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## Towards a New Foreign Policy

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## Towards a New Foreign Policy

Renny Babiarz

The soft and weak overcome the hard and strong.

(*Lao Zi*)

(*Dadao Mei Diguo Zhuyi*, down with American imperialism)! Upon hearing the slogan “down with American imperialism,” most would likely imagine it connected in some way to the Middle East, given the current state of US foreign affairs. However, this particular quote comes from China during the Korean War, when China allied with North Korea and Mao Zedong stirred the general population into a patriotic fervor against the US as part of the Chinese war effort. Ironically, fifty years later it is within China that the US should be looking for examples of how to shape its foreign policy today.

China has changed over the past fifty years from being politically very anti-American to being much more open and economically interdependent with the US. These changes did not happen overnight; it was rather the result of a slow accumulation of economic, educational and cultural changes from within and exchanges without China. From macro-level economic policies and agreements between governments to the educational exchange program of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, China and the US depend upon one another to an extent unthinkable even fifty years ago. What happened to open China to the West so thoroughly since the death of Mao in 1976? How did China and the US, who were enemies during the Korean War, develop a relatively much closer relationship since then?

Such interdependence did not begin because the US threatened military action or economic sanction if China did not change. Instead of being coerced into change, there

was an attraction to these reforms at both the local and national level. In 1978 farmers in certain areas of China began independently redistributing land and founding entrepreneurial projects, and in 1979 Deng Xiaoping officially began the national “gaige kaifang” opening policy,<sup>1</sup> all without overt coercion from the international community. This suggests China’s reform policies are an example of the successful effects of what Joseph Nye defines as “soft power.” Soft power reflects the attractiveness of a country’s institutions, prosperity, and ideology that work to attract and shape the preferences and choices of other countries -in this case China- at the individual, local, and/or state level; it is often contrasted with hard power, which describes military or economic coercion.<sup>2</sup>

The relationship between China and the US helped to facilitate and shape China’s rapid economic, social and cultural changes over the last 25 years. This relationship is characterized more by an emphasis on trade, education and cultural exchanges, and less by military or economic coercion. It is this (continuing) successful interaction between the US and China, with emphasis upon the influence of soft power, that should be a model for how the US approaches its 21<sup>st</sup> century foreign relations policies. China shows us that soft power’s constructive engagement not only works, but its success within a radically different culture like China’s suggests that it could potentially be a model for other areas of the world troubling the US in years to come.

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<sup>1</sup> Zhou, Kate Xiao. *How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>2</sup> Interpreting China’s economic reforms in terms of international influences does not discount the important role of domestic politics in the development of these reforms. In fact, most scholarship on China’s economic reform policies interprets the adoption and early shape of these reforms in terms of Chinese domestic political forces precisely because there was not any overt pressure from outside China to force these changes. The logic seems to be that if there was no specific outside pressure, then internal pressures must be primary among influences of and causes for China’s reforms. See Moore, Thomas G. *China in the World Market*, (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 2, for more detail concerning international economic forces influencing the development of China’s economic reforms. The interplay of domestic and international forces upon the development of China’s economic reforms will be explored more fully later in the paper, as will the concepts of soft and hard power.

To explore this idea, first the concept of soft power will be defined in contrast to hard power. Next, this paper will generally describe the ways in which US soft power has worked within China over the last twenty years, including particular examples of educational exchanges. Finally, practical ways in which China can be used as a “training ground” for developing new soft power strategies are suggested as examples for developing US soft power in other parts of the world. The US should use China as a theoretical and practical model for enhancing the influence of its soft power through encouraging educational exchanges and economic development projects, which overall provides a more effective method for achieving US foreign policy objectives over the long-term.

### **Soft Power**

Soft power is often contrasted with hard power in descriptions of power relations between states, yet both methods are directed towards the same goal: the achievement of a change in state behavior towards a desired end. The hard/soft distinction does not itself indicate a particular kind of power, rather it comes from the way in which power is used and the ways in which outcomes are achieved. Hard power is any power that is used by a state to *coerce* a change in behavior, for example through military threat or economic inducement (sticks and carrots).<sup>3</sup>

Soft power, on the other hand, describes any power that *attracts* a change in behavior. A state can “obtain desired outcomes in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and

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<sup>3</sup> Nye Jr., Joseph, “The Velvet Hegemon,” *Foreign Policy*, Issue 136 (May 2003).

