Korea is prepared to wait for the next U.S. Administration to be elected in November 2008, if necessary, before settling issues associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), consisting of the nuclear, biological and chemical, as well as the missile launching proliferation issues. The record shows that on multilateral diplomatic process of defusing the North Korean nuclear issue, hosted by Beijing and known as the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang had delayed their progress until the fall of 2005, well after the November 2004 congressional and presidential elections and the launching of the Second George W. Bush Administration.

The report turns next to the broader implications of the unfolding crisis. The tension on the Korean Peninsula was clearly escalated as a result of this test-firing of the Taepodong-2 missile by North Korea, which turned out to be a failure as it malfunctioned within 43 second of its launching. What it means on the future of the East Asian regional peace and security requires serious and measured considerations. Several preliminary points of observation can be made.

First, North Korea demonstrated its possession of the technical know-how and capability for launching the long-range missile beyond the 1,400 km (Taepodong-1 missile) to reach an estimated 2,500 miles range. When it is equipped with the nuclear warheads, which North Korea claims that it now possesses (although they have yet to be tested in open-air), the DPRK will emerge as a new nuclear weapons state, thereby posing security threats to the U.S. territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and the continental West Coast, not to mention the U.S. troops presence and deployment in the Asia-Pacific region.

Second, the North Korean new capability as a nuclear weapons state may trigger other regional powers, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, to initiate their own nuclear weapons development. This can lead to a nuclear arms race in the region unless it is defused by a new U.S. commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella and protection of its allies in the region.

Third, the shock wave generated by the North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile launching will travel to China, Russia, and other countries beyond the Northeast Asia region, to the ASEAN countries, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere countries.

Fourth, launching the Taepodong-2 missile can have a booster shot effect of accelerating the time schedule for resumption of the currently stalemated Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks. Whether it will help or hinder the implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, such as an agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, however, is not clear at this time. It all depends on the reaction by each of the Six-Party Talks member states, and the world public opinion that substantiates either hawkish or dovish foreign and security policies by each major power at stake.

It is relevant to underscore the urgency of the diplomatic settlement of the unfolding security crisis, as Henry A. Kissinger noted in his contributed article to Washington Post, on May 16, 2006, entitled “A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy.” “An indefinite continuation of the stalemate would amount to a de facto acquiescence by the international community in letting new entrants into the nuclear club.” Under this
circumstance “(F)ocusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue” and “(D)iplomacy needs a new impetus,” as Kissinger insisted.xxv

I agree that “Progress [on Korea] requires agreement regarding the political evaluation of the Korean Peninsula and of Northeast Asia” in general. This may require “A new approach on North Korea” like negotiating “a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” and on exploring new “ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.” Such a policy commitment is already on record in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks alluded above. The future challenge lies in moving this policy process into action. That will become increasingly difficult and controversial in the absence of mutual trust and confidence-building measures.

Despite a series of diplomatic moves and actions against the North Korean launching of missiles, first by the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of the Japan sponsored Resolution on July 15, followed by the Group of Eight (G-8) Economic Summit statement of July 17, and the ASEAN Regional Forum chairman’s statement of July 28, Pyongyang has consistently resisted the external pressures for returning to the Six-Party Talks forum for peaceful negotiation and settlement of the nuclear and other related issues.

The Six-Party Talks forum has proven to be rather limited as a diplomatic means to settle the politically charged and salient issue of the nuclear weapons proliferation in regional and global politics. Like all diplomatic moves it is a means to an end rather than an end itself. This suggests that there is a limit to diplomacy and to such a multilateral diplomatic forum approach to problem solving as the Six-Party Talks. Bi-multilateral approach (i.e., 2 + 4) to defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis has not proven to be a success as a working peace strategy for defusing the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.xxvi

The Logic of Asymmetric Conflict and Security Dilemma

The ambitious North Korea, under Kim Jong Il as its leader, has pursued the high-risk and high-stake policy of developing the nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence strategy. It is playing the classic tit-for-tat game of nuclear brinkmanship with the U.S. as the surviving superpower, in order to compensate for its weakness through the dangerous firing of nuclear weapons. It is in order to overcome the security dilemma that North Korea deliberately chose to play the brinkmanship strategy and thereby to raise the security challenge on the Korean peninsula.

