OFFICE/DEPARTMENT
By Denny Roy
Senior Fellow
This commentary first appeared in The Honolulu Star-Advertiser on Feb. 25, 2024.
President-elect Lai Ching-te’s victory in Taiwan’s recent elections means the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, which opposes unification with China, will hold the presidency for a third consecutive term. China considers Lai even more of a “separatist” than outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, which has prompted heightened speculation about whether Beijing might attempt to forcibly annex the island, which would probably result in a US-China war. Nevertheless, a Taiwan Strait war appears very unlikely in the short term for several reasons.
Beijing has signaled that it wants to improve China-US relations, despite the events that drove the relationship to a low point in 2022 - 2023. The Chinese government was largely reacting then to what it considered provocative US actions, such as Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Tsai’s meeting with Pelosi’s successor Kevin McCarthy in the US, and US President Joe Biden calling Chinese leader Xi Jinping a “dictator.” But China clearly hoped the Xi-Biden summit in November would halt the decline. Prior to their meeting, China’s domestic media reversed course and spoke favorably of the USA, leaving many Chinese citizens bewildered.
Although many US commentators assert that Xi has already made the decision to use military force, with some predicting the date of the attack as sometime between 2025 and 2035, China in fact is not yet committed to going to war over Taiwan. During his summit with Biden, Xi seemed worried that Americans are assuming war is inevitable, and he reportedly said China has no plans to take military action against Taiwan within that time frame.
True, Xi has said the People’s Liberation Army should be able to carry out missions such as conquering Taiwan by 2027, which is the army’s 100th anniversary. He has also said China should be unified by 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic. But this is insufficient evidence that he has set a deadline for using force against Taiwan. If he had such a deadline, he would be saying so clearly and often to ensure that all parts of the Chinese state were preparing to fulfill his orders.
Serious weaknesses in the Chinese economy became apparent during the last year, and external conditions are making the situation worse. Foreign investment has plunged, and “de-risking” by trade partners is orienting substantial economic activity away from China.
Even in the best of times, a Taiwan Strait war could cause serious economic turmoil within China by disrupting trade, triggering foreign economic sanctions, and subjecting China to an embargo of its seaborne oil imports. The resulting social upheaval could threaten Xi’s hold on political power. In traditional Chinese strategic culture, internal weakness amplifies external danger, and a period of economic downturn is an especially bad time to start a war.
The Chinese government’s reaction to the Taiwan election was surprisingly calm. While Beijing detests Lai, Chinese commentary emphasized aspects of the outcome favorable to China. Lai got only 40 percent of the vote, a weak mandate, and the DPP lost its majority in the legislature. Had there not been an unusually strong third-party candidate, victory might have gone to the Kuomintang (China Nationalist Party) candidate, who took the position that Taiwan is part of China. This is enough to give Chinese observers hope that momentum for Taiwan independence is slowing, which removes any immediate need for war.
Beijing will give the new president a chance before he takes office in May. China will continue to pressure Taiwan militarily, economically and diplomatically—not as a preparation for attack, but to persuade Lai to say during his inauguration speech the words Beijing wants to hear: that Taiwan is in principle part of “China.” There is almost no chance Lai will do this, but in the meantime Taiwan gets nearly half a year of guaranteed peace. With conflicts ongoing in Ukraine and Gaza and tensions increasing on the Korean Peninsula, even temporary stability across the Taiwan Strait is welcome.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent institutional positions or policies of the East-West Center.
Image: President-elect Lai Ching-te (left) celebrates victory at an election-day rally. Photo by Annabelle Chih/Getty Images
By Denny Roy
Senior Fellow
This commentary first appeared in The Honolulu Star-Advertiser on Feb. 25, 2024.
President-elect Lai Ching-te’s victory in Taiwan’s recent elections means the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, which opposes unification with China, will hold the presidency for a third consecutive term. China considers Lai even more of a “separatist” than outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, which has prompted heightened speculation about whether Beijing might attempt to forcibly annex the island, which would probably result in a US-China war. Nevertheless, a Taiwan Strait war appears very unlikely in the short term for several reasons.
Beijing has signaled that it wants to improve China-US relations, despite the events that drove the relationship to a low point in 2022 - 2023. The Chinese government was largely reacting then to what it considered provocative US actions, such as Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Tsai’s meeting with Pelosi’s successor Kevin McCarthy in the US, and US President Joe Biden calling Chinese leader Xi Jinping a “dictator.” But China clearly hoped the Xi-Biden summit in November would halt the decline. Prior to their meeting, China’s domestic media reversed course and spoke favorably of the USA, leaving many Chinese citizens bewildered.
Although many US commentators assert that Xi has already made the decision to use military force, with some predicting the date of the attack as sometime between 2025 and 2035, China in fact is not yet committed to going to war over Taiwan. During his summit with Biden, Xi seemed worried that Americans are assuming war is inevitable, and he reportedly said China has no plans to take military action against Taiwan within that time frame.
True, Xi has said the People’s Liberation Army should be able to carry out missions such as conquering Taiwan by 2027, which is the army’s 100th anniversary. He has also said China should be unified by 2049, which is the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic. But this is insufficient evidence that he has set a deadline for using force against Taiwan. If he had such a deadline, he would be saying so clearly and often to ensure that all parts of the Chinese state were preparing to fulfill his orders.
Serious weaknesses in the Chinese economy became apparent during the last year, and external conditions are making the situation worse. Foreign investment has plunged, and “de-risking” by trade partners is orienting substantial economic activity away from China.
Even in the best of times, a Taiwan Strait war could cause serious economic turmoil within China by disrupting trade, triggering foreign economic sanctions, and subjecting China to an embargo of its seaborne oil imports. The resulting social upheaval could threaten Xi’s hold on political power. In traditional Chinese strategic culture, internal weakness amplifies external danger, and a period of economic downturn is an especially bad time to start a war.
The Chinese government’s reaction to the Taiwan election was surprisingly calm. While Beijing detests Lai, Chinese commentary emphasized aspects of the outcome favorable to China. Lai got only 40 percent of the vote, a weak mandate, and the DPP lost its majority in the legislature. Had there not been an unusually strong third-party candidate, victory might have gone to the Kuomintang (China Nationalist Party) candidate, who took the position that Taiwan is part of China. This is enough to give Chinese observers hope that momentum for Taiwan independence is slowing, which removes any immediate need for war.
Beijing will give the new president a chance before he takes office in May. China will continue to pressure Taiwan militarily, economically and diplomatically—not as a preparation for attack, but to persuade Lai to say during his inauguration speech the words Beijing wants to hear: that Taiwan is in principle part of “China.” There is almost no chance Lai will do this, but in the meantime Taiwan gets nearly half a year of guaranteed peace. With conflicts ongoing in Ukraine and Gaza and tensions increasing on the Korean Peninsula, even temporary stability across the Taiwan Strait is welcome.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent institutional positions or policies of the East-West Center.
Image: President-elect Lai Ching-te (left) celebrates victory at an election-day rally. Photo by Annabelle Chih/Getty Images
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