openness.”<sup>4</sup> Soft power is a more ambiguous concept than hard power because it arises as a reflection of a country’s values, it can be both within and without the domain of the state to control, and its ability to shape preferences tends to be associated with the intangible aspects of culture, institutions, and ideology.<sup>5</sup> For example, the US government’s establishment of the Peace Corps (now an institution) is an example of a state’s active encouragement of soft power, while Hollywood movies being watched around the globe is a cultural example of soft power’s working outside the domain of centralized control and promotion. These examples reflect active and passive dimensions of soft power; it can be actively promoted (i.e. Peace Corps initiatives that improve and inspire others), yet always passively exists, for good or ill (American culture always has some degree of presence without being actively promoted as such).<sup>6</sup> Soft power essentially reflects the ability of a country to indirectly frame the preferences of other countries without firing a shot; if I can attract you towards wanting what I want, then I do not have to force you to act the way I want.<sup>7</sup>

The problem with soft power, some say, “is that it’s, well, soft.”<sup>8</sup> It is all but impossible to quantify, and thus it can be difficult to concretely link soft power with particular effects.

This presents great difficulty in identifying and measuring soft power, yet it is only part of

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<sup>4</sup> Nye Jr., Joseph, “Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age,” In *Reordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11th*, edited by Mark Leonard, The Foreign Policy Centre, (March 2002). [Available WWW]: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/36.pdf> [July 23 2004].

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> This touches on a conceptual question that arises when considering how to develop soft power. Soft power is not coercive; that it attracts implies it is passive. Yet “enhance,” “develop,” and “promote” all are active verbs. How does one actively increase the effect of something that is passive? Is “enhancement” itself a form of coercion?

I believe that one key to this issue is choice. Actively promoting certain choices over others and working to expand the number of opportunities available without forcing the selection of any particular avenue is one way to actively enhance soft power-without being coercive. On the other hand, seeking to take the lead and set an example for others is a more passive way of enhancing soft power. Leading by example encourages others to follow-but does not entail coercing them to do so. In this way, enhancing soft power has both active and passive dimensions.

<sup>7</sup> Nye, Jr, Joseph S. “The Limits of US Power,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 117, issue 4 (Winter 2002/2003).

<sup>8</sup> Ferguson, Niall, “Power,” *Foreign Policy*, Issue 134 (Jan/Feb2003).

a broader current of immeasurable forces that nonetheless impact international relations in significant ways. While explaining the place of soft power within international relations theory in his article *Apocalypse Forever?*, William Tow notes that the structuralist approach in International Relations emphasizes the effects of unobservable and/or immeasurable phenomena that influence relations between states.<sup>9</sup> The observable yet immeasurable shared customs and mores of diplomatic communities and their impact upon negotiations between states is one example of such an influence.

Another criticism of soft power points out that American popular culture (the global presence of which reflects a degree of US soft power) does not always make people in other countries love the US.<sup>10</sup> However, this critique misses larger points. First, the “attractiveness” of a certain set of choices does not entail feelings of love for a particular country. Second, any such attractions are developed by a combination of influences, including ideology, institutions, and economic opportunities. To the extent that others in the world are attracted to sets of choices commonly identified with the US on the basis of any or all of these aspects is an indication of the influence of the United States’ soft power, and such attraction need not be based on love-practical utility will suffice.

More extreme critics downplay soft power altogether, arguing that using hard power to topple a dictator (for example, Saddam Hussein) will make other countries change out of fear of the US threat of reprisal. However, as Thomas Carothers explains,

the experience of recent decades shows that while the direct application of military force can certainly oust defiant dictators, military threats and bluster almost never do. While rapid regime change seemingly offers a quick fix for knotty problems, the U. S. government will still need to pursue sustained diplomatic solutions to its security problems, as well as to pursue a broad range

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<sup>9</sup> Tow, William T. “Apocalypse Forever?,” *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Volume 49, Number 3 (2003): 314-325.

<sup>10</sup> Ferguson, Niall. “Power,” *Foreign Policy*, Issue 134 (Jan/Feb2003).

of nuanced, nonmilitary efforts to empower the domestic opponents of hostile dictators over the longer term.<sup>11</sup>

As case in point, North Korea's dictator Kim Jong-Il remains in power after the rapid regime change in Iraq during March and April of 2003. Since the end of the Iraq war, North Korea has given the impression of having actually quickened its efforts at developing a nuclear weapon to counter the US threat of military force, rather than abandon the project in the face of such a threat.