What are the policy implications and what lessons can be drawn from the unfolding drama of the North Korean nuclear brinkmanship strategy and the “war and peace” issue on the Korea Peninsula?

What makes the North Korean case interesting and important is that Kim’s North Korea, as a weak state, confronts the overwhelming power of the United States as a hegemonic state. Kim’s North Korea relies on new form of asymmetric strategy vis-à-vis the United States through internal balancing of its military power. As a country isolated Kim’s North Korea is no longer capable of forming alliance with others through external balancing. By mobilizing their own internal resources, however limited they are, Kim’s
North Korea confronts the United States by employing a strategy of internal balancing (Walt, 2005: 16).

The internal balancing strategy of North Korea is based on three broad options. First is the conventional warfare capability of exploiting the “contested zone” of the Korean Peninsula across the DMZ by launching military attack. Second is the developing and acquiring the WMD capability that, through deterrence, would make it difficult-to-impossible for the United States to use its superior conventional forces against them. Third is the weapons sale or technology transfer of the WMD capability to other countries or to a terrorist group with no obvious “return address” (Walt: 132-141).

Depending on how the current nuclear controversy is addressed and managed, there exists a distinct possibility of the worst-case scenario of a nuclear-armed North Korea becoming a reality (Cha and Kang, 2003).xxvii The danger exists for North Korea’s overblown rhetoric of threat and retaliation coming true as a “self-fulfilling prophesy.” Likewise, the new national security strategy of preemption by the Bush administration, proclaimed in order to defeat global terrorism in the post–September 11, 2001 security environment, may be invoked, although the Bush strategy may be ill suited to the Korean security. After Iraq North Korea may be the next target; at least that is what Pyongyang believes.

The literal application of the Bush strategy to North Korea, invoking the doctrine of preemptive war, may end up with greater tragedy of leading to another Korean War. The price of the regime change that results from the war may be too high and costly when directed to the belligerent and bellicose North Korean regime of Kim Jong-II. An outbreak of the Korean War will need to be avoided by all means; it will not only undermine the economic foundation, but also destroy the fragile peace sustaining the burgeoning political and civil societies of South Korea’s new democracy.

“Avoiding the apocalypse” in the Korea Peninsula will require the United States and its allies to take deliberations on the Korean security head on with renewed seriousness (Noland, 2000; 2004). This will require upgrading their policy debate over “nuclear North Korea” to a higher level of scholarship and practical strategies that confront the “war and peace” issues head on (Cha and Kang, 2003). The U.S. policy toward Korea, for instance, suffered from the past practice of treating Korea as “ad hoc, reactive, and derivative of the alliance with Japan” (10). But the U.S. policy to confront “nuclear North Korea” must go beyond this practice of treating Korea policy an appendage.

The security dynamics of the Korea Peninsula are a classic case of a security dilemma arising from the situation of an “anarchic” structure of international politics. Under anarchy, independent action taken by one state (in this case the DPRK) to increase its security is taken by the United States and its allies of South Korea and Japan feel less secure. The nuclear standoff as a security dilemma is a specific type of Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where cooperation between North Korea and the United States with its allies is difficult because of the possibility of defection and cheating in the absence of mutual trust. Does this mean that there is no hope and possibility of achieving cooperation under anarchy?

According to Robert M. Axelrod’s 1984 study, there are three ways of overcoming the security dilemma. The first is by promoting “the mutuality of interests,” that is, the extent to which each actor (in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation) can achieve its
own interest by acting cooperatively rather than competitively. The second is by lengthening “the shadow of the future,” that is, the extent to which actors value future payoffs from further interactions. The third is by limiting “the number of players,” that is, cooperation becoming more difficult as the number of players increases (1967). That the United States chose to involve other actors in the nuclear talks, under the umbrella of the six-party Beijing talks, may make the situation more complex and complicated rather than confronting North Korea face to face.