### **Soft Power in China**

Soft and hard power refers to the powers of states influencing other states. However, it would be a mistake to view China's opening reforms as purely a product of state interaction with the West and US. The reforms themselves occurred within China, in the countryside, in cities, and numerous places in between; likewise, influences upon and causes of the reforms are just as numerous. Looking within the Chinese state for domestic conditions that led to reform, Kate Zhou emphasizes a bottom-up approach and identifies the industry and entrepreneurial spirit of farmers spontaneously reorganizing home and village modes of production as precursors of Deng Xiaoping's official naming of the rural *baochan daohu* (individual household production) reform system.<sup>12</sup> In a similar vein, but with an emphasis on politics, Lynn White focuses upon the influence of local government officials and their endorsement and support of local economic initiatives as precursors to official central government policy formulation.<sup>13</sup> Then there are the more centralized state approaches to understanding China's economic reforms, focusing upon the elite, or the effects of the Cultural Revolution upon

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<sup>11</sup> Carothers, Thomas. "Why Dictators aren't Dominoes," *Foreign Policy*, Issue 137 (July/August 2003): 59.

<sup>12</sup> Zhou, Kate Xiao. *How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>13</sup> White, III, Lynn T. *Unstately Power, Volume One*, (Armonk, New York; London, England: M. E. Sharp, 1999).

the elite, or the role of state institutions.<sup>14</sup> All of these approaches offer perspectives into real aspects of domestic Chinese culture and society from which the shape and structure of reforming China continues to emerge.

However, it is clear that international influences have been integral to China's economic and social changes as well. Professor Ren Donglai, a Nanjing University US-China relations expert, asserts that a major part of the process of reform in China actually began with China's opening to the outside world, and then reforming in reaction to subsequent international influences. On this basis, Professor Ren argues that the now ubiquitous Chinese phrase *gaige kaifang* (literally meaning "reform opening," \_\_\_ ) should be reversed to *kaifang gaige* ("opening reform," \_\_\_ ) to more accurately reflect this process of change within China during the 1980s.<sup>15</sup>

More specifically, in his book *China and the World Market*, Thomas Moore describes the influence of international markets upon China's growing participation within the world economy. Moore asserts "there is much about the changing nature of economic activity in China that can be understood as a function of its position in the international political economy," and on this basis he considers China's economic reform and development to follow a "global logic" that fits a pattern of behavior shaped by other countries with similar domestic conditions.<sup>16</sup> While many of China's reform policies were developed without direct foreign pressure on particular issues, this does not mean that these policies are only a consequence of domestic Chinese politics. A lack of direct foreign

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<sup>14</sup> These different approaches are outlined in: Zhou, Kate Xiao. *How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Ren Donglai, Professor of International Relations at Nanjing University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, China, 11/5/03.

<sup>16</sup> Moore, Thomas G. *China in the World Market*. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press 2002), pg. 44.

pressure does not discount the indirect influence of international forces in the development of key reform policies within China.<sup>17</sup>

If international forces contributed to ushering China's economic reforms, and these influences were not primarily coercive in nature, then this indicates that to some degree international forces attracted China towards certain choices and preferences regarding economic reforms. Further, by focusing upon US influence and dividing this into the two categories of either hard power or soft power, it becomes clear that soft power has been the greater influence over time. There have been instances of the US using hard power to try and coerce Chinese behavior; consider the annual debate regarding Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status in the US Congress from 1989-1999 and the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.<sup>18</sup> However, of the 11 times that the US Congress voted upon Most Favored Nation trade status for China, there was never a time when it did not pass.<sup>19</sup> Despite the constant threat of withdrawal, the MFN debate rarely had much impact upon US-China relations, as both countries understood it was in the United States' interest to renew it, especially as trade relations deepened into the 1990s. And while the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis certainly represents military coercion, this incident is an exception within the generally peaceful history of US-China relations since China's economic reform policies. Hard power coercion has occurred within US-China relations, but it has not been nearly as influential as soft power in attracting changes from within China.

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<sup>17</sup> Moore, Thomas G. *China in the World Market*. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press 2002), pg. 42

<sup>18</sup> MFN was granted to China in 1979, but after the 1989 Tiananmen incident China's MFN status was annually debated and voted upon in Congress from 1989 to 1999. After 1999 the US granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Ren Donglai, Professor of International Relations at Nanjing University and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, China, 11/05/03.

US soft power has worked both actively and passively in China. Simply by being the world's only superpower the US has passively attracted many Chinese to desire a relatively higher level of material wealth for themselves and a higher international status for their country.<sup>20</sup> However, soft power also works more actively within environments that promote knowledge and education; in order to be attracted to particular values and choices, people must first be exposed to them. Therefore one of the most important and obvious ways in which soft power is enhanced is through education and educational exchanges.