Does this mean that future war is unavoidable and inevitable on the Korea Peninsula? The answer is “not quite,” because it all depends on what the United States and its allies are prepared to do next. The only way to avoid war and conflict on the nuclear standoff, again as Axelrod argues, seems to by “lengthening the shadow of the future.” U.S.–North Korean dialogue and negotiation over the nuclear issue, or lack of it, reflect what may be called a “tit-for-tat” game, which is usually played by states that are perceived as distrustful: “If you cheat, I will do likewise” and “I will do to you what you did to me.” This strategy works, however, only if there is a long shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1967). Unfortunately, with the continued stalemate and brinkmanship, this shadow is rapidly dwindling and, with it, the narrowing funnel of choices and the loss of the degree of freedom in foreign policy decision making (Nye, 2002: 78–79).

The U.S.–South Korean alliance cannot be taken for granted any more, but will require constant vigilance and nurturing. The sequence of an unfortunate developments, starting with a fatal traffic accident involving a U.S. military vehicle running over 2 school girls in 2002, led to “anti-American” sentiment and subsequent street demonstrations getting out of hand, with burnings of the American flag. These were heavily covered by the media. This episode, combined with U.S.-ROK divided opinion on policy toward North Korea, helped an unconventional politician, Roh Moo-Hyun, win his presidential bid over a “pro-American” candidate in the 2002 December presidential election.

E. Summary and Conclusion

In the end the investigatory journey on “Building an East Asian Regional order” requires highlighting few obvious points in the changing global security environment, in which we all are engaged and enmeshed as concerned citizens. In this regard the heightened security threat in Northeast Asia, unleashed by the North Korean provocation of multiple missile launching of July 5, 2006, and the diplomatic responses to defuse such a crisis, will exhibit the nature of regional conflict with inherent limits and possibilities for the diplomatic approach to problem-solving.

First, we have one world but many regions. The region, in turn, has many nations and states. The territorial boundaries of statehood are firmly demarcated and settled. Second, we live in the world which is subject to rapid socio-economic changes, which are unleashed by the forces of globalization and Information-Technology revolution. Third, the process of regionalism from above, in the form of inter-government consultation among the nation-states, and regionalization from below, through market-driven economic factors and forces of trade, investment, tourism, and migration is constantly shaping and affecting the landscape of widening transnational activities across an established boundary of the nations and states.
Fourth, the U.S.-led global security order, or an “American imperium” as others prefer to call it, has been having a profound effect on regions, especially in creating a world of porous regions. Regions differ in their institutional form, type of identity, and international structure. Some regions, such as Asia and Europe, have core regional states, in these cases Japan and Germany that over decades have acted as supporters of American power and purpose.

Other regions, such as Latin America, South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, however, lack such intermediaries connecting them with the United States. Spurred by U.S. policies, especially promoting globalization has made a world of porous regions. This regional porosity is enhanced politically by vertical relations that link core regional states to America, regions to sub regions, and America to regions. The American imperium is not only an actor that shapes the world. It is also a system that reshapes America (Katzenstein, 2005: 1).

There are certain countries in the region which are left out in isolation, either by choice or by circumstances, from a world of porous regions. The Kim Jong Il’s North Korea today, which refuses to return to the Six-Party Talks, is a case in point. Following the missile launching of July 5, 2006, which was subsequently met by the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous decision against the North’s provocation, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) annual meeting of foreign ministers was held in Kuala Lumpur on July 28, but did not succeed in diplomatic settlement of the controversy.

Inconclusive ARF Kuala Lumpur 2006 Process:

The ARF was attended by foreign ministers of all member states including the North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun and the U.S. Secretary of State Condoeezza Rice. The two leaders did not meet face to face, thereby bypassing the possibility of settling the disputes and agree to resume the stalemated Six-Party Talks soon. The Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s earlier attempt for ninety minutes to persuade North Korea to return to the Six-Party talks did not succeed at the meeting. The result was the ten-party talks at the ARF. This included five countries of the Six Party talks (minus the DPRK), plus Australia and Canada (which were within the range of North Korea’s Taepodong -2 missile launching), Malaysia, New Zealand and Indonesia.