As the Chinese government has decided on a national level that English language competence is one of the keys to successfully competing in the global marketplace<sup>21</sup> and English language learning crazes have swept through various parts of the country,<sup>22</sup> a great deal of cultural exchange within China occurs in English classes at all levels of education (especially classes taught by foreign teachers). While economic development is the general motivation, it is the day-to-day contact in classrooms across China where real, tangible cultural and intellectual exchanges are made. Classrooms are the main conduits for the transmission of US ideology, culture, and institutional values within

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<sup>20</sup> The Phrase "to get rich is glorious" [*zhifu guangrong*; \_\_\_\_] is one of Deng Xiaoping's more famous quotes that has come to symbolize China's economic reform period. The open desire to encourage the improvement of China's material wealth was a huge ideological shift for the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s—a shift towards Western and US capitalist values that is still felt today, as market forces continue to erode Communist ideological principles and practices in China.

<sup>21</sup> This further reflects soft power at work in China: the wealth and institutions of more developed countries indirectly shape the choices for effective economic development, for example English language proficiency.

<sup>22</sup> This is not a recent phenomenon. That China is experiencing an "English language craze" (and has been for quite some time) is practically a given to any foreigner who has traveled or lived there. For a Chinese cultural view of this phenomenon, see "A Nation Hot for English," *China Today* (May 2002). [Available WWW]: <http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e20025/e.htm> [July 23 2004]; for a perspective from Chinese government media, see "China Becomes Biggest Market for English Learning," *People's Daily Online*, last updated September 27 2002. [Available WWW]: [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200209/27/eng20020927\\_103980.shtml#](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200209/27/eng20020927_103980.shtml#) [July 23 2004]; for a foreign (to China) point of view, see "Forget Keeping Fit, Learning English is the Latest Craze," *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 11<sup>th</sup> 2003. [Available WWW]: <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/01/10/1041990096582.html?oneclick=true> [July 23 2004].

China-this is where much of US soft power in China is developed, enhanced and experienced everyday.<sup>23</sup>

## **Education as Soft Power: China as a training ground for US Soft Power development**

### **From Theory...**

Thomas Molloy, a career English instructor serving first in the Peace Corps, then the Defense Language Institute English Language Center in San Antonio, asserts that English language training is one of the basic tools needed to project US soft power. He describes the process of learning American English as a basic introduction to American values, culture, and mindset, the understanding of which is part of a broader process of US soft power attracting people from different cultural backgrounds.<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that Molloy's perspective is based mostly upon his personal experience working as an educator for the US government, and he generally appeals for broadening government support for US government funded English language training programs.

Beyond personal appeals and experiences of individuals, a country's soft power can be more systematically enhanced when education and economic development projects are established that reflect the values of that particular country. Professor Kate Zhou of the

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<sup>23</sup> This conclusion is based upon my observations and personal experiences while living in China. During 1998-1999 I taught English at Fudan University in Shanghai, during which I observed firsthand both the English language craze sweeping Shanghai (and seemingly much of the rest of China as well) and experienced the ways in which teaching American English also transmits American culture, traditions and values. Of course, this teaching is accented by Chinese published (and approved) English textbooks. During 2002-2003 I was a student at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, and during our winter break I volunteered to participate in training Chinese English teachers in the countryside of northeast China (Feixian town in Shandong province). The English teachers we trained were brought together by the Amity Foundation from all over the surrounding Shandong province countryside. This left us with a strong, firsthand impression that learning English is important outside cities in China as well-something we believed already, but experienced firsthand in Feixian.

<sup>24</sup> Molloy, Thomas. "English Language Training as a Projection of Soft Power," *DISAM Journal* (Summer 2003).

University of Hawaii, for example, is independently developing the Education Advancement Fund International (EAFI), which seeks “to set up programs in rural minority areas in China to spread the ideas of free market economy by teaching rural kids about basic economics, the American Constitution, entrepreneurship, and the rule of law.”<sup>25</sup> This fund has allowed four schools and one college in the poor minority region of Jishou, Hunan to set up programs that provide a basic introduction to certain legal, political and economic values such as the rule of law, entrepreneurship, community development, Western culture, and free market enterprises. These broader cultural themes are part of a more concrete English language curriculum taught by the volunteer American English teachers that periodically teach in Jishou county schools.