Paek and Rice spent three hours in the same room at the forum proper without speaking, let alone shaking hands. Rice was first to say that North Korea violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and threatened the international community with its missile tests, with the Taepodong-2 missile a direct threat to America. Paek countered that the U.S. deployed weapons against the North and also test-fires missiles, and yet condemns everything the North does as illegal. Paek noted that there were voices within the U.S. proposing preemptive strikes on the North but reiterated that Pyongyang is committed to the September 19, 2005 statement of principles pending lifting of the financial sanctions by the United States.

Paek earlier noted, at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center, that the ARF agreements are supposed to be reached with the consent of the members concerned. He warned that if the 10 countries at the meeting would attempt to force through any statement condemning what he called legitimate actions within the North’s sovereign rights, it would resist by all available means and consider leaving the regional framework.
He added that Pyongyang “totally rejects” the UN Security Council Resolution on the missile tests.

A wide gap and fundamental schism prevails between the United States George W. Bush Administration policy toward North Korea, with his perception of the terrorism threat in the post-911 world, and the North Korean perception and policy of Kim Jong Il toward the U.S. and the world outside. On the U.S. Bush Administration policy of regime change toward North Korea, as part of its negotiation strategy vis-à-vis North Korea, Henry Kissinger expressed his skepticism in the Washington Post Column on “A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy” on May 16, 2006. “Focusing on regime as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue,” Kissinger wrote (because) “the United States should oppose nuclear weapons on North Korea and Iran regardless of government builds them” (Kissinger, 2006).

Future Prospects:

The future of East Asian regionalism is difficult to predict, because the advocates of regionalism face a recurring criticism. The project for building institutions lacks “a clear objective, a shared vision, and strong political support” (Evans, 2005: 196). Political leaders are aware of regional developments and frequently float new proposals, for various kinds of joint projects and regional institutions. Yet, they seem to “expend very little energy persuading domestic constituencies about the importance of these ideas and devote very few resources to their implementation” (Ibid.).

If regionalism is the expression of “a common sense of identity and destiny combined with the creation of institutions,” that express their identity and shape their collective action, regionalization is the expression of economic interactions and human transactions in Northeast Asia. “Caught between aspirations for building multilateral cooperation and political realities constraining it,” so argues Paul Evans, “regionalism in East Asia often takes hybrid forms that frequently blur the distinction between governmental and non-governmental,” as manifest by various forms of Track II dialogues among the opinion leaders.xviii

A world of regions summarizes the nature of world politics today, as one scholar recently noted. World politics has undergone a huge shift recently, away from bloc bipolarity in the Cold War era, to an American-centered regionalism in the post Cold-War years. The America’s predominance or hegemony, or what Katzenstein has chosen to call “American imperium,” is now the hub in a wheel with many regional spokes (Katzenstein, 2005: 43). The future challenge lies in how to institutionalize the reality of the U.S.-dominant world order globally and regionally, so that all nations and people will feel comfortable for participation in the process of building a workable regional order.

Concluding Remarks:

In this essay the primary focus was to present the logic and evidence of an East Asian regional order, by testing the “democratic peace” proposition among others, in the new security environment of the post-Cold War era into the 21st century. In doing so the study has postulated that the post-Cold War decade in the 1990s was not conducive to a region-wide institution-building or “ripe for building a regional order” in Northeast Asia.
Contrary to the rhetoric of promise and expectation, the reality of “stunted regionalism” in Northeast Asia was due, among others, to the dynamic interplay of domestic political and economic forces and the leadership’s failure to live up to the rhetoric of their public utterance and empty promises.

East Asian international relations, unlike those in post-WWII Western Europe, were not conducive to harmonizing the on-going process of economic integration with the political decision of promoting regional institution-building. Despite the greater degree of economic interaction and interdependence of national economies of East Asia, the leadership of each East Asian country of Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan was too much preoccupied with the domestic politics and policy agenda of their national economies rather than to deepening the process of economic integration and interdependence.

This was not surprising in view of the fact that Asia has been in search of an identity, both individual and collective, and that the quest for meaningful identity continues in Asia as in Northeast Asia. True regionalism requires a sense of Asian collective identity that does not yet exist. That identity will also need to coexist with national identities, as is now the case in Europe.