Zhou is currently seeking to expand EAFI's programs to include an economic micro-finance development project for one of the villages in the Jishou region. This micro-finance project would seek to help poor people institutionalize their property for use as collateral towards small grants and loans, which could then be used to start small businesses. It is important to note that in this case micro-finance loans are intended to promote US soft power because of their immediate expansion of economic choices and the long-term impact they make in surrounding areas. After a loan is received and a business is started within a particular village, for example, surrounding areas are exposed to these ideas as well, and may wish to become candidates for such micro-loans themselves. Since no one would be forced to participate, this is not a form of economic coercion (i.e. not an example of hard power).<sup>26</sup> By promoting economic development through targeting micro-loans within the community, several goals are accomplished. First, students who go to another city to study would have new economic

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<sup>25</sup> Education Advancement Fund International Website, <http://www.yifei.org/new.html>, accessed 12/17/03.

<sup>26</sup> Thanks to Dr. Eric Harwit of the University of Hawaii at Manoa's Asian Studies department for his questions and comments on this point.

opportunities at home, providing a reason to return to their hometown; second, those exposed to US entrepreneurial values in the EAFI classroom would have an opportunity for practically applying these ideas; and finally, the project would serve as an education of property rights management for villagers.<sup>27</sup>

Both the English training and economic development EAFI projects provide a template for how to organize programs that can promote American soft power in other parts of the world. First, English language training is important as an end in itself towards expanding one's range of economic opportunities. Through attending English class, different styles and content are explored that naturally expose students and teachers to different ways of thinking about the world while shaping one another's goals and preferences. This training can then be utilized as a foundation for creating new projects, like the EAFI micro-finance economic development project. It is this foundation that has already been established by Kate Zhou in China's Hunan province that can be used as a training ground for developing other US soft power enhancing programs in other parts of the world.

### **...To Practice**

As mentioned above, a country's soft power can be systematically enhanced when education and economic development projects are established that reflect the values of that particular country. EAFI is one example of a non-profit organization that exposes Chinese students to US political and cultural values as it provides English education for these students, thus enhancing US soft power in Jishou County. This is a first step in establishing a basis for creating other kinds of locally based opportunities for students.

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with professor Kate Zhou, 10/06/03.

The costs of this first step is relatively very low; EAFI was started in 2002 with only the money required to pay for registering a non-profit organization-\$1,500-and a group of committed volunteers. Its first annual budget reached approximately \$100,000 and was raised mostly from Zhou's family and friends. This has funded volunteer English teacher's round trip travel costs to China; classroom space in Jishou; a small, local Chinese administration in Jishou; and a portion of Jishou officials' travel costs to visit the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii to recruit English teachers and begin the development of an exchange program between schools in Jishou county and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.<sup>28</sup>

EAFI's next project builds upon the first by beginning to attract micro-finance loans to Baojing village in Jishou county. This phase of development seeks to use existing local assets as collateral for attracting small-scale loans for beginning locally based entrepreneurial projects. The plan is based upon de Soto's thesis in his book The Myth of Capital, in which he turns the common view of economic development in poor countries on its head. For de'Soto, the issue at stake for poor countries seeking to develop economically is not simply gaining more capital; poor people in developing countries already have some amount of asset capital in the form of a dwelling or work equipment. However, these assets do not exist within a legal framework of title ownership; the key is finding a way to translate existing assets into a system of ownership that facilitates economic exchange, rather than raise more capital from outside. That is, the answer to the myth of capital lies not with the capital itself, but rather within the legal system of representation and common acceptance of asset capital transfer. Help develop the system, and the value of assets becomes exchangeable,

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<sup>28</sup> Telephone interview with Kate Zhou, 12/20/03.

thereby theoretically expanding economic opportunity to anyone with a claim to property.<sup>29</sup>

The projected EAFI micro-finance project seeks to experiment with this thesis in Baojing village. By using existing assets as collateral for small loans, villagers become educated in the basics of property exchanges and, more importantly, how property can be legally codified in a way used to generate additional capital. Then, by using generated capital to start small local businesses in Baojing village and Jishou county, a local economic infrastructure can be developed based upon basic property rights that protect and facilitate economic exchanges.

Both the education and economic development programs briefly described above reflect important strategies for enhancing US soft power in China at the local level. If the US supported these projects and others like them, this would ensure its soft power would develop in local, rural areas of China for years to come.<sup>30</sup> This would definitely positively influence China and US-China relations over the long-term, offering effective alternatives to hard power strategies between these two giant nations.

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<sup>29</sup> De Soto, Hernandez, *The Mystery of Capital, Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, (New York: Basic Books, c2000).

<sup>30</sup> One general criticism of advocating the teaching of US values and ideology and promoting economic development projects within other countries claims that this amounts to no more than a form of cultural imperialism. While this is generally an important issue to consider, in this instance whether or not a country's promotion of its soft power is imperialist in any way is not within the scope of this paper to address. Rather, given the facts of power relations between states, it is argued here that emphasizing soft power is simply more practical for achieving long-term US foreign policy goals.

## **Conclusion: The Importance of Soft Power**

The US is currently utilizing hard power to implement its foreign policy objectives, from military force in Afghanistan and Iraq<sup>31</sup> to providing economic incentives to allies such as Poland who support US policies.<sup>32</sup> However, the US is simply not powerful enough to militarily dominate the entire Middle East,<sup>33</sup> and carrying out unilateral military actions anywhere else in the world will continue to seriously undermine US international credibility and undercut its soft power. In fact, already there is considerable evidence that the new unilateralists' policies tend to squander U.S. soft power. Before the war, a Pew Charitable Trust poll found that U.S. policies (not American culture) led to less favorable attitudes toward the United States over the past two years in 19 of 27 countries, including the Islamic countries so crucial to the prosecution of the war on terrorism. Other polls showed an average drop of 30 points in the popularity of the United States in major European countries.<sup>34</sup>

If fighting terrorism is a top priority guiding US foreign policy, and occupying all countries posing a possible terrorist related threat to the US is not feasible, then approaches to fighting the spread of terrorism alternative to military occupation must be developed. However, current 'hard power' policies are actually closing several such 'soft power' alternatives to fighting terrorism internationally. By focusing almost exclusively on hard power now, the US guarantees that in the future coercion will be the only viable

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<sup>31</sup> See Andrew Tyrie's article for an interesting discussion on the current direction of US foreign policy in general, and its effects on international relations in particular (Tyrie, Andrew, "The Axis of Anarchy: Britain, America and the New World Order after Iraq," The Foreign Policy Centre, The Bow Group (March 2003). [Available WWW]: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/80.pdf> [July 23 2004].

<sup>32</sup> "International Business; Lockheed Wins Huge Sale to Poland with Complex Deal," *New York Times*, April 19<sup>th</sup> 2003, Business Financial Desk.

<sup>33</sup> Tyrie, Andrew, "The Axis of Anarchy: Britain, America and the New World Order after Iraq," The Foreign Policy Centre, The Bow Group (March 2003):12. [Available WWW]: <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/80.pdf> [July 23 2004].

<sup>34</sup> Nye Jr, Joseph S, "US power and Strategy after Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, number 4 (July/August 2003).

alternative, as many countries (and individuals within those countries) will have already been repulsed from (rather than attracted to) the US position.

Using violence and coercion (hard power) to root out terrorism not only damages the attractiveness and efficacy of US ideology and institutions internationally, it also feeds and guarantees terrorism's long-term growth.<sup>35</sup> To some degree,

the political ideologies of exclusive nationalism or religious communalism are generated through violence. It is generally assumed that extreme ideologies, based on exclusive identities-Serb nationalism, for example, or fundamentalist Islam-are the cause of war. Rather, the spread and strengthening of these ideologies are the consequences of war. 'The war had to be so bloody,' Bosnians will tell you, 'because we did not hate each other; we had to be *taught* to hate each other.'<sup>36</sup>

If people can be taught to hate, they can also be taught to tolerate. This is precisely why education and economic development should be the long-term strategy bound within the current shorter term military activities of the US's self described 'War on Terror.' China provides a good example of the effects of such long-term, soft power engagement policies, and as such can serve as a model for developing future US foreign policies. By observing the China of today, the US can find strategies for more effectively shaping its foreign policy to provide a long-term legacy for generations to come.

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<sup>35</sup> Consider the following: "Israel's senior military commander told columnists for three leading newspapers this week that Israel's military tactics against the Palestinian population were too repressive and were fomenting explosive levels of "hatred and terrorism" that might become impossible to control." "Top Israeli Officer says Tactics are Backfiring," *Washington Post*, October 31<sup>st</sup> 2003, Foreign Service, page A01.

<sup>36</sup> Mary Kudor, "The Power of Terror," In *Reordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11th*, edited by Mark Leonard, (The Foreign Policy Centre, March 2002), pg. 25 [italics added by author]. [Available WWW] <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/36.pdf> [July 23 2004].

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