In Asia, there are three major hurdles to overcoming on the road to this coexistence and building an East Asian regional order. Geography, history and culture are all elements that could stand in the way of regionalism and a cohesive Asian identity. Fortunately, there is some evidence of a pan-Asian pop culture or identity emerging, as witnessed by the recent popularity of Japanese manga throughout the region and the current popularity of Korean television serialized drama and movies. But there is also contention on the rewriting and reinterpretation of the historical episodes and memories. No one can deny that history does matter for the living. Still, despite considerable promises, the future will remain uncertain.

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My experience as a POSCO visiting fellow at the East-West Center has been positive and exhilarating, greatly enhancing an awareness of the vast array of problems and challenges, as well as the future options, confronting Asia and the Pacific in the area of “Politics, Governance, and Security.” I would like to use this opportunity to thank the staff, research fellows and administration for their kind efforts in furthering my research project.

ENDNOTES:

1 Rozman’s book carries a subtitle, “Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization.”

2 It was Max Weber who, as a pioneer in founding the modern social sciences, noted that human beings are motivated to action by “ideal and material interests.” In Weber’s (1946) famous “switchmen” metaphor: “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed.
by the dynamic of interest” (280). Therefore, interests are the engine of action, pushing it along, but ideas define the destinations human beings seek to reach and the means for getting there (Swidler, 1986: 274).

iii De Mesquita is one of the few political scientists belonging to a school which considers no differentiation between domestic politics and foreign policy for analytical purpose decision making. International and national politics, according to him, both stem from the common ground of “people’s power, preference and perception.” See: de Mesquita (2006) and de Mesquita et. al. (2003).

iv This topic will be discussed in depth subsequently as an analytical episode of the contemporary history and politics at the last section of this paper, under the topic of “Regionalism, Regionalization, and Regional Order,” and “Summary and Conclusion.”

v The first referenced item on Katzenstein (1997) is an introductory chapter to the second referenced item of co-edited book (Katzenstein and Shiraishi (1997)).


viii For an ARF Foreign Ministers meeting of July 28, 2006, in Malaysia, to address the issue of North Korea’s missile launching provocation, see the Summary and Conclusion section of this paper.

ix China’s influence in Central Asia has been on the rise since the launching of the SCO in 2001 (Chung, 2004: 989-1009).

x For a study of trying to draw lessons from the European integration that are applicable to the case of the Northeast Asian integration, see: Schmitter, Philip C. and Sunhyk Kim, “The Experience of European Integration and the Potential for Northeast Asian Integration” East-West Center Working Papers, No. 10, August 2005. Among 12 reflections on “theories and lessons” mentioned are: “interests, not identities” matter and the “core member states” should be “democracies (18, 20).

xi See: Katzenstein and Okawara (2003: 153-185). A plea for this new case for analytic eclecticism, excellent as it is, may suffer from “a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism,” as one observer has subsequently noted (Kang, 2003: 59).

xii Some skeptics and pessimists will say that the “democratic peace” proposition is not a theory but an ideology, so as to justify the U.S. George W. Bush Administration foreign policy and strategic objective of unilateralism and pre-emptive attack. The “democratic peace” proposition, however, was preceded by the Bush Administration term in office (2001-2009).

xiii From the perspective of new institutionalism, democracy can be seen as “a system in which parties lose elections” and “multiple political forces compete inside an institutional framework of uncertainty” (Prezeworski, 1991: 10-14).

xiv This varied definition of peace is taken from Young W. Kihl’s lecture notes on “Introduction to International Politics” at Iowa State University, 2003.

xv The following analysis is derived from my earlier argument. See: Kihl, 2005: 262-263.
Elsewhere I have undertaken similar analysis and explanation for regime change and democratization of Korea’s Sixth Republic, see: Kihl (2005): 262.

On the claims of the U.S. reliance on “democracy and double standards” that, at times, creates problems, see: Walt (2005: 95-100). “The U.S. acts hypocritically, applying different standards to its own conduct than it expects from others,” says Walt (95).

As for further elaboration of the theme of 3-Ps, also noted in the first section of this paper, see: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, _The Principles of World Politics: People’s Power, Preference, and Perception_. 3rd edition, Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly Press, 2006. Also, see: de Mesquita et. al. (2003).


Gilbert Rozman is a sociology professor at Princeton University. His earlier edited book, among many others, are on Japan, China, and Russia. Also, see: Rozman, 1991.

Also, on July 5, 2006, the day of North Korea’s missile test-firing, I ended up paying a visit to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, under construction, across the Western corridor of the DMZ. The party of three officials from North Korea, who I learned left Pyongyang in the morning, was not aware of this fact at the time of meeting our group from Seoul as of 9:30 a.m. local time.

For a timely and useful analysis of the waves of globalization in East Asia, especially for the “four global waves of the pre-modern era,” see: Dator, Pratt, and Seo, coeditors, especially chapter 16 (2006: 219-248).

Elsewhere I attempted to apply the similar perspective to explain the developmental path of South Korea’s search for modernization and democratization. See: Kihl, 2005: 311-314.

The Bush Administration imposed an economic sanction on several international financial institutions, including the Macao based Banco Delta Asia, for the charges of North Korean counterfeiting of the U.S. dollars (the so-called super notes) and the money laundering practices by the North Korean regime.


For my analysis of the 2+4 process of the Six Party Talks, see: Kihl, 2006: 245-267.

This and subsequent analysis is derived from Kihl, 2005: 337-339.

Evans, 2005: 196. Track II diplomacy on Northeast Asia security dialogue, including the North Korean nuclear standoff, is: Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and Council on Cooperation and Security in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). These bodies involve the individual experts from various countries including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea for the first one and also for the second (except North Korea).

REFERENCES:


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Rozman, Gilbert, “Regionalism in North East Asia: Korea’s Return to Center Stage.” In Armstrong et al., eds., *Korea at the Center*: 151-166.


An attempt is made to answer the questions, among others, of how the end of the Cold War and an on-going regional dynamics of rapid socio-economic changes are shaping and affecting the foreign policy agenda and institution-building in Northeast Asia. Although the focus is broad, in terms of identifying the factors and forces of regionalism in this era of globalization and complex interdependence, the sources of Dr. Kihl’s data are derived particularly from the latest security and foreign policy dynamics in the Korean Peninsula. Last week he returned from a week-long conference trip to Seoul, where he made a quick field visit to a site in North Korea, across from the corridor of the DMZ. Promoting inter-Korean relations and exchanges is an integral part of the Seoul Government foreign policy of “Peace and Prosperity.”

In answering his research questions the prepared paper proceeds in several steps: first, a statement of the research problems, a rationale and possible remedies, and formulation of testable propositions; second, a literature survey of the study of East Asian security and regionalism, with an analysis of selective inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) as a case study for comparative regionalism; third, a theoretical articulation of the logic for both institutional design and institution building for a workable regional order, that will promote “democratic peace” through a vibrant market economy. Dr. Kihl will complete the discussion with a summary and conclusion.

As for the methodology and approach, his paper makes a plea for going beyond “analytical eclecticism” of rethinking security in East Asia, toward an approach that may be characterized as “syncretistic,” as it aims to combine research traditions of using field observation and participatory analysis, such as conducting interviews and documentary reviews, with a clear set of theoretical concerns about comparative regionalism and regionalization in Asia and the Pacific.
Dr. Young Whan Kihl is a professor of political science at Iowa State University and a visiting POSCO Fellow at the EWC. He has published numerous books and over 200 articles concerning Korean and Northeast Asia affairs. His most recently published book is: North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (2006, Coeditor). He is a recent recipient of the 2005 Regents Faculty Excellence Award, from the State of Iowa, and the 2005 Global Korea Award, from Michigan State University. Kihl currently serves as editor-in-chief to International Journal of Korean Studies and contributing editor to Korea Journal (a publication of Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Seoul). Dr. Kihl can be reached directly at KihlY@EastWestCenter.org or by telephone at (808) 944-7244.